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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
The study discusses two distinct ethnic groups, which compete for resources and engage in 
ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, they share territory, have commonalities and are 
complementary. The study elucidates these discursive social forms to redefine interethnic 
coexistence.   
 
1.1   Background information  
 
„Coexistence‟ is a concept that can easily take centre stage in contemporary socio-political 
debates. Whether one wants to make sense of Huntington‟s (1996) “clash of civilizations”, the 
religious and ethnic conflicts in India, Indonesia, Nigeria and the Sudan or the juxtaposition of 
a market economy with communism in China, „coexistence‟ comes to mind. The concept, as 
indicated above, is a multidimensional one that encompasses contradictions and 
inconsistencies in human interactions. The study examines ethnic groups that live side by side, 
recognise themselves as distinct and are externally recognised as such. Although they are 
rivals, have strained relations and compete for scarce resources, they are also complementary 
and interdependent. Besides, this complex relationship is examined within the context of an 
influential and an ambivalent state.
1
  
In Africa, Kenya takes pride in being one of the most stable, peaceful and fairly prosperous 
multiethnic states in the conflict-prone continent. And this notion is not unfounded. Kenya has 
indeed remained quite stable in the midst of turmoil in the neighbouring states. Even limiting 
oneself to Kenya‟s immediate neighbours like Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, one can 
see that all have at one time or another experienced ethnic conflict, civil war and military 
dictatorships. For this reason, Kenya has been one of the key and strategic hosts to the large 
number of fleeing groups (refugees). Moreover, ethnic conflict and turmoil have been 
witnessed in many other states. From the Rwandan and Burundian ethnic cleansing and 
genocide, the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, recurring ethnic tensions in Nigeria, 
to the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, Africa has had more than its fair share of ethnic 
tensions and conflict, war and instability. And yet, the problem does not seem to be anchored  
                                                          
1
 In the study, „state‟ and „government‟ will often be used interchangeably. Empirically, I had problems drawing 
a clear distinction between the two. Although a state will ordinarily be more enduring than a government or a 
regime, it has been noted that in the vast majority of African countries, these entities are closely intertwined and 
not easily disentangled (Villalon, 1998: 9).  
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on the degree of homogeneity in these states. Conflict and turmoil have been witnessed in 
what would pass as “true nation states” like Somalia (Abdullahi, 1998; Schlee 2001, 2002), 
bi- or tri-ethnic states like Rwanda and Burundi where groups share one language and a long 
history of living together, to diverse multiethnic countries like Ethiopia (Triulzi, 1996), 
implying that ethnic conflict in Africa has never been reducible to simplistic categories like 
„sameness and peaceful coexistence‟ or „ethnic diversity and conflict‟. The internal dynamics 
that explicate why some states have escaped ethnic conflict, genocide and political instability 
require careful scholarly scrutiny. This study therefore is partly about how the crises 
witnessed elsewhere have been avoided in Kenya in general, and between the Kamba and the 
Maasai groups in particular. These two groups with linguistic and cultural distinctions, share a 
volatile and fluid political border, have fairly distinct modes of subsistence, and invariably 
compete for regional and national resources and political power. They often resort to armed 
but „controlled‟ conflict, form political alliances, are engaged in social and economic 
exchanges and also have certain commonalities or seek common identities. Let me begin by 
giving a brief description of these groups. 
 
1.2   The Kamba and the Maasai: An overview 
 
The Kamba are a Bantu-speaking and farming group, while the Maasai are part of the Eastern 
Nilotes, formerly called Nilo-Hamites, and are predominantly pastoral. Throughout history 
however, there have been pastoral and non-pastoral Maa-speaking peoples. I do not wish to 
delve into an already well documented discourse regarding how Maa-speakers have shifted 
their identities and economy through out history (see Jacobs, 1975; Galaty, 1982; Kituyi, 1990; 
Spear and Waller, 1993). In terms of social organisation, the Maasai divide into many 
subgroups or sections spread over Kenya and Tanzania. These include, (Il)-Purko, Samburu, 
Loitai, Waasin-Kishu, Loitokitani, Loodokilani, Matapato, Keekonyokie and Kaputiei (see 
Sankan, 1971; Berg-Schlosser, 1984; Kituyi, 1990; Sommer and Vossen, 1993).  
In the course of my study, I interacted mostly with the Ilkaputiei (Kaputiei) Maasai who live 
mainly in Kajiado administrative district bordering Ukambani (“Kambaland”) to the west. The 
political border between the two groups, physically marked by a railway line that connects the 
cities of Nairobi and Mombasa, stands as an interface of social, cultural, economic and 
political continuities and discontinuities. This line is often portrayed as representing a 
boundary, across which ethnic identities and social relations do not neatly mesh. This aspect is 
expounded on in chapter six. 
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Though the Kamba generally consider themselves to be one mbai (“ethnic group”), there are 
historical, cultural and dialectical differences between the “Kamba of Kitui” and the “Kamba 
of Masaku” and others within these broad inclusive categories. Created by the British colonial 
masters in the early 20
th
 century, Kitui and Machakos (Masaku)
2
 districts were up to as recent 
as late 1980‟s the two administrative areas for the Kamba people. It is worth noting here that, 
while to a large extent the Maasai sections and clans live in designated territorial areas, 
Kamba clans on the other hand are largely mixed, owing to a long history of vibrant internal 
migration. Although the population census of 1999 was supposedly manipulated, it is 
estimated that there are about 3 million people whose first language is Kikamba and who 
recognise themselves as Kamba. The Maasai on the other hand number 584,488 according to 
the same census. The „politics of numbers‟ and its influence on Kenya‟s multiethnic stability 
is taken up for discussion in chapter seven. 
The Kaputiei Maasai, like many other Maasai sections, are emerging from a predominantly 
pastoral economy, and like the rest of their counterparts, are undergoing fast social 
transformation. Kituyi (1990) and Holland (1996) present the Maasai as a group under 
pressure from the state to transform itself. The fact that the Maasai have taken up farming and 
have been gradually integrated into the monetary economy has meant that the dichotomy, 
often said to characterise how they compare with the Kamba, has become conceptually and 
empirically misleading. Nevertheless, the Maasai are said to represent the “the highest degree 
of pastoral specialisation among Eastern Sudanic-speaking peoples”. 3  It is partly this 
“specialisation” in pastoralism that sets the arena 4  in which interethnic relations and 
exchanges between them and their mainly agricultural neighbours can be discussed. Generally, 
the Maasai are torn between embracing modernisation at the expense of sacrificing certain 
traditional institutions and practices and retaining their heritage. And although much of the 
credit in the transformation process has been given to the state, the political pressure 
notwithstanding, an internal comparative need to compete and „catch up‟ with their 
neighbouring and migrant groups living in their territory cannot be underrated. Indeed, Rajah 
(1990:110) warns against giving too much emphasis or attention to the role played by the state 
in social transformation processes.  
It should be stressed however that while the Maasai today may have their agricultural 
neighbours as models, this is quite a recent development and swapping of roles, for these 
                                                          
2
 “Machakos” was the British version of Masaku. 
3
 See Galaty (1993: 62). 
4
 “Arena” in the study is used  in Long‟s sense: As social encounters or situations in which contests over issues, 
resources, values, and representations take place (1997: 6; 2000: 191). 
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groups (e.g. Kamba and Kikuyu), used to imitate the Maasai in the past. What is more, despite 
the disparities in social transformation, there are still many similarities between the Kamba 
and the Maasai. In both groups, for instance, kinship ties are very strong and in most cases, 
form the basis for social organisation and social networks. But in terms of comparison, the 
Maasai have more in common with the Kikuyu with whom they have had a long history of 
intermarriage and cultural diffusion (Middleton and Kershaw, 1972: 60-64).  
One of the most striking differences between the Kamba and the Maasai is in the literature. 
Unlike the Kamba, the Maasai have been studied intensively and extensively by ethnologists 
and historians due to, inter alia, their fascinating history, unique cultural heritage, their 
portrayal as exotic and an interesting resilience of old traditional practices which seem to have 
withstood the test of time. Besides, the Maasai have also attracted scholarly attention because 
of their unparalleled resistance to British rule, alienation of their land, the post colonial 
challenges they have faced and the attempts made by the state to integrate them into the 
„mainstream‟ economic, social and political life. In anthropological research however, there 
has been a shift from what used to be labelled as „uncivilised‟ or exotic non-western groups 
like the Maasai of East Africa to a more general concern with the “heterogeneity of all 
societies” (Jenkins 1997: 18).  
 
1.3   Purpose and significance of the study 
 
The significance of this study is seen both on a theoretical as well as on a methodological 
level: It seeks not only to fill certain gaps in theory and knowledge but also make a 
contribution on how knowledge is generated. The dominant discourse tends to present groups 
that are distinguished by descent, language and cultural practices as more likely to be 
conflictual, divergent and to pursue parallel interests (Gutkind, 1970). In Africa, this approach 
has been used to explain the prevalence of ethnic conflicts, instability of states and 
underdevelopment. Such a discourse is shared by scholars, the media and individual actors. In 
fact, as I began my fieldwork, a local administrator said that there was “nothing” to say about 
the Kamba and the Maasai except that both groups are “enemies” and “have nothing in 
common”. Such emic comments influenced the title adopted for this study.  
There is no need to belabour the point that much of the phenomena in African reality would 
be difficult to comprehend without taking the ethnic factor into account. It transcends and 
defines social structures and political relations. Even in Tanzania, one of the most cohesive 
states in Africa, and where overt ethnic conflicts have been rare, the Maasai complain of being 
despised, demeaned and marginalised.  
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Most of the studies conducted in multiethnic African states have tended to focus on 
disharmony, particularly in as far as it threatens the existence of the nation state. Besides, 
there has also been a tendency to focus on those cases where disorder has captured the world‟s 
attention. Even Horowitz notes that he looks at groups that are “relatively large and therefore 
interact at the centre of politics rather than in isolated local pockets” (1985: 17), creating the 
impression that those groups that constitute “local pockets” should be of less scholarly interest. 
He admits however that there are many “less dramatic manifestations” of conflict in the 
world.
5
 And while Horowitz tells us why we should concentrate on “large” groups, Jenkins 
reiterates that anthropologists have concentrated more on minority rather than majority 
ethnicities (1997: 49). My study strikes a balance, by looking at how „small‟ and „big‟ ethnic 
groups interact. 
During a doctoral colloquium at the University of Bielefeld in November 1998, Prof. Günther 
Schlee remarked that many scholars have pursued the objective of trying to unveil reasons 
behind the many ethnic conflicts in Africa and the failure, or miserable performance of the 
state. Taking into account the multiethnic nature of African states and the artificial national 
borders, he reasoned, what should perhaps preoccupy scholars is how stable states have been 
possible at all. This study partly responds to this challenge. In chapter seven, I discuss how 
ethnic politics in Kenya have been organised to produce one of the most stable countries in 
Africa. By so doing, the study addresses one of the pertinent issues and challenges to state 
formation in multiethnic societies in Africa, namely what keeps even hostile and differentiated 
groups together, making stable multiethnic states possible. There is recognition that even as 
transnational boundaries and communities gain prominence in academic discourse, the 
boundaries within states have not diminished in significance, for they not only shape the 
international boundaries but are also equally contested and redefined, and are sources of 
conflicts and often destabilise the state itself. Besides, as evident from the 1980‟s, more 
conflicts are being witnessed within rather than between nation states. Writing on South Asian 
groups, Wijeyewardene (1990) stresses that ethnicity should be analysed “at the local 
community level”. 
But on the other hand, although there is enough evidence to suggest that the Maasai and the 
Kamba have had strained relations (Ndolo, 1989; Sobania, 1993), this is not merely a study on 
ethnic conflict. And yet, considering the ever shifting contexts and magnitudes, it would be 
naive to say that  there are enough books on ethnic conflict on our shelves. And whereas there 
is every reason to devote enormous resources and time in analysing the social and political 
                                                          
5
 Horowitz, (1985: 3). 
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constellations that lead to conflict (Wimmer, 1997b), and to find explanations for the ethnic 
conflicts around the world, it is equally important to highlight how these tensions and conflict 
situations are pre-empted, avoided and precluded in other settings, despite the contested 
borders, competition for power, heightened degree of ethnic differences and external 
instigation.  
There seems to be more explanations as to what keeps groups apart than what keeps them 
together. Horowitz (1985) concedes this by noting that scholars seem not to be ready to spill 
the ink before blood has been spilled, and that we have “enough data on ethnicity” but what 
we perhaps lack are explanations, and I think, contexts. Although there is agreement that 
ethnic conflict predicated on primordial grounds is a “myth”, to quote Crawford and 
Lipschultz (1998), there is also consensus that causes of ethnic conflicts are never obvious. 
And if causes of interethnic conflict are unclear, it would be theoretically and empirically 
interesting to find out what keeps potentially hostile groups peaceful. This study aims at 
making a contribution in this regard by looking at how ethnic groups live harmoniously in 
spite of differences and diversity.  
Considering that Kenya hosts a wide diversity of Cushitic, Nilotic and Bantu peoples that 
divide into about 42 ethnic groups,
6
 interethnic coexistence in Kenya should arouse curiosity 
and close scholarly analysis. Nevertheless, Kenya has had its share of conflict. In fact, if all 
lives lost during ethnic clashes since as recent as 1990 were to be lost at once, it would look 
like a massacre of international proportions. But since these conflicts are intermittent and far 
between, they have not threatened state stability. The study expounds on this in chapters six 
and seven. 
With regard to the Maasai, it is important to note that whereas they have been studied widely, 
there are still gaps in knowledge, as scholars keep on raising new dimensions of their identity, 
social organisation and transformation and their interactions with other groups and the state. 
The crucial role played by the state in either enhancing this harmony or disrupting it in the 
course of “nation building” 7 and quest for cohesion is therefore explored. Of major 
significance also is how the state is shaped and influenced by the competing groups.  
                                                          
6
 Some ethnic categories like Kalenjin and Luhya are too inclusive, lumping together groups that recognise 
themselves as bearing distinct identities. On the other hand, others are recognised as distinct though closely 
related to others. For instance, at least politically, the Samburu (Ilsampur) and Njemps, are categorised and 
recognised as distinct from the Maasai, although they are not only Maa-speakers but also have similarities in 
their cultural practices.   
7
 In the dissertation, double quotation marks are used to show that the researcher is quoting either an author or a 
respondent, while single quotation marks apply to words or phrases that I am using but not necessarily in their 
conventional meaning. I use italics if I am quoting words or expressions written in the same form by authors, 
when writing the names of books or to place special emphasis on words. 
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Whereas the prominence of the Maasai in literature is in no doubt, as noted, I do not wish to 
create the impression that ethnological studies have not been carried out among the Kamba. 
From the earliest accounts by missionary Ludwig Krapf around 1860, Richard Lindblom 
(1920), Kivuitu Ndeti (1972), John Middleton and Greet Kershaw (1972), Berg-Schlosser 
(1984) to Donald Ndolo (1989), there is a sizeable body of ethnological data. Looking at the 
dynamics of social change in his doctorate thesis (Universität Bayreuth), Ndolo, wrote one of 
the most comprehensive documents on the contemporary Kamba society. Nevertheless, 
reading books and articles written on the Kamba and the Maasai, one notices that very little, if 
anything, is said about how the two groups interact. And those who do (e.g. Ndolo and 
Middleton and Kershaw), only highlight conflicts. Further justification for this study rests on 
the fact that in general, most ethnological studies are rarely relational, ignoring the interface 
between ethnic groups. Some of those done among the Kamba and the Maasai have either 
looked at the groups separately (e.g. Berg-Schlosser, 1984), or focussed on Maasai‟s 
linguistically related groups (Berntsen, 1976; Kituyi, 1990; Spear and Waller, 1993). Besides, 
where cattle raids have been rampant, they have usually involved two or more pastoral groups; 
rarely does the case involve a pastoral and an agricultural one.
8
 The study shows how various 
modes of subsistence and diversity of cultural practices provide a perfect fit among two 
groups living in a fragile environment. 
The study is equally deemed significant for its application of „coexistence‟. While natural 
scientists (e.g. Pontin, 1982), historians (e.g. Davies, 1987; Strandling et al., 1997), political 
economists (e.g. Aubey, 1961) and diplomacy and peace studies (e.g. Kriesberg, 1998) have 
used this concept widely, it has not found wider application among sociologists and social 
anthropologists. And among some of those who have, for example, Torstrick (2000) or the 
Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, “coexistence” is taken as synonymous with the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis on the one hand, and as a policy rather than a theoretical concept on the 
other. This study seeks to elucidate not only the conceptual and empirical contexts but also the 
processes through which the concept is constructed and modified.  
Last but not least is the methodology. The study has largely adopted an interface approach and 
the actor-oriented approach in the generation and analysis of data. It looks at the 
discontinuities and discrepancies in the social life of two groups whose “life-worlds” intersect 
through actors and are shaped by external agents (see Long, 1989, 1992; Giddens 1984). It is 
an approach that looks at the researched (actors) as knowledgeable, calculating, capable, and 
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 In Kenya, exceptional cases have been among the Kamba and the Maasai, the Kisii and the Maasai, the 
Pokomo and the Orma along the coastal zone or intra-ethnic raids e.g. within the Maasai sections or across clans 
among the Kuria of Nyanza (western Kenya). 
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not necessarily pursuing collective pursuits but acting as principal contacts between different 
levels of social order. Investigations are based on “actor defined issues” or “critical events” 
(Long, 1997, 2000). The “interfaces” here include ethnic and territorial boundaries as well as 
how both groups relate with state authorities. „Coexistence‟ is seen as resulting from the 
interactions, calculations, negotiations, struggles and manipulations between special social 
actors representing groups or the state. The study presents actors in varying situations and 
how they make sense of their daily life with regard to their neighbours, local resources, inter-
regional as well as national trends. Through a combination of narrative, case history, 
biographies, open-ended interviews, and participant observation, the dissertation brings out 
the complexes in this „tripartite‟ relationship. The study is therefore seen as an interactional 
process between two groups on the one hand, and state authorities and other groups on the 
other, to shape the reality in which they live. 
 
1.4   Organisation of the thesis 
 
The dissertation is presented in eight chapters. In chapter one, I introduce the readers to some 
ideas on African ethnicity in general and Kenya‟s in particular. I have presented an overview 
of the groups under study (the Maasai and the Kamba), that is, social organisation, 
transformation processes, modes of subsistence, territorial areas and how they are placed 
within the Kenyan multiethnic state. Since this chapter is only introductory, these themes are 
taken up for further discussion in subsequent chapters. The introductory part also provides 
insights into the basic ideas and theory that guided field research and study. Besides, the 
section gives a brief review of studies that have been done on this subject, the gaps in 
knowledge which this study seeks to fill or bridge, as well as what aroused the researcher‟s 
interest to conduct the study. 
The first part of chapter two takes the reader to some of the main concepts used in the study. It 
begins by presenting various definitions of ethnicity and the debate that surrounds this concept: 
The primordial and the constructionist approach. An attempt is made to relate this debate to 
some of the empirical findings. Besides, the concept of coexistence is dicussed, setting the 
stage upon which the core debate in the thesis rests. The general objective is to show how 
these concepts have been utilised and defined previously, and more importantly, to enable the 
reader see how my study is embedded in these wider theoretical frameworks in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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The second part of the chapter discusses data assembling. It presents the process through 
which the researcher entered the “life-worlds” of the researched, showing the centrality of the 
actor in the study, how research partners were recruited, who was interviewed and why, the 
methods of social inquiry, the site of field research as well as the social, economic and 
political conditions under which the inquiry was conducted. Moreover, the researcher‟s social 
position and ethnic identity are discussed to give a glimpse of how these attributes shaped the 
research process and the data assembled. The fieldwork experience shows how actors made 
sense of their ethnic identity, difference and commonalities through the researcher. The 
challenges encountered during fieldwork are discussed at the end. 
Chapters three and four take up the issue of ethnic difference raised in chapter two. The 
Kamba and the Maasai have a rich body of stereotypes through which they define their ethnic 
identity, difference, modes of subsistence and morality. In these two chapters, I identify the 
actors, a step which is a basic requirement in a study on „coexistence‟. The chapters show that 
ethnic groups have a “passion for difference” 9  to the extent that group members invent 
differences to maintain ethnic boundaries. While chapter three looks at how the Maasai are 
depicted by the Kamba, chapter four looks at the Kamba from a Maasai perspective. In both 
chapters, it is argued that ethnic difference and maintenance of ethnic boundaries assume a lot 
of significance among groups that live side by side. In other words, „coexistence‟ is about 
ethnic distinction. To say that two groups „coexist‟, means that they can be distinguished. 
These two chapters therefore show how the Kamba and the Maasai distinguish themselves 
from each other. In addition, the section also discusses some of the commonalities between 
the two groups. In as much as coexistence is about distinction, there are necessary points of 
convergence among groups that share territorial space.  
Chapter five discusses complementarity and interdependence between the Kamba and the 
Maasai. Interethnic coexistence, it is argued here, is not just about difference and distinction 
but also about the social and economic exchanges that take place between groups. Without 
exchanges between groups, it would be difficult to say that they „coexist‟. It is these mutual 
exchanges, to put it simply, that keep distinct groups together. The chapter therefore shows 
how the two groups depend on each other to sustain their livelihoods. While some of the 
commodities of exchange are based on ecological differences and modes of subsistence (e.g. 
cattle, milk, maize and beans), other exchanges (e.g. where the Kamba provide shopping and 
schooling opportunities to the Maasai), reflect the disparities in social transformation.  
                                                          
9
 Citing Moore (1994). 
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Chapter six proceeds to show that although ethnic groups share and exchange resources, they 
also compete and fight for them. In this part, contested political boundaries, land and water 
resources are analysed. The chapter is about ethnic antagonism and expounds on some of the 
challenges that confront groups that share a common territory. Ethnic competition, tensions 
and conflict are presented as integral aspects of coexistence. The chapter also highlights 
ethnic conflict in Kenya in general and shows the state‟s contradictory roles in the 
politicisation of ethnicity (e.g. by the political elite), while administrators and the police 
arbitrate in the resolution of conflict. The section therefore does not just address conflicts but 
also how the same are resolved and averted. In this regard, compromises and concessions are 
discussed as important dimensions of coexistence. Besides, I also discuss how actors 
legitimise ethnic conflicts. This chapter also discusses some of the strategies adopted by 
migrant Kamba populations to win acceptance among the Maasai.  
Chapter seven examines the external dimension in interethnic coexistence. The point here is 
that ethnic groups do not „coexist‟ in a vacuum. The chapter presents the Kamba and the 
Maasai in wider social spheres and shows how both groups are shaped and influenced by 
other groups and the state, and how they impact on national politics, stability, cohesion and 
integration. The chapter presents the state‟s ambivalence in the enhancement of harmonious 
ethnic coexistence in Kenya. It is here that I assess the ethnic competition for power and 
ethnicisation of Kenyan politics. It is argued in the chapter that although the state‟s divide-
and-rule tactics enhance difference and disharmony, they also produce stability by easing 
ethnic competition and rivalry for power at the centre. The chapter also assesses ethnic 
alliances and how they shift, the politics of ethnic numbers and how stability is produced by 
“eating” with “co-eaters”.  
Chapter eight is a conclusive one that pulls together the main findings of the study and makes 
a case for a redefinition of interethnic coexistence. The chapter therefore addresses the 
question: What is interethnic coexistence? My argument is that coexistence is about ethnic 
distinction, social exchange, complementarity and interdependence as well as ethnic 
antagonism and conflict. Besides, coexistence is also about compromises and concessions. 
And since all these aspects have an implication on shared physical space, it is also argued that 
„common territory‟ is an important dimension of coexistence. Last but not least is the 
argument that ethnic groups do not „coexist‟ in a vacuum, which brings in the state and other 
groups as the „external‟ dimension of coexistence.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
As I have noted above, this chapter is intended to introduce the reader to the debates on the 
two main concepts in the study, i.e. ethnicity and coexistence. This discussion is blended with 
the data gathering process which also helps to clarify these concepts.  
 
2.1   Seeking an understanding of ethnicity 
 
This chapter starts by reviewing various theoretical perspectives and arguments pertaining to 
ethnicity and coexistence. The purpose is to examine the underlying explanations with regard 
to how „ethnic groups‟ come into being and how the same interact or „coexist‟ in particular 
social and economic contexts. The chapter will serve as a base as well as the lens through 
which the patterns of inter-relationships between the Maasai and the Kamba peoples of Kenya 
are being examined. One may wonder why an attempt should be made here to redefine the 
concept of ethnicity or ethnic groups, so widely written about by famed ethnologists, 
sociologists and political scientists. While such concern may not be unassailable, the fact that 
these concepts have witnessed wide scrutiny has also meant multiplication of controversies. 
“Ethnicity” and “ethnic groups” have meant different things in different historical epochs, in 
various contexts and to various scholars. For instance, despite the fact that it is considered 
fashionable to use “ethnic group” instead of “tribe” in African settings, Baumann avers that 
most Europeans would be upset if they were categorised as belonging to a certain ethnic 
group (1996: 19). In fact, Jack Eller questions why African groups are referred to as “tribes” 
while the same concept is not used when writing or reporting about the Balkan groups or the 
Quebec francophone and the Anglophones (1999: 196). Indeed, in the American society, 
“ethnicity” is interchangeable with being “black” with a tendency not to categorise other 
“white” groupings as ethnic (see Reed et al., 1989).  
Departing from this, Waterman argues that there is nothing pejorative or derisory in using 
“tribe” noting that “the respected British weekly, The Economist, has been using it for the past 
decade and a half...”(1994: 399). Cottam and Cottam use the term “ethnic communities” 
merely as a synonym of “ethnic groups” and defines it thus: “A social group whose members 
share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess 
one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and 
solidarity” (2001: 28, citing Smith, 1981: 66). 
In Kenya, apart from using “tribes” to differentiate various ethnicities, they are loosely 
referred to as “communities”, a terminology viewed as politically correct and popular with the 
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media and political elite. It did not come as a surprise therefore, when a number of „elite‟ 
respondents talked of the “Maasai community” or “Kamba community” in the course of my 
study. While most of them were simply imitating what features in the media, some used the 
concept to present their respective ethnic groups as sharing cultural practices, goals, destiny, 
interests and territory. But, just like ethnicity, “community” is used and redefined contextually 
(Baumann, 1996: 4). 
It would be safe indeed to say that these terminologies are largely in search of definitions 
since they have not only been interpreted differently, but anytime they are defined or 
redefined, new controversies emerge (Jenkins, 1997: 40, Wimmer,1997a: 18). Stressing a 
more comprehensive approach, Milton Yinger argues that disagreements in literature have 
been witnessed due to the fact that various authors select one or more of the following 
variables; one, how groups are perceived by others in terms of language, religion, race and 
ancestral homeland with its related culture; two, how the members perceive themselves as 
different and finally, how they participate in shared activities built around their (real or 
mythical) common origin and culture (1994: 4). But if my field experiences were anything to 
go by, those groups that we study and our own biases do not make it any easier in our 
attempts to come up with definitions of what ethnic groups are or what ethnicity is or what 
these concepts represent. As will be shown later, contextualised insights did emerge which 
may find wider sociological and ethnographical application. Nevertheless, to deepen the 
understanding of ethnicity, let me revisit  the historical debates, the “dominant discourses” (or 
primordial approaches) and the pragmatic/contemporary understanding of the concept. 
 
2.1.1   “Tribes” and “ethnic groups” 
Going back to history, some of the early references to “ethnicity” can be traced to Max 
Weber‟s “Ethnic Groups” in his book Economy and Society where he saw shared beliefs and 
common descent as key characteristics of an ethnic group or race.
10
 According to Weber, it is 
the “political community” that inspires the belief in common ethnicity (1978: 389). In his 
definition, sharing a common background is seen as the basis for collective identity and 
togetherness.  
Jenkins argues that having read Weber, Everett Hughes rejected his definition of ethnicity that 
was based on cultural traits. Hughes argued that the existence of a group is not a reflection of 
cultural difference stressing instead the aspect of internal (ins) as well as the external (outs) 
aspects (Jenkins, 1997: 11). But based on my experience in doing research among African 
                                                          
10
 See Weber (1978: 385), Economy and Society. 
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groups, it is difficult to dismiss cultural practices as a basis for drawing ethnic boundaries. In 
his book, Ethnicity in Modern Africa, Brian du Toit notes that “ethnic” has profoundly 
changed over time from its first original use where it referred to differences in religion 
particularly for being non-Christian or Jewish (Du Toit, 1978: 19), to focus on race or 
phenotype as well as emphasising socio-cultural differences. In a nutshell, du Toit notes that 
apart from the use of „ethnic‟ in reference to a socio-cultural group, the concept was later 
narrowed down to refer to a sub-group living among other groups in a foreign country and 
finally, to its usage where a group of people contrast themselves or are contrasted by others on 
the basis of sharing certain cultural criteria like language, beliefs and values, religion or 
history. He argues that while early British scientists in the 1920‟s were using „ethnic‟ to refer 
to race, Americans were giving it a socio-cultural meaning.
11
 Du Toit notes that over the years, 
the concept of ethnicity has “gained recognition as a neutral, unemotional referent to those 
characteristics and qualities that mark an ethnic group, irrespective of whether the group is 
defined basically on socio-cultural or basically on phenotypic grounds”.12 Perhaps with Africa 
in mind, he asserts that ethnic groups may have a geographical contiguity (Du Toit, 1978: 4). 
Indeed, many identity groups in the so-called non-nation states are said to be geographically 
concentrated (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 195). It has been argued by Barth and others that the 
intensity with which a group organises itself as an ethnic group and with which individuals 
stress their ethnicity increases if the same share a designated geographical space (see Roosens, 
1989: 12). The geographical contiguity, as will be shown later, is quite significant in Kenya 
where, territorial boundaries enhance and shape ethnic attachment and loyalty. In Kenya and 
other British colonies, names of ethnic groups were also adopted as names of their traditional 
homelands, although the territorial boundaries remained fairly porous irrespective of the 
restrictions placed on the migration of groups. This brings me to the concept of „common 
territory‟ which is central in interethnic coexistence. It is discussed in greater detail in chapter 
six. 
Going back to the chronology of ethnicity, a comprehensive historical review showing how 
“tribes” and “race” changed into “ethnic groups” in both sociological and ethnographic 
discourse is provided by Jenkins (1997: 9-24; see also Alexander, McGregor and Ranger; 
2000). Way back in the 1960‟s, Wallerstein appeared to use “tribe” for the social group in the 
rural area and “ethnic group” for urban residents.13 This compares to Abner Cohen‟s (1974) 
use of “tribalism” as a native term and “ethnicity” as a sociological term. Du Toit critiques 
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 Du Toit, (1978 : 3). 
12
 Ibid. p.5  
13
 Wallerstein (1960), cited by Du Toit (1978 : 7). 
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Van den Berghe and M. G. Smith‟s use of “racism” in their studies in Burundi and Rwanda 
and among the Fulani and Hausa of Nigeria respectively, arguing that they should instead 
have used “ethnic” or “ethnicity.”14 On the same line of argument, Jenkins notes that by the 
1960‟s, the notion of the “tribe” was losing currency among anthropologists who adopted „the 
less embarrassingly colonial‟ ethnic group which was also based on the social constructionist 
model (Jenkins 1997: 17). It is important to note that it is indeed the „tribe-group‟ model that 
Barth (1969) set to critique showing how collective identities and the issue of ethnic 
boundaries had been taken for granted. 
The first reference to the term “ethnic” in reference to an African society is said to have been 
done by Seligman in 1936
15
. Du Toit makes reference to Nadel and his study in the Korofan 
region of the Sudan where he is said to have used the concept of “tribe” and argued that the 
concept disregards uniformities beyond its self chosen boundaries.
16
 Du Toit admits however 
that just like “tribes”, the boundaries of “ethnic groups” are subjectively drawn. What has 
been significant in the study of ethnicity in Africa is the fact that even with increasing 
urbanisation and adoption of wage labour, ethnic affiliations have steadily remained important 
(Banton, 1983: 164). Osaghae (1994: 137) notes that ethnicity is perhaps the most popular 
concept used in the analysis of African politics.  
Irrespective of its colonial roots and the prejudice and primordial connotations associated with 
it, the concept of tribe is used rather commonly in the post-colonial African state. In Kenya, 
Uganda, Nigeria etc., the use of ethnic group is limited mainly to academic discourse. 
Otherwise, most people, some sections of the media, political establishment, and even a wide 
cross section of scholars use tribe rather than ethnic group. “Ethnic group” is generally seen 
as circumventing the pejorative implications of “tribe”. In other cases, no distinction is made 
between the two concepts. This is clearly illustrated by a parliamentary report containing 
findings of the „ethnic clashes‟ that affected some parts of Kenya in 1990/91. It is entitled 
„Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and 
Other Parts of Kenya 1992‟. Although the title bears, “ethnic clashes”, in the introduction, the 
report starts by restating the parliamentary frame of reference thus; “while appreciating the 
Government‟s efforts to stop tribal clashes in western and other parts of Kenya...”(Republic 
of Kenya, 1992: 1; emphasis mine). In the report, the concepts „tribe‟ and „ethnic group‟ are 
used interchangeably which is basically a reflection of how the same are used across the social,  
political and academic fabric. Western scholars are no exception. As recent as 1995, 
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 Ibid. p. 8. 
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 Ibid.  p. 6 
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 Ibid.  p. 6 
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Christoph Lang, writing about the situation in Kenya remarked “conflicts between different 
pastoralist tribes have occurred in history and continue up to date” (1995: 21). Suffice it to 
say that due to familiarity with the concept, the use of tribe in contemporary African society 
may not carry the biases often associated with this concept by some scholars. To many people, 
it is the only English word they know that draws distinctions among the various ethnicities. 
 
2.1.2   Primordial considerations in ethnicity 
As noted above, ethnicity discourses are riddled with debates over the involuntary or 
primordial perspective on the one hand, and a pragmatic one on the other. Treating culture as 
synonymous with ethnic identity is not uncommon, although this implies that culture can be 
the property of an ethnic group, and therefore creates non-existent mutual distinctiveness. 
Baumann notes that the simplistic equation between ethnic identity, culture and community is 
common in many societies. Indeed, he avers, “it is the dominant discourse” (1996: 22). 
Following the influential work of Fredrik Barth (1969) among others, much of contemporary 
ethnicity debates revolve around how group boundaries are socially constructed. But, though 
relatively marginal in contemporary ethnicity debates,
17
 the biological and culture discourse 
cannot be totally ignored. Baumann (1996: 16) notes that biological reductionism still enjoys 
wide appeal. Nash (1989: 10-12) identifies three most common identity markers as blood, 
substance (e.g. food) and cult, arguing that it is usually in situations where such characteristics 
are not outwardly apparent, that the secondary symbols of dress, language and physical 
features become important.   
For the sake of clarity, the primordial approach or the essentialist discourse basically refers to 
a perspective that stresses predisposition and cultural distinctions that are psychologically 
reductionist and in which one‟s or a group‟s ethnic identity is taken as „natural‟ or as a „social 
fact‟. In this model, people‟s cultural differences based on language, tradition, religion and 
ethnic roots are assumed to be by nature exclusionary. Although scorned for naturalising 
ethnic groups and providing a fertile ground for chauvinism and hatred, matters of descent and 
kinship, locality and cultural roots inform interethnic relations. The formation of any group 
involves the principle of inclusion that identifies its members and exclusion that identifies 
those who cannot be group members (see Schlee, 1996). The primordial bonds or 
cohesiveness of a group are influenced by the relative degree to which inclusion or exclusion 
is stressed. 
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The primordial model is associated with the works of Geertz (1973), Gutkind (1970) and 
Cohen (1969) among others. They talk about groups of people whose identities are primarily 
grounded in existential feelings or what Geertz called “primordial sentiments”. Early writings 
on African ethnicity for instance, treated tribes and tribalism as primordial groupings which 
did not qualify to be treated as „ethnic groups‟ (Du Toit, 1978). Quite often, non-western 
groups are seen in the West as non-modern and therefore tribal (Eller, 1999: 196). It is now 
generally agreed that in spite of people‟s predispositions and cultural settings, ethnic groups 
tend to invoke or manipulate their different attributes for various group interactions as well as 
arbitrarily shifting the criteria for ethnic identification depending on what is at stake.
18
 There 
is a wide body of literature that supports the notion that ethnic identities are not mere self-
evident categories but rather consist of porous boundaries that are constantly changing and 
being renegotiated (see Barth, 1969; Schlee, 1989; Roosens, 1989; Yinger; 1994 and Jenkins, 
1997). Morris-Hale correctly observes that rarely will a single ethnic attribute hold a group 
together or define its identity. He notes that even the so-called „ethnic‟ struggles for the 
control of resources where economic disparities exist should not be viewed as mere ethnic 
rivalries and hatred (1996: 5). This particular dimension will be taken up later in illustrating 
how ethnic differences are expressed in everyday practices in order to exclude others from 
accessing scarce or valued resources. 
Roosens (1989) notes that people will identify themselves to a certain group not because of 
the blood links but, more significantly, for a sense of belonging, psychological security as 
well as a certainty that one knows his/her origin. The „blood links‟ though appear to lay the 
foundation on which the other forms of attachment are based. Roosens does actually note that 
in some multiethnic societies with minority groups, laws might be instituted to define 
ethnicity. Citing the case of Canada, he notes that “being Indian” is mainly defined in law 
through biological descent. He writes: “A child of two full-blood Indians is, without any doubt, 
an Indian, but one who deviates too much from this ideal type is not” (1989: 16, 24). He notes 
further that the ethnic origin of the mother is irrelevant and if an Indian woman marries a non-
Indian, she loses her Indian status. In his discussion on „hybridization of roots‟, Friedman 
cites a case where a youth from a mixed marriage insisted that he was „black‟ and justified by 
saying that “if I am mixed, then I have no history and no identity, no roots, I am nobody” 
(1999: 253).  
This particular case, cited in a context where Friedman is discussing hybrid identities and 
cultural globalisation, illustrates how primordial considerations shape and influence people‟s 
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definition of their own identity and how kinship roots are embedded in social meanings. 
Although the youth insists that he‟s „black‟ in this particular context, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that he would readily take advantage of his mixed identity in another context. In 
my study, it was interesting to see that while some respondents reproduced the essentialist 
mode of ethnicity, stressing how physically different and mutually exclusive the Kamba and 
the Maasai were, others reproduced the fluid aspects, while others oscillated between the two.  
Talking about the height distinction between the Kamba and the Maasai, a respondent (Kamba 
businesswoman) noted, “they are tall (Maasai), but now look at me, how many Maasai are tall 
like me...eh...even men (laughs)?” But as she challenged a primordial criterion or marker of 
„being Maasai‟, she opened up a Pandora‟s box about her own identity noting that “because of 
my height, some people think I am not Kamba”.19 Although starting from an essentialist view 
of ethnic identity, she challenges that notion by showing how limiting and misleading it is to 
classify people simply by their physical features. During our conversation however, I could 
not rule out an underlying motive to demystify the Kamba notion of the Maasai as physically 
imposing and fierce fighters. During the study, the question of “who is a Maasai/who is 
Kamba?” was met with responses that ranged from kinship roots, language and territory to a 
wide range of commonly held stereotypes. The responses were: Those who speak 
Maa/Kikamba (language), “if your mother and father are Maasai”, “if your father is 
Maasai/Kamba” (patrilineal kinship), non-Maasai who have been taken up as a wives by the 
Maasai, those who live in Maasai territorial areas/Ukambani (designated physical space or 
locality), those who practice „Maasai culture‟, “if someone says he is Maasai, there is nothing 
you can do to him” (self identification and contested identities), and if you have been bred on 
“Maasai milk”.  
When I asked the Kamba what they associate with Maasainess,
20
 they talked of: Being 
“traditional” or “people of culture”, “backward”, “they are tall”, “black”, owning “many” 
heads of cattle
21
, moving animals from one place to another (nomadism/transhumance), 
“walking very fast” (Maasai men) and “proud and arrogant”. Other attributes identified 
included, gaps in the front lower teeth, clean shaven women, young men with braided hair, 
wearing of red shukas and ornaments, red ochre on the head, pierced earlobes, living in cow-
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 She insisted that she was a “pure Kamba”! Among the Kamba, one is considered as Muukamba kivindyo 
(“truly Kamba”) if his/her both parents are recognised as Kamba and/or if one was not born outside of wedlock. 
People therefore insist: Ndyaauka na mwaitu, literally meaning “I did not come with my mother”. Whereas the 
worst insult you could possibly tell a Kikuyu man is to characterise him as uncircumcised (kiihi), as for a Kamba 
man the worst insult would perhaps be to tell him he „came with his mother‟. 
20
 see Spear and Waller (1993) for a comprehensive review of the complexity of Maasai identity. 
21
 Pastoralism is one of the most dominant features of the Maasai identity. Over the years however,  the Maasai 
increasingly keep fewer cattle as others who previously kept cattle as the main economic activity have taken up 
agriculture to diversify their subsistence economy. 
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dung walled huts, men carry clubs and knives, illiterate and having many wives. The Kamba 
had relatively much to say about the Maasai. Their detailed descriptions illustrated not only 
what appeared to be „clear‟ distinctions between them and their Nilotic neighbours, but also 
the richness of the Maasai culture.  
On the other hand, whenever I asked a Maasai respondent “what do you associate with 
Kambaness”, they were generally economical with words. The question was treated as being 
“sensitive”. Whether it was due to my own identity as Kamba or for some other reason, the 
Maasai appeared to be more reluctant to essentialise. I got responses like: they are just like us, 
it is you who should tell us, they are farmers, toil a lot, wear clothes of “these days”, lost their 
culture, light skinned (white), short, poor, have no cattle, no land,
22
 and that they are tricky 
and cunning. They gave fairly fluid depictions of Kamba identity. In both cases however, the 
descriptions were reflexive in nature, made vis-à-vis the other group and they should therefore 
be evaluated in that context; few could stand on their own. An exhaustive discussion on these 
depictions is taken up in chapters three and four. Barth reminds us that “categorical ethnic 
distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information but do entail 
social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained 
despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories” 
(1969: 10). 
All in all, I was to discover that, just like Gerd Baumann (1996: 4) notes, actors can be 
incredible at how much they grasp the complexity of ethnicity. The descriptions clearly 
showed that actors knew how complex it was to delineate ethnicity but have their own ways 
of categorising who belongs to which group. Such field experiences, treated in some detail 
later on, illustrate how physical differences traced to one‟s kinship roots were/are socially 
constructed or given meaning in people‟s daily lives. It was rather interesting listening to 
African groups discussing „colour‟ differences and other genetically predisposed 
characteristics that were said to distinguish “who is who”. 
While some responses appeared to border on the primordial model of ethnicity (Geertz, 1973) 
many were, either socially constructed or long held stereotypes. Even the genetic 
characteristics were laden with social meaning. What is clear is that phenotype or physical 
appearances are simply identity markers in a myriad of others. To be fair to Geertz, he did 
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 Descriptions were often given in absolute terms with little relativity. The Kamba were said to have „no land‟ 
but this simply meant that they hold smaller plots; they were also said to have „no cattle‟ although they keep 
some stock which has allowed cattle raids to significantly define Kamba-Maasai relationships in history. On the 
other hand, the Maasai were associated with „having many wives‟ although the Kamba practice polygyny too. 
Asking a Maasai respondent why these descriptions were so „clear-cut‟ and yet the reality was different, he said 
that he didn‟t want to cause „confusion‟ or sound like he didn‟t know the Kamba „very well‟. 
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provide the link between the primordial „givens‟ and social meaning by stating that actors will 
perceive blood and cultural ties as natural and obligatory (1973: 260). From my field 
experience, it seems that there are many instances in life that could tempt actors to perceive 
ethnicity as a given condition. This is particularly the case where people are positively or 
negatively discriminated on the basis of their ethnic roots
23
 or where others seek an „easy 
solution‟ where competition for resources like land is rather stiff. During the politically 
instigated ethnic/land clashes that almost engulfed the whole of Kenya into a civil war in the 
early 1990‟s, a Maasai cabinet minister caused an uproar when he characterised the Kikuyu as 
inherently selfish and power hungry and said that one could tell a Kikuyu from others since 
they apparently had “stained teeth” and “protruding stomachs”! It was quite a crude way of 
drawing a distinction between the Maasai and the Kikuyu. The remark appeared to be 
informed by some naked hatred in the Moi regime for the influential and internally widely 
dispersed Kikuyu.  
It was quite misleading though since after many decades of intermarriages and assimilation, 
the Maasai and the Kikuyu identities overlap a great deal. Besides, despite the fact that the 
Maasai take pride in their milk white teeth and lean erect bodies, these are attributes that not 
only cut across many ethnic groups but have discontinuities among those who identify 
themselves as Maasai. Actually, many non-Maasai groups tend to identify the Maasai through 
their traditional shuka dress and other cultural practices particularly the removed lower 
incisors. Indeed, certain physical features and forms of dress are common markers used in 
ethnic identification and subsequent discrimination (Horowitz 1985: 45; Schlee 1989: 5; 1991; 
3). As will be shown later, owing to the fact that the Maasai physical attributes lend 
themselves easy to imitate and therefore look „Maasai‟, the Maasai identity remains one of the 
most appropriated in Kenya. And while there has been instances in which some of those who 
claim to be Maasai are challenged to prove if they are “truly Maasai” or are accused of having 
“no drop of Maasai blood”, these have been mainly non-violent encounters. As elusive and 
controversially laden as they are, physical attributes are nonetheless applied in interethnic 
conflicts. Jocelyn Alexander et al. note that for those involved where ethnicity has become 
salient, “ethnic identifications are often understood as both natural and all too real” (2000: 
306). It has been shown that ethnicity enhances symbolic and behavioural differences which 
can be used to promote or defend the political, economic or social interests of the 
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 That is common when one seeks to obtain an identity card on attaining the age of 18. Some Kamba and 
Kikuyu  peoples born and living in Kajiado district (Maasailand) would be told to „go back home‟ to their „home 
districts‟ and obtain the identity cards there. The same rule would be applied when school leavers applied for 
admission to government/state colleges or when they availed themselves for recruitment to the armed forces. The 
two activities  are carried out at the district level to „give all tribes a chance‟, to quote a district commissioner. 
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communities concerned (see Peil and Oyeneye, 1998: 86). A colleague of mine from Burundi 
noted that during the ethnic genocide of the 1994/95, the apparent relative differences on the 
size and shape of the nose among the Hutu and the Tutsi were utilised by the villains in 
positive and negative discrimination. He had no concrete answer though when I asked him 
how these features manifest themselves in those born of mixed marriages.  
It is also worth noting that during the ethnic cleansing, while some used such apparently clear-
cut features to inflict harm on targeted members, to others, these were features that identified 
those who needed help and protection. In an edited book, Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, 
Obi Igwara notes that “some Hutus chose to commit suicide rather than kill their Tutsi 
compatriots, and...some Hutus risked their lives to save and hide their Tutsi friends and 
relatives”(1995: 1). There are many other social, psychological and economic considerations 
as well as dummy distinctions and categories that are created as groups target others. Banton 
(1983: 83) notes that in ethnic competition, “the more defenceless a minority is, the more 
suitable it is as a target”. Conversely, when „minority‟ groups dominate power, as has been 
the case in many parts of Africa (e.g. Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana), the revered 
„majority‟ or more populous groups are usually demonised and labelled with all sorts of 
stereotypes that are treated as „facts‟. That explains the case referred above in which a cabinet 
minister vilified the Kikuyu ethnic group. 
Despite the fact that essentialism may be used as a benchmark in certain interethnic 
encounters, the primordial approach to ethnicity has been criticised for, among other things, 
assuming ethnicity to be a natural or given phenomenon and for failing to recognise its 
dynamism and why it is important in some situations and not in others. Besides, the approach 
is said to underplay the political, social and economic milieu as well as failing to recognise 
ethnicity as a function of social forces and impulses. What is more, by stressing that ethnicity 
is a permanent form of moral obligation to one‟s fellow kin overlooks the fact that often 
people have a relatively weak and diffused loyalty which imposes no particular obligation to 
help a kin member (see Osaghae, 1994: 139; Crawford, 1998: 11).  
Going by the arguments and counter arguments presented here, one may conclude that  
irrespective of the plausible position that takes ethnicity as principally a function of social 
meanings and as manipulable (flexible), the primordial dimensions constitute the basis for the 
social construction of ethnicity. Moreover, this balance between nature and nurture is often 
skewed depending on the actors and the issues at stake. Some scholars however are very 
categorical; Jenkins notes: “No matter how apparently strong or inflexible it may be, ethnicity 
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is always socially constructed, in the first instance and in every other” (1997: 47; original 
emphasis).  
 
2.1.3   Ethnicity: Pragmatic considerations 
Regarding the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, Eller (1999: 196) notes that the interethnic 
conflict witnessed was neither primordial nor were the very identities on which it was 
predicated. Deviating from “cultural stuff” in the definition of ethnic groups, Fredrik Barth led 
the way in the adoption of a discourse that treats the creation and maintenance of ethnic 
boundaries between groups as core in the anthropology of ethnicity (Barth, 1969; Jenkins, 
1997:90). The setting of boundaries is said to be necessary where groups engage in 
competitive situations (Horowitz, 1985: 70). He notes further that such boundaries tend to 
shift with the political context. Horowitz further provides a crucial link between physical and 
social boundaries by noting that “territorial boundaries help shape the level of group identity 
that emerges as the most salient, the wider the effective territorial boundaries, the wider the 
ethnic boundaries are likely to be; the narrower the territorial boundaries, the narrower the 
ethnic boundaries, all else equal”.24 Recognising how complex and fluid boundaries could be, 
Horowitz remained rather non-committal, for in interethnic relations there will always be 
intervening variables that cannot be held constant. 
In much of Africa, ethnic territorial boundaries were artificially created during the colonial 
period and perpetuated or sustained by the post-colonial state. In other cases, individual 
groups themselves realised that fragmentation would put them at a disadvantage in the ethnic 
competition that was expected to follow the creation of independent states.
25
 This acted as a 
major driving force in frantic efforts to redefine both social and territorial boundaries. Indeed, 
emphasis of common descent and myths of origin have been common particularly among 
groups living across national boundaries (see Wijeyewardene, 1990). In some cases, these 
group-based initiatives have been thwarted by the political leadership keen to keep potentially 
powerful groups fragmented.  
It has been stated over and again that ethnicity is indeed relative and that it is a social resource 
manipulated by actors depending on who has what power to influence the flow or access to 
scarce resources. It has been assumed that people may change their ethnic identity “if they can 
profit by doing so” (Roosens, 1989: 13). Well, non-material considerations may also motivate 
groups to shift their ethnic boundaries. 
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 Horowitz, (1985: 66). 
25
 Ibid.  p. 71. 
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It has been argued that the boundary a certain group claims at a certain time is arbitrary and 
can shift out of linguistic, social, or any other changes. Evidence from Africa shows that 
individuals as well as lineages are normally in the process of becoming members of a given 
ethnic group since one is not a member of a group in an intangible way (see Du Toit 1978: 8). 
This argument has also been ratified in latter writings.
26
 Ethnic boundaries are said to be 
porous, fluid and flexible and may be manipulated to serve given ends at a particular place 
and time (Barth 1969). It would be prudent here to provide a definition of an ethnic group. In 
this regard, Yinger provides one of the most comprehensive. He defines it thus: “An ethnic 
group is a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and or 
others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and 
who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are 
significant ingredients” (Yinger, 1994: 3). Ethnicity claims have to be validated by others who 
serve as the audience and the benchmark on which such claims are made. The example given 
above where the Kamba and the Maasai define each other illustrates this. Ethnicity is 
therefore produced and reproduced through internal and external definitions (Barth, 1969: 15; 
Jenkins, 1997: 80). However, shared locality which is given prominence by some scholars as 
an integral aspect of ethnicity, is often challenged (see for example Jenkins, 1997:41). Using 
the case of Wales, Jenkins argues that locality involves political rights and responsibilities 
which are not entailed in ethnicity.  
Based on his social constructionist view of ethnicity, Barth defined ethnic groups as 
“categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves”. He noted that in 
defining ethnic groups, “the features that are taken into account are not the sum of „objective‟ 
differences, but only those which actors regard as significant” (1969: 14). Borrowing mainly 
from Barth, Jenkins provides a summary of what should guide one in defining ethnicity.  
He says that ethnicity has to be defined from the social actors‟ perspective and that the focus 
of attention then shifts to maintenance of ethnic boundaries, that is, the interaction between 
„them‟ and „us‟ across the boundary. He says that ethnic identity depends on ascription both 
by members of the ethnic group and by outsiders.
27
 He adds that ethnicity is not fixed but 
rather situationally defined. Fifth, that ecological issues influence ethnic identity just like 
competition for economic niches which plays a crucial role in the generation of ethnicity.  
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 See, for example, Schlee (1989). 
27
 see also Roosens, who notes:  “It is impossible for ethnicity to mean anything without the existence of ethnic 
groups or categories, for it is a relational construct” (1989: 19). 
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Others have associated ethnicity with common culture and history as well as similarities and 
differences between people (DeVos 1995). Ethnicity is said to define membership and 
eligibility into a status group.  
In the pragmatic approach, the most significant aspect in the search for a definition was the 
departure from seeing these groups as „social facts‟ or givens to looking at what the actors 
think, that is, their self ascription as well as the ascription of those in interaction with them or 
to quote Jenkins, as an attribute of the other (Jenkins 1997; see also Barth 1969). In a 
summary, Jenkins identifies four elements in the social constructionist model of ethnicity, 
namely that ethnicity emphasizes cultural differentiation, it is cultural but produced and 
reproduced in social interaction, that it is not fixed or unchanging but rather variable and 
manipulable and finally, ethnicity is collective and individual at the same time (1997: 41; 
original emphasis; see also Yinger, 1994: 3-4). He admits however that these categories 
cannot in any way be treated as final as there are questions relating to how ethnicity is to be 
differentiated from or related to other forms of communal attachment or identification.  
  
2.1.4   Clan or ethnic group? 
Suffice it to say that while ethnic groups have been the main focus of study among 
ethnologists interested in social identity, some scholars have challenged that notion stressing 
instead other lower level social units e.g. clans and lineages or even larger units and networks 
(Schlee, 1989:1).  
In his study on ethnic groups in Southeast Asia, Wijeyewardene (1990) similarly noted that it 
is important to look at ethnicity „at the local community level‟ arguing that it is here that 
individuals define their own identity and sometimes, in terms of that identity unleash violence 
on their neighbours threatening their right to exist. The question however remains: what is 
„local community level‟? In fact, in his edited book, Wijeyewardene and others discuss ethnic 
groups across national boundaries in Southeast Asia.
28
Without delving into the controversies 
of defining what is „local‟, this basically shows that the level at which a researcher bases 
his/her study should be determined by the setting as well as the objectives of the study in 
question. In spite of the popular scholarship on „interethnic relationships‟, Schlee (1989) has, 
for instance, examined interethnic clan relationships or cross-ethnic clan ties in the Horn of 
Africa with fascinating insights, showing not only how complex it is to identify or locate 
ethnic and clan boundaries but how clans constitute the basis for interactions across wider 
social networks.  
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 See Wijeyewardene, (ed.) 1990;  Ethnic Groups across National Boundaries in Mainland Southeast Asia.   
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There is no denying however that in some of these groups in the Horn and north of Kenya for 
instance, clans appear to take precedence over broader social groupings. In analysing 
interethnic relations therefore, the challenge is to establish at what level are socially 
meaningful interactions and transactions taking place. Needless to say, individuals or groups 
that engage in various forms of exchanges, will represent various identities based on their 
ethnic group, subsection/tribe, clan, moiety, lineage, family or religion. In my case, much of 
the analysis centred on  the interactions and transactions at the interethnic group level, that is; 
„Maasai‟ versus the „Kamba‟. However, any relevant intra-ethnic or clan-based patterns of 
coexistence were taken into account.  
It would be important here to note that while the Kamba could remotely be divided into two 
main sections (Ndeti, 1972: 1; Ndolo, 1989: 8), the Maa-speaking peoples divide into about 
twenty-two autonomous and territorially demarcated sections (Sommer and Vossen, 1993: 30). 
These Maasai sections are further subdivided into several clans (Sankan, 1971: 1-4). The 
relatively „clear‟ demarcations among the Maasai were reflected in their self-definition of 
their identities in which they often made reference to their sections or clans, categories which 
many Kamba respondents were not ignorant about. On the other hand, a long history of both 
internal and external migration as well as faster adoption of „modern‟ lifestyles appeared to 
have dealt a major blow or eroded the significance previously attached to clans and lineages 
among the Kamba. Generally speaking though, it was clear that in both groups, lower levels 
of attachment or identity were not necessarily limited to internal exchanges or relations within 
the particular ethnic group. Among the Maasai for instance, different sections or clans have 
always related with a wide cross section of non-Maasai neighbours so that those who border 
and closely interact with the Kalenjin groups (e.g. the Kipsigis) or the Kisii to the west, are 
„different‟ from those who closely interact with the Kamba to the east. Nevertheless, the 
various sections maintain a Maasai identity and are identified as such. In addition, while they 
may often have internal strife and conflict, they do form alliances against a common external 
adversary. Jenkins correctly points out that “although two groups may be differentiated from 
each other as A and B, in a different context they may combine as C in contrast to D (with 
which they may combine in yet other circumstances)” (1997: 40; see also Banton 1983: 176; 
Schlee 1989: 42). 
The weakening of clan ties among the Kamba was evident as many people would not tell their 
clan totems much less observe clan head directives or attend clan meetings. A big number of 
the young people have only a vague idea of their clans, if they know them at all. “The Kamba 
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have lost their culture and direction”, regrets Mr Makoti, 69.29 The clan heads are rarely 
respected anymore and the situation is worse in the „new settlements‟ where people from 
different parts of Ukambani have converged. Mr Makoti notes, “many people in this nthi sya 
makomano (“new settlements”) would not even disclose their clan and nobody has the 
mandate to ask them anyway”. It appeared that in most cases, people invoke their clan during 
marriage ceremonies or when they need some monetary or material assistance or when vying 
for an elective post, or when they are meant to pay damages to another clan especially after 
one of their own kills or maims outside the clan.
30
 It is also found prudent when one simply 
wants „proof‟ over his or her kinship roots or to disqualify suitors and brides before a 
marriage ceremony. Otherwise, for those who can claim some economic independence or are 
relatively well-off, they treat clannism as a liability. Clan-based forms of behavioural sanction 
and punishment are hardly observed when invoked while in many cases, statutory forms of 
arbitration have generally taken precedence.  
Mr Makoti told me a story about a man beaten up by his clan members for failure to attend 
clan meetings. He was in addition ordered to produce a fine of a male goat. When he reported 
the matter to the chief, those responsible were rounded up by administration policemen
31
 and 
in a settlement out of court, they paid for his hospitalisation and a „fine‟ of Ksh 6,000 (EUR 
80) including the chief‟s dues of Ksh 2,000 as an arbitrator.32 Some of the clan members 
however helped them to pay up. There are many cases however of people sponsored to school 
and even to university by the mbai, even though such cases are becoming rare. Other forms of 
social organisation have instead taken root particularly using those in urban areas to raise 
funds for local projects under the understanding that “we should not forget our people” or “we 
should not forget where we came from”. Few want to be labelled as “those who have hidden 
in Nairobi”. Those in the rural areas usually expect that those in urban areas meet fairly often, 
share in their agonies, keep close contacts and visit one another and yet, the reality is usually 
different. It is often embarrassing for some if they cannot deliver a letter to their relatives in 
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 The names of research partners in the thesis have been changed in observation of confidentiality. However, 
names of state officials and politicians who were interviewed as „key informants‟  have not been altered. 
30
 If the case is being settled out of court 
31
 In the provincial administration, the administrators from the rank of chief straight to the provincial 
commissioner, are administration policemen who provide security to these officers, quell civil strive and crime, 
enforce certain decrees and laws e.g. arrest those brewing traditional alcoholic drinks or those practicing female 
genital mutilation. In some remote areas, they symbolise „government presence‟. 
32
 Among the Kamba, just like in many other areas in Kenya, chiefs normally arbitrate disputes over land, 
oversee land transactions and also settle criminal offences that would otherwise be settled in a court of law. In 
return for their services, they normally ask for, or expect usuu (porridge in Kikamba) a practice that over the 
years has been conveniently monetarised. The sum of payment for the „services rendered‟ is usually arbitrary but 
is mainly dictated by what is at stake and the level of income of the parties involved. In an incident where A 
Kamba from Machakos bought 10 acres of land in Kiboko when I was carrying out research in the area, the chief 
asked for Ksh 5,000 as usuu after „facilitating‟ a land transaction that saw Ksh 200,000 change hands. 
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the towns since it is assumed that coming from the same village, then you must have some 
close contact there. Other new forms of social security include self-help groups which may 
not be clan-based but geographically determined, religious-based groups e.g. where people 
who worship together will assist one another during droughts, funerals, weddings and even for 
school fees fund raising ceremonies. Contrary to Ndolo‟s (1989: 15) observation that only the 
two largest clans (perhaps in reference to Aombe and Atangwa) do not practice exogamy, even 
some of the smallest Kamba clans hardly insist on exogamous relationships. During my study, 
I came across four cases where attempts to block endogamy among Aanziu, Aakitutu and 
Atwii clans failed. I shall now look at another key concept in the study. 
 
2.2   What is interethnic coexistence? 
 
Although the entire study revolves around „coexistence‟, it would be appropriate to introduce 
some ideas and debates on this concept. Review of literature reveals that by and large, 
coexistence is a terminology whose meaning is taken for granted or assumed to be self 
explanatory and therefore unnecessary to concretise. However, Weiner gives an elementary 
definition: “To exist together, in conjunction with, at the same time, in the same place with 
another” (1998: 14).33 As a concept, coexistence has evidently not found wide application in 
ethnological studies. Weiner partly explains this: That both as a concept and as a policy, 
coexistence was not born in the West. But this applies only if we limit ourselves to peace 
studies, for coexistence has been used widely in the natural sciences, particularly in the fields 
of mathematics, physics, ecology and agro-biology. In his book, Competition and Coexistence 
of Species, Pontin (1982) provides an elaborate analysis of „coexistence‟ in relation to plants 
and animal species in their competition for survival within their niches. I find some of his 
ideas (e.g. “conditions for coexistence”) quite relevant in making sense of how human groups 
compete for resources. I will revisit this in chapter six and seven. 
It has been observed that coexistence per se, that is, when unqualified, is ambiguous. Louis 
Kriesberg (1998) notes that for clarity, an adjective is usually added to the concept. Such 
adjectives include „conflictual‟, „competitive‟, „peaceful‟, „harmonious‟, „stable‟ etc. Besides, 
the concept is used in many disciplines and therefore, it is equally important to clarify the 
context in which it is used and the subject of study. With regard to ethnic groups, some 
scholars use „coexistence‟ in a restricted sense; to refer mainly to harmonious relationships. 
Kriesberg, for instance, argues that coexistence means a “wide range of relationships, 
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excluding ones characterised by overt struggle or relations between persons or groups in 
which none of the parties is trying to “destroy the other” (1998: 182).34 To him, interethnic 
coexistence excludes violent conflict, but may be “restored” after conflict. This is also the 
approach adopted my Weiner and many of the contributors to the Handbook of Interethnic 
Coexistence (1998). The bone of contention therefore is whether antagonism and conflict 
should be considered as part of the „coexistence‟ process. The “overt struggle” Kriesberg is 
talking about usually does not assume permanence among groups. In any case, these struggles 
can also take place alongside sustained systems of mutual exchange. I adopt a more inclusive 
approach in which conflictual situations are considered as part of interethnic coexistence. 
Besides, I do not take coexistence as a relationship that is initiated after conflict but rather as 
an ongoing everyday relationship in which groups compete for resources and supremacy 
while at the same time maintain cross-ethnic transactions. Actually, many studies show that 
groups of different ethnicities, religions or otherwise, but share physical space, there is always 
a thin line between harmony and conflict. In her study in Lebanon, Peleikis (2001) shows that 
potentially hostile Shiite Muslims and Greek Catholics often live together in harmony. More 
examples on the incompatibilities in coexistence relationships are provided below. 
It is important to underscore here that coexistence was a very popular concept during the cold 
war. The concept was used by political scientists/economists to illustrate the juxtaposition of 
communism with capitalism or socialism with a free market economy (see Aubey, 1961). 
Aubey, who wrote his book within the auspices of the so-called “economics of competitive 
coexistence”, notes that the term “coexistence” was apparently coined by the former Soviet 
leader, Lenin, as he strategised to handle the Western threat against the Soviet Union. Lenin 
reasoned that the West and the Communist Bloc could “coexist” peacefully without recourse 
to war or open conflict. At worst, he suggested, the two blocs could engage in “competitive 
coexistence” where each pursued its interests without necessarily endangering the survival of 
the other. Aubey shows that there could be cases of economic, cultural and intellectual 
supremacy in coexistence; that it is not a „conflict free‟ process. Galbraith and Menshikov 
(1988) bring in the dimension of concessions and compromises in coexistence by arguing that 
countries that relate closely but compete enhance relations by not getting into “each other‟s 
way”. On his part, Griffith (1971), demonstrates the diversity that coexistence represents; that 
it neither involves equal transactions between groups nor is equality a prerequisite. In other 
words, coexistence may be possible in cases where a group dominates another. Kriesberg 
notes that this domination may be so severe that the subordinated party may not consider it 
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feasible to raise any challenge. Whereas this applies among the Kamba and the Maasai, there 
is however a tendency to demystify dominance, albeit metaphorically. Besides, the 
subordinated group also wins concessions from the more privileged group by yielding to it. I 
provide more details in chapter six. 
Apart from political scientists and economists, historians have also done studies on 
coexistence. In his book Conquest, Coexistence and Change, Davies (1987) examines the 
strained relations between the Welsh and the English over a long period of time. He 
demonstrates that coexistence is a function of intimate as well as potentially explosive 
interethnic relations. He argues that it involves struggles and negotiations to accommodate 
differences among potentially antagonistic groups like the “conqueror and conquered, settler 
and native, English and Welsh”. Appearing to share Kriesberg‟s view, he avers that 
“coexistence” could also “fail”. Indeed, Josef Korbel examined what he called the “failure of 
coexistence” in the former Czechoslovakia, arguing that communism could not “coexist” with 
the democratic forces (free world). But, he concedes that “coexistence” is a process of 
blending “two antagonistic ways of life”. However, he argues that as a practice, it can be used 
as a deception to obscure extremely unpleasant situations (1959: vii). He is suggesting that 
using „coexistence‟ in situations of antagonism and conflict can be misleading since the 
concept is often taken to be synonymous with harmony. This seems to be the reason why he 
cautions that coexistence can fail. Horowitz (1985: 136) indicates that coexistence is a process 
that may juxtapose “incompatible” groups or ideas. Further evidence on incompatibility is 
provided by Rajasingham-Senanayake, who notes that for a long time, the peaceful 
coexistence of “diverse and hybrid cultures” in Sri Lanka astounded ethnologists (1999: 99). 
She argues that quite often, ethnic groups are presented as mutually exclusive entities ignoring 
their fluidity and overlapping forms. This supports Galtung‟s (1994) idea that “coexistence” is 
possible “in spite of borders”. In other words, groups that may appear to be quite different and 
antagonistic in various ways, may equally engage in mutual transactions to enhance their 
survival. Indeed, Davies concedes that even in situations where there are glaring power 
disparities, “peaceful coexistence” is possible.35  
Davies brings in the idea of “the arts of coexistence”, suggesting that coexistence is a social 
practice which groups may have to learn (1987: 415-21). Besides, he also talks about the 
„external factor‟ and shows how the state could create ethnic divisions and disharmony by 
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 A distinction could be drawn between „harmonious‟ and „peaceful‟ coexistence. In my view, to live in „peace‟ 
means merely devoid of conflict, overt hatred and war, while „harmony‟ appears to suggest a deeper notion of 
not just living in peace but complementing exchanges, reciprocal relationships, shared practices and 
understanding, and perhaps destiny. In other words, „harmony‟ implies a sense of mutual acceptance and social 
intercourse. 
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treating groups differently, granting separate charter of liberties, regulating interethnic 
marriages and assigning different status and privileges (see also Roosens, 1989: 23-40). 
Indeed, many of Africa‟s ethnic conflicts have been blamed on the state (Wimmer, 1997b). In 
chapter seven, I will examine how interethnic coexistence is influenced by the state and other 
groups.  
Some authors have even taken the debate further to look at the global dimension in the 
coexistence processes. According to Galbraith and Menshikov, „coexistence‟ is shaped by a 
world that has become “immutably and perilously interdependent and small” (1988: 2). In this 
sense, coexistence is seen as a juxtaposition of the global with the local. They insist that 
coexistence is shaped and made necessary not only by the „local‟ milieu but also by the 
surrounding external environment. Writing earlier, Ramundo (1967: 161) talked about the 
“law of coexistence” stressing the interdependence of states, opposed social systems and more 
importantly, the interplay between the “local” and “global”, necessitated by “a fact of 
international life”. Although I am not looking at how countries coexist, Galbraith, Menshikov 
and Ramundo highlight the external aspects of coexistence, which are useful in making sense 
of how ethnic groups are shaped by governments and other groups (see chapter seven).  
 
Description and analysis of the field experiences below will clarify further the concepts of 
ethnicity, difference and interethnic coexistence. 
 
 
2.3 Methodological Reflections 
 
2. 3.1   Entering the field  
 
2.3.1.1   “Are you from across”? 
When I went back to Kenya for research work in August 1999, I was assigned teaching duties 
at the University of Nairobi where I work. After a series of consultations with the chairperson 
of the Department of Sociology, my workload was reduced with my seminars rescheduled to 
Mondays and Tuesdays. This provision made it possible to have at least four days of 
continuous fieldwork per week. As required by law, I had to apply for a research permit 
before embarking on my study. The research bureau was then under the Office of the 
President but has since been moved to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. A 
research permit was issued on the 10
th
 of September 1999.  After two months of fieldwork, I 
reviewed my study objectives based on the real field experiences. Consequently, I applied for 
a new research permit but one the officers  advised me otherwise. He warned that to obtain a 
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permit to research on ethnicity could be problematic particularly when one of the ethnic 
groups targeted for study was in the President‟s Rift Valley province and a member of the so-
called “KAMATUSA”.36 I heeded his advise and proceeded with fieldwork using the old 
permit. The bureau had also „allowed‟ me to proceed with research work after providing them 
with a provisional list of interview questions rather than a questionnaire. This followed a 
lengthy discussion on the open-ended and interpretative methodological approach which was 
to be used in the study. Ordinarily, before a research permit is issued, the researcher is 
required to hand in two copies of the questionnaire to be used in the assembling of data. 
 Before I could begin any field activity, I was expected to report to the District Commissioner 
(DC) in the respective districts of Kajiado and Makueni where I was to carry out research 
work. These mandatory visits were to bring to the attention of these officers about my 
forthcoming activities in their areas of jurisdiction. Since Kajiado is nearer to Nairobi, I 
decided to go there first. Unfortunately, the DC was unavailable during my first three visits. 
Each time I was being told to “check later” or “come tomorrow” or “try next week”. It was a 
familiar experience in a Kenyan government office. Asking whether if I came at the said time 
I would find the DC, the usual answer was “you might find him, just try”. When I finally met 
him on the fourth visit, to my surprise, he told me that as a “Kenyan” researcher, I did not 
need to see him. From this experience, I assumed it would be a waste of time travelling all the 
way to see the Makueni DC. I began my fieldwork. Wherever I went however, I paid courtesy 
calls to the local chiefs. Earlier experience had shown that these location heads could easily 
disrupt research work on “security grounds”. I also knew that I would be recruiting some of 
them as research partners or key informants. 
When I started my fieldwork in rural Kajiado (Maasailand), I found it rather difficult to 
maintain any covert identity. I found myself in a setting where people knew one another by 
name, family name or lineage. Newcomers are therefore noticed very easily. Heads turned 
everywhere I went. In my modest jeans, some old sneakers and a T-shirt, I had to reckon with 
the fact that I still stood out. There were other problems. For instance, when I went to see the 
Kenyewa
37
 area chief in Simba market, the administration policeman at the entrance 
„pretended‟ that he did not know the chief‟s name. He was a Maasai and from my name, he 
assumed that I was Kamba, which I suspect made him to ask “are you from across?” to which 
I responded “which across?” He replied “Ukambani”! I confirmed that Ukambani was my 
birthplace. I told him about my place of work and that I was conducting a study in the area. 
He wondered what I wanted to inquire from the chief since “he is just a young man (laughs), 
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 KAMATUSA is an abbreviation for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu groups. 
37
 Kenyewa is one of the administrative locations in Kajiado district. 
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he is new, he doesn‟t know much.” I told him that it was a requirement to report to the chief 
before starting on any research work in his area of jurisdiction. He told me that if that was a 
requirement, then I could proceed to the office but if I wanted information about the area, “see 
me, I will show you the people to talk to.” And on that note, I had began the reflexive 
enrolment process. 
 
2.3.1.2   Initial impressions: Unveiling the myths 
Irrespective of the setting, the purpose of social research is generally to enable the researcher 
see beyond the ordinary in order to arrive at a new understanding of social life (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998: 8). However, it is often the case that scientific analyses begin with a certain 
preliminary observation, experience and conceptualisation. In this section, the main objective 
is not only to discuss some of the myths and stereotypes that I was confronted with but 
perhaps more importantly, to discuss methods through which myths could be unveiled. The 
first challenge was to see whether common stereotypes corresponded with the actual daily 
practices. In addition, I had to overcome my own personal biases as a member of one of the 
ethnic groups being studied.  
My perspective of the Maasai had been shaped by a number of factors. I grew up about 30 
kilometres away from the Ukambani-Maasailand border (Nairobi-Mombasa railway line) but 
it was not until 1980, at the age of 13, that I saw a „Maasai‟ for the first time. I had been sent 
by my mother to buy kerosene at the Shell service station in Kiboko, which lies along 
Mombasa Road. It was at this time that I saw Maasai men and women rooming around the 
market centre. Their shuka (loin-cloth) dressing style and physical appearance (e.g. their 
pierced earlobes), gaps in the lower teeth, clean shaven women, men holding clubs and with 
swords hanging from the abdomen and relatively taller made them stand out among the more 
dominant Kamba population. My childhood friend, then 15, and who had been to Kiboko 
before (his father was a barber there), asked me whether I had seen “the Maasai” before. 
When I told him that I had not, I recall him telling me they are “very bad people” and that 
“they kill the Kamba”. I had heard about fierceness of the Maasai before but we disagreed on 
their might because my grandfather used to narrate to us how the Maasai used to lose 
interethnic battles whenever they took on the Kamba. We decided to consult his father, who, 
to my disappointment, confirmed what his son (my friend) had said. Having migrated from 
Kilungu where contact with the Maasai has been historically more intense than where my 
parents had migrated from, my friend‟s father told me that he had not expected me to have a 
correct impression on the issue. In the latter part of 1999 and much of 2000, some 20 years 
later, I was to realise that Kamba opinions about the Maasai are just as diverse, contradictory 
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and uncoordinated. Interviewing an old Kamba man (Kyuli) in May 2000,  he told me that he 
could not “recall” an incident where the Maasai defeated the Kamba in battle. I raised the 
story that I had been given in 1980. His response was that “as small boys, it would have been 
boring to tell you that the Maasai are weak (laughs), I think he (my friend‟s father) wanted 
you to admire them and also keep off, not to go near them”. Strauss and Corbin argue that 
early concepts often provide a departure point from which to begin data collection but warn 
that once data collection begins, initial conceptions should be gradually discarded as this 
could hinder discovery (1998: 205). 
Of all the strategies that were adopted to assemble reliable data (e.g. participant observation, 
relating what was said and actual action and using different sources of data) time was the most 
significant factor. In a number of occasions, and owing to my prolonged stay in the field, 
respondents would retract some things they had told me earlier either after having a better 
understanding of my research activities or after realising that spending more time in the area 
had yielded information that had „falsified‟ what they had said. Regarding an incident where 
the Maasai were involved in an armed conflict with the Kamba at the Simba trading centre in 
February 1999, the chairman of the centre had given me an account that conflicted with what I 
gathered from other sources. Meeting me two months after our first interview, he asked me to 
see him later “for some clarifications”. When I met him,  he said: “Young man, do you know 
there are things we tell passers-by, we are on the main road, people keep on asking questions, 
you cannot tell them everything...I did not know that you were going to be around that long” 
(Makonyi, 21/06/2000). This partly touches on one of the basic things in ethnographic 
research, namely that actors may not share with outside investigators what they share among 
themselves (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001: 163).  
As I conducted fieldwork, I would form certain initial impressions which changed as more 
insights emerged. I must admit that when I began fieldwork in Maasailand, homesteads 
looked rather similar, people appeared more or less dressed the same way and it was difficult 
to tell who enjoyed what status, wielded what power, could influence what or could be a 
potential informant. From what started as a fairly „homogenous‟ group, I was to find out that 
the Maasai were not only such a socially differentiated group but even antagonistic. Whatever 
was to emerge as „differences‟ therefore between the „Kamba‟ and the „Maasai‟ had to be 
treated with lots of caution as the lines of distinction got thinner as overlaps emerged. There 
were many things that I surmised to hold only to be confronted with other dimensions in the 
course of the study. I was, for instance, told repeatedly that the Kamba and the Maasai are 
“enemies” although day-to-day activities appeared rather harmonious and reciprocal. Asking a 
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Kamba what he had to say about the Maasai, he  quipped: “You know the Kamba and the 
Maasai are enemies”. As a follow up, I asked him, “could you please tell me why they are 
enemies”? He said: “You are Kamba, if you do not know, how am I supposed to know”. Apart 
from equating group membership to shared knowledge, his reluctance to clarify revealed not 
only the fluidity of such claims but also how actors can mislead investigators. Asking the 
same question to different actors led to a more integrative position. It also helped talking to 
„outsiders‟ who had stayed in these areas for considerable time to take me through what they 
had to go through themselves. 
I had to devise ways of establishing how differences as well as notions of commonality were 
constructed and made sense of. What did the Kamba mean, for example, when they said that 
they were more “modernised” than their counterparts, the Maasai. I found it misleading, to 
assume that the Kamba „traditional‟ systems had been broken down. This had to be seen in 
relative terms. In fact, Ndolo (1989) had shown that the Kamba „lagged behind‟ other groups 
like the Kikuyu and the Luhya in the adoption of western education and Christianity. 
Compared to the Maasai however, they were „better off‟. Maasai culture has had stronger 
elements of persistence and resilience; less watered down compared to the Kamba.  
 I had to reckon with the fact that Maasai „traditional‟ appearances were often deceptive. Their 
traditional dress could deceive a newcomer to make the assumption that such dressing styles 
represented illiterate and „rural-based‟ populations. An American researcher I met in Kajiado 
noted that making “negative” comments about the Maasai in English assuming that no one 
around him would comprehend what he said had landed him into “trouble.” Incidentally, this 
applied for the Maasai „elite‟ too. I had to get accustomed to the fact that the lean, tall youth in 
full traditional regalia including a club and a sword and with dusty legs, could be a university 
student on holiday or somebody who has never been to school. The Kamba used to claim that 
these similarities in dress and appearance had led to loss of cattle as raiders would be hardly 
distinguishable from the rest when paraded by police for identification. But even in “uniform”, 
there were some outstanding distinctions. The „educated‟ ones tended to ignore some pieces 
of attire, associated rather closely, were more inquisitive and spent most of their time in the 
market centres. More details on physical appearances are provided in chapter three. 
 
2.3.1.3   Situating the study: Description of the site 
Let me start by presenting the wider context within which this study was conducted. The 
study was carried out at a time when Kenya was in a deep economic crisis following the 
suspension of World Bank and IMF financial support and a declining tourism sector that had 
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not recovered after the ethnic clashes of 1997 that took place in and around the historical town 
of Mombasa. Suspension of aid was based on accusations of bad governance, poor human 
rights record, a bloated civil service, corruption and failure of the government to move fast 
enough in the privatisation of loss making state corporations (parastatals). The structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) prescribed by the World Bank over the years had seen drastic 
reductions in the financing of education and health services.
38
 The cost-sharing policy 
introduced in government health facilities and in schools had led to reduced access to health 
care (with many resorting to herbal medicine) and falling school attendance respectively.
39
 An 
education officer
40
 in Kajiado district noted that rising costs in education had worked against 
government efforts to encourage the Maasai to send their children to school. He noted that the 
number of Maasai girls dropping out of school and married off had increased, while fathers 
“conveniently” claimed that they could not afford to keep them in school. Local 
administrators also said that “petty crimes” (e.g. theft of cattle, sheep and goats) had increased 
along the Makueni-Kajiado boundary. This was particularly attributed to “idle young men” 
(some school drop outs) who could not find other means of generating income. Although 
these thefts were not only interethnic but also intra, they were mainly portrayed as 
“intertribal”. In general, the worsening economic situation in Kenya was compounded by the 
re-ethnicisation of the political sphere as leaders mobilised their ethnic groups in preparation 
for the “Moi succession”.41 The instrumentalisation of ethnicity had taken root in the early 
1990‟s during the debates that led to the re-introduction of a multiparty system of government.  
The study was also carried out through a period of drastic climatic and seasonal change; 
starting with harvests and abundant pastures to a time of drought and famine. The infamous El 
Nino heavy rains of 1997/98 that swept through much of East Africa were double edged, 
destroying many infrastructural establishments but resulting in bumper harvests. The 1999 
period therefore was a time of plenty, farmers had food stocks while cattle keepers had 
pastures and water. As we moved to 2000, rains failed and the fortunes were gradually 
overturned, there was rampant food and water shortages, decimated pastures and enormous 
livestock losses. Nevertheless, the people in the study areas are no strangers to these shifts but 
each time they occur, strategies of survival are realigned, modes of exchange between the 
                                                          
38
 With few exceptions, this has been the same story in many African countries. In Zambia for instance, in view 
of the deteriorating living conditions under SAPs, the people renamed the acronym “Strangling African People”, 
accusing the Bretton Woods institutions of marginalising African countries and trapping them in a cycle of 
dependency and underdevelopment. 
39
 The new coalition government, which took over from Moi after the 2002 elections, re-introduced free primary 
school education. 
40
 A Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) official. 
41
 President Moi,  who ruled Kenya for 24 years, stepped down in 2002. 
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groups are altered and intensified and there are more incidences of ethnic conflict as groups 
compete for scarce resources. There was movement of Maasai cattle into Ukambani and other 
parts of Maasailand while both groups relied more and more on the market for the provision 
of foodstuffs. But in all this misery, there were inherent signs of resilience. It was also a time 
when the Maasai not only in Kenya but also in the neighbouring Tanzania continued to press 
for ancestral land rights in the wake of diminishing grazing areas. 
The study was conducted in Makueni and Kajiado districts of Kenya (see map below). The 
Kamba and the Maasai live in different districts but it is mainly along the shared border where, 
like all interface analyses, the examination of interethnic interaction is particularly intense, 
dynamic and unpredictable. Apart from droughts that threaten the Maasai economic base 
through livestock losses, they are also confronted by a serious health crisis.   
By going through the records and his own experience, the clinical officer at the Simba Health 
Centre did associate certain infections to lifestyles, housing, cultural practices etc. He 
identified common infections like Brucellosis, which he associated with inadequately cooked 
meat or organs like kidneys and liver that are also eaten raw. He attributed Tuberculosis to the 
limited ventilation in Maasai huts, which eases transmission. Tuberculosis has also been 
identified as one of the commonest opportunistic diseases among patients with the AIDS virus 
(HIV). The clinical officer also identified sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) which he 
attributed to “promiscuity”, a common stereotype of the Maasai. There is also typhoid which 
was attributed to contaminated water sources, while eye infections were associated with cross-
infections through flies. But, as a prophylactic against diseases, the drinking of milk however 
helps to keep illnesses at bay. International NGOs particularly AMREF and bilateral 
organisations like the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) have been active in 
improving the health related problems in Kajiado through safer water supply, primary health 
care campaigns and setting up of health facilities as well as support for the existing ones. A 
Maasai pastoralist told me: “There are things which we are also reviewing ourselves like 
dirisa 
42
(windows) and sleeping with women. To say the truth, sex is not a problem to a 
grown up Maasai man!...now we hear of this disease (AIDS) and we are concerned…they say 
some of the people who are dying now die because of it and it is true... people are dying at a 
faster rate these days” (Nkari, 18/05/2000). The challenge has been to transmit AIDS 
messages in such a way that campaigners are not seen as necessarily condemning Maasai 
sexual practices but rather sharing information on the deadly virus. Another issue has been to 
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 Corrupted Swahili word dirisha. The Kamba call a window ndilisya, also a loan word from the Swahili 
language.  
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create awareness in an environment where AIDS has become just one among many other life-
threatening conditions. 
Below are two maps showing the location of Kajiado and Makueni districts and the specific 
area of study respectively. 
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Map 1. The administrative and „ethnic‟ districts of Kenya                        
 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 1997. Kajiado district is shaded, and adjacent to it is Makueni district. The Maasai 
inhabit Kajiado, Narok and Trans Mara districts while the Kamba native districts are Makueni, Machakos, Kitui 
and Mwingi. 
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Map 2. The area of study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This map was sketched by a „local‟ cartographer. Note the railway line that marks the political border between 
Maasailand and Ukambani and the trading centres along the line, particularly Sultan Hamud, Emali, Simba, 
Kiboko and Makindu which feature prominently in the study. Note also other places like Chyulu, Oloitokitok 
(Loitokitok) and Mashuru. 
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Both districts receive inadequate rainfall and are categorised as semi-arid. Kajiado and 
Makueni are food-deficit areas, often relying on the state and charitable organisations for the 
provision of foodstuffs during prolonged droughts. Sharing harsh climatic conditions, infuses 
a sense of commonality among the Kamba and the Maasai. The Kenya Human Development 
Report,
43
 released by the University of Nairobi in May 2002, says that the most vulnerable 
and poor groups in Kenya are pastoralists (e.g. the Maasai) and peasant agriculturalists (e.g. 
the Kamba). The theme of commonality will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four. 
Apart from these notions of sameness based on aridity and vulnerability, Maasailand and 
Ukambani are paradoxically areas with gross disparities. The table below shows the 
distribution of livestock. 
 
Table 1: Livestock production (1995) 
                
   Makueni(Ukambani)                         Kajiado(Maasailand) 
 
    Cattle     258,700                                   822,401 
    Sheep     116,900                                   874,469 
    Goats     286,000                                   853,677 
    Poultry   611,640                                   398,429  
 
Source: District development plans of Makueni and Kajiado, 1997.
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The table shows that Kajiado has an extremely high concentration of cattle, sheep and goats. 
Just to know how big this disparity is, one has to bear in mind that Makueni has twice the 
human population of Kajiado. But on the other hand, Kajiado is almost three times the size of 
Makueni.
45
 On the other hand, it is rather conspicuous though that when it comes to poultry, 
Kajiado lags behind. The explanation is that traditionally, the Maasai usually neither keep, eat 
nor like chicken (elukunku), which they equate to „birds‟(mtunyi). Those who keep poultry in 
Kajiado therefore are either the „progressive‟ Maasai or migrant populations, particularly the 
Kamba and the Kikuyu. In Ukambani, it is taken as great honour by visitors if a chicken is 
slaughtered for them. Chicken is a delicacy reserved for very special occasions like weddings 
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 See The Daily Nation, Friday, 3. May 2002. 
44
 Compared to Kajiado, Makueni figures appear rounded up.  
45
 Kajiado measures 21,105 square kilometres compared to Makueni‟s 7,440.  In terms of cattle population per 
square kilometre, Kajiado has 39 cattle while Makueni has 34 cattle.  In terms of surface area therefore, the 
disparity is small. 
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or fund raising ceremonies for the „guests of honour‟. Otherwise, chicken are kept as 
alternative sources of income sold to meet the daily monetary needs (e.g. to buy sugar, 
cooking fat or soap). Besides, with limited land acreage in Ukambani, keeping chicken is 
preferred because they require little space. In addition, unlike cattle, sheep and goats, their 
prices are more stable and they are easier to feed regardless of the season. What is more, 
among the Kamba, ownership of chicken is used as a benchmark upon which one could 
determine how „badly-off‟ a household is. In other words, it is the minimum that a family 
should own. A „very poor‟ person is often said to be one who “does not even own a chicken”. 
Among the Maasai, one is regarded that poor if he does not own any cattle although that is 
said to have been a long bias expressed by the cattle-owning section of the Maasai,  against 
gatherers or iltorrobo and those who tilled the land, the ilmeek (Spear, 1993: 4).  This 
variation should not be construed to mean that the Maasai had „higher‟ standards in setting the 
„poverty line‟. These „limits‟ have to be  understood within each group‟s social, cultural and 
economic milieu. For instance, a Kamba household could „function‟ normally without any 
cattle. That would be inconceivable among the Maasai. This is not to say that cattle have no 
significance among the Kamba. In fact, Ndolo shows that even during the colonial period, the 
semi-pastoral nature of the Kamba economy diversified their income base making them more 
averse to wage-labour compared to the Kikuyu who occupied more arable land (1989: 117). 
Apart from the distribution of livestock, another attribute of distinction is polygyny. This is 
more common among the Maasai. According to the Kenya Welfare Monitoring Survey III 
published in May 1996, 8.6% of all married men in Kajiado (Maasailand) were polygynous 
(had more than one wife) compared to 1.7% in Makueni. As noted earlier, the Kajiado figures 
would even be much higher if migrant and entirely monogamous groups like the Kikuyu and 
Kamba were excluded from the statistics. The same survey also showed that Ukambani has 
more women-headed households.  
 
2.3.2   Application of the ethnographic research methodology 
2.3.2.1   From a quantitative background to interpretative approach 
Research methodology in the social sciences is a highly contested subject (Lachenmann, 
1995). Strauss and Corbin correctly point out that both qualitative and quantitative methods 
have roles to play in the development of theory (1998: 34). They advocate a methodology 
where both approaches interplay and feedback into each other. The challenge remains: How 
does one strike a balance between the temptation to seek representativeness or what is typical 
in a given area and treating as paramount the informant‟s perspective or the local perceptions 
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and knowledge systems. Anyhow, the partner‟s views or presentation of his life-world should 
reflect on the broader society in which he is a member.  
Bourdieu‟s book, Logic of Practice, was particularly helpful in expounding on the distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative research. He begins by pointing out that social science is 
divided into what constitutes subjectivity and objectivity (Bourdieu, 1990: 25) and notes 
further that although there is antagonism between these two modes of knowledge, there is the 
subjective experience of the world and also the objectification of the objective conditions of 
that experience (see also Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). Bourdieu argues that  “social science 
must not only...break with native experience and the native representation of that experience 
but also, by a second break, call into question the presuppositions inherent in the position of 
the objective observer who, seeking to interpret practices, tends to bring into the object the 
principles of his relation to the object, as is shown for example by the privileged status he 
gives to communicative and epistemic functions, which inclines him to reduce exchanges to 
pure symbolic exchanges” (1990: 27-36). The observer has to distinguish the discrepancy 
between the practically experienced reasons and the “objective” reasons of practice. The study 
adopted an intersubjective approach, in which, actors‟ subjectiveness attained „objectivity‟ in 
as far as they were assumed to be shared by others within a given space and time frame. 
Everyday life-world was taken as intersubjective (as a “social world”). It was assumed that 
actors‟ life-worlds were subjectively motivated and articulated purposively based on their 
particular interests and what is feasible for them (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 15-17). 
Similarly, Moore (1994: 3) notes that human experience is intersubjective and embodied, not 
individualised and fixed but “irredeemably” social and processual. 
Bourdieu criticised “context” or “situation” approaches which sought to correct the structural 
approach. He avers that these approaches have fallen back on the “free choice of a rootless, 
unattached, pure subject” and argues further that the so-called situational analysis “remains 
locked within the framework of the rule and the exception” (1990: 53). He critiques the 
objectivist view that tends to look at social practices from their “state of pure appearance” 
rather than “as it is lived and enacted”(1990: 104).  
The methodology debate, which has preoccupied social scientists for decades, remains a bone 
of contention in my own department at the University of Nairobi. Most of my colleagues in 
the department of sociology are schooled in the quantitative approach in the generation of 
social knowledge and although qualitative research methodology is taught as a course, it is 
basically treated as a „supplementary tool‟ that should at best be used to enrich quantitative 
data. What is more, qualitative research methodology is not taught at graduate level. A 
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colleague who researched on how tourism impacted on agriculture along the Kenyan coast 
proposed to use qualitative research methods. His professor had nothing against it but he said 
to him: “Just use quantitative methods to avoid unnecessary questions”. It was clear to the 
candidate that the supervisor was not exactly sure how the methodology would be defended 
during the oral examination. I still recall an incident in 1994 where, a PhD candidate who had 
used the grounded theory approach in her research on „teenage sexuality‟ faced serious 
problems with one of her supervisors, who dismissed her rich narratives and biographies as 
“journalistic” insisting that for a doctorate thesis, “hypotheses have to be rigorously tested”. 
With the support of the other supervisor, she defended her position and was finally awarded 
the doctorate degree. Admittedly, the thesis remains one of the most spectacular works ever 
presented before a board of examiners in the faculty. Nevertheless, that experience did not 
deter some of my colleagues from asking why I was not using questionnaires for data 
collection. Severally, I had to defend my methodological approach in departmental seminars. I 
stressed the importance of developing analytic codes and categories developed from field data 
rather than preconceived hypothetical codes (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Apart from my 
area of study that called for an ethnographic approach, and therefore ruling out the use of a 
questionnaire, qualitative research is generally more suitable in most African settings where 
settlements are not lineally organised, modes of production and relations are quite complex 
and data bases are scanty and far between. The guiding principle was to seek reflections from 
individual respondents and groups. The functioning and dynamics of  the Kamba and Maasai 
societies was constructed by following closely the day-to-day activities of some its members. 
I was keen to capture what was typical in a given area or situation as well as allowing room 
for variations. An attempt was made to see reality from the standpoint of actors or research 
partners which made it possible to acquire the vantage point necessary to see not only patterns 
of interethnic coexistence but also power structures. 
I remember discussing my research methods with a respondent named Mutua.
46
 He had asked 
why I was not using a questionnaire and wondered why I was seeing him severally. On the 
issue of the questionnaire, I recall telling him that I did not want to end up “testing” my own 
ideas but rather I was seeking his. He sought more clarification. I tried to explain how 
participant observation and oral interviews elicit more reliable data compared to a 
questionnaire. I suggested to him that he could, for instance, give a very accurate account 
about his close friends, family, parents or close relatives whom he shares in their daily lives 
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 Mutua is a Kamba and school drop out, worked for a Maasai pastoralist as a cattle herder. More details about 
him can be found in chapter five (5.1.3). His inquiry on methodology is also revisited  on the section on 
“methodological challenges” (2.3.3). 
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and yet he has never administered a questionnaire to them. That appeared to make sense to 
him. He agreed that if he would have access to a  questionnaire that had been administered to 
his family members, he would most likely find certain pieces of information that may not 
reflect their real life experiences as he knew it as a co-associate.  
 
2.3.2.2   Selection of research partners  
The study borrowed a lot from the ideas of qualitative researchers, particularly Barney Glaser, 
Anselm Strauss, Juliet Corbin, William Whyte and David Silverman. Other useful insights 
came from the actor-oriented approach of Norman Long and Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu‟s 
“Logic of Practice”. Strauss and Corbin define qualitative research as an inquiry about 
people‟s lives, lived experiences, behaviours, emotions, feelings, social movements, cultural 
phenomena and interactions (1998: 11). 
The study was done through episodes of ethnographic research deploying in particular 
participant observation, informal interviews, biographies, in-depth interviews, cartographic 
techniques (making maps) and recording interviews (audiotapes) where possible. Selection of 
interview partners was based on the subject of inquiry, ethnic affiliation, one‟s knowledge 
base and the willingness to participate in the study. Most interviewees were selected through 
the snow-balling method. 
Being a relational study, there were certain regional variations and methodological challenges. 
For instance, Maasai men were generally keen to participate in the study and would even 
insist on being present as I interviewed their wives, while in Ukambani, men would often tell 
me: “Talk to my wife” insisting that women were in a “better position” to provide me with the 
information I wanted. This was a pointer to the variations in family power structures and how 
knowledge systems were distributed among men and women. The following account shows 
how I met one of my research partners in Maasailand. 
Eager to establish contacts among the Maasai, I took a walk from the Simba shopping centre
47
 
and through narrow paths, thorny bushes, overgrazed fields and noisy bleating cattle, I came 
across a Maasai Manyata (actually, enkang
48
). Outside one of the huts stood a woman who 
was curiously looking at me. I greeted her in Swahili. She did not answer back and instead she 
entered into the hut immediately. There were some two small children playing outside another 
hut. There were six huts in total. I walked into the compound and went straight to the hut she 
had entered into. Before I could call her, she came out and asked who I was and what I wanted. 
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 This is about 150 kilometres south of Nairobi. 
48
 The word  Imanyat (manyata) is used rather loosely to refer to „homestead‟ which is actually enkang. Manyata 
are actually warrior homes/camps built after initiation into warriorhood (Ilmurrani). Enkang is the thorn fenced 
homestead with several huts and where women, elders and cattle live. 
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She spoke in some broken Swahili but we could communicate. I told her my name, where I 
came from and  that I was doing research in the area. I also told her that I had permission from 
the local chief to conduct research. “So, what do you want from me, I don‟t talk to 
strangers”49, she posed. I told her that if she could spare some time I could explain.  
She told me that she has no time since she had a lot to do. I told her that I could come another 
day if she gave me an appointment. She said that I was wasting time with her since she 
“doesn‟t know anything”. I told her that I was interested in her lived experiences and 
everyday life. She responded: “I only milk cows, cook and  fetch firewood (pause)...I am sure 
that is not what you want”. I told her that was a major component of what I was interested in. 
She replied: “If you want to know anything about us (Maasai) come and talk to my husband 
or look for other men”. I told her that I will talk to the husband and „other men‟ but that I was 
also interested in interviewing her. She told me to come back the following day at around 10 
in the morning. I came back the following day as agreed. It was on a Saturday. She was not in 
the homestead. I met a co-wife who told me that Nkata had gone to Kibwezi to sell milk. I 
was tempted to interview her (Nkata‟s co-wife) but I felt that could be counterproductive 
jeopardising the rapport I had established. I was not to see Nkata until the 10th of December 
although I used to check on her almost on a daily basis. In the meantime, I had also 
established some other contacts in the area.  
When I met her, she told me that she was not expecting me and that she had assumed that I 
got “better sources” of what I wanted. I asked her why she was not home on the 4th of 
December as agreed and she  retorted: “Did you expect me to sit here and wait for you?”50  
She offered me a stool to sit on. She remained standing. She told me that her husband had 
instructed her not to talk to me before I met him. Lucky enough, he arrived as I was trying to 
negotiate with her. He greeted me and spoke in Maa with his wife and she left immediately. 
He told me that he had already enquired from the chief about my presence in the area. He 
wanted to know why I was keen on talking to his wife “when you know very well that she 
will tell you nothing”.51 I insisted that the study would not be comprehensive if I talked to 
men only. He gave me the go-ahead but as an afterthought, he asked me whether I was in a 
position to find a job for his son. I told him that we could discuss that later. He said: “We 
know you people, you come here, ask us questions, waste our time and you never want to help 
us”. I asked him which “people” was he was referring to but he did not answer. He talked to 
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 She actually said “people I do not know”; later revised after she said later that from the first time she saw me, 
she knew I was not Maasai…and “not from here.” 
50
 It appeared that giving me an appointment was tantamount to sending me away. 
51
 He did not mean that his wife would deliberately not share information but rather, she was not in a position to 
„know‟ a lot. According to him, she would „mislead‟ me. 
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his wife briefly and left. On that note, I began the interviewing process. Nkata was to tell me 
later that there are many things that men do in Maasailand without consulting their wives: 
“Maasai men think that women cannot keep a secret, they can say dangerous things to 
outsiders, they are not reliable”. Data were gathered mainly in four  separate occasions. Apart 
from interviewing her at home, I also attended her “self-help” group meeting and  
accompanied her to Kibwezi trading centre where she had gone to sell milk. Apart from 
interviews, simple and participant observation were therefore important supplementary 
sources of data. She used to call me “my son”. Little did she know that she was only 3 years 
older than me! My judgement was that telling her the „truth‟ would have been to my 
disadvantage, since it would have altered our „mother-son‟ relationship which was working 
perfectly. Regarding her suitability to the study, she represents what I would consider as a 
„typical  rural Maasai woman of today‟. She is a woman at the threshold of various interface 
levels. She dropped out of school after little formal education and married an illiterate and 
much older man as second wife, but she has made an effort to make sure that her children 
benefit  from formal education. She was also engaged in milk trade with the Kamba as her 
main customers (although she had said that her activities were just limited to the household). 
Nkata‟s experiences are presented in chapter five. I had a total of about 45 interview partners. 
During the entire fieldwork, neither the research partners nor local administrators (with the 
exception of one) bothered to ask for my research permit. This was a departure from what I 
went through during my fieldwork for my masters thesis way back in 1990/91. This change 
could be partly attributed to a freer society after the adoption of a multiparty democracy in the 
early 1990‟s.  
 
2.3.2.3   Flexibility and „using what works‟ 
Flexibility and creativity during fieldwork is considered central to qualitative research (Karthy 
Charmaz and Richard Mitchell, 2001; Glaser and Strauss, 1979; Strauss, 1997 and Strauss and 
Corbin 1998, Whyte, 1984). Irrespective of the documentary guidelines on qualitative 
research that I had read before fieldwork, I made an attempt to be as adaptive and innovative 
as possible. I was not only guided by the principle of multiple realities but the knowledge that 
what had worked elsewhere was not necessarily going to work in my situation. This flexibility 
therefore made it possible for the study to make some inroads in some of the conventional  
practices in qualitative methodology. Different actors related with me differently. Some would 
relate with me on the basis of gender, as a researcher, and as a “foreigner” while to others, I 
was a faculty member at the University of Nairobi. In some occasions, being registered for 
doctorate study in a European university made it easier to recruit some partners. A retired 
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police officer noted that: “Local researchers gather data for nothing”, adding that those from 
other countries look “more serious”. For some respondents, the mention of the word “PhD” 
thrilled them and wanted to be associated with the study saying they had never been involved 
in such a study before.  
In view of the general living conditions and income levels, I had chosen not to use a car. 
Whereas walking around and using public means worked perfectly well, to some respondents, 
that was cause to doubt my authenticity. In what was ideally an experiment, a fairly influential 
man who kept on postponing appointments saying that he was pressed for time agreed to be 
interviewed after I drove to his compound. Surprisingly, he apologised for his earlier stance 
noting that he had not expected somebody who was teaching at the university “to be walking 
around in dirty jeans and snickers”.  
In Sultan Hamud, a respondent told  me that “after talking to me, you don‟t need to talk to any 
other Maasai”. This put me in an awkward position since being an influential man, I did not 
know how he would react if he found me interviewing somebody else. I had to engage him 
into a long conversation so that he would appreciate the notion that interviewing others was 
not necessarily aimed at „cross-checking‟ what he had shared with me but rather to benefit 
from other people‟s unique experiences. A local councillor once met me in Simba and told me 
that he had been told that I was carrying out research in “his area”  and that he was wondering 
why I had not gone to interview him. I had to save the situation by explaining to him that 
since he was a “big man”, I had planned to talk to him last so that I could also share with him 
my findings on the area. This appeared to please him and offered to assist me to attend some 
local public meetings. Maasai leaders were generally concerned about the image of the 
Maasai which they said had been presented “negatively” in books and in the media. For this 
reason, they felt duty bound to provide “accurate” information.  
Local power structures shaped the interviewing process including who should be interviewed 
before whom. An attempt to interview the chairperson of Simba trading centre before 
interviewing the local chief was met with the response: “The head is more important than the 
neck...talk to the chief first then come and talk to us”. The chairperson said that he did not 
want to be accused of undermining the provincial administration.
52
 There was an ethnic 
dimension too. Whereas the chief was Maasai, the chairperson of the centre was Kamba 
although Simba is in Maasailand. I will revisit this in chapter six. 
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 This is a prefectoral system of administration introduced by the British colonial government and retained by 
the post-independence state. The civil servant posted to a region (e.g. to a “division” or “district”) acts as a 
delegate of the central government and officers of individual ministries in his/her region are subordinate to 
him/her. Further clarifications are provided in chapter seven. 
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Apart from selected and carefully chosen respondents, data were also obtained from „casual 
discussions‟ held with people in a bus, on the road side or when I accidentally listened in on a 
conversation. Some of these incidences would provide very useful information that would 
clarify certain codes and categories. The whole research exercise was not a steady continuous 
process but one marked by ups and downs. It would at times take one or several days without 
„any data‟ and then a day would make all the difference. Data would also be gathered at „odd 
places‟ outside the research area or at times when I had taken time to relax. On three 
occasions, I left respondents in a restaurant to rush to my room to make some notes and then 
came back within a reasonable interlude. At another time, a respondent whom I was listening 
to wondering how he would react if I took notes, raised the issue himself saying that I should 
note down what he was saying “or is it that I am telling you nonsense”. I had to learn that 
each day, each respondent and each place presented unique challenges that had to be dealt 
with spontaneously. When I met the chief of Kiboko location to arrange for a suitable date of 
interview, he ended up saying so much regarding a ranch where dominantly Kamba and some 
Maasai families had been evicted by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS).
53
 I was to realise 
later that he had provided detailed information basically because in his judgement, I was not 
taking notes. Being in a restaurant, we ended up talking for about 3 hours. Luckily, since I had 
found the discussion very informative, I used to take a break, rush to my room and note down 
what we had discussed. My absence passed for normal urinal breaks which he also took to 
pass water. This experience is similar to Baumann‟s strategies during his study in Southhall 
(London) where he talks of “hurrying to the toilet to take my notes” (1996: 65). In my case, 
all these were precautionary measures as the chief had given me an appointment to see him 
“officially” the following day at around 9.00 hours. When I went to see him as agreed, with 
my writing paper and pen ready to take notes, he said that he had told me “everything” the 
previous day. This was interesting because, during our three-hour „casual‟ conversation, he 
kept on telling me that “I shall give you all the details tomorrow”. My conclusion was that 
although he knew that I was doing research, the absence of a questionnaire or writing material 
and a pen was to him a casual talk which encouraged him to share information freely without 
little if any inhibition. The social environment was quite relaxed and he must have thought 
that since I was not recording the information, whatever he said would be of no consequence.  
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 This is discussed in chapter six to show how state authorities shape ethnic competition over land resources and 
conflict. 
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2.3.3   The researcher‟s social position 
 2.3.3.1   Being „Kamba‟ among the Maasai: Identity dilemma in the field 
During the study, it was assumed that the nature of data gathered were shaped and influenced 
not only by the situation and the actors, but my own personal identity. Doing research among 
the Maasai was quite a challenging task. On the one hand, I was conscious about some of the 
biases and stereotypes I had acquired over the years as a Kamba. A researcher is shaped partly 
by the “degrees of difference” in cultural background or ethnic identification between him and 
the “study subjects” (Whyte, 1984: 28). Every effort was made to ensure that the study did not 
reinforce essentialist notions that I had acquired over the years as well as some of the biases 
reflected in the media and also in various research works: The idea was to remain „open‟ to 
learn. Doing research among the Maasai made me appreciate some of the advantages a 
„foreigner‟ may have in carrying out research in places away from „home‟.  
Many of the Maasai that I came into contact with took it as an opportunity to say what they 
thought about the Kamba. For instance, Mr Solinketi 
54of Sultan Hamud said that: “I am 
happy you have come to talk to us”. To him, I was not just a researcher but also as a 
messenger. I was being treated as if I had been sent on some fact-finding mission after which I 
would go back and report what I found out from the other area. The phrase “tell them that...” 
or waambie in Swahili or taliki in Maa was used quite often. In the completed form, the 
Maasai would say taliki Ilmeek tiaki mikira ilmankati which means, “tell the Kamba we are 
not enemies”. Others would say: “Tell them we need each other…we are enemies but we live 
together…“we are not wachokozi (troublemakers) anymore” or that the Maasai are friendly 
people. Others stressed that: “The Maasai are not as stupid/ignorant as they (Kamba) think” 
and that “they should not be taking us for granted”.  Another said: “Both of us are supporters 
of Moi”.55 An elder noted: “They (Kamba) should ignore what the politicians say.”56 A cattle 
trader said: “Some of us (Maasai) voted for Ngilu…that Kamba woman”. One respondent told 
me to “correct” the notion that the Maasai pin their spears outside a hut as a sign that they 
were having sex with the woman of that hut. This “correction” can be found in chapter three. 
Demands to “correct” what were seen as “falsehoods” were generally made by the Maasai 
„elite‟.57 
The statements above touch on very many aspects of Kamba-Maasai relationship. There are 
stereotypes (discussed in chapters three and four), an emic definition of coexistence (“we are 
enemies but we live together”) as well as commonalities and ethnic alliances (e.g. “both of us 
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 A retired teacher and former councillor. 
55
 Revisited in chapter seven.  
56
 Awareness that politicians shape much of the discourse that defines interethnic relations. 
57
 Particularly teachers and local leaders (e.g. councillors). 
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are supporters of Moi”). To the Maasai respondents, I was not just a researcher but an 
ambassador who would bridge some of the gaps identified between them and the Kamba. To 
other Maasai, I was an informant and for these, they did not lose an opportunity to make 
enquiries about the Kamba, particularly their political orientation. It appeared that some 
sought to confirm what they already knew. All in all, this reciprocal relationship, where I got 
research partners who volunteered information and allowed me to stay in their midst while 
they had in me a listener who would take a message of goodwill to the “other side”, enhanced 
commitment to the study. There was evidence of commonalities and the fluidity of social 
boundaries as Maasai actors said they voted for a Kamba presidential candidate in the 1997 
elections or that both groups “support Moi”. There was an attempt to deconstruct certain 
stereotypes e.g. by saying that the Maasai are not “ignorant” as well as appreciating forces of 
social transformation which had resulted in reductions in cattle raids. Others alluded to the 
fact that some of the „local‟ tensions and misunderstandings had an external dimension and 
cautioned: “Ignore what the politicians say”.  
Since I was not proficient in Maa language,
58
 I employed the services of a pre-university 
student to assist me in the interpretation of texts or during interviews where the respondent 
could not speak Swahili or English. He played a crucial role in the enhancement of my 
hermeneutic approach, that is, in the pursuit of a more integrative ethnographic experience. I 
do recognise that command of a local language permits access to a wide range of data that 
may not otherwise be taken advantage of. I must say however that my inability to master Maa 
at times worked to my advantage. As a „stranger‟, I became a centre of interest. The study 
generated a lot of curiosity among the Maasai. As some spoke in Maa, others volunteered to 
translate. Maasai respondents got immersed in the study with commitment that I did not 
witness among the Kamba. One of them told me that an exercise that had forced me to talk to 
people who could only speak Maa “must be very important”.59 He noted further that  “people 
come here to ask about water problems or to laugh at us! They don‟t ask how we relate with 
our neighbours”. Besides, I was to learn in due course that the Kamba who spoke Maa were 
often despised and treated with suspicion by the Maasai.
60
 They were the wajuaji or the 
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 The time available for fieldwork (one year) was not adequate to learn and master Maa. 
59
 A remark by Mr Palalelei, a Maasai elder, in Kiboko (15/04/2000). More information on Palalelei is provided 
in the empirical chapters. A photo of his homestead is provided in chapter five. 
60
 Although mastery of other people‟s language can no doubt facilitate assimilation or integration, there are 
occasions when this is not the case. During my stay in Germany for instance, there have been situations where 
good command of German contributes to appreciation and builds bridges that would otherwise be impossible to 
achieve but I must add that in some other situations, speaking broken German or English has served me best. The 
latter scenario portrays me as a „foreigner‟, somebody on transit or incapable of accessing certain benefits in the 
German job market or the welfare system thereby attracting sympathy. I am taken as somebody who needs help, 
one who is not a „threat‟ or competitor. 
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“know it all” who “exploit the Maasai”. This was a surprise since bilinguals should 
theoretically provide fertile ground for harmonious coexistence, common understanding and 
integration.  
In some instances, some Maasai assumed that I could speak Maa fluently and that I was 
therefore „pretending‟. Sitonik61 asked me: “Why are you speaking to me in Swahili?...I know 
that you speak kimasai”. When I told him that I had learnt only a little, he said “we know that 
you speak but it is okay”. My concern was that by this assertion, he had concluded that I fitted 
into a Maasai analogy where the Kamba are said to be “cunning”. In actual fact, most Maasai 
respondents were more comfortable with “foreigners” who could not follow all their 
conversations. Other experiences were perhaps more dramatic. 
 
Negotiating for an interview 
A respondent selected for interview as a key informant refused to cooperate and proceeded to 
justify his position. This was the immediate and long serving chief of Kenyewa location. I 
went to visit him in the company of his son, who, in the course of my study, had become a 
friend and an informant too.  After the son (named Tenka) introduced me to the old man, the 
former chief spoke with the son for about 20 minutes in Maa. Then the father posed a long 
question in Swahili: “What is your name, what do you want and where do you come from”? 
After I answered those questions, he said that he wanted to know three things; one, what the 
study was all about; two, whether I had a letter from the local chief since he did not want to be 
accused of undermining him; and thirdly, whether he stood to benefit in any way from the 
study so that he would know “how much time I should allocate” for the exercise.  
I was shocked since I had not experienced this kind of resistance before. Even after 
expounding on the study objectives, he told me that he did not see how he would “benefit” 
from the exercise. He introduced an interesting dimension in the conversation when he said 
that “the Maasai have been taken advantage of by other people for so long”. Though fairly 
reticent about his experiences, he talked at length on how “people from outside” exploit the 
Maasai thinking that they are very “stupid”. He said that he was not going to be “another 
victim”. He was blunt: “If what I know is important, then you must pay for it”. He noted 
further that if I did not know, the Maasai have “woken up” and are not going to be “taken 
advantage of” anymore. He said that I was “lucky” if I had met Maasai who had assisted me 
with information “free of charge”. Telling him that data gathered for academic purposes 
should ordinarily not be monetarised did not change his mind. I tried to explain that the 
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 A male school teacher. 
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information he was to share with me was invaluable and could only be shared freely. To this 
suggestion, he quipped: “Kijana (young man), nothing is for free these days”. The statement 
was pregnant with meaning. My interpretation was that he was talking about the Maasai 
society in general whose leaders have been seeking redress for past and apparently present 
forms of exploitation. When I told him that I was doing the study for scholarly purposes, he 
said “now, are you not a Mkamba?, how will the Maasai benefit from your study?” I tried to 
insist that “we are all Kenyans”62 and that since I teach in a local university, students from all 
parts of Kenya would indeed benefit. He interjected and asked: “How many of your students 
are Maasai”? I told him that students are not admitted in the university on ethnic basis and 
therefore it would be difficult to know how many students are Maasai.  
I told him though that  there were some students I knew personally from Samburu district. He 
asked me: “You don‟t know that there is a difference between the Maasai and the 
Samburu?”63 He said that the reason I was not saying the number of Maasai students at the 
university was because “there is none...so you see, people like you come here get a lot of 
information but nobody cares about us”.64 Saying “nobody” cared about the Maasai struck me 
since the Kamba on the other hand talked about the Maasai as people who were “enjoying 
state protection” and “favours”. His arguments appeared to be consistent with some of the 
Maasai leaders who have been pressing for “indigenous” status on the one hand and a federal 
system of government on the other. The conversation is very similar to what Teresa Gowan 
experienced during her study among homeless recyclers. She warns that “one limitation of 
doing ethnography with the marginalised is that it is hard to see the mechanisms of exclusion” 
(2000: 75).  
On the issue of ethnicity, I explained that impartiality was one of the guiding principles of the 
study and that I was working with research partners drawn from the Maasai and the Kamba. 
As for the letter from the chief, I told him that I had not transgressed rules governing research 
as I had obtained a permit from the Office of the President and that I had reported to the chief 
in question who had in turn given me the go-ahead to conduct field research in the area. When 
I produced the permit, he said that he could not trust “documents from Nairobi” as they might 
have been forged. At that point, I had to leave and think of another strategy or look for 
alternative informants. But, in his bitterness, he had provided very useful information.  
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 A familiar phrase in the multiethnic Kenyan society. It is analysed in chapter 8. 
63
 This distinction is discussed in some detail in chapters one and four. 
64
 A common opinion among the Maasai. 
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Besides the fact that it proved rather difficult to trace the new chief
65
 for a letter, I had to 
acknowledge that the basic mutual trust with the former chief had been breached. Later on, I 
tried to make sense about the whole experience. The old man had behaved as if approaching 
him in the company of his son had amounted to some form of insubordination. A generational 
issue could not be ruled out considering the highly structured Maasai society. As a senior 
elder, he might have felt intimidated and would not submit to his son‟s request. On the other 
hand, he appeared not only quite unhappy with the Kamba but he also maintained an 
intransigent position. I was to find out later that some of the most serious interethnic conflicts 
were witnessed during his tenure as chief in-charge of what used to be a very expansive 
Maasai territory. I had also to take into account that he served during the one-party state when 
research was restricted.  
Apart from such challenges, my marital status was a problematic subject among the Maasai, 
where men marry as early as in their late teens and early 20‟s. It was often taken for granted 
that I was married. So the question used to be “when” I married and “how many children” I 
had and what my “wife” was doing for a living. With time, I discovered that depending on 
who was asking or making the assumption, I could jeopardise my position as a researcher by 
insisting on the truth. Being a society where age-grades and sets define relationships and 
responsibilities, being „unmarried‟ gave me a junior status. In some cases, saying that I was 
not married is what was seen as a lie. If the question was posed, I answered correctly, when it 
was taken as a foregone conclusion, I had to judge what would be the consequences of my 
clarification. 
 
2.3.3.2   Being „Kamba‟ among the Kamba 
Needless to say, being members of the groups we study accords the fieldworker certain 
advantages especially having the subjective knowledge necessary to truly understand the 
group‟s life experiences (Miller and Glassner, 1997: 104). But “doing anthropology at home”, 
as it were, has its own inherent challenges. A leading qualitative researchers cautions that one 
has to bear in mind that any interpretative act is influenced consciously or otherwise by the 
tradition to which the interpreter belongs and therefore, s/he has to accept a separation from 
his/her familiar universe and the study s/he is doing (Silverman, 1997: 12). 
As I began my fieldwork among the Kamba, I had felt that I had an edge conducting research 
in an area whose cultural practices, modes of subsistence, climatic conditions and ways of life 
were familiar to me. But, as I shall outline shortly, doing research among „my people‟ proved 
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 He had moved with his animals to the Kari grazing grounds in Kiboko (Makueni district). 
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to be relatively more challenging, all the advantages (including a mother tongue) 
notwithstanding. I was to realise that some of the „advantages‟ outlined above could also work 
against the researcher. In my case, the Kamba, unlike the Maasai, were more problematic to 
engage as research partners. While some used to be busy in the farms or engaged in various 
income generating activities, others would say that the Kamba who “know more” about the 
Maasai are those living among them or taken as wives. The paradox was that some of these 
Kamba women married to the Maasai would pose as “Maasai” and even deny their ethnic 
descent. Other Kamba considered the subject of inquiry as “very sensitive” with three 
respondents suggesting that for such information, I should talk to the “authorities”. One 
clarified that the Kamba have “permanent homesteads” and therefore can be easily traced if 
they were to be victimised for what they shared during interviews. Even more discouraging, 
other respondents insisted that they did not know “anything” about the Maasai “apart from 
what you know”. Others felt that I was basically interested in the Maasai respondents since 
earlier researchers who had conducted fieldwork in the area had targeted the Maasai and 
“ignored” the Kamba. I was concerned that such a notion might discourage many potential 
respondents from taking part in the study.  
Unlike among the Maasai, it was hardly taken for granted that I were married. Respondents 
used to ask. Older and illiterate men and women would also inquire about my clan 
membership and lineage while younger and educated respondents showed little interest. Those 
older respondents who happened to be members of my clan were usually more receptive to the 
study. Other research partners wanted to know I was interested in doing research on 
coexistence between the Maasai and the Kamba and not between the Kamba and other Bantu 
groups like the Kikuyu and the Embu. Others wanted to know how the data would be used. A 
respondent (Ann Mwende)
66
 asked: “Will this (the study) solve all the problems we have with 
the Maasai?” I told her that such studies could be useful in creating deeper understanding 
among the two groups. 
I had to be conscious of the fact that in a narrative, the story is being told to a particular 
audience/person and that it might have taken a different form if someone else were the listener 
(Miller and Glassner, 1997:100; quoting Riessman, 1993: 11). This might explain why on 
many occasions, Kamba respondents used to tell me “you know them (Maasai)”. To the 
Kamba, I was not just a researcher but also a member of the society, who shared their world 
view. Asking the Kiboko location chief about Kamba-Maasai relations, he quipped: “are you 
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testing me? Which Kamba doesn‟t know about these things”? (i.e. “enmity”). There was a 
general tendency to portray the Maasai as unchanging. 
 In the course of my study, I met and interacted with many teachers particularly those working  
in primary schools. They were generally so enthusiastic about the study that in some cases, 
they would seek to direct its course. Some had strong opinions about who should, and should 
not be interviewed. As „rural elite‟, teachers are accustomed to being „consulted‟ on various 
issues. Since they are often the only people on regular salaried employment in the rural areas, 
they are role models in Ukambani and to some extent, also among the Maasai. With higher 
literacy rates, they shape and influence opinion on many issues ranging from political 
representation, ethnic relations, government policies and activities of non-governmental 
organisations. Teachers are held in such high regard in the rural Ukambani that a peasant who 
has looked after his wife well often say: “If you meet my wife, you will think she is a 
teacher/a teacher‟s wife”. Teachers are not only some of the prime movers of the local 
economy as businessmen and women but also lead women groups and other self-help grass 
root organisations. As opinion leaders and shapers, they are sought by politicians, they are the 
church leaders and are the ones who neutralise the powers of local leaders, particularly chiefs. 
They cushion the rural masses from the excesses of the provincial administration particularly 
exorbitant fines, arbitrary arrests and land disputes. The Kamba teachers working in 
Maasailand engage in commercial farming, while others have intermarried with the Maasai. 
Such teachers provide vital links in interethnic relations although on the other hand they are 
despised by the Maasai who see their deployment in their territory as “external domination”. 
In Emaroro, Mashuru division of Kajiado district, a Maasai man had demanded the removal of 
a Kamba teacher after the teacher intervened to „rescue‟ the man‟s daughter who had been 
removed from school and married off as a second wife.  
From the foregoing, it is understandable why some teachers asked why I did not interview 
them. In Loitokitok, a primary school headmaster told me: “If you talk to us, you will save a 
lot of time...we know everything”. It was in such occasions that the ideas of Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) regarding “variation” in the research process and how to select research 
partners were useful. I had to strike a delicate balance between benefiting from the teachers‟ 
experiences and being recruited into their „camp‟, which, in those settings, constituted the 
privileged. Besides, although they were sources of very useful information, theirs was not 
necessarily a reflection of the experiences of the farming and pastoral communities.  
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The notion of Language 
“You know that they are very different from us”, was the response to a question I had posed 
to a Kamba respondent, Mr Musango who was living among the Maasai. The simplistic and 
seemingly tautological answer suggested three things; one, he felt that he was addressing 
somebody who should know, two, the distinction between the two groups is taken so much for 
granted that it would be ridiculous to ask, and three, this distinction is so „unreal‟ and 
exaggerated that substantiating the „difference‟ was an arduous task. Asking for elucidation 
led to a familiar response; the dressing codes, Maasai huts, cattle keeping (as if the Kamba 
keep no cattle),
67
 female circumcision, etc. Musango, like Sitonik, was desperate to „prove‟ 
how distinct these groups were.  
Musango moved from one criterion to the next to make a strong case. About language for 
instance, he told me how „impossible‟ it is for a Kamba to learn Maa language 68  and 
dismissed those who had achieved that feat as “those Kamba who aim at taking advantage of 
the Maasai.” But he was categorical that speaking Maa is not what makes one a Maasai. 
“There are other things”, he said. Apart from the attributes above, he also identified territory, 
Maasai patriarchy and “doing what the Maasai do”. It was quite interesting how actors would 
start in earnest telling me how „different‟ they were from the other group but then find it 
difficult to support their assertions. It shows how groups safeguard their identities jealously 
and would want to hold onto „something‟ that distinguishes them from the rest. 
Language featured quite prominently. In Solinketi‟s homestead, he had a „Kamba‟ domestic 
servant who could not speak Kikamba, prompting the ex-councillor to pose the question “now, 
would you consider him a Kamba?” And for sure, although he still bore a Kamba name and 
had Kamba parents, he regarded himself a Maasai. Seeking to find out the extent to which 
language was considered a criteria in defining ethnic boundaries, a Kamba research partner, 
Mr Mananu, noted that the Kamba concept of akavila or andu mate Akamba (“other ethnic 
groups” or “those people who are not Kamba”) is “those people who speak another language”. 
However, he insisted that the domestic servant is a Kamba who “had refused to learn the 
language of his people”. It is a typical example of how the criteria for ethnic inclusion and 
exclusion shift. 
Whatever the case however, one usually affiliated him/herself with one of the groups and 
rarely did people take the „middle‟ position. Studies done have shown that people can go to 
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 In his effort to expound his point on difference, he went into the details of saying how „Kamba cattle‟ are 
different from „Maasai cattle‟. 
68
 As part of the eastern branch of the Nilotic languages, Maa language and Kikamba (a Bantu language) do not 
have much in common, and appear to have hardly benefited from genetic and areal relationships (although there 
are some loan words). For details on Maa language, see Sommer and Vossen (1993: 26).  
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any lengths, often inventing stories, just to show how distinct they are from others, including 
eating habits in South Asia (Wijeyewardene,1990: 3).  
Going back to the Kamba-Maasai identity debate, Palalelei remarked that the „difference‟ 
between the two groups was “obvious...we live here together but there is a big difference”. 
Asking him what kind of differences these are, he adopted a linguistic criterion and asked 
“what do you people call water? what do you call milk?”69 After telling him the Kikamba 
names (he speaks Kikamba), he told me the Maasai equivalents and posed a question: “And 
you ask if we are different”? At that point, I got a bit frustrated since going by his initial 
determination, the knowledgeable man ended up oversimplifying ethnic differentiation. 
Drawing his attention to the bilinguals among a section of the Maasai and the Kamba, he 
asked: “If you learn kimasai do you think you will be Maasai?”, which takes one back to 
Solinketi‟s story above. Apart from unshared language, he also highlighted the modes of 
subsistence (pastoralism and farming), transhumance, construction of huts, development 
disparities, importance attached to initiation rites (particularly circumcision), polygyny and 
dressing. He noted though that “it is difficult sometimes to say this is what is Maasai and this 
is what is Kamba”. Besides, it was clear that nearly all the „differences‟ identified were social 
practices. The tendency to treat an item like language as a „natural‟ attribute, even when actors 
know that it is learnt within a certain social space, underscores how eager actors are to stress 
„difference‟. As we proceeded with our conversations, it was becoming clear that we were 
talking about how real and fluid ethnic difference is. Convinced as I am that ethnicity is 
entirely a social construction, one cannot ignore how actors insist on Barth‟s (1969) “cultural 
stuff” in defining their identity. Barth noted that ascriptive factors in ethnicity are used to 
mark boundaries but they may change and the cultural characteristics of the members may 
also be transformed. Common language for instance, has been shown not to necessarily 
constitute a prerequisite for common consciousness nor protect groups against conflicts 
(Haneke, 2002: 146).  
 
2.3.4   Methodological challenges 
One of the major challenges of the study was to stay focused in the midst of competing social 
realities. Charmaz and Mitchell (2001: 161) warn that “a potential problem with ethnographic 
studies is seeing data everywhere and nowhere, gathering everything and nothing”. 
Maintaining a “perspective” particularly in participant observation is a major challenge 
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 The Maasai refer to water as enkare while the Kamba call it kiw‟u. On the other hand, the Maasai‟s name for   
milk  is kule while the Kamba call it iia. 
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(Whyte, 1984: 27). During the study, an attempt was made to establish connections and 
continuity in the data gathered, integrate research categories and compare data with emerging 
categories on a regular basis. Researching on interethnic relations posed certain challenges. 
Due to the „sensitivity‟ of the topic, some respondents would „disappear‟ leaving some gaps in 
my fieldnotes and memos. To have a coherent story, such gaps would be filled up with 
supplementary sources or much later after the respondents resurfaced and were willing to 
continue. Among the Maasai, transhumance disrupted interviewing process. In certain cases, 
follow-up interviews meant travelling to distant areas where they had moved with their cattle. 
The principle of „theoretical saturation‟ and sampling was adopted where a line of inquiry was 
followed up to such an extent that there was no more variant or new information emerging.  
For some respondents, the absence of  a questionnaire made them think that I was not doing 
“research”.  For instance, Mr Mutua asked, “you don‟t have that form which people fill?” By 
“form” he was referring to a questionnaire, which is the commonest method of data gathering 
in Kenya. When I told him that I had no “form”,  he looked unsettled. As noted earlier, I had 
to engage him into some lengthy discussion regarding the methods of data gathering that I 
was using. My earlier experiences had shown that apart from their inherent shortcomings, 
questionnaires introduce officialdom, fear and „distance‟. Surprisingly, I was now getting 
schooled to the idea that failure to produce this device was also generating suspicion and 
distancing myself from respondents. Mutua even knew that a questionnaire was „quicker‟ 
saying that if I were using one, I would have “got” what I “wanted” a long time ago. He 
wondered why I kept on coming for „clarifications‟ from him.  
Generally, I had problems using a tape recorder. At one time, I and a university student (John) 
who was assisting me with translation of Maa, were given a go-ahead to attend a women‟s 
meeting. After a short session of self introduction, I asked them whether I could record the 
deliberations on tape. One member insisted that I should not tape-record the proceedings. 
Speaking in Maa she said “you never know where he will take the information”. I complied. 
Generally speaking, recording of interviews proved problematic. The perception that whatever 
I was doing must have been „serious‟ restricted my acceptability and raised the stakes. 
Explaining to respondents the reasons as to why I needed the information on tape was 
understandable but the doubts remained. Their suspicions were not baseless. For a very long 
time, Kenyans have lived in a culture of fear. Apart from that, I realised that stressing that 
what they were telling me “was very important” was working against me. By stressing that it 
was important, some respondents feared that those records may be kept for a long time and 
that the data could at one time be used against them. In other cases where respondents had no 
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problem with tape-recorded interviews, I often noticed that they were more cautious about 
what they said, in effect restricting the information they would ordinarily share. 
For the women group referred above, John and I adopted a strategy where he took notes since 
a direct translation could have influenced the proceedings of the meeting. Among the issues 
discussed included a Kamba woman heading a credit scheme. They wondered whether she 
would lend them more money
70
 and discussed her attitude towards “Maasai groups”, which 
they felt was negative. One member suggested that they should not discuss about her in my 
presence but another told them that they should not “fear people”.  
Deliberations resumed and I kept on getting concerned why John would not be taking down 
notes during some discussions. He was to tell me later that some of the things discussed were 
“not important”. My experience with John taught me that interpreters/assistants must be 
chosen carefully. They should know clearly the purpose of the research and that the researcher 
is interested on gathering data that may otherwise be of very little or no interest to the 
assistants, or which they may take for granted as members of the local community. 
During fieldwork, inconsistency of information made me realise why it was important to 
match not just what people say and do (Long, 1989), but rather what they also say and do at 
different times and places. In my first interview with the leader of a credit facility, she told me 
that 60% of women were receiving loans but then during the third interview in her office, it 
turned out that out of a total of 204 beneficiaries only 80 were women against 124 men. 
Besides, distinctions had to be made between „collective‟ or typical practices and individual 
ones. Asking a Maasai respondent about his daily diet, he told me that unajua chakula yetu ni 
nyama (“you know that our food is normally meat”) only to find out in the course of the 
interview that he had not eaten meat for about a fortnight. The question had forced him to 
project a positive image about himself and his group, otherwise, in the contemporary Maasai 
society, meat consumption has gradually become a luxury. Such responses also show that 
depending on how a question is framed or understood, the respondent might be forced to 
create some non-existent categories.  
I had to be cautious about how „reality‟ was being presented by the actors. In fact, this 
traversed many areas of the study including the definition who the Maasai or the Kamba were, 
with a consistent attempt to portray each group as a clear-cut collective entity although  
observations and in-depth analyses revealed inter-group overlaps. Many decades ago, Leach 
had encountered the same problem while studying interethnic relations in northern Burma 
(Leach, 1954: 17).   
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 They had previously borrowed Ksh 50,000 which they had lost through „poor‟ investment. 
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Last but not least, this is largely a study that anthropologists would perhaps lay much claim to. 
In spite of the fact that I have worked closely with social anthropologists (including my 
supervisors), it is difficult not to see myself as a sociologist „doing anthropology‟, the fluidity 
of the borderlands notwithstanding. In fact, Jenkins (1997: 6) notes that recent developments 
in anthropology have made it “...no longer as easy as it might once have been to distinguish 
anthropology from sociology, its closest sibling and most obvious rival”.  
Needless to say, as a researcher, I did impose my own influence or limitations on the data 
gathered and do acknowledge that at times, it was possible to influence actors‟ responses 
when asking questions or seeking clarifications on issues that they ordinarily do not deal with 
in social practice.
71
 
 
2.4   Conclusion 
 
This chapter was aimed at exposing the reader to the complex debate on ethnicity and to 
clarify some of the concepts and the approach used in the study. The two sections allowed the 
reader to see the interplay between theory and practice. The section serves as a foundation to 
the subsequent empirical chapters and also to the concluding chapter. Of particular importance 
was the controversies surrounding ethnicity; the “dominant discourse”, presenting groups as 
„givens‟, and the pragmatic approach pioneered by Barth (1969), which looks at ethnicity as a 
situational and a conscious effort of group members in response to social, economic and 
political pressures, as well as basis for social action. I have stressed that there are multiple, 
interlocking or overlapping collective identities. However, the chapter has also shown how the 
Kamba and the Maasai make sense of their ethnic identity and distinctiveness, a theme that is 
pursued in greater detail in chapters three and four.  
The readers were introduced to the concept of „coexistence‟ and its discursive dimensions. 
This chapter has shown that „ethnic coexistence‟ is a contested concept. However, it has 
emerged that coexistence is about difference, juxtaposition of seemingly incompatible groups 
and antagonism as well as interactions between groups, the possibility of switching identities 
and external influence. The various dimensions contained in this provisional definition are 
expounded in the empirical chapters, with a succinct synthesis in the final chapter.  
The process of data assembling has shown how the researcher entered the field and how he 
was recruited into the life worlds of the researched and how interaction with various groups 
shaped the „methods‟ of research and the content of what was assembled. The fieldwork 
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 See Bourdieu  (1990: 82). 
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experience provides preliminary ideas on how the Kamba and the Maasai „coexist‟ and how 
the researcher acted like a point of convergence for the actors who made sense of their own 
identity and difference. I acted like a mediator of peaceful coexistence. The challenges 
experienced during fieldwork, and the need for flexibility, underscore the subjectivity of the 
research process. The „rejection‟ I often experienced among „my own people‟ and the warm 
reception I got from the Maasai, partly confirm why difference plays a complimentary role in 
coexistence relationships as I will be arguing in chapter five.   
In the next two chapters, I examine emic notions of ethnic difference based on common 
depictions that often present ethnic groups as unchanging entities. The aim will be to define 
the actors, how they make sense of ethnic difference and how this distinctiveness is an 
important dimension of coexistence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE ACTORS: ETHNIC DEPICTIONS, DIFFERENCE AND 
COEXISTENCE (PART ONE) 
 
I have already noted that the Kamba and the Maasai are distinct but interacting groups. 
Chapters three and four seek to deepen this understanding by addressing one of the basic tasks 
of any study on interactions, that is, identifying the actors or parties and their attributes, and 
how these influence how they relate with one another. These chapters take up the debate in 
chapter two, to show how groups oscillate between primordial and constructivist ideals to 
make sense of their identities and interactions in their daily struggles. My argument in these 
two chapters is that to say ethnic groups „coexist‟, means that they are „distinct‟. In other 
words, I consider distinctiveness as one of the most basic requirements in a coexistence 
relationship. I shall discuss this distinctiveness and ethnic difference by presenting and 
analysing the rich body of Kamba-Maasai ethnic depictions. From Horowitz (1985), we know 
that ethnic groups that share physical space have myths about their relative values and 
stereotypes about one another (see also Barth, 1969: 19). This study however goes a step 
further and shows how ethnic stereotypes define difference and therefore how depictions 
become relevant in discussing coexistence. But stereotypes, particularly negative ones, do not 
just expose difference but also antagonism and rivalry, aspects that are an integral part of 
interethnic coexistence.  
I have to point out however that in as much as „coexistence‟ is about difference, antagonism 
and rivalry, it is also about cross-ethnic transactions, sharing and commonalities. Whereas the 
bulk of these exchanges are discussed in chapter five, I will highlight the contradictions in 
ethnic depictions. By „contradictions‟, I mean that although actors present other groups with 
whom they live together as if they were separate and unconnected to them, observation of 
everyday practices reveals a different story. Observing everyday practices involves 
delineating the “critical interfaces” that show the points of contradiction and discontinuity 
between the different and often incompatible lifeworlds of the actors. This allows us to 
understand the production of the heterogeneous cultural phenomena and outcomes of cross-
ethnic interaction and discursive domains (see Long, 1997: 34). Using an entirely emic 
approach, I show who the Maasai are from the eyes and lived experiences of the Kamba 
(chapter three) and vice versa (chapter four). In each case, I also present the logic and 
meaning behind ethnic depictions,
72
 as well as the group‟s response on how it is portrayed. 
The discussion is not simply limited to ethnic stereotypes per se, but goes beyond these 
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 Ethnic depictions here mean generalisations, stereotypes, representations and portrayals. The concepts are used 
interchangeably in the study. In fact, Torstrick calls them “popular understandings” (2000: 36). 
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popular representations to discuss issues around which these depictions revolve, namely the 
modes of subsistence, cultural practices, disparities in social transformation and the access 
and deployment of resources within and across the two ethnic groups.  
 
3.1   Kamba ethnic depictions of the Maasai 
3.1.1    Making sense of visible difference  
Apart from language and modes of subsistence, distinctive markers, emblems and diacritical 
features are identified as important aspects of ethnic identity (Barth, 1969; Schlee, 1991; 
Eicher, 1995; Eller, 1999). Schlee notes that the display of material objects or gestures 
“indicates group membership and other social relationships and provides expectations for 
corresponding „real‟ behaviour” (1991: 2). Furthermore, racism and discrimination are mainly 
a function of outward appearance and the meanings attached to those appearances. Barth notes 
that overt cultural forms are a reflection of the external circumstances to which actors must 
accommodate themselves. He notes further that on the basis of culture-bearing aspects, 
differences between groups become differences in trait inventories (1969: 12).  
While skin colour is not an important variable among these African groups,
73
 there are 
specific physical characteristics associated with each ethnic category, most of which are 
reminiscent of racial distinctions. While the Kamba would be unobtrusive in a „Maasai‟ 
trading centre and vice versa, there are attributes associated with each ethnic group and 
deployed in everyday life interactions. Telling „who is who‟ influences how impressions 
across the groups are managed. Actors identified the attributes associated with each group. 
For the Kamba, the Maasai are tall
74, walk fast, have erect bodies, “large white teeth”75 and 
dark skinned while the Kamba are said to be short, light skinned and muscular. Tall Kamba 
would be said to have “Maasai blood”. Most of these descriptions, even when given by 
women, tend to be male-specific, an indication of the significance attached to patriarchy in 
both groups. Tallness among the Maasai is associated with eating of meat, drinking of milk 
and blood, and walking a lot, while the Kamba apparent shortness is said to be due to poverty, 
lack of food and toiling in the farms. Both groups value height, but since the Kamba are 
relatively short, they belittle it. Mutua
76
 notes: “They (Maasai) need it, if you are looking after 
cattle, height helps, you can see all your animals, you can see lions and hyenas that may attack 
your animals...what else can you use it (height) for?” (in Mashuru, 25/01/2000). Kamba men 
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 Although when describing each group‟s physical attributes, the Kamba were said to have a lighter skin 
complexion.  
74
 Nilo-Hamites (e.g. the Maasai)  are associated with what Adamson (1967:21) calls  “great height”. 
75
 Actually not as a result of  predisposition but a social practice, namely the intake of calcium (from Maasai‟s 
milk rich diet). 
76
 A Kamba working as a herder in a Maasai homestead. More details about this actor in chapter five. 
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are particularly uneasy about the height aspect which is said to attract Kamba women to 
Maasai men. 
As I have noted above, tall Kamba are often mocked to have Maasai blood, a claim used to 
accuse Kamba women of being unfaithful to their husbands. But actors from both groups 
acknowledge that neither are all Kamba short nor are all Maasai tall, but these grey areas are 
ignored in everyday talk. Other actors claim that they can tell whether one is Maasai or 
Kamba by intuition, irrespective of height, body marks or dress. Palalelei, a Maasai, says 
“when you meet a Kamba, you just know, you just feel it (prolonged laughter!)”. He argues 
that even with those Kamba that have adopted Maasai dress code and body marks, he would 
still tell they are not Maasai. But the “feeling” he is talking about is based on what he has 
internalised as physical attributes associated with each group. Although he insists that he 
cannot go wrong in his categorisation, he admits that many Maasai do not stick to their 
dressing code nor are all people wearing such attire or ornaments necessarily Maasai (see also 
Spear and Waller, 1993). Besides, among the Kamba and the Maasai, there are some shared 
pieces of attire like hand made tire sandals,
77
 worn by both men and women. 
The ethnic dressing code, which make the Maasai stand out, includes brightly coloured loin 
clothes and shawls or shuka and usually red, ornaments (including heavily beaded necklaces, 
cowrie shells and bangles won by women),
78
 bodies painted with ochre and men‟s regalia like 
clubs and knives, and occasionally spears. These ascribed markers of cultural identity, that 
also include braided hair, clean shaven heads, severed incisor teeth and pierced earlobes with 
plugs dangling below them, make the Maasai an outstanding group indeed. In the introductory 
part of their book, Spear and Waller (1993: xiii) carry a stereoscope photograph of Maasai 
girls apparently taken in early 1900s and note the following about Maasai image and dress 
code: “In essentials, it has not altered much in eighty years”. This resilience in Maasai culture, 
which wins them many admirers, including the Kamba, remains as the most obvious mark of 
distinction and difference. 
On their part, the Kamba are said to have “abandoned their culture”79 by adopting the “clothes 
of these days”, meaning, among other attire, dresses, skirts and blouses for women and shirts 
and trousers for men.
80
 Although the Kamba have had elaborate beadwork and other 
ornaments (some copied from the Maasai), very few wear them today. But even those who do, 
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 These are normally made by men „shoe makers‟ and sold during market days in the trading centres. 
78
 For details on Maasai manifestation of identity through codes of costume, see Klumpp and Kratz  (1993: 203-
18). 
79
 They were generally said to have “nothing to show” for their cultural heritage. 
80
 Most of these clothes are bought in the open air markets during “market days”. A few buy new ones but 
increasingly, second hand clothes, otherwise called mitumba, have become more common.  
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they acknowledge the elegance of Maasai ornaments, with clear cuts of colour (see Klumpp 
and Kratz, 1993: 207). But the Kamba dismiss this „elegance‟ saying that it is “simply” a 
combination of “bright colours which is typical of the Maasai” (in reference to the dominant 
red clothing worn by the Maasai).  
There are certain practices peculiar to the Kamba, though. In the recent past, chipping the 
upper front teeth into sharp points was valued in some clans and territorial areas. It was meant 
to enhance one‟s appearance. Among the Kitui Kamba, women in particular used also to 
beautify themselves with cicatrilizations over their body using latex of the local euphorbia. 
They also used to tattoo their cheeks (see also Adamson, 1967). Piercing of earlobes, said to 
have been an imitation from the Maasai, used to be a common practice among the Kamba. 
These permanent bodily marks are still evident among the older generation. The Kamba of the 
1920‟s were just as „traditional‟ as the Maasai and borrowed a lot from the rich Maasai culture. 
In fact, during the long-distance-trade with the Arabs at the East African coast in the 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries, and for which the Kamba became very famous, the Swahili used to call 
them wasionanguo, meaning “the naked people”.81 A closer look indicates that the Kamba 
underwent faster social transformation only after the Second World War. Although one can 
hardly find a Kamba dressed „traditionally‟ today, as recent as the 1940‟s, they were dressed 
similar to the Maasai, as illustrated by Adamsons‟s paintings and photographs (1967: 238-
257). Besides, even in the 1970‟s, old Kamba men in particular used to walk around scantly 
dressed.  
What is important to underscore is that these appearances of distinction shape patterns of 
cross-ethnic interaction. They are used to determine  who is „modern‟ or „backward‟, who is 
in „transition to modernity‟, who has upheld „culture‟, who is literate or illiterate, who is 
„poor‟, those who should not board certain public vehicles and how much fare they are 
charged,
82
 where to shop, which bars to go (there are “Maasai/Kamba bars”), the attention 
accorded an individual in an office and who qualifies to be issued with an identity card within 
a demarcated territory. In this regard, the Maasai tend to be more „problematic‟ to classify. I 
was told, and also witnessed, cases where Maasai dressed in traditional attire would be 
assumed to be illiterate and ignorant and therefore people backbite them in English or 
overcharge them in public vehicles only for their adversaries to be shocked at the realisation 
that the „naive‟ looking man is actually a university student on holiday.  
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 Lindblom (1920:22), quoted by Middleton and Kershaw  (1972), but stated as waringao which is a mistake, 
for that means  “the boastful people”. 
82
 The „Maasai‟ may be prohibited from boarding certain public vehicles or may not bother to stop them. This 
has nothing with „being‟ Maasai but looking „Maasai‟. When dressed in their traditional attire, the Maasai are 
occasionally overcharged by non-Maasai Matatu and bus operators. 
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Studies done elsewhere similarly show the significance of physical attributes and stereotypes. 
Eller notes that in Rwanda, people were categorised as Hutu or Tutsi according to their degree 
of beauty, their pride, their intelligence and political organisation. Quoting Destexhe (1995: 
38), he notes that the colonisers established a distinction between those who did not 
correspond to the stereotype of a Negro (the Tutsi) and those who did (the Hutu). In addition, 
the Tusti were said to be “more Caucasian” and therefore more superior (Eller, 1999: 201). 
The role that was played by explorers, missionaries, colonialists and even western scholars in 
the creation, enhancement and perpetuation of ethnic difference among African groups cannot 
be overemphasised. When the Maasai are said to have “good looks” (Adamson, 1967: 220), 
this positive discrimination sows seeds of ethnic pride and chauvinism. But on the other hand, 
such depictions create the uniqueness and exoticism which encourage cross-ethnic 
transactions like intermarriage. 
 
3.1.2   The Maasai as enemies 
Negative attributions among the Kamba and the Maasai are so prevalent that the attention of 
the researcher shifts from whether the groups hold each other in low regard to seeking 
explanations. The groups portray each other as enemies. As I show in greater detail in chapter 
six, much of this enmity has to do with competition for resources like cattle, farmland, 
pastures and water. A key research partner, Sitonik summed Kamba-Maasai relations thus: 
“You know, when we sit with the Kamba, we are usually solving disputes…we have no 
opportunity to say positive things about each other.” On their part, the Kamba blame the 
Maasai for such disputes and present the Maasai as warlike, brutal, merciless, swift and 
temperamental. A „temperamental‟ Kamba is said to be “as temperamental as a Maasai 
warrior.” The Maasai are said to be extremely ruthless and to kill people indiscriminately 
during ethnic conflicts.
83
 However, the Maasai deny this, although Sankan notes in his 
pioneering book on the Maasai that the conception of the guilt of murder did not extend 
beyond Maasailand: “A man can only be regarded as guilty if he murders another Maasai, not 
if he murders a man
84
 from another tribe or race” (1971: 14). To be fair to the Maasai though, 
this basically applies in most ethnic conflicts and should not be treated as a Maasai peculiarity. 
It is important to note that it is not just the Kamba who claim to hate the Maasai. The Maasai 
refer to the Kamba as iloong‟u, which means something that stinks or smells. Middleton and 
Kershaw (1972: 67) citing Hobley (1910) make reference to long‟u but they neither offer any 
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 In „traditional‟ Maasai society, usually, women were never murdered during war. They could be captured and 
taken as wives instead. The Kamba did the same. 
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details regarding its cultural significance nor take it as a codename that continues to have 
relevance. If there is something that has never died out,  it is this codename. How did it come 
about? My research partner, Solinketi, explains that it was originally associated with Zebra 
meat which is said to have a distinct smell which the pastoral Maasai loathed just like they 
hated hunters. So the Maasai would refer to the Kamba thus “the people who smell have 
come”. So iloong‟u, meant to refer to Zebra meat gradually came to be used in reference to 
the Kamba in place of Olopirisia or Ilmeek which are the „normal‟ Maasai names for „the 
Kamba‟.  The word iloong‟u fitted well with what the Kamba represented in the eyes of the 
Maasai, namely rivals and enemies. But careful not to make it look as if directly aimed at their 
Bantu neighbours, the Maasai would say that their cattle were the ones irritated by the awful 
smell of the Zebra meat. 
Iloong‟u is not used by the Maasai unless the speaker intends to insult the Kamba. The Kamba 
do not seem to have an equivalent. When they call the Maasai Akavi,
85
 which means a number 
of things including the „normal‟ name for “the Maasai” and in another sense “one who would 
one day raid your cattle”, it is still too „mild‟ compared to Iloong‟u, although the enmity and 
hatred are mutual. But there seems to be a distinction between enmity and hatred. While the 
Kamba regarded the Maasai as amaitha (“enemies”), the Maasai appeared rather to have some 
deep rooted hatred for the Kamba.  Portraying them as cowards (later in the chapter), the 
Maasai do see the Kamba as “enemies” but due to a long history of rivalry, cattle raids, 
encroachment on Maasai land, the Maasai „hate‟ the Kamba. However, Schlee‟s account 
shows that it is not easy to concretise “hatred” (2002: 21-25). Nevertheless, it is indisputable 
that enmity and hatred go together, in that enemies would be hated.  
Commenting on ethnocentrism, Forster et al. (2000: 21) indicate that some Tanzanian peoples 
have derogative names for foreigners. For the Chagga, they are “kyasaka”, for the Pare, 
“mnyika” (i.e. “people of the bush”) and for the Luguru, “mtoka mbali”.86 The Israelis are 
said to portray the Arabs as irrational, emotional and violent (Torstrick, 2000: 35).  
 
3.1.3   The Maasai as “herders” and not keepers of cattle 
“The Kamba have always looked down on the Maasai as people who know nothing else other 
than looking after cattle (aithi)...” (Mananu, Kilili, 17/06/2000). Of importance here is the 
distinction made between “herding” and “keeping” or “owning” cattle. Although the Kamba 
keep and adore cattle themselves, kuithya, that is, looking after cattle, is not considered noble. 
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 The word bears semblance to “Kwavi”, also called “Iloikop”, the marginalised agricultural Maasai (see Spear 
and Waller, 1993). 
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 In Swahili, mtoka mbali means „from afar‟. 
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In „traditional‟ Kamba society, when a goat was slaughtered, the neck, very bony with little 
meat, was reserved for the young men who looked after cattle. Today, siblings often gauge 
how much their parents love them depending on whether they are assigned herding duties or 
not. Moreover, those who take up herding jobs for a monthly wage would ordinarily be 
ashamed to disclose their occupation to other people. The point is: Herding is demeaned while 
ownership of cattle is a passion that runs deep in the group. Even those Kamba in lucrative 
employment will have cattle, sheep and goats, and may incur enormous expenses maintaining 
their stock. Many of these deploy the services of a cattle herder whose annual wage
87
 often 
outstrips the total value of the stock he looks after. In addition, due to shrinking acreage, they 
may have to graze outside the family land at a fee. 
The question is, why are cattle that important even with decreasing grazing land? Apart from 
being the means of exchange during food shortages, supply of meat during feasts and 
ceremonies, payment of school fees, meeting medical bills, a central component in 
bridewealth negotiations, and in rituals to appease the gods through sacrifice (e.g. when rain 
fails), there is an underlying symbolic aspect. Contrary to Schlosser‟s (1984: 70) assertion that 
cattle were of less “spiritual importance” to the Kamba, in fact, a homestead is considered 
incomplete without a cattle kraal. Apart from land, cattle are the second most valuable asset 
that a father can bequeath his children. As a measure of wealth and wellbeing, possession of 
cattle has remained a focal point of shared understanding between the Kamba and the Maasai. 
Even among those that would be called elite in both groups, the talk about the heads of cattle 
in one‟s possession is common and having a large stock enhances one‟s status among 
contemporaries. All this begs the question: why do the Kamba belittle Maasai pastoralism 
when cattle are such a valued resource among them? My explanation would be that for the 
Kamba to justify their mockery of the Maasai, the “ownership” bit is ignored and instead the 
Maasai are portrayed as mere “herders”, which is a low status activity.  
For the many Kamba who are oblivious of their group‟s past similarities with the Maasai, the 
herders‟ low status is enhanced by the modest traditional dress worn by the Maasai herders. 
Besides, owing to Maasai social organisation, where several families may share an enkang 
(homestead), the large cattle herds that the Kamba see are taken to be “collectively owned”,  
an assertion that is not necessarily incorrect. What is more, “herding only” carries other 
intrinsic meanings. It is taken as an indication that the Maasai have not diversified their 
economy, that they have „lagged‟ behind in the taming of nature (e.g. by farming) and 
consequently evoking the feeling that the Kamba are better-off. In an environment where 
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community development initiatives are not necessarily seen as a  responsibility of the state, 
and where groups compete to „catch-up‟ with the „others‟, putting others in bad light enhances 
a group‟s self-worth. This exoneration of the state, it will be argued later, eases the 
competition for power at the centre, confining conflicts at  the periphery with the consequent 
result of some semblance of a stable state.   
 
3.1.4   The Maasai as “backward” and “ignorant” 
Being the most dominant depiction, Kamba‟s portrayal of the Maasai as “backward” and 
“ignorant” is beset with serious conceptual problems. The concepts are not only difficult to 
concretise despite having repeatedly featured in literature, but they are also associated with 
colonial discourses. They are equally reminiscent of the way the Maasai are presented by 
other groups and outside of Kenya‟s borders. 
At least empirically, the line between backwardness and ignorance is fairly thin. Deduced 
from actors‟ descriptions, ignorance, was associated with actions that were interpreted to be 
illogical, devoid of knowledge, counterproductive or placed those involved in jeopardy. On 
the other hand, backwardness was expressed in relative or comparative terms. Borrowing a lot 
from the modernisation model, the Maasai were said to have lower literacy rate, fewer schools, 
low school enrolment rate, fewer medical facilities, poorer water supply, poorer quality of 
roads and “traditional” housing structures. Others associated backwardness with keeping of 
large herds of cattle “for their own sake”, female circumcision, warriorhood, early and 
“arranged” marriages and polygyny. Some of these issues are handled exhaustively elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, it would be important to point out here that based on these perceptions, Maasai 
neighbours have evolved an ideology of superiority over the Maasai. However, most of these 
claims are at best ostensible assertions, for the same are to be observed among non-Maasai 
groups.  
As a way of distancing themselves from the Maasai, the Kamba say that Maasai pastoralism, 
dress and other practices like female circumcision are “things that we used to do many years 
ago”. Making this observation, Mutui was to admit later that female circumcision “has 
persisted” among the Kamba. Apart from female circumcision, the Maasai were said to eat 
raw meat, drink blood and milk “direct from the cow” (not boiled). Observations made 
showed that when an animal is slaughtered, only the liver and kidneys may be eaten raw while 
the consumption of blood (usually mixed with milk) or milk that is not boiled is a rarity. 
Moreover, meat is not eaten as frequent as I had been made to believe. Increasingly, a bull,  
goat or sheep is slaughtered only during special occasions (e.g. marriage ceremonies). 
Penetration of the cash economy and the consequent social transformation has led to the 
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commoditisation of cattle which are sold to pay for school fees, meet medical expenses, buy 
clothes and foodstuffs. Otherwise, just like the Kamba, many Maasai buy meat from 
butcheries. 
Persistence and resilience of Maasai practices like dress and food appear to enhance the 
feeling among the Kamba that the Maasai “don‟t change”. Kyuli puts it this way: “I am an old 
man (about 65), I grew up here with the Maasai, I see them everyday, now they eat ngima and 
isyo
88
 and some go to school, but...no, they have not changed, what they used to do when I 
was a small boy is still what they do these days” (Kyuli, Kiboko, 11/05/2000). Although he 
appreciates that there has been some transformation among the Maasai society, he rejects this 
reality which would negate his long cherished convictions of what a „Maasai‟ should be like.  
Another aspect that the Kamba claimed exposed “Maasai ignorance” is a practice where 
pregnant women are denied foods like meat and milk. The Maasai reason that if these women 
are fed to their fill, particularly on these protein rich foods, babies would be too big to pass 
through the birth canal and the woman or the child or both may die during birth. In addition, it 
is also almost a taboo among the Maasai in general to eat eggs, chicken and fish (see also 
Schlosser, 1984: 155). Ordinarily, the mothers-in law are charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that the expectant daughters in-law adhere to the feeding code. In certain cases, 
women may be forced to avoid food for two days. The situation is compounded by the 
recurrent droughts and famine experienced in the area. The point is, the frail looking 
expectant women are not denied food out of ignorance but, “wisdom”.89  
Scientifically, it is held that pregnant women should be placed on a balanced diet and that 
eating a lot of food does not result in big babies. Moreover, although the Kamba may take this 
notion as „ignorance‟, in the recent past, the Kamba had similar beliefs and practices too, 
whereby pregnant women avoided fatty foods. It is a question of social transformation which 
is presented as “our culture...” A recent comparative study done in Kajiado among the cross-
section of groups living there showed that most Maasai women give birth to underweight 
children. Wangulu Eliezer (1999) shows that out of 46 “pure Maasai parents” who gave birth, 
their children‟s birth weights were 2.72 kilograms compared to 3.18 kilograms for children 
born of 86 mixed parents (e.g. Maasai and Kikuyu) and over 3 kilograms for children born of 
144 parents that were non-Maasai.
90
 These differences, that tended to follow ethnic lines had 
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 Kamba traditional dishes. Ngima is popularly known as ugali in Swahili. Made by adding  cornmeal (usually 
white) to boiling water and stirring to a thick paste, it is the staple diet among many ethnic groups in Kenya. The 
interviewee equates adopting Kamba dishes with „modernity‟. Isyo is a dish prepared by mixing maize and 
legumes. More details in chapter four. 
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 Noted Sitonik, one of my research partners. 
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 See “Horizon”, The Daily Nation, Thursday, December 16, 1999, p. 11.  
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something to do with feeding habits. What is more, the Maasai in general tend to dislike green 
vegetables. 
While creating awareness on healthy dishes, a clinical officer in Simba health centre met a lot 
of resistance whenever he encouraged the Maasai to eat greens popularly known as sukuma 
wiki and which are available in nearly all parts of the country. A man told him once that those 
people who eat “such things” are “desperate”. Speaking to the clinical officer in Swahili, he 
posed: “Nikule majani, kwani mimi ni mbuzi?”, which means, “how can I eat leaves, am I a 
goat?” Although such comments signify pride and wealth, the Kamba health workers see them 
as informed by „ignorance‟. But the Maasai attitude towards greens is quite logical. Other 
groups (e.g. the Kamba) feed on green vegetables not out of the realisation that they are 
healthy foods, but because they are staple foods, which are often despised. Many say that they 
eat them because “we cannot afford meat”. Otherwise, other claims to the effect that “only” 
Maasai women deliver at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants are 
unfounded as the same applies to many Kamba women.  
 
The story of Mwende 
„Ignorance‟ was expressed in other ways. Anne Mwende, a Kamba research partner from 
Emali narrated how the Maasai had struck her home “around 1972” in an attempt to raid cattle. 
She noted that as some went to the cattle kraal, others broke into her granary, something 
which she said was quite unusual since the Maasai raiders normally never targeted agricultural 
produce. This time however, they did. A thorough search left grain strewn all over the place 
and yet nothing was taken away. In a narrative that was given in detail and emotionally, she 
said that a month later, she found out from “another woman” (actually her step cousin married 
to a Maasai), that the warriors were most likely looking for Muthokoi, a Kamba dish prepared 
from white maize whose testa or husk has been removed using a mortar and pestle. The lean 
maize grains are then mixed with legumes and cooked in a pot. She said that the Maasai 
“thought” that Muthokoi was harvested directly from the farm. Mwende argued that the failure 
to „know‟ the process by which Muthokoi is prepared was an expression of “ignorance” on the 
part of the Maasai. She admitted however that there is perhaps even a wider range of Maasai 
practices that are equally incomprehensible among the Kamba. She appeared reluctant to 
accept that such a gap in knowledge was „normal‟. She insisted that “we know these people, 
we have lived with them, we know that they are naïve.” The whole scenario has to be 
understood within the context in which these neighbouring groups operate. To a Kamba, for 
one to imagine that Muthokoi, which involves so much labour to prepare is harvested straight 
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from the fields, is a gross expression of ignorance and naivety. But, this has to be seen in a 
subjective sense. It is a criteria being used to reinforce what the Kamba think of the Maasai 
and to enhance Kamba pride. So keen was she to distance herself from the Maasai that when I 
asked her whether there are any social and economic exchanges between the two groups, she 
retorted  “we have nothing to do with the Maasai”.  
During one of our conversations though, a young Maasai woman entered the homestead 
bringing in milk. When I put back the question to her she just laughed and told me that I was 
being “too critical”. And she belittled the milk thus: “We just accept it because we have no 
alternative...who can trust milk from the Maasai?” To her, admitting close social interaction 
with the Maasai would unmask the underlying networks of interdependence thereby 
weakening her „backwardness‟ thesis. She refused to see the milk as a mutual exchange that 
sustains groups‟ livelihoods, and was uncooperative when I told her that I wanted to interview 
the Maasai girl. Her response is explained by Hahn‟s observation that those who define others 
as strangers fear the destabilisation of their evidence (2000: 18). He notes further that market 
relations may thrive on the maintenance of strangeness/alien status (see also Simmel, 1958: 
509). Mwende‟s motivation to show that the Maasai were of a lesser status was so strong that 
even obvious cross-ethnic transactions were being denied and often treated as exceptions or 
accidents, irrespective of how frequent and consistent these exchanges were.  
 
Other examples 
In other cases, Maasai „ignorance‟ was deduced from their perceived indifference to 
„modernity‟, largely a colonial discourse. A Kamba businesswoman in Simba trading centre 
drew my attention thus: “Look at those women over there (pointing to a group of four Maasai 
women)...what are they doing?...they are doing nothing, just talking and wasting time...to be 
in the market, they think they are okay, they are just like the other people...is that business? 
they are just idlers...and some of these people have not been anywhere, they just know this 
place” (Mwongeli, 12/06/2000). To her, the Maasai are „lagging behind‟ and they do not seem 
to be doing something about it. She felt that the women in question should be “doing more” 
now that „their‟ trading centre‟s business was in the hands of the Kamba, but that due to their 
„ignorance‟ they “did not see the difference”. Actually, the Maasai women were not “doing 
nothing”. Two of them were selling milk, small packets of sugar and tea leaves to their fellow 
Maasai women in what can be called ethnic trade. Moreover, the Maasai were not as parochial 
as the Kamba tended to paint them, as some of the Maasai women were selling milk in bigger 
quantities and in distant areas outside of Maasai territory. In general, the Maasai are just as 
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conscious about, and keen on regional as well as on national issues just like the Kamba. It is a 
question of the passion to show that the Maasai were different. 
How else was the apparent Maasai „ignorance‟ and „backwardness‟ expressed? During a 
conversation with the headteacher of a primary boarding school
91
, he gave an interesting 
account of a dialogue he had with a Maasai parent. He started thus: “You are asking why we 
regard these people as backward, ahaa, where do I start?...okay take the example of this man 
from Sultan Hamud, he has about eight children here (laughs)...no, they aaaare, seven, they 
are seven! I think they are seven. When he is paying school fees, he sometimes forgets some 
children, he cannot remember that they are his! There is this small boy, I think in standard 
four, whose fees he forgot to pay when he came here in June, I told him mzee (old man), you 
have left out one of your sons...he said no, no I have paid fees for all my children...no you 
have not! You know, I told him that he has seven children in the school and not six, then he 
counted quietly, one, two, three...of course in kimasai (Maa) and he said, I have only six 
children here and I have paid fees for all of them. I told him no, your children are seven. He 
insisted that they are six! I told him that I shall send home the one he has left out. When I told 
him that, he said that he wanted to see the boy. I sent for him, and you know what, the man 
was not sure whether that was his son! To convince himself, he asked the boy to say who his 
mother was, then he burst out laughing and said aha kweli ni yangu, weka yeye kwa listi, aha, 
ni pesa gapi (oh, it is my child, put him in the list, oh, how much do I owe you?), then he paid 
the money (Ksh 7,000 or EUR 85) and left...now look at that, who can forget his children? 
Okay, he has four wives but you should not forget your children...so when you ask me why 
we regard these people as backward, there is so much to say” (Kenneth, headteacher, Kiboko, 
22/08/2000).  
The question is: Why is this incident of a busy businessperson with a big family of about 20 
children taken as an indication of backwardness and ignorance? One of the things that the 
headteacher detested was the large number of children. In another interview with a Maasai 
elder, I was told that with such a large number of children, one can easily “forget” some. He 
said that just like cattle, Maasai do not count their children. But he did not stop there. He 
quipped that it is possible that the man in question was “just playing games with the 
headmaster”! He felt that instead of seeing that as ignorance, it should be the other way round: 
“Having so many children that you cannot tell their names is the dream of any Maasai” 
(Palalelei, Kiboko, 13/09/2000). It is instructive that apart from age and animal wealth, having 
many wives, children and grandchildren over which to exercise authority enhances respect 
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among the Maasai society. While the Kamba were keen to portray the Maasai as people who 
cared more about their cattle than their wives and children, evidence seemed to go against this 
thesis. But the Kamba were not the only ones. Take the example of Tenka a Maasai aged 20. 
Identifying himself with a generation keen to embrace change and opposed to some Maasai 
practices, he told me that when his father comes home after being away for several days, “he 
asks about the cattle...whether any cows gave birth...he might not even greet my mother...it is 
normal here but some of us find it odd.” He claimed that the mother never looked disturbed by 
this „neglect‟. I decided to take the young man to task. I asked him why he thought he thought 
his father‟s behaviour was odd although the mother was not „bothered‟. He had no answer. 
Being a „modern‟ Maasai looking forward to going to university, he detested certain forms of 
behaviour common among his parents‟ generation. The question is: Are the Maasai less 
affectionate towards their kin? From my observations, nothing could be further from the 
actual practice. And I cannot put it better than Fr. Hans Mol, a Dutch missionary who has 
studied Maasai language and culture for 40 years. He notes: “These are the only people of 
Africa whom I know kiss in their greeting...mother kisses child a lot, brother stands stiff and 
is kissed on the cheek by sisters, sisters run so fast to meet each other upon returning home 
that you expect a big crash only to get this gentle hug.”92  
 
Maasai „ignorance‟ in daily conversations 
When a Kamba shares a story with another or others and the story is taken as a lie, his or her 
listeners might in disapproval say “mantha Muumasai ukenge”, which means, “look for a 
Maasai to tell that lie”. This in essence implies that it is only the Maasai who cannot 
distinguish a lie from the truth. Surprisingly, another Bantu group, the Kikuyu, also have 
similar sayings about the Maasai. A Kikuyu may respond to a story judged to be a 
misrepresentation of the truth thus: Etha Maathai uhenie (“look for a Maasai to lie to”) or 
“ndukandue Maathai” which means, “don‟t make me a Maasai”. I should add that many 
Kenyans in general, particularly in urban areas, appear to look down on people whom they 
categorise as Maasai. For instance, few residents in Nairobi care to know the names of Maasai 
guards who man entrance gates to their residential courts. They simply refer to them as 
“Masai” and greet them habari Masai (“how are you Maasai”) or Masai kuja (“come here 
Maasai”). For some reason, the guards do not seem to get offended. One would be very lucky 
if s/he said to a Kikuyu guard habari Kikuyu and left unscathed. The difference in reaction to 
the greeting is explained by what the ethnic categories referred to are perceived to represent. 
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The Maasai guard is likely to interpret the greeting as “hello Mr courageous”, while the 
Kikuyu might take the greeter to be saying “hello Mr thief”.93 
 
The Maasai as contingent planners? 
The Maasai are depicted as a group that never plans ahead. Although the Kamba appropriate 
this notion, development agents and state extension officers have enhanced this image. 
Pastoralists and peasant cultivators are constantly cautioned to plan ahead and steer clear of 
contingent methods. In the course of my study, I attended barazas (public meetings) where 
agricultural, livestock and administrative officers gave “advice” to the Maasai and Kamba 
cattle keepers with regard to management of herds. As drought looked imminent, farmers 
were told to store “enough grain” during harvests. From intensive interviews conducted 
among a cross range of local residents and from observations made, it was clear that few heed 
the „expert advice‟ provided by government officials and non-governmental organisations. 
The first challenge was to find out why such advice is ignored.  And it turned out to be the 
same old story of top-down approach where expert knowledge is provided with little 
consultation with the local groups.  The advice is provided in a vacuum, hardly with safety 
nets to cushion vulnerable groups. Few external agents care to find out why herds are not 
reduced before an imminent drought or why most farmers sell their crops immediately after 
harvest.  
Of interest here however is not what the Kamba and the Maasai do with their crops and herds 
respectively but rather how each group makes sense of the others‟ actions. While both groups 
are generally vulnerable when rains fail, it is rather striking that the Kamba see the Maasai as 
a people whose survival hinges on contingency. Evidence gathered however suggests 
otherwise. The argument therefore, that the Kamba adjust better to the fragile environment is 
simply an affront in ethnic rivalry. In fact, in defence of the Maasai, I was told: “I never 
understand the Kamba, they had a bumper harvest just the other day and now we are queuing 
with them for relief...in fact, they are more desperate than us, now at least for us, you can 
understand...we have no farms” (Palalelei, Kiboko, 10/05/2000). This was in reference to the 
food shortages that came after the long rains of 2000. Palalelei‟s comments outline the 
Kamba‟s lifecycle where harvest and famine alternate with striking frequency. To illustrate 
this point, I present one of the farmers‟ (Kyuli) experience by listing food shortages and 
famines since 1960. Some of these famines, the Kamba conceded, would have been avoided if 
they were anything different from what they were portraying the Maasai to be. 
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1961: yua ya Ndeke, i.e., “the famine of the plane”. Food had to be distributed using planes 
due to floods. 
1965: yua ya Ata, i.e., “the famine of wheat”. People received wheat as food relief. 
1969: yua ya Makaa, i.e., “the famine of charcoal”. People had to sell charcoal to survive. 
1974-76: yua ya Longosa, i.e., “the famine of disorganisation”. This drought and famine was 
so intense, it decimated livestock. Children dropped out of school, families broke up while 
others relocated. Maasailand was not spared. 
1983/84: yua ya nikwa ngwete, i.e., “the famine of „I am dying despite having money‟”. 
During this famine, grain was often unavailable in food stores; having money therefore made 
no difference. Besides, people had to eat katokelele (yellow maize). Kyuli said that there were 
still “smaller famines” in between the years. It would be safe to say that hardly a single year 
ends without some parts of Ukambani experiencing food shortage. Food shortages often 
follow bumper harvests. Even after the enormous grain harvests that came by way of the El-
Nino rains in 1998, people had shortages shortly after. This chronology of droughts and 
famine also affected Maasailand (at least Kajiado) which lies in the same climatic zone with 
much of Ukambani. Rain failure means poor pastures and causes social turmoil as the food 
chains of man and beast are disrupted. Besides, vulnerability on either side impacts on the 
other as the Maasai move their animals looking for pastures in Ukambani while the Kamba 
seek assistance (e.g. maize and beans) from their kin in places like Loitokitok (Maasailand). 
Drought, as I point out in chapter five, creates an arena in which the two groups intensify their 
interdependence. 
As for the Maasai, some of the problems they face are a creation of the state. In the 1970‟s 
group ranches were created to regulate rangelands grazing. These ranches have been 
transformed into individual plots discouraging pastoralism and increasing transhumance. In 
fact, a Kenyan scholar argues that the ranches restricted the Maasai to designated areas 
thereby causing overgrazing and depleting water. “Due to overgrazing”, notes Aboud (2001), 
“the pastoralists have lost their livestock and abandoned their way of life. Most are doing 
lowly urban jobs”.94 He argues that attempts to reduce their herds as a way of conserving the 
environment were uncalled for, adding that the plight of pastoralists has been worsened by 
persistent encroachment on their land by people practising “modern agriculture”95 and by 
gazetting parts of the grazing fields to pave the way for national parks and game reserves and 
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yet they hardly benefit from the revenues earned from tourism. Aboud exonerates pastoral 
groups from blame as herds shrink, and instead accuses the state and other groups that have 
encroached on pastoral lands. Aboud however, falls short of saying whether the ongoing 
subdivision of group ranches and issuing of title deeds to individual owners
96
 (e.g. in Kajiado), 
is the way forward. From interviews, most Maasai have mixed feelings about creation of 
individual plots. Although the intention of subdividing the ranches is to encourage individual 
responsibility and therefore development of the land parcels, there is very little evidence that 
this objective is being met.
97
 
In Ukambani, people blame the state for inaccessibility to drought resistant crops and stop-gap 
measures like food relief while promises to dam rivers for irrigation have remained unfulfilled 
since independence. In the Kenyan state, the Kamba and the Maasai find a common enemy, 
but for different reasons.  
 
The „Kambanisation‟ of modernity?  
Citing Aristotle, Bourdieu (1990) reiterates that man is the most imitative of all animals. On 
that premise, there is basically nothing shaming in copying others. In practice however, social 
transformation processes are full of controversies regarding agents and recipients; it is an 
arena of contestations. Regarding western culture, Roosens notes: “There seems to be a far 
reaching consensus among human beings, whatever their cultural tradition, that a number of 
material goods and social values, whose production originated in Western society, are 
desirable” (1989: 11). The Kamba, posing as agents of modernity, claim that they are partly 
responsible for the transformation in Maasailand although the Maasai on the other hand are 
often cited as an example of conservatism and resistance to development in both Kenya and 
Tanzania (Forster et al., 2000: 110). And yet, the Maasai have either been selective or as they 
say, “marginalised”. Besides, Galaty (1993) tells us how economies and societies of what we 
call Maasailand emerged and were transformed over the centuries. Nevertheless, if the Kamba 
were to be believed, they argue that they adopted „western‟ ideals (e.g. education and market 
economy) earlier or faster than the Maasai and became the pastoral group‟s role models. Such 
claims are quite common. Triulzi (1996: 261) tells us that the Boorana were regarded as 
“senior members” or those who “opened the way” of the Macha society in Ethiopia.  
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 “Individual” here includes parcels belonging to a „family‟ (man, his wife/wives and children) or extended 
family (where married sons or brothers have not been allocated their own parcels). 
97
 Just like the group ranches, the individual parcels have created pockets of poverty as keeping of cattle has 
become untenable for some. Nevertheless, during the fieldwork period, adjudication of group ranches, creating 
of individual plots and issuing of title deeds was underway in many parts of Kajiado district. The 1997-2001 
development report indicates that 15 group ranches were to be subdivided by the end of the plan period 
(Republic of Kenya, 1997: 95). 
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To go back to the Maasai, if groups that have contributed to the social transformation in 
Maasailand were to be identified, it would be a very complicated exercise. This is clear in 
Being Maasai (Spear and Waller, 1993). The Kamba generally talk about more recent 
developments, particularly during and after colonial period. In fact, the Kikuyu are even better 
positioned to make such claims in view of the long history of association between them and 
the Maasai. But all these are „recent‟ developments. Throughout history, the Maasai have 
been an influential group and both the Kamba and the Kikuyu imitated their cultural practices. 
Spear talks about Maasai cultural pride, arrogance and dominance of the plains, noting that 
“while pastoral Maasai might be reluctant to speak the languages or participate in the social 
institutions of others, hunters and farmers readily learnt Maa and participated in pastoral 
social activities” (1993: 13). Well, this may have been the case in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, but a closer examination of the Maasai society from the 1940‟s appears to show a 
reversed trend where Maasai‟s Bantu neighbours and the state assumed an increasingly 
commanding influence in the transformation of the Maasai society. 
For many of the Kikuyu and Kamba „models‟ who migrated to Maasailand as state employees 
or to do farming, they were simply pursuing their own interests. In any case, in the 1960‟s and 
70‟s, many professionals (e.g. teachers and doctors) resisted state postings to Maasailand 
citing remoteness and lack of amenities. Many non-Maasai migrants were driven by the desire 
to access resources like land and markets for farm produce and retail goods. In some parts of 
Africa, it is argued that elite groups excluded others from “modernity”. The first African 
groups to get European education like the Creoles, Baganda and Yoruba are said to have got 
advantages which they did not want to share with others (Peil and Oyeneye, 1998: 79). The 
authors however do not explain how this was feasible.  
One thing that struck me during fieldwork, was that relative to the Maasai, the Kamba were 
keen to present themselves as being “modern”, that they have abandoned most of their 
traditional practices and embraced modernity while the Maasai on the contrary insisted that 
they were “traditional” even those who had embraced modernity. 98  As a matter of fact, 
Ukambani has more educational facilities and there are many Kamba teachers working in 
schools all over Maasailand. Many of these teachers have been involved in campaigns to 
boost school enrolment among Maasai children, but the decision to send the same to school 
has rested with the Maasai themselves. Well, there are those who go a step further, those who 
rescue Maasai school girls that are married off against their will by their fathers. There are 
also many Maasai who have attended school in Ukambani
99
 and who assist in rescuing such 
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 The Maasai know that thanks to tourism, being „traditional‟ evokes pride. 
99
 For instance, the youthful Maasai chief of Kenyewa Location, Kajiado District. 
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girls and encourage Maasai parents to support girl education. In many of the public meetings 
that I attended in Maasailand, their leaders stress on formal education and often criticise 
institutions like warriorhood which keep boys away from school or lead to drop outs. 
Surprisingly, school drop out rate is equally high in Ukambani, although this is related to 
inability to raise school fees (Republic of Kenya, 1996).  
The tables below show some of the disparities in the distribution of educational institutions in 
the  two districts. 
 
Table 2: Educational facilities (1995) and ratio per population 
                                     Makueni                          Kajiado            
Pre-primary               912  (1: 840)                    452   (1: 901)                       
Primary                     767  (1: 1,000)                  189  (1: 2,155)           
Secondary                 125  (1: 6,135)                    23  (1: 17,711)            
Youth polytechnics     44 (1: 17,429)                     6  (1: 67,895)  
Source: District development plans (Makueni and Kajiado), 1997-2001.100 
 
Looking at table 2, one can clearly see some glaring disparities in the distribution of 
educational facilities, the inhabitant population in the respective districts notwithstanding. The 
total population of Kajiado district according to the 1999 census was 407,368 while Makueni 
had 766,885. The table shows some glaring disparities particularly in the distribution of 
primary and secondary schools and youth polytechnics. The pre-primary schools appear to be 
proportionately distributed. In fact, the concentration of primary and secondary schools in 
Makueni, though a semi-arid district, is one of the highest in Kenya. In Nyeri (Kikuyuland), 
arguably one of the most developed districts in Kenya, the primary school ratio is 1: 1,715 
while secondary school ratio is 1: 5,161, comparing very favourably with Makueni. Makueni 
however lags behind in many other important facilities like electricity, telephone, water 
supply and roads.  
Going back to the Kamba and the Maasai, it is important to note that the disparities in the 
statistics above is not all that makes the Kamba to claim to be the pacesetters of modernity. It 
is what has been passed on through the generations, what the people see and attach meanings 
to, share in conversations, sometimes read and hear in public meetings. The bottom line is that 
depictions are hardly based on hard statistics. It is important to note here that in spite of the 
fact that the groups demean each other, all are in a transition to „catch-up‟ with other ethnic 
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groups. Claims on literacy is a question of magnitude. There are no „pure‟ types on either side 
but a mixture of both „tradition‟ and „modernity‟. The only difference perhaps, is that among 
the Maasai, certain traditional institutions like age-sets and rites of passage still have a lot of 
relevance in the contemporary day-to-day affairs of society. Elders, for instance, may 
negotiate with schools to agree on days to carry out important traditional ceremonies like 
circumcision. But then, school goers are expected to wear school uniform, while school 
attendance itself has revolutionised household labour.  
Although some of the variations in literacy are presented as primordial, it is basically a 
question of environments and proximity to influential agents that have shaped practices, 
aspirations and life goals. Bourdieu noted: “A given agent‟s practical relation to the future, 
which governs his present practice, is defined in the relationship between, on the one hand, his 
habitus with its temporal structures and dispositions towards the future, constituted in the 
course of a particular relationship to a particular universe of probabilities, and on the other 
hand a certain state of the chances objectively offered to him by the social world” (1990: 64). 
Although there might be disagreement on Bourdieu‟s concept of objectivity, he does stress the 
significance of the social environment in shaping people‟s destiny. After all, some of the 
schools of which the Kamba claim ownership, trace their roots to external religious 
organisations or the state‟s ministry of education. Moreover, in principle, a Kenyan can school 
anywhere in the republic. The only limitation is that in most pre-primary and primary schools, 
local languages/dialects are the main medium of communication and tool of tuition in the 
rural areas. Otherwise, provisions limiting the number of pupils that can be admitted to 
secondary schools outside their home districts are never strictly followed.  
The Kamba embraced state and missionary patronage while the Maasai either rejected it or 
were ignored. The relationship between the Maasai and the state as an agent of social 
transformation may have been largely indirect, mediated among other agents (e.g. Maasai 
neighbouring groups). The „pressure‟ therefore was brought to bear on the Maasai, as they 
were meant to feel disadvantaged and „left behind‟ as their neighbours „progressed‟. Although 
these osmotic and diffusionist forces cannot be denied, the Maasai internal dynamics cannot 
be ignored either. It has been quite a selective group. In fact, Kituyi cites an incident where an 
MP‟s calling on the Maasai to embrace modernity and “dress decently” earned him an exit 
from parliament. And yet on the other hand, he was basically telling them what they were 
doing! A Maasai elder explains: “Maasai don‟t want to be told what to do, they know what is 
good for themselves...the Maasai are arrogant, you know that, who can force the Maasai to do 
anything? what you are seeing here (schools, „modern‟ houses) is what the people 
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want…which tribe in Kenya has not been assisted by the government (state)? (Solinketi, 
Sultan Hamud, 12/06/2000).  
As the Kamba claim to have been modernisation „brokers,‟ the Maasai hint of their own 
„modernity‟, very much in line with the idea of plural modernities (Long, 2000). The social 
change approach has attracted criticism for, among other things, seeing people„s cultural 
values and belief systems as inappropriate or “an obstacle, a barrier to be overcome” (see 
Cochrane 1979:10-11). The theory lacks the multidimensional approach necessary to assess 
the complexity of development processes. Further criticism of the theory comes from Long 
(1989:222) who, mainly citing Knorr-Cetina (1984:4), argues that social change among the 
local communities cannot simply be explained by the intervention of public authorities or 
“powerful outsiders” but rather as a result of the interactions, negotiations, and social and 
cognitive struggles that take place between specific social actors. Long says that social actors 
have to be perceived as “knowledgeable” and “capable” who respond depending on the 
context and whom they are interacting with. Cochrane notes that “indigenous peoples” are 
interested in self-assertion and self-expression. Criticising the social change model, he says 
that “targeted populations” may want some of the advantages of civilised knowledge but (they) 
will want inevitably to make use of them in the rhythm of their lives and in a society  they 
have inherited even if it is a modified  society.  
 
“Helping” the Maasai to “catch-up” 
Ukambani is an area where it is unusual to find a woman who is not a member of a women‟s 
self-help group.
101
 And like in all places where these groups exist, development activities in 
the villages are often channelled through them. They have also been easy prey for politicians 
who recognise them as crucial vehicles in the mobilisation of public support. It is against this 
background that I would like to discuss a Kamba-led credit scheme in Maasailand. Unlike in 
Ukambani, only a few women among the Maasai are members of self-help groups. I would 
like to base my discussion on a series of interviews held with Mrs Mwongeli Makoani. She is 
one of the most successful businesspersons in Simba trading centre. Of particular interest here 
however is her position as co-ordinator of a non-governmental organisation that supports 
women development activities in Kajiado.  
She is the „local‟ chairperson of the district-wide Kajiado Community Credit Limited (KCCL). 
There are such organisations in nearly all the districts in the Rift Valley province. Vitage, a 
Netherlands organisation, funds the credit facility. At the „grassroots‟ level, these schemes are 
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 Starting as „women groups‟, in the 1970‟s men have also been joining them. A self-help group is called 
mwethya or kikundi in Kikamba. 
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run under the so-called central management committees (CMCs). Mwongeli  heads a CMC 
that serves parts of Mashuru division in Kajiado. But although it is a „Kajiado‟ outfit, she 
reached out to Kiboko, Emali and Sultan Hamud in Makueni district. She argued that 
“development needs were everywhere” and that the credit scheme was bound by neither 
ethnic nor physical boundaries. But not „all‟ access the loans. The funding agency is 
particularly interested in businesspersons, „progressive‟ farmers and cattle traders, who are 
members of self-help groups. At the time she started her work in 1997, hardly any Maasai 
women groups existed in the area. They had to „bend the rules‟ and conduct awareness 
campaigns to popularise the credit facility. Although women were particularly „targeted‟, men 
were also encouraged to join groups and apply for credit from the CMC. Potential members of 
these groups had to be “business minded”, she added. The provincial state administration 
came in handy in popularising the credit facility. She particularly singled out the district 
officer (DO) Mashuru division, who was Kamba, for giving her “enormous support”.  
By the time of my interviews (June-August 2000), she had about 18 registered groups with a 
total membership of 204 people. What was their social profile? One thing that struck me when 
I examined the files, was that although the word “women groups” featured prominently, 
actually, men outnumbered the women. There were 124 men (60.8%) and 80 women (39.2%). 
She explained that men were “more enthusiastic” on matters of “trade and money”. And how 
about the ethnic distribution? Out of the 18 groups, only 5 groups had Maasai membership 
and names.
102
 These 5 groups had a total membership of 59 members which represented 29% 
of all those who were accessing credit from the CMC. The rest of the groups had Kamba and 
Kikuyu membership.  
There was a range of criteria that did not favour the Maasai. First time borrowers receive 
between Ksh 5,000 and 50,000 depending on the needs or capacity of the group or an 
applicant.
103
 That is where the problem started. Those Maasai interested in loans dismissed 
those amounts as “too little”. One of my interview partners, Nkata, told me it did not make 
sense to many Maasai to be indebted over “money that cannot buy three bulls”,104 in reference 
to the Ksh 50,000. And that was not all. Other conditions made the loans less attractive to the 
Maasai. Before the group or a member could secure a loan, 30% security for the loan had to 
be paid. This was said to be a show of “commitment”. Actually, the 30% is refunded when the 
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 The Maasai groups were; Matonyoko (9 members), Ewuas (9), Ilparakuo (12), Ilkiramati (12) and Sukuta (17). 
103
 By June 2000, the CMC had disbursed a total of  Ksh 14,332,000 (EUR 186.130). 
104
 The Maasai may be just as „poor‟ as their Kamba neighbours but their utterances espouse pride. They see 
things in a big way; their huts may be small but they will be many, their wives may have lower fertility but a 
man will have several and therefore many children, and their cattle may be the traditional zebu type but they will 
be kept in their tens and hundreds and will wander in vast grazing fields.  
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loan is repaid. The money is also paid back with an interest of 2 % per month. Now, history 
has taught the Maasai to be sceptical about external agents. Within no time, rumours spread 
that those loans should have been dished out “for free” and that the CMC wanted to fleece the 
Maasai. Mwongeli‟s ethnic identity (Kamba) was conveniently used to legitimise these 
suspicions. This might explain why no Maasai self-help group has been given an additional 
loan since the start of 2000. Records indicated that after the 5 groups received the first loan,
105
 
they defaulted, while other members lost interest. She noted that „Vitage‟ recognised that 
“Kajiado has many tribes”. What was ironical was that some of the members of the groups 
receiving loans from the credit scheme did not consider themselves as residents of Kajiado. A 
member of a group called Kuweta na Kwika
106
 noted: “We just live here (Kajiado), she107 
knows that we come from Makueni”.  
The „disinterest‟ of the Maasai created an opportunity for the non-Maasai. She justifies this 
move by noting that: “I have tried my best...the Maasai are not keen on these loans...they 
don‟t like borrowing money from anything official”(Mwongeli, Simba, 24/08/2000). Maasai 
misgivings should be understandable considering the group‟s low literacy rate and the fact 
that collateral for the loans were to be their cattle, which they value very much. She said that 
she had been trying to “teach them” to change their attitude and borrow a leaf from the 
“Kamba and Kikuyu groups” which were relatively doing better.  
This discussion brings the development theory model to the fore. She sees herself as a 
development agent and the Maasai as „recipients‟ and adopts a directive approach, and even 
seems to suggest that the Maasai should take whatever they are given without questions. 
Suspicions and ethnicisation of the initiative partly explains why what started as a noble 
development initiative was reduced to a Kamba-Maasai affair. She thought that the Maasai 
“needed time” to “catch-up”. To get some feedback from the Maasai, I talked to Sitonik, a 
problem shooter. Regarding development initiatives in Maasailand, he quipped: “We tell our 
people that foreigners cannot develop Maasailand”. He argued that the non-Maasai who work 
in Maasailand have a negative attitude towards the “locals” and went further to say, “look at 
Kajiado town...it has failed to grow because it is occupied by foreigners...a young market like 
Isinya
108
 will grow and overtake Kajiado because it is developed mainly by the local Maasai”. 
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 First loan seekers received between Ksh 5,000-50,000; the second loan between Ksh 10,000-100,000; the 
third, Ksh 10,000-200,000; fourth Ksh 10,000-500,000. According to the records, only one group Ngwatanio, 
with Kamba and Kikuyu membership, had received a fourth loan. Groups were investing the monies in shops, 
cereal and cattle trade and the buying and selling of second-hand clothes. 
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 Name means “doing what you say”. 
107
 In reference to the chairperson of the credit scheme. 
108
 Isinya lies between Kajiado and Athi River towns. 
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He did not think that the Maasai themselves have shaped what he called “systematic 
marginalisation”.   
In a nutshell, the subsection has attempted to show the meanings the Maasai attached to a 
Kamba-led organisation. From the start, they counted themselves as „excluded‟ on the basis of 
ethnicity. To make matters worse, the operations of the credit facility were implemented in a 
hurry, heightening Maasai misgivings. Arguing that the Maasai needed more time to “catch-
up” was a cover up for the depictions the leader of the credit facility had about the Maasai. On 
the other hand, Maasai dismissal of the money offered as “too little”, helped her to exclude 
them. When she told me that she was “helping” the Maasai to “catch-up”, what she had in 
mind was the success of women groups in Ukambani, whose model, she argued, could have 
been replicated in Kajiado. Unfortunately, the Kamba „Diaspora‟ ended up appropriating a 
credit facility that in theory had been intended to serve the Maasai. If the Maasai did not hate 
the Kamba for this, a possible explanation would be that from the start, the Maasai neither 
considered the credit facility as „theirs‟ nor meant to serve their interests.  
 
Putting „backwardness‟ into perspective 
In much of Africa, a discourse on modernity, tradition and backwardness has been on the 
centre stage for decades. Indeed, tradition and modernity are said to be two major social, 
political and economic processes that have been competing with each other in the African 
state (Macharia, 1997: 107). Using the mathematical principle of a subset, Macharia shows 
that there can be no clear distinction between “modernity” and “backwardness.” Horowitz 
(1985) notes that groups will hardly be “collectively” advanced or backward. Stressing the 
same point, Wimmer notes that it is “all rare that all members of a politically mobilised ethnic 
group find themselves in a similar economic position” (1997b: 640). While the two authors 
make sense in their analyses, they do not explain why and how groups living in fairly the 
same conditions create these ethnic categories. 
For those familiar with Maasai literature, the notion of portraying the Maasai as „backward‟ or 
„traditional‟ is neither new nor could it be exclusively attributed to the Kamba. In Kenya, the 
post-independence initiative to bridge the colonial marginalisation of pastoral areas has 
remained elusive, leaving Maasailand lagging behind in terms of access to crucial facilities 
like roads, schools, medical facilities and water supply. Much of the „backwardness‟ therefore 
associated with the region and its people, reflects less on the Maasai as a group but more on 
the lopsided policies of the colonial and postcolonial state. For instance, of all the trading 
centres along the Kajiado-Makueni border, Simba (which entirely lies in Maasailand) is the 
only one that lacks electricity and telephone services. Such disparities enhance ethnic tensions 
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as the Kamba consider themselves „better-off‟. This sense of superiority and talk that “Kamba 
towns have electricity and telephone”, sows seeds of hatred, albeit rhetorically. In the Kamba 
and Kikuyu portrayal of the Maasai as ignorant and “easy to lie to”, there are historical, social, 
economic and even mythological explanations. Interethnic property relations appear to be a 
major factor. For the Kamba, demeaning their Maasai neighbours helps them make sense of 
their equally precarious position where water scarcity and food shortage are perennial 
problems and which the state has not been in a hurry to address. It becomes important to talk 
about „other‟ groups that are at a more disadvantaged position. This boosts the group‟s self 
esteem.  
If the Maasai are „backward‟, it is only through the lens of the widely accepted western notion 
of modernisation. In any case, there is every indication that the Maasai have embraced formal 
schooling, western medicine, other forms of dress, diversification of subsistence economy, 
and have changed their eating habits. Whether this „mainstreaming‟ is a „good‟ thing is 
another question altogether. What is rather clear is that just like the Maasai were cultural 
models for their neighbours during much of the precolonial period, they are aggressively 
trying to „catch-up‟ and want to be part of the „wider game‟. Falling short of propping an 
explanation, Forster, Hitchcock and Lyimo (2000: 145) note that the Maasai have long been 
looked down upon by their Bantu-speaking neighbours. This notion could be misleading 
though. Looking back into history, the notion of the Maasai being „backward‟ must be a 
recent phenomenon that was reinforced through the coming of the Europeans and the 
differential influence they had on African groups. Having been labelled as rebellious and 
warlike by the British, the Maasai were basically left alone after the former alienated part of 
their territory. Otherwise, Maasai image was the model for most Bantu groups like the Kamba 
and the Kikuyu. A lot of what came to be recognised as Bantu practices were actually imitated 
from the Maasai, notably, ways of managing cattle herds, cattle breeds, practices like female 
circumcision, piercing of earlobes and the making and wearing of beads and other ornaments. 
These are the groups that German scholars called die Maasaiaffen (the Maasai apes), that is, 
those groups that imitated and adopted Maasai practices.
109
 After all, going back into history, 
African pastoral groups appear to have enjoyed higher status than cultivators. Peil and 
Oyeneye (1998: 58) confirm this notion with regard to the “high status” pastoral Tutsi and 
“low status” agricultural Hutu in precolonial Rwanda (see also Eller, 1999).  
The swapping of modelling roles, where the Maasai find themselves having to imitate others, 
is partly responsible for the Maasai being “on the horns of a dilemma” (Holland, 1996). 
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Moreover, what makes the group sink deeper into a quagmire is that there are strong forces, 
internal and external (e.g. state) that seek to sustain Maasai culture. Bourdieu argues that 
groups with a tendency to persist in their ways may be composed of individuals with “durable 
dispositions that can outlive the economic and social conditions in which they were produced” 
and that this could be a source of misadaptation or resignation (1990: 62). 
What is striking is that in most cases, it is the illiterate Maasai who insist that “things have 
changed”. A cross section of Maasai elite supported the whole notion of being „traditional‟, 
expressing remorse for breaking with the past. A careful analysis revealed that it was 
considered fashionable to show the rest of the world that in spite of schooling, adoption of 
„modern‟ dressing styles and urbanisation, one had not lost his/her „roots‟. This was also done 
for self-praise, to show how much one must have worked hard to make it to the „top‟ 
irrespective of the apparent social and cultural restrictions.
110
 Others who held this view were 
„Maasai‟ whose ethnic identities were contested. Then there were politicians who simply 
praise Maasai cultural practices for political expediency. Whatever the case, the bigger debate 
among Maasai leaders is not whether the Maasai should be left alone but rather whether they 
are having their „rightful‟ share of state resources. It is out of their initiative to „become 
Kenyans‟, as Kituyi (1990) put it, that they are said to be „modern‟ or „backward‟. At least on 
the surface, Maasai housing structures look more „traditional‟,111 enrolment in school is lower, 
drop outs are higher and the general infrastructure is poorer compared to their neighbouring 
groups like the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kisii and the Kipsigis.  
 
Are the Maasai „ignorant‟ 
Spear (1993: 1) tells us the following about the Maasai: “Uncowed by their neighbours, 
colonial conquest, or modernisation, they stand in proud mute testimony to a vanishing 
African world”. While many Kamba respondents were unanimous about Maasai „ignorance‟, 
a few had a different story. If we take „cunningness‟ and „craftiness‟ or outwitting people as 
the opposite of „ignorance‟, then the story of Kyuli of Kiboko challenges the notion of the 
Maasai as „ignorant‟. And I met him in unusual circumstances. Whereas recruiting research 
partners was an arduous task as noted in chapter two, Kyuli asked me to interview him. He 
told me that he had heard that I was carrying out research in the area and had wondered why 
“you are not interviewing old men”. I obliged. He is a farmer and also runs a small retail 
business in Kiboko trading centre. Out of the large body of data generated after spending 
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 But it is not uncommon to find a brand new Toyota Hilux pick-up packed right in the midst of the traditional 
mud huts. 
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considerable time with him, of relevance here is what transpired during the 1999/2000 
drought.  
A Maasai herder approached him in April 2000 during the prolonged drought and asked him 
to allow his “50 head of cattle” to graze in his farm at a fee of Ksh 10,000 (EUR 130) per 
month. After surveying his pastureland, the Maasai herder paid for the coming month 
immediately; “they always pay before hand”, noted Kyuli. But when the cattle were brought 
in, they did not number 50 but 99. Kyuli said, “to make matters worse, the person I had 
negotiated with...the owner, was not there...the two cattle herders could neither speak 
Kiswahili nor Kikamba.” He suspected that perhaps they „could‟ but did not want to. He was 
caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, he could not air his protests due to 
the communication barrier and on the other, the man he had transacted business with was 
nowhere to be seen. And that was not the end of the dilemma. Kyuli desperately needed the 
money, which was forthcoming without delay but the cattle owner made those payments 
through a proxy. After four months, he sought assistance from the police who refused to 
intervene after Kyuli could not produce a written agreement. Although it would have helped 
to seek assistance from the chief, he restrained himself fearing that the state administrator 
would “complicate things”. Apparently, the chief would have questioned why he was not 
involved during the time of agreement. Kyuli had other genuine fears. He noted: “If the chief 
knew that I was getting Ksh 10,000 a month, he would have demanded a monthly rate for his 
intervention (shakes his head)...the chiefs of these days! they are just criminals”.  
Based on these misgivings, he mobilised his Kamba kin and neighbours to drive the cattle out 
of his grazing fields. It was at that juncture that the owner of the cattle reappeared. Kyuli was 
to find out that the man was all along monitoring the animals almost on a daily basis: “He 
would come...ask his servants whether there was any problem and then go away”, he noted. 
Although he rejected a suggestion to review the terms of the „contract‟, he admitted that the 
Maasai herder had outwitted him. He told me that “it is easy to dismiss the Maasai, they look 
ignorant, very harmless but they are very clever”. But there was another dimension. The 
Maasai herder, as another Maasai (Palalelei) noted, had “proved” that “you can easily deceive 
the Kamba”. He went on to say how the Kamba had been “spoiled” by money and therefore 
“ready to do anything” to earn it. A reflection of this incident reveals that as a survival 
mechanism, the Maasai have perfected the art of “yielding” to “wield” influence (see 
Magdalena Villarreal, 1994). Using a Mexican example, Villarreal shows how women in a 
development project played “subordinate” in order to create room for manoeuvre and win 
power and influence.  
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Taking the Maasai for granted has in many occasions landed the Kamba into trouble. An 
incident that took place in a Maasai village near Emali illustrates this point. A Kamba cattle 
trader bought 10 heads of cattle from a Maasai pastoralist in December 1999. After the cattle 
he had selected were taken away by his aingi (hired cattle escorts), he, with the cattle owner 
on his side, followed from behind. They were heading to Emali trading centre where the 
payment was to be made. The Kamba cattle trader had other plans though. As they trailed the 
cattle from a distance, he deceived the Maasai cattle owner. On the pretext that he was 
attending to a call of nature in the bush, he disappeared in the woods thinking that by so doing, 
he had 10 heads of cattle „for free‟.112 He had agreed with the aingi on where they would take 
the cattle to.  
To his surprise, when he got to Emali after clearing about 7 kilometres through the thorny 
bushes, he was shocked to find several Maasai murran keeping vigil over his car which he 
had presumed to be safely parked at a fairly exclusive restaurant.
113
 He had only two 
alternatives, namely to risk losing the four-wheel drive car which was to be burned or 
detained, and paying for the animals. He came to grips with not only a very complex and 
effective communication system on the part of the Maasai  but also a well organised system to 
counter any threats on their lifeline and demeaning acts. The narrator (a Kamba who 
witnessed the incident) said “it was an opportunity for the Maasai to show the Kamba that 
they are not as stupid as we think” (Musyoka, Emali, 11/01/2000). Before the man paid up, 
the Maasai had threatened to seek the intervention of the restaurant‟s proprietor, a senior 
government official. Within a short time, many influential Maasai knew about the matter too. 
After going underground for a couple of days, he had to pay for the animals and an additional 
“fine”.  
I gathered that such incidences of deception were common in the area and the Maasai were 
hardly on the receiving end. For instance, the Maasai had duped innumerable Kamba into 
„buying‟ non-existent commercial plots and pieces of land. Some local administrators who 
were accomplices in the alleged conspiracies had hampered seeking state intervention. In 
other cases, the „victims‟ could not say the names or locate the homesteads of the „villains‟. In 
their traditional regalia, the Maasai look of simplicity and vulnerability is often “mistaken” as 
emblems of honesty and reliability. This deception works to their advantage. Besides these, 
the Kamba have lost many cattle, sheep and goats through Maasai „cunningness‟. This 
involves the manipulation of livestock marks. For instance, a Kamba called Umoa bought a 
bull from a Maasai herder in Makindu market but after a week, a group of Maasai came to his 
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village looking for “our lost cattle”. Finding this bull which bore their marks, they took it 
away claiming that Mr Umoa must have stolen it. Mr Maithya, a neighbour who mediated on 
the case, said: “It was difficult to prove that he had bought it since people are not issued with 
receipts!” (with prolonged laughter). In his village alone, that had happened three times. This 
is compounded by the fact that unlike in the olden days, many Kamba do not mark their cattle.  
Among the Maasai, cattle marking is done almost without any exception, with a lot of 
precision and on clan/family lines. A lot of significance is attached to it. Similarly, the Kamba 
used to mark cattle and had clan-based cattle brands (Lindblom 1920: 129; Middleton and 
Kershaw; 1972: 73). The practice has been largely disregarded in the course of time due to 
inter alia; changes in land tenure (individualised ownership and therefore grazing in restricted 
areas), dispersion of clans, keeping of fewer stock, and lesser significance of cattle wealth as 
formal education and white collar jobs took precedence. As for the Maasai, cattle branding is 
still observed strictly and by looking at the marks, one could easily trace the family or section 
of the owner. What happens is that once Maasai bump into unmarked cattle (indo itembane) 
during raids or mere theft, they treat them as “cattle without an owner” and brand them 
immediately.  
Looking at all these scenarios, one sees that the Maasai outsmart the Kamba in various 
contexts. And this is partly because the Kamba are socialised to perceive the Maasai as less 
ingenious. Erroneously, the Kamba assume that the Maasai „respect‟ them. In fact, the Maasai 
regard them as “easy prey” to use the words of Mualuko (Loitokitok). Besides, the Maasai, as 
vulnerable, illiterate and „backward‟ as they may look, have one major advantage. Being a self 
conscious marginalised group, they have very close contacts with their political leaders. While 
a Kamba teacher, respected in his/her neighbourhood and considered an opinion leader may 
never have met his MP, or have any contacts with him, it would not be surprising to find an 
„ordinary‟ Maasai pastoralist who can just walk into the office of a Maasai cabinet minister. 
Secondly, and as we shall see later when discussing “politics of recognition”, the Maasai 
easily evoke sympathy even when they have wronged others. And they know that. 
 
3.1.5   The Maasai as “promiscuous” 
Citing what he called “previous reports”, a Maasai businessman told me that my dissertation 
should not present the group in “bad light”. He lamented that “many lies” had been told and 
published about the Maasai. Anyhow, I was given many stories regarding how each group 
was more „moral‟ than the other. I would be told how the murran are so disciplined that they 
“cannot touch alcohol” only to find some drinking, not in secluded places but in the public 
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bars. Such was also the myth that it was a taboo or “unheard of” for them to sleep with 
married women.
114
  
The story of how Maasai men simply leave or „plant‟ their spears outside a hut as an indicator 
that they are having sex with the woman who lives there
115
 has been told over and over again. 
And people never tire of telling them. Very few Kamba respondents did not cite this story to 
express how „immoral‟ and „promiscuous‟ the Maasai are. The story is also similar to another 
one which I saw on CNN about a community in rural India where a married woman can be 
shared by brothers. In this case, the man leaves his walking stick outside the hut to indicate 
that “the woman is busy”. The practice of „leaving a spear‟ outside the hut has also been 
associated with the traditional Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi.  
Going back to the Maasai story, it is indisputable that Maasai men pin their spears outside the 
hut before entering inside for whatever business. This is done for practical reasons. 
Considering that a spear could be as long as two metres, while the entrance to the huts is 
hardly more than a metre high, it would be extremely cumbersome to get into the hut with the 
spear. In the evening however, the spears are kept in the huts for security reasons. While some 
Kamba respondents knew this, they would only confirm after I shared with them the other 
side of the story. For those who held the stereotype as „true‟, the deconstruction was treated 
with derision. But then comes in Sitonik, the teacher. Rather sarcastically, he praised „his‟ 
people, the Maasai for “inventing” the “do not disturb” tab seen in houses and hotel rooms 
around the world!  
Some stories about Maasai sexual relations are not stereotypes though. Members of the same 
age-set can share wives but as always, the woman has the final say. Ole Sankan admits though 
that this traditional arrangement where a wife theoretically and in practice can sleep and have 
children with any man of her choice, provided he belongs to the husband‟s age group, has led 
to “easy spread of venereal diseases within Maasailand” (1971: xii). The stereotype has been 
that the women have no choice. Whatever the case, the whole arrangement has faced stiff 
challenges from Christianity, monogamy and modernity. Let me illustrate. Sometime in the 
mid 1990‟s, a fairly educated Maasai man was having a drink with his semi-literate friend and 
a member of his age-set in Kiboko. At some point, the „friend‟ bought him two drinks and 
excused himself saying he was coming back „shortly‟. This man was seen entering into his 
friend‟s rented house in the trading centre. A Kamba neighbour, who knew that the two had 
been playing hide-and-seek games, went out looking for his friend and found him drinking. 
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 It was also evident that neither do all boys become murran nor do all murran live in the warrior villages 
(manyata). See also Spencer (1993: 150). 
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 Married Maasai women usually live in separate huts from men. 
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This particular Kamba knew that the practice of sharing wives among age-mates was 
increasingly facing resistance among the Maasai. After relaying the information to his Maasai 
friend, the latter rushed home immediately. He found his friend and his wife in bed. He beat 
him up and took him to the nearby police station where the suspected „adulterer‟ was locked 
up overnight. The „accused‟ thought he would take advantage of the non-Maasai policemen 
by telling them that among the Maasai, what he had done was the norm. The police however 
had handled similar cases before. The next day, the „wronged‟ man was asking for Ksh 
100,000 (EUR 1.300) from his friend‟s family as “compensation”. He threatened to take him 
to court or “deal with him”. Through the intervention of their parents, uncles and some clan 
elders, it was agreed that he would receive Ksh 5,000 (EUR 65) ransom. It was claimed that 
“as Maasai”, they should not wash their dirty linen in public (Kiboko is dominantly Kamba). 
The complainant was also told by an elder that if the „accused‟ had been Kamba, then a high 
fine would have been “justified”.  
The wronged had taken advantage of the modern forms of arbitration and sanction, for the 
Ksh 100,000 he demanded was quite exorbitant by local standards. To the eyes of the Kamba 
though, it was an indication of how „similar‟ the two groups had become in their ways of 
resolving interpersonal differences. The incident was an eye opener to Kamba residents in 
Kiboko who realised that many of the „traditional practices‟ that the Maasai are said to 
observe are no longer tenable. For the Kamba to see a “Maasai rise against Maasai” over a 
woman served to deconstruct the „Maasai image‟. A Kamba businessman in Kiboko put it 
thus, “...that day, we knew that the Maasai are just pretenders…they say that they share wives 
and yet we had to intervene otherwise they would have killed each other” (Kyuli, 14/09/2000). 
This was an incident that made the Maasai also come to terms with their own „culture‟. The 
older generation, for instance, are said to have been “disappointed” by the reaction of the 
“educated” man. 
Did the Kamba who followed this story „change‟ their attitudes towards Maasai sexual 
relations? Generally, no. They insisted that this was an “isolated” case. Maasai „promiscuous‟ 
status had to be maintained to support other generalisations revolving around „primitivism‟ 
and presenting the Maasai as abusers of women. Taking into account that the Kamba also 
regard themselves as more Christianised than the Maasai, such negative analogies enhance the 
feeling that they were „better-off‟. At the time of my fieldwork, this had taken a different 
dimension with the HIV/Aids pandemic. The Maasai were being presented as a “risk group”. 
A Kamba commercial sex worker in Kiboko told me that when she is going with a Maasai, “I 
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have to charge them more...they don‟t use condoms, they don‟t care, you know...they sleep 
with anybody, they don‟t care, that is their life” (28/06/2000). 
I gathered many stories that involved Maasai men and Kamba women. Such stories would be 
narrated with detail and enthusiasm. They remained fresh in people‟s memories perhaps 
because of their phenomenality. Maasai pastoralists/traders lost thousands of shillings to 
Kamba and Kikuyu female commercial sex workers based in the trading centres. In one 
particular account given by a Kamba woman working in a bar in Kiboko market, a Maasai 
trader lost Ksh 60,000 (about EUR 800) in a lodging where he had spent the night with a 
friend to the bar maid, and who had since relocated to Mombasa. Although this friend of hers 
was afraid of the reprisals, she told me that the Maasai cattle trader had later said that what he 
had lost was “pesa kidogo” (“little money”) and that it was “ng'ombe tatu tu” (“only three 
heads of cattle”). She had offered to go for her friend in Mombasa clarifying that “this would 
have cost him about Ksh 3,000...but he would have recovered his Ksh 60,000”. She sounded 
as if she knew exactly where her friend was and assumed that the „stolen‟ money would have 
been found intact. Cleverly, the Maasai trader had rejected the offer. Telling her that the 
Maasai man would probably have lost an additional Ksh 3,000, she burst out laughing in 
agreement. She considered the Maasai as gullible. But in this narrative, there is a mix of 
„class‟ and „ethnicity‟. In the rural settings, it is common practice for the „poor‟ to take 
advantage of the „rich‟ irrespective of ethnic affiliation. It is only that the Maasai appeared 
more vulnerable. This vulnerability was said to be exacerbated by Maasai men‟s tendency to 
be ostentatious “even when they sell one cow” (Mutui, Kiboko, 06/03/2000). To be fair to the 
Maasai, considering that a cow can fetch up to Ksh 10,000 (EUR 130), the monthly salary of a 
trained primary school teacher, it is a considerable amount. 
Going back to the Ksh 60,000, that is a lot of money by any standards. My reading is that it 
was not that the money was “little” but perhaps because the Maasai trader was addressing a 
Kamba audience. The underlying message seems to have been; “we have money, you do not 
have it”. It was evident that for those who have it, the Maasai carry a lot of money with them. 
The school headteacher referred earlier, told me how Maasai parents, in comparison to the 
others, not only paid school fees for their children usually in cash, but they would pay any 
outstanding balances and contingent levies “on the spot” even when they did not know about 
them.   
 
3.1.6   External depictions: The Maasai as a “famous” group 
Many books have been written and numerous films made about the Maasai. It is definitely one 
of Africa‟s prominent groups. In fact, they are often presented as symbolising African heritage 
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and the elusive but cherished „uncontaminated‟ identity. And from school pupils, the warriors, 
elders, to women, awareness about their fame (often exaggerated) cuts across age-sets and 
their vast territory. “We are known all over the world, I am sure you know that”, remarked a 
Maasai elder during my fieldwork. Palalelei continued: “You people...you are known for 
nothing (not as well known).” Although one may say that few groups, if any, can be said to 
lack some form of pride, the case of the Maasai pride can only be comparable to the Nuer of 
Sudan and Ethiopia.
116
 If those people who study the Maasai have disagreed on certain 
aspects of Maasai history, ethnicity, social organisation and practices, they are agreed on one 
thing; the Maasai are a proud people. So proud are they that after the 2001 September 11
th
 
attack in New York and Washington, they donated 15 cows to assist the Americans! after a 
Maasai student who was in America at the time came back home later and narrated the 
episode to his people.
117
 This gesture put the Maasai in the news once more as the American 
embassy officials in Nairobi went to Maasailand (Trans Mara) to receive the cattle. 
Palalelei was keen to stress that the Maasai were „better positioned‟ than the Kamba in their 
ethnic rivalry and competition. The phrase, “I am sure you know that” had a deeper meaning. 
First and foremost, he was addressing me as a Kamba and therefore seeking 
acknowledgement of his assertion that the Maasai are famous. Secondly, he knew that I was 
studying in Germany and therefore sought to confirm whether the Maasai were well known 
overseas. In general, Maasai fame appears to reverse the purported „advantaged‟ position of 
the Kamba who portray themselves as the „local agents of modernity‟. Well, the Kamba 
dismiss Maasai‟s world appeal and fame saying that it has reduced them to tourist objects.  
Incidentally, the heading of this subsection is also based on a protest comment made by a 
Kamba respondent: “Okay, they are famous, is that important?” (Mwende, Emali, 
20/07/2000). This comment, made out of anger, sent me pondering, what is in fame? Mwende 
was of the view that the Maasai were famous “for the wrong things”. That they were well 
known for “keeping their culture, circumcising women, keeping many cattle, killing lions, 
their traditional clothes, such things...whites come here, they don‟t cross to our side, they go 
to Kajiado...some of these people you see here (Maasai), have they even been to school? no! 
but they have white women”.118 The idea of Maasai men being admired by white women does 
not seem to go down well among Kamba men. But although they could not comprehend 
exactly why the whites had a liking for the Maasai, they were convinced they could not 
compete. They also felt that „fame‟ translated into material gains and enhanced Maasai‟s self 
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esteem. Sitonik, my research partner, was more blunt. He claimed that if there was a white 
who knew a Kamba, then this must have happened “by accident” as s/he criss-crossed 
Maasailand or by meeting them “in the hotels where they work”.119 
All this brings to mind books like die weisse Massai (“the white Maasai”) by Corinne 
Hofmann (2000). The book tells you how „different‟, exotic and unique the Maasai are. In a 
casual chat with a German family, with whom I visit once in a while, and who had read the 
book,
120
 they could not hide their curiosity about the Maasai. No wonder that the first time I 
visited them, they had asked whether I was Maasai. Telling them that I was not, they looked a 
bit disillusioned. I was partly to blame. Before I visited the family, we had exchanged notes 
about ourselves and photographs. Accustomed to the Kenyan style of using the Maasai image 
as a way of selling Kenya to the outside world, I had sent them Maasai photographs in their 
traditional regalia (in shawls, loin-clothes, pierced and extended earlobes etc.). Little did I 
know that this was actually the kind of person they expected to see. Listening to them telling 
their friends about what they had learnt from me, little would be said about my studies in 
Germany or my university career but rather whatever I said about life challenges in rural 
Africa, snakes, hunger and poverty. But to be fair to them, what sense would it have made to 
their listeners being told how „western‟ I was! A friend of theirs quipped one evening that I 
was “fortunate to be in Germany”. Although he was apologetic later, his was a position shared 
by many of my Kenyan friends. 
Kenyans or indeed Africans who read Hofmann‟s book should be excused for the anger the 
book may evoke. For it presents a very familiar African story; people living very close to 
nature, using rudimentary methods of survival, hardly influenced by the urban or 
„modernised‟ environments in which they live121 and „crude‟ in behaviour. But again, when 
you read about the rich body of depictions exchanged between the Kamba and the Maasai, 
you might find Hofmann‟s book too „mild‟. The only difference perhaps, is that her book runs 
like a documentary, a lived experience, devoid of meanings and stereotypes. I know that I am 
landing on a very slippery ground, for whatever the Kamba actors said about the Maasai was 
presented as „real‟. So that what Hofmann, as a westerner not „stand‟ among the Maasai, turns 
out to be what a Kamba cannot „stand‟ too. They literally share a platform. But there is still a 
difference. Hofmann presents her story as an „insider‟ and as this study has shown, insiders 
often deconstruct myths, stereotypes and imagined ethnic differences. But contrary to this, she 
uses her insider position to perpetuate „known‟ Maasai stereotypes. 
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During my study, it was clear that many Maasai knew that there was a large body of literature 
written on them. While some expressed concern about the „negative‟ image often portrayed, 
many took pride in being „internationally‟ well known. Actually, the first time I heard about 
Hofmann‟s book, was from one of my Maasai research partners. When Sitonik talked about 
the book, I first thought that he was referring to another sensational story that hit Kenyan 
headlines earlier regarding a British woman who met another Samburu man in Mombasa, fell 
in love and divorced her husband.  
Although I doubt that he had read the book, he gave a vivid account of its contents. He did not 
say the title of the book nor the author but he noted that “it is written by a woman from 
Switzerland who had married a msamburu”. This compels me to comment about Hofmann‟s 
selection of her book title, die weisse Massai, although the story actually revolves around a 
„Samburu‟. It is the appealing and well known „Maasai‟ image which must have made her to 
select a „Maasai‟ title for marketing reasons. Admittedly, the Samburu (Ilsampur) are 
linguistically and culturally related to the „Maasai‟ but, inhabiting Samburu district, they are 
in many respects a distinct ethnic group
122
 from the Maasai of Kajiado, Narok and Trans Mara. 
They do recognise themselves as „Samburu‟. A Maasai historian, ole Kantai notes: “..also 
within this body of the Maasai are Ilsampur who are geographically isolated by their location 
in the north east of Kenya”.123  
Although Maasai fame may at times be premised on the “wrong reasons”, as Mwende had 
noted, their admiration world-wide is evident. And this fame is not just acknowledged by 
Kenyan groups, novelists and tourists. Scholarly works have been on the frontline. From 
Adamson (1967), Kituyi (1990), Spear and Waller (1993) to Holland (1996), the Maasai are 
praised for their resilience, unique culture and history. Within East Africa, Maasai image has 
been appropriated for all sorts of purposes. Tourist websites advertising Kenya as an attractive 
destination would be incomplete without pictures of the Maasai.
124
 In addition, there are 
instances where non-Maasai Kenyan groups pose as Maasai for commercial purposes. A 
Kenyan journalist, Wycliffe Muga, wrote an article entitled “when „Maasai‟ is a job 
description”. He eloquently noted that in the coastal town of Mombasa (where he was based), 
“we have long been familiar with “Maasai” as a job description, rather than a tribal 
label...”.125 
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 Unlike other „Maasai‟, for instance, they keep camels. „Politically‟, they are also treated as distinct from the 
„Maasai‟. Apart from having their own district, they are also counted separately from „Maasai‟ during censuses 
and in the run up to the 1992 elections, they were slotted as a distinct member of the so-called KAMATUSA, 
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He proceeds to give a vivid account of how non-Maasai groups clad in the red shuka (shawl), 
braided hair, and holding a club, hawk beaded „Maasai‟ ornaments in the beaches, the 
underlying motive being to catch the attention of European  women tourists. He notes that 
“the anecdotal evidence would seem to indicate that the great majority of these „Maasai‟ are 
actually Giriama,
126
 often ex-members of some tribal dance troupe...it paid dividends to be a 
“Maasai” and so they deserted their earlier calling and settled down to being full-time 
„Maasai‟ to their conspicuous advantage. But recent years have reportedly brought increasing 
numbers of Digo and Kamba into this speciality market. And although the Giriama had a head 
start, „Maasai‟ from these other tribes are believed to be in hot pursuit, racing neck to neck, to 
challenge the dominance of Giriama „Maasai‟”. It would appear that Bantu groups have not 
ceased to be die Maasaiaffen (Maasai apes) only that this time around, the „aping‟ has taken a 
different form in that it is for commercial purposes. The imitators cannot afford to introduce 
modifications but instead try to be as „Maasai‟ as possible, often overdoing it. Because of 
Maasai fame, their traditional dance, which other East African groups may not find very  
thrilling, pulls huge audiences among foreigners basically for what it represents. 
The „real‟ Maasai are caught up in a dilemma. On the one hand, they are demeaned by other 
Kenyan groups while on the other, many mimic their dressing styles to access certain 
resources, making it look quite fashionable and potentially resourceful to be Maasai. After I 
learnt a bit of Maa, I greeted a watchman in Nairobi‟s South „B‟ estate who, from his dress, 
looked Maasai. He retorted in Swahili: “Wewe ukiona mtu amevalia namna hii unafikiri ni 
Masai?”, meaning, “if you see someone dressed like this, why should you conclude that he‟s a 
Maasai?” I challenged him, saying that one may speak Maa when he is not Maasai, to which 
he responded that he was just dressed kikazi (“as per the demands of the job”). It was clear 
that all what his employers (Kenyan Asians) wanted was a „Maasai watchman‟. In any case, 
they communicated in Swahili.  
 
The Maasai in commercial advertisements 
The Maasai international appeal is used in the advertisement of a wide range of products. On 
Kenyan television, the national postal corporation
127
 carried an advertisement in the 1980‟s in 
which somebody who posed like a Maasai was shown running through several ridges, valleys 
and plains to post a letter, and then showed how „easy‟ it had become overtime to access 
postal services. In this advertisement, Maasai image is associated with the past. In Germany,  
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a coffee processing and marketing company, Tchibo, features the Maasai in a television 
commercial that advertises coffee. It is safe to assume that the commercial is aimed at giving 
coffee „African roots‟ and perhaps show that the beans have been acquired through “fair 
trade”. Otherwise, I am certain that both the company and the targeted consumers are not 
ignorant of the fact that the Maasai, predominantly associated with pastoralism, live outside 
the coffee belt of East Africa. In the Tchibo commercial, the Maasai image appears to 
represent the African identity. The leading airline manufacturer, Boeing, also features(d) the 
Maasai in one of its commercials perhaps to drive the point home that a Boeing airline can 
take you to the remotest parts of the globe. Here, the Maasai are presented not only as a 
marginal group inhabiting geographically distant areas but also as a tourist attraction.  
In yet another feature (see photo below), a Maasai looking after cattle in the dry East African 
plains is holding a mobile phone, a gadget associated with 
elitism in that part of the world. This photo, carried by Missio 
aktuell of the German Catholic organisation, was in connection 
with the inequitable distribution of technology in the world. 
While the photo shows the technological gap between African 
countries and the industrialised world, it also appears to  
show the mix between modernity and tradition. It is an irony 
since the last thing one would associate with a Maasai herder is a 
mobile phone. Following a discussion I held with two German 
students who toured Kenya and saw a considerable number of 
people in Nairobi and Mombasa holding mobile phones, the 
hidden message behind this photo seems to be: “Eradicate 
poverty first  and then you can think about mobile phones”. 
These are just some of the many ways that the Maasai image is 
appropriated within and outside the Kenyan borders. It is partly 
this kind of attention given to the Maasai that makes some non-
Maasai pose as „Maasai‟. There is something positive about these 
commercials; at least, it is a departure from other negative 
images where the Maasai have been portrayed as drinkers of 
animal blood, mutilators of female genitals, as a people who lead 
promiscuous lifestyles and as trapped in a development dilemma.  
 
 
Plate 1: A Maasai „cattle herder‟ posing with a mobile phone. Source: Missio aktuell 1/2000. 
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The photo could evoke pride or anger depending on who is looking at it. What is negative 
about it is that it depicts the Maasai as exotic and „different‟. Although the young man is 
holding a technologically advanced gadget, he is not representing modernity but a 
disadvantaged, „backward‟ and remotely located group. The photo and other commercials 
which feature the Maasai appear to stress that there are gains to be reaped by remaining 
„traditional‟, different and set apart from the „ordinary‟; they stress difference. 
Incidentally, the Maasai have also had „cultural ambassadors‟ supposedly to create awareness 
about „African culture‟ in the West. One such Maasai was Tom Mpeti ole Surum who was 
„Kenya‟s cultural ambassador‟ to the United States.128 He became a very famous personality 
back in Kenya and at one time joined forces to fight a cabinet minister and self styled „Maasai 
spokesman‟. The campaign did not succeed though. A CNN Inside Africa edition of 14th 
April 2001 featured one John ole Tome who appeared to have stepped into the late Surum‟s 
shoes.  
 
Seeking to exclude others 
 
In as much as the Maasai take pride in the social significance attached to their identity by 
other groups, many have strong reservations on the appropriation of „Maasainess‟. My 
research partner, Sitonik noted: “Some people think that it is very easy to be Maasai, they 
come, they try, many give up, it is not easy...you see, sometimes I am dressed just like you
129
 
but one can see that you are not Maasai.” 130  He was desperately trying to erect ethnic 
boundaries between the Maasai and non-Maasai by insisting on how „different‟ the Maasai are. 
“Red shukas are synonymous with the Maasai, but dressing in a shuka does not necessarily 
(make) everyone a Maasai,” 131  wrote Sinoyia ole Yiaile of the Maasai Environmental 
Resource Coalition. This is one of the Maasai-led organisations that are fighting for 
conservation of the Maasai pastoral economy, environment, and against the 
“misrepresentation” of the Maasai culture as well as violation of intellectual cultural property 
rights.  
In his article entitled “cultural robbers taking sheen off Maasai culture, ” he argued that 
cultural „impostors‟ should be shunned for they were “spoilers of the Maasai culture.” He 
argued that their culture was attractive and irresistible, making some non-Maasai to cash in on 
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 See The Daily Nation Friday, October 12, 2001. 
129
 In a shirt, trouser and shoes. 
130
 He was referring to certain physical characteristics e.g. height. 
131
 See “letters to the editor”, The Daily Nation, Friday 12, 2001. 
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its “commercial value.” He lamented that an individual “purporting to be Maasai” gave a 
lecture to an attentive audience at the exclusive Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi. He notes: 
“The individual does not even know how to hold a rungu (club). He holds it with his left 
hand”.132 He calls the person a “cultural robber and conman.” He expressed deep concern 
about the arbitrary observance of Maasai group norms and physical representations and took a 
swipe at those who parody the “Maasai culture.” He appeared to have been stressing what 
Bourdieu (1990: 69) calls the “pedagogic reason,” that is, to “extort what is essential while 
seeming to demand the insignificant” when defending certain ethnic ideals.  
Yiaile‟s anger appeared to be premised not on the fact that people imitate the Maasai, but that 
there were financial gains in doing this. He also cited another case in a Nairobi restaurant 
called Simmers where a waiter-cum entertainer “presents himself as a Maasai.” He argued that 
such individuals should be vetted to ascertain their authenticity and that employers should 
look for “true Maasai who understand their culture fully to avoid embarrassment.” He 
appealed to the hotel industry to be advertising such positions. What he did not say in his 
article is who a “true Maasai” is. His attempt to demarcate ethnic differences was quite 
illusionary. Although he insists on the authenticity of those who pose as Maasai, he ignores 
the fact that “impostors” may be more motivated and keen on „Maasai culture‟ more than 
those he calls “true Maasai”. He went against Barth‟s suggestion that “it makes no difference 
how dissimilar members may be in their overt behaviour-if they say they are A, in contrast to 
another cognate B, they are willing to be treated and let their own behaviour be interpreted 
and judged as A‟s and not as B‟s” (1969: 15).  
 
3.2   Conclusion 
 
As I noted in the introduction, this chapter and the next are about showing how the Kamba 
and the Maasai make sense of ethnic difference through depictions. In this chapter, one sees a 
passionate move by the Kamba to distant themselves from the Maasai whom they had 
imitated in the past. That is why many of the depictions revolve around social transformation. 
Surprisingly, the Maasai are not insisting that they have embraced education and market 
economy and therefore are increasingly becoming similar to the Kamba. Instead, they choose 
to take pride in the resilience of their culture and say the Kamba “have nothing to show” for 
their heritage. This is one depiction that is acceptable to both groups: The Kamba like being 
portrayed as people who have „modernised‟, while the Maasai, even when „modern‟, take 
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 The Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi is a five star complex. It is a preferred venue for „high level‟ seminars 
and conferences. A Rungu is the Swahili word for the Maasai traditional club otherwise called  Orinka in Maa. 
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pride in their cultural heritage. This not only lends credence to interface relations, where 
discontinuities become critical (Long, 1989), but also boils down to what the theme of this 
chapter is; to show that from the Kamba‟s point of view, the Maasai are distinct from them, 
and therefore meet one of the basic qualifications in interethnic coexistence, namely 
distinctiveness.  
In this chapter, there is a combination of primordial and constructed aspects of ethnic identity. 
Distinctions range from predisposed physical traits and temperament, ecology and modes of 
subsistence, cultural practices (e.g. dressing codes and female circumcision) to social 
transformation. The Maasai are portrayed as contingent planners, backward, ignorant, 
promiscuous, but on a positive note, as famous.
133
 These depictions are presented as opposites 
of what the Kamba are. I have shown however that there are overlaps, which are often denied. 
I have also discussed the logic behind these depictions, showing that some are grounded on 
social facts. The actors‟ are keen to draw „clear‟ lines of distinction between the two groups, 
irrespective of their interactive everyday practices and a history of interaction. Distinctions are 
drawn with so much zeal that where physical appearances are fluid, actors still claim that they 
can intuitively “feel” and tell the ethnicity of an actor. This demonstrates the quest for actors 
to maintain ethnic boundaries and make sense of their own existence and identity. 
Depicting the Maasai as “backward” is a „face saving‟ exercise aimed at legitimising the 
abandonment of many of Kamba‟s cultural practices (e.g. initiation rites). The irony in 
demeaning a noble attribute like the Maasai traditional dress is that present day Kenyan 
designers and artists have been searching for a national “African dress” which is to 
incorporate Maasai bright coloured dress code.  
It has been shown in the chapter that external dominant discourses, including western 
literature, reinforce stereotypes, even if it is by glorifying Maasai culture. The Maasai are 
portrayed as exotic and therefore far removed from their neighbours. Nevertheless, ethnic 
depictions also bring the groups together. The “backwardness” of the Maasai, presented as 
something that should be overcome, has created avenues of closer interethnic interaction with 
the Kamba assuming the role of change agents in development activities, education and 
business. Some of the depictions have wider implications; non-schooling (seen as an attribute 
of ignorance) is a reflection of some of the fundamental challenges facing the Kenyan state as 
it struggles to eradicate what it set out to do at independence: ignorance, poverty and disease. 
After going through chapter four, where I look at the other side of the story, one notices that 
in comparison, the Maasai are stereotyped more. This has to do with the resilience of Maasai 
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 Although they are said to be famous “for the wrong reasons!” 
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cultural practices which astound not just the Kamba but other groups and people from many 
parts of the world.  
Let me now look at the other side of the story: How the Maasai depict the Kamba. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ACTORS: ETHNIC DEPICTIONS, DIFFERENCE AND 
COEXISTENCE (PART TWO) 
 
4.1   Maasai ethnic depictions of the Kamba  
 
Chapters three and four could have been combined but have been separated for two reasons. 
One, a single chapter would have been too big and clumsy, and two, to allow the reader 
discern more clearly the intricate nuances in the way the two groups depict each other. 
Although both chapters are about how the Kamba and the Maasai make sense of ethnic 
difference, the two groups stress different attributes. As a proud group that values cattle 
wealth, the Maasai portray the Kamba farmers (Ilmeek) as “poor” and desperate. And owing 
to the resilience of Maasai culture, the Kamba are presented as people who have lost their 
cultural heritage and direction. The Kamba are also presented as cowards, immoral, lovers of 
women and thieves. But the Maasai present Kamba women, whom they often take as wives, 
as “hard working”. This chapter includes a section that examines commonalities (points of 
convergence) between the two groups which enhance co-operation and harmony. At the end 
of the chapter, I present the conclusion for this particular chapter and a general conclusion 
covering both chapters.  
 
4.1.1  The Kamba as “poor” 
“To us, wakamba (the Kamba) are people who live in constant poverty...always on food 
relief...they have small farms, we employ them to look at our animals and build our 
houses...even in the schools, our children are not send home for lack of fees”. This statement, 
by a Maasai (Nkari) is made with a lot of finality and embodies stativity. He talks about the 
past and the present and does not see any possible changes in the state of things. Nkari is a 
fairly well-off Maasai and he takes his privileged economic position as the embodiment of 
being Maasai. But these notions depicting the Kamba as poor are common among the Maasai. 
And unlike the Kamba who tend to have many post-colonial depictions on the Maasai, Maasai 
stereotypes on the Kamba are generally primordial. 
What is striking is that although the Maasai glorify animal wealth, and see it as the epitome of 
their identity, many of those who recognise themselves as pastoral Maasai have only small 
herds and some have no cattle at all,
134
 and two, many Maasai have diversified their economy, 
taking up farming. And although they portray the Kamba as “poor farmers” (Ilmeek), they 
                                                          
134
 Earning their living by working as cattle herders or watchmen in trading centres and towns. 
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know that the Kamba have always kept some cattle. And that is not the end of the 
inconsistencies. When I asked them to define „wealth‟ they did not just talk about cattle. 
Generally, wealth was defined in terms of visible material acquisitions that enhanced one‟s 
level of performance and  social status. They said that it is manifested by the number of cattle, 
sheep and goats owned, size of land, number of wives and children, jobs in the modern sector, 
whether one has sons/daughters in gainful employment, whether houses are mud-walled/grass 
thatched or brick/stone walled and tin roofed, in terms of businesses (e.g. cattle trade) or by 
ownership of commercial buildings. What is interesting is that all these attributes are more 
common among the Kamba than among the Maasai. What is more, in both groups, „old‟ ideals, 
like having a big family or the quantity of cattle kept rather than quality, are gradually losing 
significance. Although cattle and land are still highly valued among the Maasai and Kamba 
respectively, significance is being attached to keeping fewer but improved breeds, and 
commercialisation of farming. But all these are eclipsed by white collar jobs and business 
engagements. 
Maasai presentation of the Kamba as „poor‟ has to be seen within their interethnic dynamics 
and history of rivalry. In the recent past, when property was basically evaluated in terms of 
cattle and land, even the Kamba were great admirers of the Maasai, but they would still not 
portray the Maasai as „rich‟, since they were also their enemies. That is why Mananu, a 
Kamba, lost his temper when I asked him about Maasai‟s “wealth.” He emotionally blurted: 
“What? rich? who? (shaking his head)...you want to tell me that these people who walk 
around almost naked are rich?” (in Kilili, 19/06/2000). He was referring to the loin-clothes 
and shawls worn by the Maasai, and in his attempt to distance the Kamba from their recent 
past, made reference to Maasai dressing styles, although he admitted that had very little to do 
with their material possessions. But the Kamba of today take the Maasai as „primitive‟ 
accumulators. To make nonsense of Maasai‟s animal wealth, Mananu says that “this way of 
accumulating wealth is outdated, its a cycle, you have them now, they die next year, many of 
these (pointing to his herd of about 25) belong to my son...when they were small (his children) 
I used to have about 40 (cattle)...even more...you think he is old? (the son) he is young, just 
twenty something, but he works (employed) and now I ask him for money”.  
Mananu‟s sentiments express how formal education has shifted property and influence from 
the older generation to the young, from subsistence to a transition towards a cash economy. In 
his narrative, he takes the position of the Maasai (cattle economy), and his son, Kamba‟s, who 
have a more diversified economy. And the story of a Maasai of Mananu‟s generation is no 
different. Living near Loitokitok, the 64 year old elder, who had about 70 head of cattle put it 
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thus: “These things (cattle) used to be very important, people used to respect you a lot, women 
would not be a problem...(pauses) you want, you get (laughs), now young women want other 
things, now you cannot compare a doctor to a man with even 100 cattle, pasture is a problem 
now, drought comes, and you lose all of them...people working for the government (e.g. 
doctors) earn their salaries throughout”. He told me that although the Kamba have more 
members in the modern sector including “teaching our children in the schools and treating us 
in the hospitals” the Maasai regard them as poor. He explained that to a Maasai, tilling of land 
is something degrading and just like hunting, strenuous and less productive. He said: “Cattle 
multiply as you watch”. (Leleita, Makutano, 16/09/2000). Leleita still believes in cattle, and 
ignores the fact that they can also „go as you watch‟, particularly during droughts. 
Nonetheless, both underscore that the future lies in the modern sector, but for Leleita, old 
depictions will always find relevance.   
Let me briefly present Nkari‟s story, quite similar but which fills in some of the gaps in 
Leleita‟s. His father owned about 600 head of cattle by the time of his death in 1971. After the 
animals were shared out among the six sons,  two, out of the four still alive, had no cattle 
anymore by the time of interview.
135
 During the 1974-76 drought, most of the cattle died. 
Nkari loaned his brothers cattle, one “misused” the animal wealth and no relative was willing 
to revive his herd anymore. At the time I recruited Nkari as a research partner in 2000, only 
one of his brothers had “cattle worth talking about”, to quote Nkari. Many things had 
happened: Reduction of grazing space through land sales, school fees, paying for medical care 
and shortage of herders as school attendance took precedence. And then there are relatives 
who had died of Aids related illnesses leaving behind children. Commenting about this 
increasing burden of dependence, Nkari said: “These are some of the things that are making 
us poor...if it was just feeding and clothing, no problem, I can even take more (children)... but 
school, do you pay fees? (I told him I do) it is too much…you sell three bulls and you only 
pay fees for some, and these people (buyers), they are bad, they don‟t care, they know we are 
desperate so they just give us what they want...that is the problem...sugar never goes down but 
cattle...it is bad.” (Imaroro, 19/05/2000). Nkari‟s story reiterates how the Maasai pastoral 
economy has been declining but also its resilience e.g. through revival of herds by loaning of 
cattle.  They are stories showing how similar the two groups have become overtime. 
A Kamba chief noted that Maasai “superiority” was based on “past glory”. The chief, who 
serves both Kamba and Maasai groups, argued that since wealth and status among the Maasai 
was measured in terms of the number of cattle owned, the Kamba, as owners of modest stock 
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 Nkari was taking care of the families of the deceased brothers.  
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were put in the lowest category. Which is understandable for even Maasai who had few cattle 
or none “could not talk in the presence of men”.136 The chief said that as a young boy, they  
would be told how cattle raids among the Maasai made people “rich”. And he claimed that he 
had seen Maasai wealth and supremacy deteriorate overtime. He explicated: “Just about 15 
years ago, you could not see a Maasai eating anything else here in Emali...they ate only 
roasted meat in butcheries…now they eat kitheli just like us and queue for yellow maize137 
during food shortages, I give them food”.138 He attributes this decline to successive droughts 
and transformation processes within the Maasai society itself.  
To be fair to the Maasai, we should bear in mind that in a peasant economy integrated into a 
market economy, livestock fetches more money than agricultural products. The pastoralist 
therefore may only be second to the successful businesspersons or next to the higher middle 
income earner. The small scale farmer comes last in that hierarchy. The condition is 
exacerbated by the subsistence farmer who faces periodic bouts of drought and crop failure. 
This would of course bring in class categories which are vertical as opposed to ethnic 
categories that are horizontal. As Roosens (1989 :14) argues, ethnic divisions create 
equivalences rather than hierarchies. In any case, the Kamba resist Maasai attempt to place 
them at the bottom of the social ladder and belittle Maasai animal wealth to get even with 
them.  
In an environment where ethnic groups compete for scarce resources and self-worth, making 
sense of their lives vis-à-vis others involves ignoring „known realities‟ including documented 
information. Listening to the Maasai talk about the Kamba regarding poverty, you would be 
surprised to find out that according to the Kenya Welfare Monitoring Survey (1996), Kajiado 
and Makueni districts are some of the most disadvantaged regions in the country, with 
insignificant variations. What was defined as „poverty‟ therefore was not just material 
possessions but an ethnic category. 
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 Quoting Nkari of Imaroro, Mashuru division, Kajiado district (18/05/2000). “Men” here means those who 
owned large herds (at least more than 50 cattle). 
137
 Kitheli is a corrupted version of githeri, the Kikuyu name for isyo among the Kamba. It is the commonest dish 
among the two ethnic groups. While the Kamba prepare it simply by mixing maize and legumes, the Kikuyu, 
who live in wetter zones,  usually add potatoes and cabbages. Yellow maize normally comes from overseas 
during famine and is usually eaten as a last resort since Kenyans generally grow and feed on white maize. When 
both breeds are available during prolonged droughts, feeding on white maize becomes a status symbol in the 
villages. This is because yellow maize is either much cheaper if commercially available, or it is given out for free 
as famine relief.  Much of Maasailand and nearly the whole of Ukambani are food deficit areas. 
138
 Chiefs‟ camps are key food distribution points during shortages. 
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“Poor” but “good in business”  
One striking thing about Maasai depictions of the Kamba is that some are positive. A Maasai 
school teacher noted: “The Maasai are poor in investing money...the money they make from 
cattle trade…they just keep it at home” (Vivian Kateria, Simba Primary School,13/6/2000). 
And some of the incidences I was confronted with tended to confirm this. I was personally 
shocked after meeting a Maasai pastoralist who had just sold 39 head of cattle (out of about 
190) for a total of Ksh 485,000 (EUR 6.300) and openly confessing that he was keeping the 
whole amount in the simple makeshift hut in Mwailu (Kiboko) where he had moved his cattle 
in July 2000. Every afternoon, he would carry a chunk of it to entertain his friends in one of 
the bars in Kiboko. Asking him why he had not taken the money to the bank, he said that he 
neither had a bank account nor did he find that necessary. Further inquiries revealed that 
although those who own such large herds of cattle are few, this practice is typical among 
pastoral Maasai men. In my entire study, I met only two Maasai who had bank accounts and 
who believed in savings. Many kept their money at home after cattle sales.  
It is against this background that we discuss entrepreneurship. Whereas the Maasai portray the 
Kamba as poor, they present their Bantu neighbours as “good in business.” Several cases of 
„successful‟ businesspersons were cited, including a Kamba woman based in Simba whom the 
Maasai often described as “very rich”.139 In several trading centres in Maasailand, business 
was in the hands of non-Maasai groups. In Simba, for instance, the Kamba ran shops, kiosks, 
open air vegetable trade, butcheries and bars. Although many of these business ventures were 
in the hands of men, I am going to highlight two Kamba women. The woman the Maasai said 
was “very rich” was born in 1957, the third wife of a former prominent businessman. But at 
the time of my fieldwork, the husband was almost bankrupt and there was every indication 
that she was supporting him financially. She had learnt the art of money making; combining 
shops and rental buildings with farming and cereal trade. After the El-Nino rains of 1998, for 
instance, she made over Ksh 600,000 (EUR 7.800) from crop sales, and used the funds to buy 
a tractor and put up a new shop. Her enormous financial activities attracted police 
investigations who sought to know her source of money. She told me: “We live in a society 
where...when a woman makes money it is news”, adding that it was perhaps only among the 
Kikuyu that women entrepreneurship was taken as “normal”.140 
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 One joked that if Kamba men were like her, then the Maasai would “respect” them. The woman in question is 
discussed in chapter three, as coordinator of a credit scheme. Although the Maasai had reservations on the way 
she run the credit scheme, they admired her success in business. 
140
 She argued that when it came to women involvement in “big business”, then Kamba men were just like their 
Maasai counterparts; i.e. they took as a challenge to patriarchy.  
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The second case I would like to discuss is Mrs Monica Mulei of Sultan Hamud. She was 
running a well stocked shop within premises that belonged to a Maasai. Born in 1950 in Nzaui 
(Makueni) and forced to cut short her secondary school education in 1968 because her father 
“could not afford”141 to pay her fees together with that of her two brothers. Anyhow, 32 years 
down the line, she was running a prosperous business. She married in 1972, and had five 
children. The husband used to work with the military but died in 1988. One of her children 
graduated from university in 1996 and is in full time employment. She inherited property in 
Nzaui (after some attempts by her brother-in-law to deny her that right), she sold some 
commercial plots in 1992 and came to establish a business on the „main road‟ (in Sultan 
Hamud). This decision culminated in her encounter with Amasai (Maasai). She rented a shop 
from a Maasai whom she was paying Ksh 2,000 (EUR 30) per month. Although she insisted 
that she made about Ksh 15,000 per month, the size of the stock and the movement of goods 
suggested that she was making much more. She even admitted that what the landlord asked 
for rent was “unbelievably low”. Monica is no „ordinary‟ person. The Maasai landlord had 
refused to rent the premises to her. He had demanded that she comes with her husband “or 
another man” as proof that, one; she was “serious”, and two; that the monthly rent would be 
forthcoming. Since business premises owned by Maasai neither target nor attract other Maasai, 
as Kamba, she had met the „first‟ requirement. But still, she was forced to pay him five 
months rent in advance for him to get „convinced‟. When asked to comment on the Maasai 
assertion that the Kamba are poor, she quipped: “That is men‟s talk”!  
Very busy but keen to participate in the study, she invited me four times to share her lived 
experience. She portrayed herself as a person who had succeeded where “many Kamba men 
had failed”, namely in the “risky but profitable” world of self employment. She said: 
“Because Kamba men have been sleeping, this town now is full of Kikuyus…coming all the 
way from Kikuyu (Kikuyuland)”. But how about the Maasai whose cattle criss-cross the 
trading centre but yet appeared marginalised in the running of business in the trading centre? 
To this she answered sarcastically, “at least those ones, we understand”, citing the resilience 
of their cattle economy, illiteracy and inadequate business models. About Maasai claim that 
the Kamba are poorer, she posed: “Do you think my landlord can say that?...he can‟t”. She 
claimed that the Kamba (men) had not “proved” the Maasai wrong. 142  Monica strongly 
believes in women. She told me that if I had been observant, then I must have noticed that 
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 She had been forced to repeat her end of primary school education for the father “to look for money”. She 
said that at the time, it was simply quite “unusual” for a family to invest in women education. 
142
 Stereotypes however are not necessarily based on social facts. 
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among Kamba families that lose a parent, it is always a catastrophe if its the woman who dies. 
And she seemed to epitomise this herself. 
I would like to revisit Maasai‟s occasional presentation of the Kamba as “good in business”. 
Suffice it to say that Kamba „dominance‟ of business has nothing to do with ethnicity but the 
socio-cultural environment in which the Kamba, unlike the Maasai, operate and how history 
has shaped both groups. In the 19
th
 century long-distance-trade that took groups from the 
interior to participate in the Indian Ocean trade along the East African coast, the Kamba were 
only rivalled by the Yao and Nyamwezi of Tanzania. With a history of recurring famines, the 
Kamba were also very active in interregional trade, particularly in the Kikuyu country where 
some of the items obtained from the coast e.g. salt and corrie shells were traded for food 
supplies.  
It is important to point out though that Maasai recognition of the Kamba as excelling in 
business does not exonerate them from being designated as “poor”. Moreover, it is also a 
relative edge. Both the Maasai and the Kamba are quick to point out that other ethnic groups 
e.g. the Kikuyu, Meru and Kisii tend to be more entrepreneurial.  
 
4.1.2    A story of raiders and thieves 
A discussion about the Kamba and the Maasai would be incomplete without talking about 
cattle. And what is interesting is not that both groups keep them, but rather that they have 
killed each other for them. The heading is derived from a comment made by Sitonik: “We raid 
cattle, they (Kamba) steal cattle” (Mashuru, 21/03/2000). As a trained primary school teacher, 
Sitonik had very idealistic observations. Asking him why he said the Kamba stole cattle while 
the Maasai „raided‟ them, he explained that among the Kamba, raiding “in the traditional 
sense” died off “long ago” as the group disregarded their “culture” and embraced “modernity”. 
Though not entirely implausible, his suggestions ignored two things. One, the Maasai were 
also a transformed group whose traditional institutions of sanctioning social behaviour have 
been steadily superseded by statutory ones. Two, much of the „raiding‟ was not being done for 
the „collective‟ good but by individuals who had commercialised the exercise.  
He insisted however that whenever the Maasai „raid‟ cattle among the Kamba, a counter raid 
should be regarded as theft. One thing was clear, the Maasai had never been comfortable with 
the criminalisation of what used to be an acceptable way of accumulating wealth. Across the 
Ukambani-Maasailand border, cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, grass and wood are often 
acquired through „theft‟. The Kamba „steal‟ from the Maasai, the Maasai „steal‟ from the 
Kamba, the internal thefts notwithstanding. The Maasai say that the Kamba are thieves “just 
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like the Kikuyu” while the Kamba say that Maasai‟s “deceptive” looks notwithstanding,143 
they „steal‟ without batting an eyelid.  
I would like to present an incident to illustrate this depiction. Something unusual took place 
one morning in February 1999. A Kamba businessman who owned a slaughter house in 
Simba was accused by a Maasai trader of “stealing” Ksh 32,000 (EUR 400) within the 
precincts of the slaughter house. There were also Maasai „witnesses‟ whom the Kamba 
thought were fake. The businessman insisted that he had not picked any money. The Maasai 
acted swiftly, and after a some consultations, a group of Maasai murran came and took a bull 
from the slaughter house as ransom. They said that the bull would only be handed over after 
the full payment of the „stolen‟ cash had been made. In retaliation, the Kamba businessman 
mobilised his workers, relatives, friends and other Kamba in the neighbourhood who, armed 
with bows and arrows, crossed over to Maasailand and took 30 heads of cattle and 16 goats. 
What followed was a stand off that lasted for about three days. Business in the centre was 
virtually paralysed during that period. In the arbitration process which involved state 
authorities, the cattle taken by the Kamba were returned to the Maasai. The goats were handed 
over much later.  
An examination of the incident revealed that it was something waiting to happen. There had 
been tension in the trading centre for a long time. The Maasai considered the centre as „theirs‟ 
on the basis of territoriality and therefore felt they had every right to control all business 
activities. They had lost the interethnic competition in entrepreneurship. It emerged that when 
the Kamba butcher slaughtered a bull, it was sold out within a day. Conversely, when a 
Maasai slaughtered, he would be forced to throw some of the meat away. The chairperson of 
the centre noted that when it was Maasai‟s turn to slaughter, “even a goat would stay 
overnight” (Mavuthi, Simba, 21/06/2000). The chair, in consultation with the chief and local 
businesspersons made an arrangement where only one bull or cow would be slaughtered per 
day and that this would be done in shifts where, “if a Maasai slaughters today, a Kamba 
slaughters tomorrow”. This  was meant to give each ethnic group a chance. So, why was 
„Maasai meat‟ boycotted? It appeared that while the Maasai had no discrimination in buying 
meat (or could not do without meat), many Kamba residents would boycott when a Maasai 
slaughtered arguing that “Maasai meat is not clean” and therefore they were not buying meat 
„for hygienic reasons‟. Moreover, even Maasai butcheries would be avoided with the excuse 
that the sanitary conditions were insalubrious, and that the Maasai “roast meat only for a few 
minutes”. A Kamba respondent said: “If you have been eating meat around here, you must 
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have realised that Maasai eat meat when blood is still oozing out” (Kyuli, Kiboko, 
15/09/2000). The Kamba boycott of Maasai meat was interpreted to mean that they had 
hatched a strategy to drive the Maasai out of a fragile but lucrative meat business.  
Back to the „theft‟ case.  The Kamba had returned the animals taken from the Maasai while 
the Maasai had returned the bull, but the issue of the money had not been resolved. Elders 
from both groups could not agree. A Maasai elder was quoted as saying: “If you had taken our 
cattle or sheep, no problem, we do these things...but money, no, money...you have to pay.”  
Local government officials had to intervene. Through local chiefs, the matter was reported to 
the Makueni officer commanding police division (OCPD) and district commissioners (DCs) 
from Makueni and Kajiado. When the two groups finally met in an emotionally charged large 
gathering, the Maasai made two conditions. One, the money must be paid in full, and two, the 
Kamba businessman should be banned from doing business in the trading centre. After 
assessing the incident, the OCPD came to the conclusion that the „Kamba‟ should pay the 
money “whether they stole it or not”.144 Although the Kamba protested, Mavuthi says that this 
was the only way the Kamba would earn their peaceful stay in the market. It was the price to 
pay for “acceptance” from the Maasai who, as the local chief said “were simply asking for 
respect.” At some point therefore, the issue was not the money but a group‟s worth, self-
esteem and recognition.  
The Kamba were given time to raise the money and a date was agreed on when the payment 
would be made. The Kamba organised a fundraiser to raise the Ksh 32,000. The 
businessman‟s family members, his clan, families in the neighbourhood, fellow 
businesspersons and friends made contributions. The Kamba were convinced that „their man‟ 
was innocent and that this had turned into a “Maasai versus Kamba” duel. That explains why 
irrespective of one‟s material inadequacies, the Kamba made contributions, ignoring the fact 
that the businessman could afford to pay the money on his own. When the money was being 
handed over to the Maasai, the Kamba made the „final‟ condition. They insisted that if the 
Maasai  were “sincere”, then they should be subjected to the revered Kamba oath (kithitu or 
muma). The Maasai asked for a few hours to consult on that proposal. After „consultations‟, 
they said that they could not be forced to take part in an exercise whose consequences could 
be fatal. Although Bourdieu (1990: 68) alludes to the requirement of “being born in it” in 
order to „believe‟ and suffer the consequences of magic or witchcraft, the Maasai took no 
chances. The Maasai went contrary to Bourdieu‟s argument that beliefs are not an arbitrary 
adherence to a set of doctrines but rather “a state of the body”. Whatever the case, two things 
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were clear, namely the Maasai „believed‟ in Kamba witchcraft and magic if they stood any 
chance to lose, and two, they knew a lot about the Kamba than what the latter had imagined.   
To the Kamba, the refusal to swear by their oath was interpreted to mean an admission of guilt 
and a confirmation that the Maasai had not lost any money. It was a display of not only a 
clash of the traditional institutions of administering justice and discontinuities of values but 
the transcendence of societal sanctions and beliefs across ethnic boundaries. The OCPD, who 
was neither Maasai nor Kamba, ruled that the money be handed over without conditions. The 
Kamba however asked the Maasai to give them a „stick‟ (kutulilwa muti)145 an act which, 
according to the Kamba oathing system would enable an aggrieved party to administer the 
oath against the Maasai ex-parte. This suggestion too was cleverly rejected by the Maasai (for 
details on Kamba oathing system, see Lindblom, 1920; Ndeti, 1972, and Middleton and 
Kershaw, 1972). 
What was Kamba‟s interpretation of Maasai‟s refusal? The chair of the centre put it thus: “We 
(Kamba) felt like we were dealing with our fellow Kamba not Maasai, they knew everything”. 
The response of the Maasai was a pointer that they had good knowledge of Kamba‟s cultural 
practices and belief systems
146
 which called into question the hitherto held general belief 
among the Kamba that the Maasai took for granted Kamba magic, witchcraft and medicine. 
And thanks to this „acknowledgement‟, the Kamba did not consider themselves as losers. Mr 
Mutui said that to the Kamba, the Maasai had not only „finally‟ demonstrated that the Kamba 
could inflict harm on them away from the battlefields, but they had also “confirmed” that they 
were the aggressors. He said that handing over the money to the Maasai was a demonstration 
that the Kamba could go to great lengths and sacrifice a lot for the sake of peace. There has 
been talk since then about how the Kamba went out of their way to pay money that they had 
not been „stolen‟. To the Maasai however, the compensation was an admission that their loss 
was a genuine one. Mr Palalelei (a Maasai) told me: “We know them (Kamba), they are mean, 
if they had not done it, they wouldn‟t have paid”.147 What the Kamba were to realise was that 
they had to confirm that they were indeed „thieves‟ and that since they were in Maasai 
territory, they had to live with that. Refusal to pay would have jeopardised their residence in 
Simba. They had fewer options. But perhaps more important is how what started as a personal 
dispute between two traders had been deliberately elevated to a „tribal‟ dispute pitting the 
Maasai against the Kamba. Witchcraft and ritual are important means of social control and 
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 Through many years of cross-ethnic interactions and the Kamba wives married to the Maasai. 
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 “Mean” here also meant “poor”. He meant that: “As poor as they are (Kamba), they must have been guilty to 
pay”. 
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resolving of conflicts (Gluckman, 1965; Turner, 1972), but usually within a group. Kamba‟s 
attempt to apply these sanctions of behaviour across ethnicities were rejected. And yet, this 
rejection is also taken as Maasai admission of guilt. Apart from depicting the Kamba as 
thieves, this becomes a negotiation process with regard to residence rights. The councillor told 
me: “Look, they do all sorts of things here...you must have heard about how they stole some 
money from a Maasai the other day, but we are saying let them stay…we take peace to be 
very important” (Tauketi, Simba, 22/06/2000). Although the incident involved two people, a 
Maasai and a Kamba, the Kamba guilt is generalised (“they”) while the Maasai „victim‟ 
remains in the singular form. He stressed what was „important‟.  
 
4.1.3   The Kamba as “harmless witches” 
This is a lopsided depiction. While nearly all Kenyan ethnic groups recognise Kamba 
witchcraft, the Maasai dismiss it with contempt. Let me first clarify that I am not delving into 
the broad discourse on witchcraft, traditional medicine, and religion. I restrict myself to what 
was of relevance among the Maasai and the Kamba, namely claims of the Kamba magical 
power to cause harm (through muoi i.e., the sorcerer or magician) and to protect individuals 
from the same (through mundu mue i.e., the priest-doctor). Otherwise, for details on Kamba 
moral and traditional sanctions, one could refer to Ndeti (1972: 113-129).
148
 
One major contrast between the Kamba and the Maasai is the practice of witchcraft. While it 
would be implausible to suggest that the Maasai have nothing to do with sorcery, they are 
definitely much less superstitious. Partly due to the importance attached to witchcraft by some 
Maasai neighbouring groups (particularly the Kamba and the Kisii), the Maasai will tell you 
that they do not believe in “those things”. In practice however, they do. Nonetheless, sorcery 
is less a question of bodily harm than forces of evil that may disrupt the smooth flow of 
traditional ceremonies. In such occasions, sacrifices to the deity are made to keep at bay the 
forces of chaos (Spencer, 1993: 149). Among the Kamba society, it is a different story 
altogether. Ndeti notes that “if a person has been killed by a wild animal, people believe he 
has been bewitched. If a child dies of common illness, the gossip goes around that some 
hideous witch stole the life of that child. If a man fails to win a woman‟s love, he is bewitched. 
Many accidents, especially serious ones, are caused by witchcraft”. On the other hand, Maasai 
religion does not include widespread beliefs in the existence of ancestral spirits or mystical 
powers and is characterised by what Schlosser calls “general lack of belief in witchcraft and 
other forms of superstition” (1984: 150). That may explain why a Maasai elder‟s reaction to a  
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question about witchcraft was swift and firm: “There is nothing like that” (Palalelei, Kiboko, 
18/08/2000). 
However, at least according to the Kamba, witchcraft has been useful in their transactions 
with the Maasai. During cattle raids, the divination powers of Kamba priest-doctors would be 
sought to direct the raiders on the routes to follow when planning a raid on Maasai cattle or 
when tracing Kamba cattle which had been taken away by the Maasai. This would also 
involve protective charms to guard them against injury. However, some Kamba raiders would 
still get killed in Maasailand or would come home empty handed. Mr Kyuli told me of an 
incident where, having been overwhelmed by Maasai raiders in 1961, his group threatened a 
group of Maasai murran that they would mysteriously die if they took the cattle away. After 
this, the Kamba traditional kithitu ritual, used to settle disputes, was performed. Amid 
laughter, he noted, “the Maasai ignored the threat...I am sure no-one died”. It is important to 
underscore here that Kyuli was in no measure sceptical about Kamba witchcraft. He explained 
that although Kamba witchcraft was lethal, it had its “limits”.  
Giving it a more historical perspective, Mr Mutui noted that one of the most frustrating 
experiences among the Kamba was their realisation that unlike the Kikuyu, Meru or Taita, the 
Maasai showed no apprehension or fear towards Kamba witchcraft. He observed: “For the 
first time, a weapon that the Kamba had used very successfully to scare away enemies, 
failed...the Maasai were not intimidated by witchcraft.” He noted that there was no evidence 
whatsoever that the Maasai feared Kamba witchcraft which was a major blow since witchcraft 
was traditionally the Kamba defence “when everything else failed”. He noted that while the 
Kamba traded in witchcraft, magic and medicine, the Maasai were not keen to buy Kamba 
medicine or charms like the Kikuyu and Taita were. Citing his earlier stint in the civil service, 
Mutui noted that whereas the Kamba would be „feared‟ in the civil service as well as in 
private firms, an advantage they would use to protect their jobs or get promoted, “they would 
have problems if they were dealing with a Maasai boss, it would be frustrating”(Mutui, 
Kiboko, 10/03/2000).   
Perhaps, out of such frustration, the Kamba would play certain games with the Maasai to 
assert their prowess. Kyuli told me a familiar mythical story. At one time, the story goes, as 
the Kamba and the Maasai were signing a peace accord after bloody conflicts, some hiding 
Kamba warriors shot arrows upwards that tactfully landed on Maasai huts, cattle and people. 
When the Maasai asked why the Kamba had not observed a cease-fire, the Kamba elders said: 
“These arrows were shot yesterday, they had not arrived yet”. This gimmick was intended to 
create some mystery about Kamba weaponry and witchcraft with the ultimate aim of warding 
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off any possible attack from the Maasai. The Maasai were sceptical and the peace agreement 
was revoked. The “harmless witches” were sent back to the drawing board as their attempt to 
assert psychic influence over the Maasai failed. 
 
Being courageous and warlike but not “criminals” 
To show that the Maasai were the „opposite‟ of what the Kamba were purported to be, 
courage was stressed and crime downplayed. The Kamba-Maasai rivalry is pegged on various 
standards of morality and excellence by which performance and social standing are judged. It 
was repeated again and again that the Maasai had lesser incidences of crime.
149
 The Maasai 
were presented by the Kamba as warlike, brutal and merciless. The Maasai on the other hand 
said that as the Kamba were more deprived, they had a greater propensity to commit crimes 
like stealing or robbery. The police were uncooperative in providing statistics saying that such 
data was “classified information” and “sensitive”. The Kamba would also cite the traditional 
„weapons‟ that Maasai men carry around as “evidence”. Closer analysis revealed that although 
many Maasai men carry clubs and knives, these play a more symbolic role and are hardly used 
to settle interpersonal disputes. The police and the provincial administration serving both 
groups did confirm that the Maasai had a lower crime rate than the Kamba. However, one has 
to bear in mind that the Maasai had lower crime reporting rates and not necessarily 
incidences.
150
 Maasai traditional institutions of arbitration and administration of justice 
through the council of elders are still operational. But allegiance is now dictated by 
convenience. People turn to them when they suit them most. Compared to the Kamba for 
instance, a Maasai who has killed somebody can “get away with murder”, in the sense that 
while this crime carries a mandatory death sentence before a Kenyan court of law, among the 
Maasai, the „accused‟ would be ordered to compensate the bereaved party several heads of 
cattle without resort to litigation.
151
  
An administration policeman attached to the Simba chief‟s camp which serves Maasai and 
Kamba residents, said that compared to Ukambani, crime “on the Maasai side (Maasailand) is 
very low...we are idle most of the time...hardly is anything reported that would require our 
attention”. He said that most of the time, “we have to deal with crimes committed by the 
Kamba...we do not like it, we are here to serve the Maasai”. He did admit though that when 
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 „Crime‟ here is used loosely to include what falls under the police criminal code as well as acts that are 
disapproved of and punishable by the group. Examples include stealing, rape and murder.   
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 It is difficult to access information due to vastness and remoteness. 
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 Sankan (1971: 14) says that the fine for murdering a fellow Maasai is 49 cattle but as he clarifies, fines vary 
considerably depending on the context and or Maasai section. I was told of a case in Imaroro (Kajiado district) 
where 19 heads of cattle were paid as compensation for a man murdered during a domestic dispute. The „nine‟ is 
said to remain constant as representation of the body‟s nine orifices.  
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they carry out patrols among the Maasai, “we find things happening”, suggesting that the 
difference may lie in concealment on the part of the part of the Maasai. The officer had 
worked in the multiethnic and urbanised parts of Kajiado (Ngong‟ and Kiserian) for 8 years 
where he said crime rate was very high. Asking him to explain, he attributed this to “the 
Kikuyu” and nearness to Nairobi. In Kenya, the Kikuyu are depicted as having a higher 
propensity to crime relative to other ethnic groups. Although the “Kikuyu are thieves” notion 
is treated as primordial, of course high crime rate among the Kikuyu has nothing to do with 
ethnicity or the socialisation patterns among the group but rather their long history of a cash 
economy, disintegration of their traditional institutions of social security, higher levels of 
urbanisation, unemployment, disparities in wealth distribution and landlessness among other 
reasons.  
Going back to the Maasai, they claimed that migrant Kikuyu and Kamba populations in places 
like Loitokitok had substantially increased the incidences of crime (e.g. murder). While these 
claims were corroborated by the police and chiefs, the crimes in question were not necessarily 
committed against the Maasai. A police officer in Loitokitok said, “here, Kikuyu(s) rob the 
Kikuyu...what do the Maasai have? just cattle? who wants cattle? people want money”152 
(Loitokitok, 07/09/2000). While the officer appeared to confine himself to the urban centre 
whose business is firmly in the hands of the Kikuyu, cattle thefts in the villages were rampant. 
As to the question of crime rate among the Maasai, he talked of ethnicity as a social fact 
noting: “Among the real Maasai, crime is low” and surmised that for most of these people, 
they were victims of crime.
153
  
 
4.1.4   The “hardworking” Kamba women: Positive stereotype?  
Among the Kamba and the Maasai, women workloads in the homesteads vary mainly due to 
inter alia; differences in social organisation, modes of subsistence and marriage arrangements. 
The Maasai society is heavily men dominated, women marry relatively early and apart from 
women circumcision, most rites of passage and important ceremonies revolve around men. 
While hut construction is women‟s responsibility, opinion is divided as to whether this crucial 
task should be taken as an indicator of women‟s indispensable activities and therefore high 
status or as signifying male hegemony. Although one cannot argue that the situation of 
women among the Kamba is any better, increased literacy among women has drastically 
reduced incidences of early marriage while the phenomenon of women self-help groups have 
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 His idea of real Maasai excluded Maasai who had embraced modernity, those with contested or dual identities 
or those who had been naturalised. 
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enhanced women‟s position in society. In a dominant cattle economy, Maasai women are 
charged with the responsibility of milking, selling it and also looking after cattle. On the other 
hand, farming being the dominant mode of subsistence among the Kamba, women prepare 
farms, cultivate, weed, harvest crops and also trade their produce. Then there are activities 
that cut across both ethnic groups. These include; child care and weaning, cooking, fetching 
firewood, drawing water and shopping. Looking at these workloads, you would say that 
women in both groups have more than their fare share of household labour. But these 
activities are made sense of along ethnic lines, through ethnic and gendered lenses. While the 
Maasai women are regarded as “lazy” by not only Kamba but Maasai men, there seemed to 
have been a consensus that Kamba women were “hardworking”, with Maasai men saying that 
they were “overworked”. It is not uncommon to hear the Bantu farming neighbours claiming 
that the Maasai (in general) are lazy. Writing on the Maasai and the Kisii interethnic relations, 
Omagwa Angima (2001) asserts that in contrast to the Maasai, “the Kisii are very industrious 
people”.154 
Turning back to the Maasai and the Kamba, Solinketi noted that, “in Ukambani we know that 
the women farm and do hard work” and then added that, “the Kamba know that Maasai girls 
are lazy”. He was the first Maasai respondent to say that „their‟ own women were „lazy‟. 
Otherwise, almost every Kamba respondent had this notion. The Kamba businesswoman in 
Simba said that “the Maasai are very lazy...their women do nothing 155 ...they just roam 
around...I don‟t think the Kamba would marry them even if they were available, anyway, they 
would also not accept because they know what is awaiting them ahead” (Mwongeli, Simba 
trading centre, 08/06/2000). Her comment that Maasai women „roam around‟ compares to 
Bourdieu argument that from the eyes of an outsider, “work” may be confused with “leisure” 
owing to a misinterpretation of social practices (1990: 83).   
Nevertheless, Mwongeli introduced an interesting dimension in claiming that even if the 
Maasai women were „available‟ the Kamba would not want to marry them for their perceived 
laziness. Considering that Kamba men found it difficult to marry Maasai women due to early 
marriage arrangements and bridewealth, Mwongeli‟s claims sounded more like the sour 
grapes story. Mr Mutua, a Kamba herding cattle in a Maasai homestead, told me that Maasai 
women are “so lazy” that “they cannot lift a 20 litre jerry can of water, that is why you see 
them with donkeys all the time”.156 Laziness here is equated with being physically weak. 
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 Sunday Nation, June 10, 2001 (www.nationaudio.com). 
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 It is important to note that respondents tended to express their opinions in absolute terms like “doing nothing”, 
simply to stress their positions. 
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 The 20 litre water containers are very common among the Kamba. While it was evident that donkeys were 
more commonly found in Maasai homesteads than Kamba ones, it would be implausible to argue that they had 
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On the other hand, Simba‟s chairperson, Mr Mavuthi noted that “allegations” that Maasai 
women are lazy are perpetuated by the Maasai themselves to minimise competition for their 
women. This particular observation was endorsed by Ms Riantei, a Maasai, who said that she 
is normally “surprised” to hear that Maasai women are lazy since “our men do nothing at all 
so how can we be lazy?”, she posed. This was a remarkable observation since most Kamba 
respondents assumed that Maasai women were entirely dependent on men for their livelihood.  
Generally, it appeared that to the Kamba, if somebody is not working in the fields, then “there 
is no work”.157 In Kamba households, those who have been looking after cattle are often said 
to have been “idle” in comparison to those who worked in the fields digging terraces, planting 
crops, weeding or harvesting. And it seems that as the Maasai increasingly embrace farming, 
they have adopted this limited view of what constitutes “work”. Maria, a Kamba woman who 
has lived among the Maasai (Loitokitok) for 13 years said that Maasai women‟s daily life is 
like “the way the Kamba live when there is drought...just staying idle”. Having spent some 
nights in Maasai homesteads (e.g. Nkata‟s in Simba), I did not see women‟s „idleness‟ even in 
families where men had three wives. Nkata, for instance, wakes up very early (at about 5.00 
a.m.) particularly when she is to milk the cows and transport the milk to the trading centres 
for sale. The family has about 150 head of cattle, at least according to her son. Apart from 
milking cows and marketing the milk, Nkata also cooks, shops, collects firewood, draws 
water and undertakes routine repairs on the huts in the compound. The family does not 
practice farming. Her explanation was that this would go contrary to “Maasai culture” or 
means of livelihood. When I told her that I had seen  agricultural farms among the Maasai, she 
said that “some Maasai have no cattle anymore and had been left with no other alternative”. 
She noted further that those who could afford and were keen to diversify their economy use 
labour “from Ukambani”. I asked her why the Maasai could not do such work themselves and 
she said that the Maasai (in general) were not used to “hard labour”, adding that “they hate 
working with their hands”. I noticed that at least in those families where a Maasai had a 
Kamba or Kikuyu wife, there was some farming going on. But being a Kamba woman in a 
Maasai homestead seemed to increase her responsibilities for cultivation did not exempt her 
from the „normal‟ Maasai women chores of milking, taking care of children, looking after 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
made Maasai women “lazy”.  As carriers of water, firewood and goods bought or to be sold in the markets, 
donkeys lighten women‟s work.  
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 A common characteristic in ethnic depictions is the way „noble practices‟ are given a „bad name. Even where  
positive attributes are acknowledged, they are trivialised. For instance, while appreciating Maasai bravery and 
courage in war, the Kamba rather put it thus “they are brutal”. In Kenya, the Kikuyu are latently positively 
stereotyped by other groups as hardworking and result-oriented but instead of putting it this way, they are instead 
said to be “money lovers” and that they would kill for it. Kamba‟s “hardworking” women are portrayed by the 
Maasai as “neglected” by their men and “left to rule the homestead.”   
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cattle, cooking, shopping, fetching water and firewood. Going back to the Nkata‟s case, she is 
clearly a „busy‟ woman, constantly on the move selling milk to the Kamba and fairly „open-
minded‟ but who takes cattle keeping as a very noble activity. To her, farming activities were 
tiring and less prestigious, which also reflected her attitude towards the Kamba. 
Examination of the household gendered division of labour in the two groups revealed how 
women‟s activities, largely dictated by the modes of subsistence, are constructed and 
categorised into „light‟ and „hard‟ work. None of the Maasai women respondents took their 
workload as „light‟. However, they were unanimous on one thing; that Kamba women did 
“much more”. It is worth noting here that some Maasai men did not just say that Kamba 
women were “hardworking” which would be a positive attribute, but rather “overworked”. 
Putting it this way, the Maasai insinuated that the women were not just responding to the 
labour needs of their households but rather as a consequence of an oppressive Kamba 
patriarchal system. By so doing, the Maasai kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, to 
make Kamba men unattractive to Maasai women as potential suitors, and two, to distract the 
attention of Maasai women from their own men who were said to be “more oppressive” and 
“very restrictive”. It was also argued that Kamba men are “very uncaring...they leave their 
women at home, go to towns looking for jobs, they don‟t care, most us (Maasai men) stay 
here with our wives” (Nkari, Imaroro, 19/05/2000). Nkari‟s comments are also double-edged 
in that he underscores the point that Kamba men are irresponsible and at the time pours scorn 
on migrant wage labour, which he dismisses as an indicator of „modernity‟.158 
In a nutshell, these depictions of women‟s work influence cross-ethnic relations particularly in 
curtailing agnatic kinship. As evident in the text, the notion that Maasai women are “lazy” has 
to be understood within the context/social milieu in question. It is argued that the idea of 
survival through cultivation of the soil scares Maasai girls.  
 
4.1.5   The Kamba as “unsuitable” to marry Maasai women  
“The Maasai often married women from other tribes-usually not the other way round” 
(Sankan, 1971: xi). Why would the Maasai marry from other groups but „prohibit‟ their 
daughters from marrying outside? First and foremost, the Maasai have been surrounded by 
farming groups for generations. While the pastoral „IlMaasai‟(erroneously called real Maasai) 
detested non-pastoral groups (ilmeek), including fellow Maa speakers like the Okiek and 
Arusha, the Maasai have always taken up wives from other groups provided female 
circumcision was practiced. Sankan expounds: “Although Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru etc. wives 
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highest proportion among the many ethnic groups he studied in Kenya. 
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are to be found everywhere in Maasailand today and in the past, seldom does one find a Luo 
woman who is married to a Maasai.”159 This preference for circumcised women explains why 
intermarriage between Maasai men and Chagga women
160
 is quite common along the Kenya-
Tanzanian border and inside Tanzania.  
In spite of cherishing the notion that Maasai women are lazy, their „beauty‟, among other 
things, has always drawn Kamba men to Maasai women. According to the Kamba however, 
there has always been barriers erected by the Maasai to block such intermarriage. First, there 
is the issue of male circumcision. The Maasai, just like the Kikuyu in the past,  circumcise 
men in such a way that a small piece of flesh called enteleliai is left hanging below the penis. 
This is meant to maximise pleasure during sex. In fact, among the Kikuyu of Murang‟a this 
form of circumcision is still common, and this flesh is called ngwati (“holder”). In traditional 
Kamba society, this form of circumcision, perhaps copied from the Maasai, was also common 
in the past and the piece of flesh is called nthui, which literally means “scratcher”. Now that 
the Kamba do not carry out this form of circumcision anymore, young  Maasai women are 
discouraged from marrying men “who are not properly circumcised” and therefore would not 
satisfy their sexual desire.  
Apart from circumcision, the Maasai adopted other measures to exclude Kamba suitors. Kyuli 
(Kamba) narrated how unmarried Maasai girls would wear ornaments worn only by married 
women in order to masquerade as “untouchable” when visiting Kamba homesteads. Often, the 
Kamba knew this trick but aware that Maasai men could be extremely violent if their women 
were molested, the girls would be given the benefit of doubt. This confusion explains why 
Anne Mwende (Kamba, Emali) could not tell the marital status of the Maasai girl who used to 
bring milk to her. She simply said: “With the Maasai, you never know”. Stressing how 
difficult it has been for the Kamba to marry Maasai women, a 75 year old Kamba noted: “The 
only Maasai women I know that were married by the Kamba are those that were raided in 
Ukavi (Maasailand) during cattle raids” (Maithya, Ngaakaa, 29/08/2000). He referred me to 
one of these women but when I visited her, she insisted that she was Kamba. Among the 
Maasai, there are also many women who were raided from Ukambani before and during the 
colonial period.  
 
“I cannot marry a Kamba” 
I would like to discuss a Maasai actor, Ms Patricia Toine, a school teacher, whose father is 
Maasai but who has a Kamba mother. She put it simply: “My mother is a Muukamba (Kamba) 
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 The Luo circumcise neither women nor men. 
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 The Chagga commonly practice female circumcision. 
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but I wouldn‟t marry in Ukambani...a Muukamba? nooo!” (Toine, Simba, 14/06/2000). Her 
reasons are that she considers herself a Maasai and therefore would not marry from where her 
mother came from. She is adamant about this issue of lineage noting that “we don‟t follow our 
mother‟s traditions...the father decides”. “Decides” here has at least two meanings. One, that 
in a patriarchal society descent is traced following the male line and two, that on matters of 
marriage, „the father‟ is the determining factor. She also said that her mother does not say 
“very positive things about Ukambani161...she tells me that if Ukambani was good, she would 
have married there”. She continued “…Maasai ladies are not interested in marrying in 
Ukambani because of hardship…in Ukambani you have to cultivate, you have to work 
hard...Maasai believe that Kamba are ever poor...as a woman,
162
 you don‟t feel secure”. She 
stressed “shortage of land” and “fear” that a potential Maasai father-in-law may have to 
support the family into which their daughter married when it “should” be the other way round. 
She said that her maternal uncles “are always coming for help from my father.. we hardly get 
anything from them...may be some beans when they harvest which they rarely do.” For all 
these reasons, she had decided to identify herself with what she was convinced was a higher 
status group. What is more, as a teacher, Patricia is regarded as a „high achiever‟ among the 
Maasai. This would probably not be the case in Ukambani. This evidence appeared to negate 
conventional assumptions that children of mixed ethnic families can choose to be “one or the 
other at different times” (Cottam and Cottam: 2001: 196). While that remains an option, some 
attention has to be drawn to the social profile of the ethnic groups involved.  
 
Other barriers 
Regarding female circumcision, it would be important to note that although there are still 
pockets among the Kamba where women go through this rite, the practice has decreased 
substantially. The Kamba herdsboy, Mutua, who worked for a Maasai pastoralist and whose 
experience is discussed in chapter five, cited circumcision of Maasai women as the main 
reason why he would not want to take a Maasai wife. Due to social transformation and change 
of attitudes occasioned by Christianity and schooling, very few Kamba men today would 
specifically seek to marry a circumcised woman. If anything, such women are a laughing 
stock in the Kamba society. But for those „few‟ who seek Maasai women, there is another 
barrier. Bridewealth among the Maasai, usually paid in cattle, is often out of reach. To make 
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 The respondent made reference to territory and ethnicity interchangeably, appearing to suggest  that being 
Kamba also embodied all that was associated with Ukambani e.g. the „hard‟ farming activities, crop failure and 
shortage of land.  
162
 Asking her whether she was restricting herself to Maasai women,  she clarified that “all” women, including 
those of Kamba descent, feel insecure marrying Kamba men. 
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matters worse, it is „fixed‟ only in theory. A Maasai father can demand several heads of cattle 
simply to disqualify a suitor he does not want. In fact, many murran I talked to lamented over 
the „competition‟ posed by senior Maasai elders who have a lot of cattle at their disposal and 
who are constantly seeking their third or fourth wives. In one case, Nkari, a Maasai elder, 
narrated how he had to assist his 23 year old son to marry a girl who was being sought by 
“another man of my age”.163 They ended up giving 11 heads of cattle for the girl, which, he 
said was exorbitant. In addition, they had also given two sheep, sums of money, honey and 
sugar. Incidentally, Kenyan newspapers are awash with reports in which state officials and 
also relatives have to intervene to „rescue‟ school girls married off usually to old „rich‟ Maasai 
men. In short, courtship and marriage among present day Maasai is a far cry from the picture 
painted by Sankan (1971: 45-49).  
Increasingly, fathers make unilateral decisions without due consultation with their spouses 
other elders, their age-grades or relatives. Looking at marriage arrangements among the 
Maasai, one could authoritatively question Peil‟s and Oyeneye‟s (1998: 66) thesis that in most 
African societies, cross-ethnic marriages are “still viewed” as joining of lineages and more 
premised on character and ancestry rather than wealth. In any case, bridewealth has never 
been one of the least considerations in marriage among most African groups. 
Using the example of Spanish America, Banton (1983: 113) shows how different groups with 
different privileges and status were favoured or disfavoured in the selection of mates with 
whites having more room for manoeuvre. This may also apply to the Kamba-Maasai affinal 
relationship in that it has not been necessarily „ethnicity per se‟, as actors often implied, but 
rather a question of material endowment and fear of the unknown. By asking for more cattle, 
the Maasai have not been necessarily blocking the Kamba from marrying their daughters but 
out of what a Maasai elder called “uncertainty”. He explicates: “when you give your daughter 
to the Kamba, you see, you do not know what will happen, she might be mistreated, 
overworked...we don‟t like that” (Solinketi, Sultan Hamud, 26/06/2000). Asking him why the 
Maasai have fewer reservations about their daughters getting married to the Kikuyu, he cited 
their long history of interaction and similarities in the manner in which boys and girls were 
circumcised, and summing it up by saying that the Maasai treat the Kikuyu as “our cousins”. 
He added that the Kikuyu “respect” them while the Kamba do not. This issue of “respect” is 
revisited in chapter five, six and eight.  
Another barrier identified was the age at which Maasai girls marry. Given that they are 
normally ready for marriage after circumcision, which is carried out between the ages of 12 
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and 16, many Kamba men said that by the time these girls “look marriable”, say at age 18, 
they are already people‟s wives. Mutua made fun of the Maasai saying that “they marry girls 
who have no breasts,” to stress their apparent young age. Let us now look at it from the 
reverse side. It is safe to say that Kamba women have always married Maasai men. Mutui 
noted that the Kamba never mind the animal wealth they get from their Maasai in-laws. For 
the Maasai, what the Kamba ask for bridewealth is “cheap” particularly because many Kamba 
ask for goats
164
 which are the least valued in a Maasai herd.  
These affinal relationships have also been used by the girls‟ relatives to access land in 
Maasailand. It was uncommon to find Kamba women married to the Maasai who had not 
drawn their next of kin to Maasailand. The kin could be given a small plot for cultivation or 
certain grazing rights. These relatives of hers also stand a better chance of being loaned cattle 
by the Maasai if theirs are wiped out by drought or if they need cows for milk. Nevertheless, 
Mutui averred that for most Kamba, a girl married to the Maasai is treated as “lost” in spite of 
the gains in livestock and land. Actually, it would be misleading to imply that Kamba women 
have no reservations about the Maasai. In many cases, Kamba parents may be willing to have 
their daughter marry a Maasai only for the girl to object. Kamba women are discouraged by 
the possibility of having to be circumcised and by what another called the “very strict culture” 
involving dressing styles, a meat and milk diet, piercing of earlobes, milking of cows and 
fears based on “sharing of wives”. Concern was expressed regarding what was perceived as 
the peripheral position of women in the Maasai society.  A Kamba lady, Margaret who lives 
in Loitokitok, said that she loathed the sight of a Maasai woman with a donkey following her 
husband to the trading centre where the man buys what the family needs. After moving from 
shop to shop and through the open air market, the goods are loaded on the donkey which the 
woman accompanies home while the man stays in the market centre. But while Margaret finds 
the idea of not providing money to the woman to do the shopping herself and at her own time 
“oppressive”, Mwende, another Kamba noted: “that is the only nice thing Maasai men do to 
their women (laughs)...how many Kamba men can take their wives to the market centre for 
shopping?” What one sees as dominance and oppression is to the other an expression of care 
and empowerment. 
Not least are the „concerns‟ expressed by Maasai girls and their parents regarding „work‟. It 
was stressed that Maasai women are used only to “light work”,  and were therefore unwilling 
to marry Kamba men who would subject them to farm labour or leave them to “fend for 
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 In the traditional Kamba society, only livestock , farm produce and honey could be given as bridewealth. 
Asking for goats (browsers), instead of cattle, has been influenced by decreasing grazing land. 
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themselves”. 165  Some women (e.g. an aunt to one of my respondents) left their Kamba 
husbands and returned to their Maasai families and remarried. Reasons given included, 
language barriers, “too much work” in the farms, no cattle to milk and lack of “respect”. 
Inhibitions discouraging cross-ethnic, racial and religious marriages are not a new subject. In 
Kenya, it is not uncommon to hear people say why they would not marry a man or woman 
from certain ethnic groups. Reasons advanced range from “rigidity of culture” among the Luo, 
“temper” and “oppression of women” among the Kisii and the Meru, “witchcraft” among the 
Kamba, “laziness” among coastal communities, “backwardness” among the Maasai to 
“money greed” among the Kikuyu. And as noted, the stereotypes are often based on certain 
plausible notions. Indeed, Peil and Oyeneye note that although many members do not fit the 
stereotyped models, “there is often some basis of truth which supports the stereotype” (1998: 
86). Perlmann notes that ethnic stereotypes are “assumed to be somehow inherent in the 
nature of the group, perhaps in its biological make up” (1988: 4). What is more, these 
stereotypes are not confined to larger social units. Within the groups themselves, there are 
regionally or clan based biases. A Kamba from Makueni will tell you about the “spoilt” 
women of Kangundo and Masaku.
166
  
Elsewhere, barriers are often erected to discourage Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslims, Christians against non-Christians, Protestants against Catholics (e.g. Northern 
Ireland) and blacks against whites (e.g. in the United States, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom). In many African societies, marriage  inhibitions across ethnic groups are quite 
common. In some extreme cases, like in Rwanda, intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi, 
though not categorically prohibited, was treated as something out of the ordinary (Eller, 1999). 
And just like in the Kamba-Maasai case, stereotyping enhanced difference by undermining 
cross-ethnic affinal relations.  In general, cross-ethnic marriages will be higher among people 
who are least subject to the control of kin. Besides, where marrying outside the group is 
allowed, some groups will be more preferred than others. Kamba men would rather a Maasai 
woman than a Kikuyu (although they are culturally closer) where as, Maasai men would 
rather marry a Kikuyu woman than a Kamba.  
It has also been stressed that while interethnic marriages constitute an important form of 
social exchange, conversely, they could be instrumental in ethnic conflicts. Banton (1983: 
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 In reality however, Maasai women are just as „hardworking‟ as their Kamba counterparts. To stress “light 
work” the respondents would conveniently exclude activities like cattle herding which has increasingly become a 
woman activity as children are sent to school. Worse still, in some cases, the girls are not sent to school or are 
forced to drop out to fill this labour gap.  
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 Kangundo and Masaku constitute some of the most „developed‟ areas in Ukambani. Apart from coffee 
growing and a higher level of urbanisation and an early exposure to a cash economy, nearness to Nairobi and 
higher literacy rates makes these areas „stand out‟ in Ukambani. 
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113), for instance, argues that interethnic marriages can become a fundamental form of 
competition and exclusion.  
 
4.1.6    “The Kamba like women” 
If you were to ask a Kenyan, leave alone a Maasai, what the Kamba are „known for‟ 
(stereotyped), you would most likely be greeted with a smile. For the question brings to mind 
witchcraft, appetite for women and cowardice. For the time being, I restrict myself to the issue 
of women. Stories told about the abortive coup of 1982
167
 assert that when armed soldiers 
stormed rich Kenyan-Asian neighbourhoods in Parklands, Pagan and Westland‟s in Nairobi, 
the Kikuyu were busy looting valuables e.g. jewellery and hard cash, the Luo were struggling 
to carry televisions, hi-fi systems, videos and sofa sets, while the Kamba targeted women. 
When the coup was finally quelled, the story goes that the Kamba soldiers had “nothing” to 
show for it. In everyday life, it is said that when several Kamba men sit together, they are 
likely to talk about women while the Kikuyu would be talking about ways of making money 
as the Luo exchange notes on their real and imagined academic credentials. A Kenyan will not 
believe you if you dismiss these generalisations. Having been a particularly interested party in 
stereotypes during fieldwork, what struck me most is not that Kamba men like women or 
spend lots of time talking about them but rather how convinced the non-Kamba groups are 
about it.   
In their depiction of Kamba sexual life, the Maasai are relatively more reserved. Whereas the 
Kamba portray Maasai‟s sexual practices as unsavoury, the Maasai simply put it that Kamba 
men have appetite for women. These two versions expose certain differences. In their 
stereotype, the Maasai exclude Kamba women. Two, while the Kamba see Maasai 
„promiscuity‟ as largely restricted within the Maasai society, Kamba men were said to be 
„dangerous‟ to any woman irrespective of her ethnicity. In fact, a Maasai school teacher 
averred that one reason why the Kaputiei Maasai were unwilling to stop female circumcision 
was the “imminent threat” posed by Kamba men.  
Strange enough, when I started inquiring about incidences that would support Maasai 
depictions of Kamba men, hardly anyone came up with a credible observation. Instead, I was 
confronted with narratives that involved Maasai men and Kamba women. This was interesting 
as Maasai men had tended to „exonerate‟ Kamba women. In Emali, a Kamba chief told me 
how he had to resolve a sexual dispute where a prominent Kamba businessman‟s wife had a 
Maasai lover.
168
 The businessman reported that the love affair had resulted in the infection of 
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 In reference to the Kenya Air Force abortive coup detat staged in August 1982. 
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 Maasai men were said to lure Kamba women with money in exchange for sexual favours. 
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his wife with a venereal disease. After he was infected with the disease, apparently by his wife, 
he beat her up to reveal where she had got it from. That is how a Maasai man came into the 
picture. After the treatment of the disease, the man came to the chief to seek his intervention. 
When the chief asked him what he expected his office to do, he was quoted as having said: 
“The man who has done this to my wife is a Maasai, you must do something”. The chief said 
that it was quite unlikely that the Kamba man would have reported the incident to him if the 
one accused was another Kamba. He noted: “He knew that he could very easily get a 
handsome compensation from the suspect...he also knew that the Maasai have fear for 
authorities” (Chief, Emali, 21/08/2000).  
The chief decided not to act, arguing that his being a multiethnic locality, the Maasai would 
have protested against any move that would have jeopardised their “name”, dignity and 
possessions. Apart from the monetary motive, the wronged man appeared to have been keen 
to paint the Maasai as people infested with all sorts of diseases, which fits into an earlier 
assertion that they were a “risk group”. The chief could not clarify why the Maasai “feared” 
authorities for this claim went contrary to Maasai reputed courage, pride and readiness to 
defend their interests. Chapter seven, which examines how the Kamba and Maasai relate with 
the state, sheds more light on this.  
 
4.1.7   Cowardice and keeping of secrets 
If it were not for the ethnic competition for political power, Kamba „cowardice‟ would not 
arise. From the colonial period to the present, the Kamba carry the reputation of loyalty and 
honesty that borders on cowardice. About the Kamba, Adamson wrote: “They are very 
likeable people and popular all over the country” (1967: 237). 
Since they are portrayed as less ambitious and contented with „little‟, the Kenyan Asian retail 
business community look out for the Kamba to hire as attendants
169
while town dwellers hire 
their girls and women as domestic servants. Besides, the Kamba are said to be less likely to 
take bold decisions that might threaten their jobs or undermine authority. Although we have 
no statistics, it is conjectured that compared to a Kikuyu, Meru or Kisii, a Kamba would avoid 
commercial loans fearing the possible consequences should anything go wrong. For that 
reason, it is argued, the ethnic group has minimal stake in the country‟s economy, their 
numerical strength and proximity to Nairobi notwithstanding.  
At the regional level, the Maasai regard the Kamba as cowards whom they say “have always” 
dreaded facing the Maasai in battle. Even with decreasing incidences of cattle raids and 
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on the assumption that they have a lesser propensity to steal. 
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interethnic conflicts, the „cowardice‟ talk is still rife.  The Kamba are said to be “soft”, which 
appears to go contrary to Maasai assertion that their Bantu neighbours “toil too hard” in the 
fields. Besides, the Kamba regard themselves as men and women of exceptional bravery. 
Ndeti notes “the Akamba self-pride in the dignity of labour is further testified by the types of 
jobs which they occupy in the Kenyan government. Both the army and the police have a 
substantial number of Akamba. The large portion of actual fighting men are Akamba” (1972: 
148). These „facts‟ do not necessarily falsify the Maasai position on the Kamba. This simply 
shows what ethnic depictions are in practice; able to be twisted and manipulated to fit 
intended goals even if that means contradicting oneself. On the afternoon of the 25
th
 August 
2000, I was seated in a bar-cum restaurant in Kiboko having a meal of roasted meat with two 
of my research partners. It is a place where Kamba and Maasai mix freely. Like most „good‟ 
bars in the region, it had a pool table
170
 where young men in particular, and also women, took 
part in endless duels with losers having to part with an agreed amount of money or bottles of 
beer. On that afternoon, a Maasai murrani,
171
 fully dressed in the traditional regalia, took on a 
Kamba teacher. The teacher hesitated taking the murrani on, but as other Maasai patrons 
jeered him saying that he was acting “cowardly”, he stepped forward and offered to play.  
What would ordinarily have been a „normal‟ play between two men was instantly transformed 
into a „Maasai-Kamba‟ duel. People left their seats to surround the pool table. They played a 
total of 10 games. The murrani lost all. In fact, they played so many in his attempt to avenge 
his steady defeat. At the loss, the young man shed tears hitting his head on the wall and 
hurling incoherent insults, saying that he could not believe that “a Kamba” had beaten him in 
a game. The loss was to degenerate into a clash between his group of Maasai murran and the 
Kamba patrons if it were not for the intervention of two policemen. The loss had robbed the 
murrani his pride as a warrior. He was disturbed that he had “let the Maasai down”, to quote 
another Maasai (Nkari) whom I had asked to make some sense of the murrani‟s reaction. 
Although the Kamba cheered during the first four wins, at some point, some were asking the 
teacher to “let” the Maasai murrani “win one game”.  
I gathered that the angry young man had played and lost to other Maasai without any scenes, 
but losing the game to a Kamba assumed a different meaning. The bar attendant said: “I 
always tell these people (the Kamba) not to play against the Maasai, if you leave them alone, 
then there is peace here, they come, they play, solve their own problems, drink their beer and 
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 Otherwise called “Billard” in German or billiards in English. 
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 I am using murrani here instead of murran simply to distinguish between the singular and the plural form. 
Otherwise, a one warrior is olmurrani while many are ilmurrani. In writing, murran (without the prefix il and the 
suffx i) is commonly adopted in reference to the Maasai warrior age-set (see Spear and Waller, 1993).   
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go away”(Kithome, Kiboko, 25/08/2000). Kithome argued that “losing to the Kamba was like 
losing twice”. First, the game and, perhaps what was more painful, hurting his personal and 
ethnic pride, and concern that the humiliating defeat may confirm Maasai‟s apparent 
„backwardness‟. 
This debate about Kamba “cowardice” is revisited in chapter seven when discussing 
interethnic competition for state resources and power. Nonetheless, I would like to talk about 
„secrecy‟ which is closely linked to cowardice and „softness‟. What are secrets? From an emic 
definition, it is that body of information which, if revealed, could be damaging to a person, 
family, lineage, clan or group. In many cases, by its very nature, a piece of information is 
expected to be regarded  „secret‟ without prior caution.172 
In the „traditional‟ Maasai society, women were considered to be “incapable” of keeping 
family and group secrets. From a male perspective, they were said to carry “small brains” and 
therefore could easily jeopardise the immediate family, clan or section interests should they be 
privy to “crucial information”. In the olden days, they would be kept in the dark regarding 
expeditions, cattle raids, booty and whatever transpired in male gatherings. Actually, it is not 
that they could not keep secrets. They were taken as subservient and subordinate and therefore 
taken for granted and ignored. Even in the contemporary Maasai society, this trend has 
continued. The attitude that women “don‟t matter” has had devastating consequences: 
Daughters are pulled out of school and married off by their fathers, land and cattle are sold 
behind wives‟ backs and men disappear for days without prior warning to their spouses.  
The Kamba are perceived by the Maasai as “unreliable” people who could easily divulge 
important information if threatened. Solinketi of Sultan Hamud says that whenever the Kamba 
captured a Maasai warrior during cattle raids, and asked him to disclose his accomplices or 
say where they had taken the raided cattle, “the Kamba would always be disappointed” for the 
captive would not betray his compatriots. On the other hand, he continued, when a Kamba 
raider fell into the hands of the fierce Maasai, “he would shamelessly say everything”(amid 
laughter). Solinketi even cited a 1965 incident in which he took part. Surprisingly, these 
assertions, that the Kamba would betray their fellow raiders and even reveal where the raided 
cattle had been taken, was confirmed by Kyuli and Mutisya, who, during their youth, raided 
cattle among the Maasai. Kyuli said that a Maasai captive would “say nothing...even if you 
threaten to kill him”. The two men could not hide their admiration for the Maasai “hardness”, 
as a reflection of  “real men”. They confirmed that Kamba „secretive‟ plans to raid the Maasai 
would at times leak to the Maasai or the police. But again, Ukambani was also a bit more 
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„opened up‟ in terms of communication and therefore the state could easily know what was 
happening. Moreover, there were many Kamba, even during the colonial period working for 
the police and military. Despite these facts, the Maasai insisted that just like their women, the 
Kamba had loose tongues.  
Solinketi noted that among the Maasai, revealing secrets is “acting like a woman” and 
therefore “no man would allow himself to bend that low”.173 Sitonik was even more blunt. 
Putting it in English, he likened Kamba „cowardice‟ and „softness‟ to “the way women 
behave”. He pointed out that Kamba traditional institutions like male circumcision had 
collapsed and yet it was during such occasions that “men would be taught important things, 
you see, secrets that are important for the survival of the group...these things (e.g. traditional 
circumcision) have disappeared” .174 He argued that even for those who went through the old 
rite of passage, it was never “tough enough”, adding that Maasai and Kikuyu circumcision 
produced “real tigers”. He then posed: “How many of you (Kamba) have been circumcised 
using the traditional knife?...you take small boys to hospital, they are injected with pain killers, 
then the doctor uses a scissor to circumcise, now, you call that circumcision? Is that a man”? 
(Sitonik, 18/03/2000). He turned to the national police force and quipped: “I even wonder 
how they (Kamba) manage to be in the police force and military
175...they cannot keep secrets”.  
In schools, the ability to keep one‟s mouth shut, was said to distinguish between “the cowards 
and the brave”, “the hard and the soft”, “the men and the women”,176 and “the Kamba and the 
Maasai”.  
A Kamba teacher, working in a school near Sultan Hamud that has Kamba and Maasai pupils, 
told me that teachers “face a problem” if a Maasai pupil is asked to name his/her fellow pupils 
when the group had broken school rules (e.g. „roaming‟ around the trading centre). A police 
officer attached to Kiboko police post said the same about Maasai suspects; “they never tell 
you anything, which forces us to beat them...(up)”. The general police brutality in Kenya 
notwithstanding, the officer said that the Maasai stood out as “hard nuts to crack”.  He argued 
that the Maasai were less willing to expose their accomplices in a crime (e.g. stolen goats, 
sheep and cattle) for they were bound by some “collective responsibility” or comradeship, 
which meant that exposing the others would amount to betrayal. This was particularly noted 
among Maasai warriors (murran), who have to exercise peer equality and protection. 
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 Maasai men hold women in low regard. This is not to suggest that they are an exception. In fact, a study by 
Obura (1991) showed that the same obtains in many other ethnic groups.  
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 In contemporary Kamba society, most boys are circumcised in hospitals/health centres. 
175
 The Kamba are considered to be overrepresented in the police and military forces. 
176
 Here, a woman could be a “man” if she could keep a secret. Likewise, a man could be a “woman” if he could 
not keep one. 
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How does one make sense of these depictions on cowardice, secrecy and „hardness‟? Among 
the Maasai, building a strong institution of secrecy has been a matter of expediency. Maasai 
survival has hinged on sustainability of herds in fragile environments and shrinking grazing 
grounds, keeping cultural practices in the midst of hostile groups and other hegemonic forces 
(e.g. the colonial and postcolonial state). In such an environment, economic survival and 
maintenance of social boundaries has been a matter of life and death. This „isolation‟ creates a 
fertile ground for enhancement of cohesiveness against the „others‟. For a captor or „suspect‟ 
therefore, the stakes are quite high and it is only through „hardness‟ that he can bestow honour 
and pride to himself and the larger group. A combination of factors may explain why the 
Kamba may not be as „hard‟ or secretive as the Maasai. Thanks to a wider adoption of 
Christianity, formal education, monetary economy, a weakening clan system and an 
individualised land tenure system, the sense of „collective interest‟ has been undermined. As 
the Maasai society becomes more differentiated and many of their traditional institutions 
weaken, „hardness‟ will probably be measured in other ways (e.g. academic achievements)  
and at some point, the issue of certain ethnic groups being more secretive or cowards may not 
arise. 
 
4.2   An assessment of ethnic depictions 
 
It is not uncommon for groups living side by side to demean each other. A prominent example 
are the English who, perceiving themselves as culturally and morally superior, have in their 
eyes, treated the Irish as backward and inferior (Morris-Hale, 1996: 47). There is a tendency 
for groups to assess their relative positive attributes, self worth and their relative level of 
advancement vis-à-vis other neighbouring groups (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 196). In the 
multiethnic African societies, it is common for neighbouring groups teaching their children 
that “the As smell...the Bs are immoral (they allow sex before marriage); the Cs are ignorant 
(few children go to school); the Ds are lazy (they do not grow cash crops); the Es are grasping 
(they are successful traders)” (Peil and Oyeneye, 1998: 79). The duo attributes this to 
prejudice, that is, hostile feelings towards others, but they do not say exactly how groups 
acquire these attitudes. Although stereotypes “refuse to take individual variations into 
account” and are morally condemning, they may strengthen group cohesion (Eriksen, 1995: 
252). 
Many groups in the world have something to say about those they interact with, and this is 
also common among Nation-states. Eller notes that in Rwanda, the three groups are depicted 
in various ways. The smallest ethnic group, the Twa, are seen as gluttonous, loyal, lazy, 
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courageous when hunting and without any restraint. On the other hand, the Hutu agriculturists 
are said to be “hardworking, not very clever, extrovert, irascible, unmannerly, obedient”, 
while the pastoralist Tutsi are characterised as “intelligent, capable of command, refined, 
courageous, and cruel” (1999: 200, quoting Maquet, 1961: 164). He shows that these 
„colonial‟ stereotypes have continued to shape interethnic interactions and coexistence in 
Rwanda and Burundi. Although Eller argues that most of these biases were externally 
constructed,
177
 it would be misleading to assume that African groups did not stereotype one 
another. In any case, stereotypes are not necessarily baseless. I entirely agree though, that the 
Europeans who saw unlike and unequal races in the Rwandan groups perpetuated and 
deepened ethnic divisions, tensions and animosity as the same biases were used to determine 
which group would rule over the others. 
Peil and Oyeneye (1998) note that apart from enhancing group solidarity in situations of 
potential conflict and threat, stereotypes and prejudice give identity and self-respect to people 
whose status might otherwise be low. I would assume that this partly explains why most 
ethnic stereotypes are negative. Cottam and Cottam note that greater problems of disharmony 
occur where strong judgements are made by one group regarding the relative 
superiority/inferiority of other communities. They argue that it is even worse where the 
community is weak in terms of population but highly achieving, e.g. the Jews. In such cases, 
they aver, “a community that is judged to be relatively underachieving is likely to be seen 
stereotypically in contemptuous terms”. Such terms, they note, include indolence, intellectual 
inferiority, low moral standards, and poor occupational performance including „poor‟ 
leadership. They note that producing a sense of commonality in such situations is a daunting 
task. But as the subsection below will show, groups that display great disparities may also 
have commonalities, particularly if they share territory.  
Group comparisons have also been seen as sources of conflict and competition. Horowitz 
remarks: “The cutting edge of comparison and conflict is the juxtaposition of backward and 
advanced groups” (1985: 166; see also Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 196). He argues that groups 
are in implicit competition for a favourable evaluation of their moral self worth. This 
comparative nature is said to derive from the juxtaposition of ethnic groups in the same 
environment. He notes that in unranked ethnic groups “…of Malays and Chinese, Hausa and 
Ibo, Maronites and Druze, Creoles and East Indians...” when placed in the same environment, 
no two groups are seen to possess the same distribution of behavioural qualities (Horowitz, 
1985: 142-144). In such settings, stereotypes are said to crystallise as group comparisons 
                                                          
177
 A position also taken by Mutiso, who, writing on how Kenyan groups are portrayed, calls the depictions “the 
stereotypes of the coloniser” (1975: 47). 
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emerge. This compares closely with Alois Hahn‟s (2000: 15) conception of how neighbours 
are labelled strangers. Since each group has a distinctive inventory of imputed traits, 
alternative criteria of merit takes effect. Group worth, notes Horowitz, is important for self-
esteem even at the individual level. Citing Firth‟s (1957) study in the Pacific We, the Tikopia, 
Horowitz illustrates how cleavage and comparison can be a source of conflict even in an 
isolated and a culturally uniform environment. In this particular case, each group was said to 
differ in temperament, talents and behaviour as they approached each other with a tinge of 
formality, suspicion and rivalry. Each, he notes further, was prepared to make disparaging 
remarks about the other. Some of the explanations for such tendencies have been provided by 
psychologists. Human beings are said to have a drive to evaluate their abilities by comparing 
them with those of others.
178
 Closely related to this are group anxieties and fear for extinction 
which may force one group to engage in a race to „catch-up‟ and avoid domination (see 
Yinger, 1994: 327). Wimmer‟s (1997a) discussion of xenophobia and racism corroborates the 
same argument. This partly explicates why groups sharing common territory strive to 
maintain distinctiveness as they interact and exchange with others. 
Turning back to Horowitz, comparisons are also said to be made with those judged to be 
relatively similar to oneself, e.g. in a shared locality, and performance may either be improved 
to match the competitor and where that fails, attempts could be made to control the 
performance of the competitor or, as I show in chapter six, downplay this performance. As to 
how group comparisons have emerged in the third world countries, Horowitz underscores the 
influence of the colonial state authorities or what he calls “ethnic distribution of colonial 
opportunity”. Through this, some groups advanced or progressed faster than others due to the 
fact that they were disproportionately educated and represented in the civil service or in 
business while others are backward („traditional‟) because of being disproportionately in the 
subsistence rather than in the cash economy or disproportionately poor or uneducated. He 
notes that the British colonial administration had its own biases taking some groups as 
hardworking and industrious (e.g. Ibo of Nigeria, Kikuyu of Kenya and Tamils of Sri Lanka) 
while others like the Kamba of Kenya, the Hausa of Nigeria and the Kandyan Sinhalese of Sri 
Lanka were said to be lazy (Horowitz, 1985: 162-3). Such biases are said to have significantly 
influenced the distribution of facilities and productive resources enhancing regional/ethnic 
inequalities in the process. It is interesting that the Kamba, stereotyped as lazy by the British, 
regard themselves as hardworking (and the Maasai portray them as such) and depict the 
Maasai as lazy. This shows the relativism of ethnic depictions. “Laziness”, as I have noted, is 
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 Horowitz (1985: 144) citing Leon Festinger (1954) in his book, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. 
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a label that is shaped by ecological factors, modes of subsistence and deployment of labour, 
which are critical underpinnings that are often ignored.  
What is certain is that though often taken for granted, ethnic stereotypes influence human 
action; whether it is how Asians are despised in Britain (Baumann, 1996), or Nigerians being 
associated with drug trafficking, ethnic and personality stereotypes influence the way societies 
are organised, how they are perceived by others, whether groups can form alliances or not, 
who can be trusted and for what, whether daughters can be given in marriage, which migrants 
are friendly or unwanted and whom to trade with. They are used to justify discrimination,
179
 
hatred, cattle raids and war. Torstrick for instance shows that Israeli depictions of Arabs as 
irrational and violent influence policy and the governing of Israel (2000: 36). In Nairobi, 
Kenyans of Indian and Pakistani origin hardly employ the Kikuyu as shop attendants out of 
the generalisation that the Kikuyu are thieves; instead, they prefer the Kamba or Luhya while 
the Maasai may be employed as watchmen for their image as “warriors”. Ethnic depictions 
can also forge closer ethnic relations, for example, in the deployment of labour; Kamba 
“cowardice” and “honesty” earns them herding jobs among the Maasai. I would also like to 
mention that in certain circumstances, negative stereotypes across borders can be broken 
through improved flow of information or enhancement of “connections” (see Soffer, 1994: 
187; Peil and Oyeneye, 1998: 79).  
 
 
4.3    A sense of sameness/commonality 
 
Writing on strangeness, Hahn notes that, motivated by the need to define the identity of others, 
common characteristics among groups are treated as less significant even when these may 
“previously” have been instrumental in defining the interaction of groups (2000: 12). Moore 
(1994:1) notes that “the passion for difference seems to be linked to its unspoken and under-
theorised pair, „the same‟ or „sameness‟...” She notes that thinking about difference entails 
thinking about sameness. It has also been argued that the more similar groups become, the 
more they are concerned about remaining distinct (Eriksen, 1995: 250). Nevertheless, as 
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 In the 1992 elections, as the Kikuyu and Luo competed for presidential votes, male circumcision became an 
issue as some Kikuyu leaders said that the Kikuyu cannot vote for a kiihi (uncircumcised man) and that 
irrespective of his advanced age, Odinga, the Luo presidential candidate, remained a “small boy” for as long as 
he had not been “cut”. The Luo normally do not circumcise males. What had started as whispers was taken to the 
campaign trail with the full presence of the press. In fact, during the campaign period, the Kikuyu would abduct 
Luo men, strip them and take them for circumcision. The Kikuyu might be very modernised in many ways but 
circumcision of men draws raw passions, emotions and pride.  A Kikuyu man, whether a top executive dressed in 
a Paris designed suit or illiterate, will lighten up and get emotional as he tells you how he “faced the knife” one 
chilly morning in the river. 
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„different‟ as the Maasai and the Kamba claim and are said to be, there are certain 
commonalities, including pursuing common interests. Under certain circumstances, the 
Kamba and the Maasai portray themselves as sharing and cherishing a sense of sameness. As 
Barth tells us, while groups may use their cultural emblems to stress difference, in certain 
situations, some of these differences may be ignored, radical differences could even be played 
down and denied (1969: 14). We have already seen how the groups distinguish themselves 
and for what reasons. But as I pointed out in chapter three, coexistence is not just about 
distinctions, but also common practices and consciousness. 
In both groups, the marriage system entails a patrilocal or neolocal post-marital residence. 
There are no matrilocal arrangements although among the Maasai, a newly married woman 
may stay at the house of the husband‟s mother until the birth of the first child. Apart from 
marriage, membership of the lineage is gained through having been born into a particular 
household. Another similarity between the Kamba and the Maasai regards inheritance rights. 
While the eldest son will normally have rights to the departed father‟s property over his 
younger brothers, the youngest is charged with the responsibility of taking care of the mother 
at old age. Moreover, both groups practice exogamy which ordinarily would have made it 
possible to establish firm interethnic networks through intermarriages but as noted earlier in 
the thesis, certain traditional practices e.g. early marriages among the Maasai and deep rooted 
perceptions held by each group regarding women from the other group make it difficult for 
them to optimise affinal relationships. Limited intermarriage with the Kaputiei Maasai 
prompts the Kamba to say that this sub-group is more “conservative” than other Maasai 
sections but this may have more to do with their nearness to the Kamba, which makes ethnic 
boundaries more important. The more populous and mainly agricultural Bantu neighbours 
have made the Kaputiei Maasai to be more „inward looking‟ in order to maintain their 
distinctiveness. 
Whereas the Kamba and the Maasai lose no opportunity to portray themselves as having very 
little in common, they have other commonalities that have emerged out of many years of 
interaction. When the “Kamba of Mbitini”180 (who have interacted with the Maasai for many 
generations), migrate to other areas of Ukambani for instance, they are often portrayed by the 
other Kamba as “too Maasai”. This emanates from their tendency to keep large herds of cattle, 
unsurpassed taste for meat, keep certain brands of cattle that are clearly marked, regard 
herding as being more important than farming, and usually circumcise women. But since 
these practices are not uncommon among other Kamba, the “Kamba of Mbitini” simply show 
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 Otherwise referred by other Kamba as “andu ma Mbitini” which means “people of Mbitini” 
 133 
 
 
 
how blurred the differences between the Kamba and the Maasai are. Let me look at some 
selected cases to illustrate commonality. 
 
4.3.1  “I am Muukamba-Muumasai”181  
Generally, being born into a family is basically the recognised and common way through 
which one become Maasai or Kamba. But it is not the only way.
182
 The Kamba become 
Maasai through marriage, assimilation, naturalisation or simply claiming to be „Maasai‟. As 
evident in literature, under certain circumstances, people exchange their ethnic identity for 
others (Baumann, 1996: 18). And while Kamba readily become Maasai, it is hardly the other 
way round. This is similar to Barth‟s study about Southern Pathans who would become 
Baluch but not the other way round (1969: 22). In the Kamba case, a Maasai identity would 
be preferred even in a mixed marriage where the father was Kamba (e.g. the case of ole 
Muonki)
183
. 
To illustrate succinctly how some Kamba become „Maasai‟, I present the case of Mualuko, 
who, in 1975, migrated from Kasikeu (Ukambani) to Loitokitok (Maasailand). He had sought 
a transfer from the local primary school where he was a teacher in his village to go to 
Maasailand “which had shortage of teachers”184, he says. But his aim was not just to go and 
teach there but to move out of the 6-acre family land and leave it to his three brothers “who 
were not as fortunate as I was.”185 Besides, he says that in Ukambani, progress was hampered 
by fear of witchcraft. Among the Maasai, where belief and practice of witchcraft is almost 
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 Put another way, “I am Kamba-Maasai”. 
182
 Among the Maasai, a non-Maasai could be naturalised if his/her mother marries a Maasai, if he or she is 
captured in war or if one requests absorption after staying among the Maasai for a considerable period. In other 
cases, many Kamba are absorbed by Maasai families after at first being taken as herdsmen. While in some cases, 
the family may let the clan know about their decision to adopt the herder, at other times this might just be a 
decision taken by the „father‟ who may also consult his brothers. After this, he is normally allocated cattle, sheep 
and goats. He is also taught the traditions of the family and instructed on how to earmark and brand his animals  
This adoption is sealed by his taking a Maasai wife and raising a family (for details, see Sankan, 1971: 19-20). 
183
 Actually his original name was Muoki but it has been manipulated to sound „Maasai‟.  Few Maasai expressed 
any desire to become „Kamba‟. An NGO worker was slapped by a Maasai for speaking to him in Kikamba, even 
after he apologised for having taken the man for a Kamba. The light skinned Maasai is said to have had „Kamba 
looks‟ but he stunned the worker when he said that he would kill himself if he were Kamba. His reasons: Kamba 
are cowards, they do not respect the Maasai and they have taken Maasai land. What was rather surprising was 
that although he distanced himself from any „Kamba links‟, his mother was known to be Kamba from Mbitini in 
Makueni who married the man‟s Maasai father in the mid 1970‟s. I was confronted with such incidences of 
vehement denials among „Maasai‟ of mixed  parentage. They were so enthusiastic about distancing themselves 
from any non-Maasai roots.  It was reminiscent of Baumann‟s experience in Southhall where he noted that “most 
Southallians are aware, of course, that there are Muslims who are „Black‟ and Christians who are „Asian‟; yet 
these are treated as classificatory anomalies” (1996: 72). The only difference perhaps is that while in Southhall‟s 
case the motivating factor was to portray groups as unified entities, in the Kamba-Maasai case, it is what it would 
mean if one was not „Maasai‟. Although one can easily be recruited as a member of the Maasai society, those 
who maintain non-Maasai identities but also pose as Maasai are usually treated  with contempt.   
184
 Regional imbalance in teaching personnel is a common problem in Kenya. 
185
 Among his three brothers and two sisters, he was the only one who had attained secondary school education, 
training and a permanent job. 
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absent, he expected to live “without fearing anyone”. After working among the Maasai for six 
years, he bought a 20-acre piece of land from a Maasai family which he had befriended. By 
then he had learnt Maa and had been “generally accepted” by the Maasai. He would always 
seek protection from the family that sold him land whenever he faced threats from other 
Maasai neighbours. Although he had „bought‟ the land, it was still expected that he would not 
fence it off, much less clear the wood cover and grass to create a farm. His land near Kimana 
was in the midst of Maasai homesteads even though some Kamba and Kikuyu families lived 
in the area. He had to tolerate the Maasai who grazed their cattle “in my  land” without prior 
warning. Wanting to expand his farm and fence it, he sought an elders‟ meeting that was 
attended by the local chief and the sub-chief. Knowing that his wishes may not be granted in 
the proposed meeting, he consulted with the “most influential brother”186 in the family that 
had sold him land.  
The old man advised that if he wanted things to work out in his favour, he should seek to be 
“made Maasai”. That was in 1983. Seeking naturalisation was “easy” since his son had been 
circumcised together with other Maasai boys the previous year.
187
 In the meeting, he was 
presented as an adopted son of the family “who has been living among us, teaches our 
children, respects elders...lives like a Maasai although he came here not long ago”.188 In a 
ceremony where he was given some Maasai cow milk by a clan elder while he was dressed in 
the traditional regalia, and was promised cattle as the “final symbol”, he was declared a 
„Maasai‟. Well, he did not get the cattle; he is actually the one who paid the family some 
money “for the service” and “took care of the elders” by providing meat and beer.  
Despite this monetarisation of the noble Maasai practice of taking in non-Maasai members, he 
says that shortly after the ceremony, the family sold him some additional 30 acres at a price 
far much below the „market value‟. He had been given a “son‟s rate.” During a series of 
interviews carried out between May and June 2000, he would say “we” to mean “us Maasai.” 
Offering me some milk to drink, he quipped “a Maasai boma (homestead) must have milk.”  
About his identity, he said: “I am Muumasai...okay, Muukamba-Muumasai” (“I am 
Maasai...okay, Kamba-Maasai)”. Although he denied that he had sought Maasai identity to 
access various resources and win acceptance, he conceded that after the ceremony, life 
became easier and he was able to own a shop in the local market and, although with some 
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 Not the eldest but held much sway because of being literate and because of his wealth accumulated through 
cattle trading. 
187
 The Maasai elders „ignored‟ the fact that his two daughters, through the intervention of his wife, had not 
participated in the emuratare ontoyie (circumcision of girls) rite of passage. 
188
 Either out of choice or as a gimmick, Mualuko wears Maasai traditional clothing occasionally, particularly 
when attending clan and village meetings, ceremonies or when attending drinking sessions in the vicinity. 
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resistance, he had since become the headmaster in his primary school. But although he is 
„Maasai‟, he is very much like the other Kamba and Kikuyu in the Loitokitok sub-district for, 
among other things, his is a fairly modern home; a brick-walled, cement plastered and painted 
house with glass windows, corrugated iron roofs. Besides, he keeps only a few grade cattle 
whose milk is sold in the nearby market. He is also practising commercial farming, growing 
beans, maize, onions and cabbages. Watering of the farms is done through canal irrigation 
from springs. In addition to his farms, he also hires other farms to grow more crops. Offering 
farms for hire has increasingly become a major income generation activity among the Maasai.  
Based on his “popularity” in the area, he said that he was considering seeking an elective 
office in the local county council. Mualuko noted that the „Kamba‟ who are hated by the 
Maasai are those who “never care to know the Maasai, they live here but they ignore the 
Maasai.” Indeed, Peil and Oyeneye note that “members of various groups often get al.ong 
quite well when they get to know each other as individuals rather than as categories” (1998: 
80). But Mualuko regrets that people “still say that I am Kamba, but I am a Maasai, my 
parents...well, my mother, my father died...my brothers and other people, all come and visit 
me here, I don‟t visit them, they know that I am not Kamba anymore but they are my relatives, 
they are my people.”  
His family had „accepted‟ the acquired identity, which, in any case, was to their advantage; 
his right to own land in Maasailand had enabled them to access foodstuffs during drought as 
well as financial support. But he also appeared to be a person yearning to „cut ties‟ with the 
Kamba and therefore „convince‟ the Maasai on the one hand, and himself on the other, that he 
was indeed Maasai. He kept on asking me “what do you think? am I not Maasai?” I was not 
sure, although he had practically been accorded nearly all the rights befitting a full member of 
the Maasai.
189
 The Kamba were living among a people who did not accept “fake Maasai.” 
One could not be „half Maasai‟. This appears to explain why revealing the „Kamba‟ identity 
among Kamba women married to Maasai men was almost taboo. It was denied too often and 
many women not well acquainted with my work would even end the conversation once I 
made such an inquiry. Statements like “who told you that I was Kamba?”, “what makes you 
think that I am Kamba?” and “go to whoever told you that I am Kamba and talk to him/her” 
were quite common. 
From Mualuko‟s account, one sees that socially relevant factors become diagnostic for 
membership rather than the overt or „objective‟ differences (see Barth 1969: 15). Although 
ethnic groups may often insist on primordial aspects, in practice, they portray ethnicity for 
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 He was living among the Matapato Maasai. 
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what it is; fluid, changing and negotiable. Mualuko claimed that one‟s ethnicity is where s/he 
“lived”. He had to stress the locality, which could be contested, and downplay the „blood 
links‟ which could not be taken away from him. It is the Maasai identity that was elusive and 
which had to be guarded, for losing it would mean losing his right to property, acceptance and 
a place to call home. It corresponds to Barth (1969) and Roosens (1989: 13) conception of 
“ethnicity and economic interest”.190 In this particular case however, Mualuko sought more 
than just economic interests.  
Being recognised as „Maasai‟ appeared to be extremely important long after he had used his 
newly acquired identity to accumulate property. In any case, there were many other examples 
of people who went through similar ceremonies but „dropped‟ the Maasai identity after they 
accessed what they wanted. Instead, Mualuko had opted to pay „dearly‟ for the sustenance of 
this recognition. His wife complained that he hosted many feasts where Maasai elders were 
invited, attended many “unnecessary” clan and elders meetings and traditional ceremonies. 
Mualuko felt that his newly acquired identity had to be nurtured through full participation in 
the activities of the „hosts‟ (apparently overdoing it). The wife felt that this constant show of 
gratitude made his newly acquired identity to be in doubt; why keep on seeking approval? But 
she admitted that: “We were nobody in Ukambani...here we are very important people”. And 
the husband seemed to realise that this „importance‟ was tied to certain responsibilities and 
expectations. Whereas she felt that they did not need to „please‟ anyone, the husband felt they 
owed their neighbours certain favours in exchange for the security of their property and 
positions. Besides, he was also interested in seeking an elective post in the future. 
In places like Loitokitok, it was difficult to develop a yardstick by which to measure ethnic 
identity and group affiliation. In some cases, ownership of cattle or adoption of Maasai ways 
of life did not qualify one to be Maasai. One had to go through the “adoption ceremonies”. 
You hardly became „Maasai‟ by just doing what they did. This is different from what obtained 
among the Hutu and Tutsi. Eller noted: “If a Hutu acquired enough wealth to own a herd of 
cattle and adopted the ways of a Tutsi, he could transform his social identity into Tutsi by a 
process of kwahitura or shedding of Hutuness and become a Tutsi” (1999: 203). For the 
Kamba, „Maasainess‟ is not an identity that one sought or attained after acquiring wealth; 
seeking Maasai identity was informed by the desire to acquire property. Starting as desperate 
migrants, most sought to shed their Kamba identity to access land and accumulate wealth, but 
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 There are actually other „non economic‟ reasons that could drive one into changing his/her identity. In 
Maasailand, I was informed of  two Kamba who sought refuge among the Maasai after being ostracised by their 
clans in Ukambani on accusations of witchcraft.  Afterwards, they became „Maasai‟ as a way of covering up 
their past. 
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then some tended to revert to „Kamba‟ after that. “Being Maasai” was about survival but once 
you make it, then it was not important to be „Maasai‟. Those who remained „Maasai‟ were 
those who still felt insecure or were aiming at accessing other resources (e.g. running for the 
local council or becoming a chief). That is why the Maasai talked of Kamba and Kikuyu who 
demean them “after getting rich” or “after using us”.  
Now that there are many ways of becoming Maasai, there are those who take Maasai wives or 
young men who are first taken into a Maasai family as herdsboys and if they „behave‟ 
themselves, they could be adopted by the family. But in all these cases, one could still be 
stripped of that status. I was told of a Kamba teenager in Makutano
191
 who had been taken in 
by a Maasai family as a “son” but was chased away after allegedly selling two bulls and 
claiming that they had simply disappeared in the fields. He was summoned by a group of 
family elders and told that he was no longer „Maasai‟ and was chased away as „Kamba‟. The 
teenager was told: “The Maasai do not do that.” Becoming „Maasai‟ was predicated on a 
number of moral standards and exceptions, and the ethnic identity could only be retained 
within certain fluid limits. Mualuko said the boy had stolen “before he had become a real 
Maasai”. “Real” here is slightly different from Sankan‟s talk of “pure Maasai” (1971: 28), 
defined by blood and used in special cases (e.g. in the selection of the first elder among 
warriors).  
Using Simmel‟s categorisation of strangers, the „Kamba‟ boy would appear to have been a 
newcomer who intended to become a full member of the Maasai society but who turned out to 
be a “marginal person” who did not integrate although he was committed to a permanent 
residence. The only difference here is that the criteria used to disqualify herding boys from 
becoming „Maasai‟ was a vice that was also quite common among the Maasai herders 
themselves and equally unacceptable among the two groups. In spite of the fact that ethnic 
boundaries are socially constructed and are based on a variety of criteria that shift, the 
Loitokitok area appeared to be quite an extreme. People here keep on telling you that there are 
no “real Maasai” (which analytically makes sense) only to discover that they are simply 
protecting their shaky and highly contested „Maasai‟ identities. The Kamba said that those 
who consider themselves as “true Maasai” (kara orosamani katukuru) were increasingly 
getting concerned about the appropriation of their identity, compelling them to come up with 
criteria for screening Maasainess. While it was clear that the Kamba could still maintain their 
identity and live peacefully among the Maasai, that set limits as to the resources one could 
access, including the possibility of remaining a „stranger‟.  
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 This market centre lies about 55 kilometres north of Loitokitok (Kenya-Tanzania border). 
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4.3.2   Being „Maasai‟ only by name  
During my study, I came across Kamba and Kikuyu members who did not „pretend‟ or wear 
the mask of being Maasai. They were forthright about their Bantu identities but the Identity 
Card (IDs) bore Maasai names, which they did not use in everyday life. These names are 
adopted mainly for speculation purposes. In most cases, these new names are adopted so that 
young people can take advantage of training and recruitment opportunities in state institutions. 
In contemporary Kenya, recruitment to the military, the police, teaching and medical colleges 
are done at the district level. Each district normally has a quota. Besides, the state also gives 
some priority to applicants from marginalised pastoral groups. Due to high literacy and 
population in Kamba and Kikuyu districts, competition is extremely stiff. To increase one‟s 
chances of selection, some school leavers „migrate‟ temporarily to Maasailand and obtain 
their IDs there.
192
 Obtaining these cards from a certain district theoretically means that you are 
a native of that area. After the recruitment is over, those who are successful may never return 
to those districts again. Those who are left may hang around or return to their home districts 
and come back the following year to try their luck again.  
There is still another category. Some non-Maasai parents residing in Maasailand give their 
children masyitwa ma Amasai (“Maasai names”) in anticipation of the opportunities discussed 
above. These are people who will have names in their identity cards that are „Maasai‟ 
although the Maasai around them recognise them as non-Maasai. This is also a category that 
does not seek to be recognised as Maasai. In fact, even in school, they maintain their Kamba 
names, but in the ID and other important certificates acquired after that, they are identified as 
„Maasai‟. Muisyo (Kamba) of Loitokitok says: “If you get my identity card (pulls it out), then 
I am Maasai, but as you have seen, I am Muukamba, they (Maasai) also know that I am 
Muukamba” (Loitokitok, 05/09/2000).  
 
4.3.3   “For me, the Kamba and the Maasai are the same” 
This is the story of Nkeni. Born in 1968, she was working in a bar in Kiboko when I met her. 
She doubled as a bar maid and a commercial sex worker.
193
 Nkeni is a unique actor. As I have 
noted before, most of the people from mixed parentage and living in Maasai territory, tended 
to identify with the Maasai even in cases where it was the mother who was Maasai.
194
 For 
Nkeni however, she is „Kamba‟ and „Maasai‟ in word and action. Her mother, a Kamba from 
Salama (Makueni) met her Maasai father when he was working in a farm that belonged to a 
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 Luckily for them, many rural residents do not have birth certificates. 
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European settler along the Ukambani-Maasailand border. They married in 1966. Although she 
grew up in a Maasai homestead, Nkeni learnt Kikamba and Maa simultaneously. 
Apart from language and matrimonial roots, some of her „Kambaness‟ came by default. She 
did not undergo the Emuratare ontoyie (“circumcision of girls”) because when her age-set 
was to be initiated in 1981, she was already pregnant.
195
 She was beaten up by the father and 
chased away from home but not ostracised. She eloped with her boyfriend (a Kikuyu) whom 
her clan later rejected when his parents came to negotiate for marriage and bridewealth. 
Nevertheless, they decided to stay as man and wife. They had dissolved the marriage by the 
time I met her in April 2000, and the three children of the marriage were in her custody. 
Nkeni lives in a „rainbow world‟. She sees herself as not only having a mixed ethnic but 
equally a multifaceted social identity. Because of her command of both Kamba and Maasai 
tongues, she had a unique way of interacting with bar patrons, who were dominantly Kamba 
and Maasai. In the first place, her „mixed‟ ethnicity appeared to have been one reason why the 
bar proprietor hired her. They are simply the most appropriate kind of attributes in this 
multiethnic locality. The bar owner remarked: “She pulls customers...she knows what Masai 
want, what the Kamba want...she knows them...she knows where to touch (how to get 
al.ong)…you know she speaks both languages” (Kiboko, 13/04/2000). But although she used 
to speak Kikamba with Kamba customers and Maa with the Maasai, conversely, she was 
„Kamba‟ to the Maasai men who sought non-Maasai women and she was „Maasai‟ to Kamba 
men for the same reasons. She also used to pose as „married‟ which enhanced her „demand‟ 
since, in the era of HIV/Aids, married women were generally perceived to be “safe”. She 
would also use the imposed marital status to ward off those bar patrons she was not interested 
in. Since getting a „Maasai‟ woman working in a bar was a rarity in the area, she was 
particularly popular among the Kamba. But then, they had to compete with the Maasai. She 
had no obvious physical attributes that would betray her ethnic identity and would speak Maa 
to Maasai patrons to “catch them by surprise” as well as “make them feel at home.” Her 
ability to „surf‟ into the worlds of both these groups‟ made some patrons very angry. She was 
often dismissed as a “cheat” who took advantage of her bilingualism. However, there were 
many occasions when she would be best positioned to mediate between the two groups, 
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 While interviewing her, I had to give her some money as a compensation for the “opportunities” she might 
have lost “talking to a man who was not interested in me,” as she put it. 
194
 Take for instance the case of Patricia Toine in this chapter. Nkeni has a divergent world view from Toine who 
sought to demean and discredit her maternal Kamba descent. Going by formal education and „exposure,‟ one 
would have expected Toine, a trained primary school teacher, to be more accommodative than Nkeni who had 
only four years of formal education. Perhaps, having to rely on Kamba employers, Nkeni‟s Kamba identity was 
important for her survival while Toine had a state job.  
195
 As preparation for marriage, circumcision precedes sex and pregnancy. 
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particularly in the „resolution of conflicts‟ within the business premises. She was each group‟s 
most popular and most hated bar attendant. She tried to please all, but each group expected 
her to take sides. The Maasai would say that she should not speak Kikamba in their presence, 
for if she had a Maasai father, then she was “Maasai”. As for the Kamba, the bar was in 
Ukambani, owned by a Kamba and therefore she should have spoken only in Kikamba or 
Swahili at worst. Both groups would have loved to hate her but usually ended up hating to 
love her. 
Nkeni had many trump cards. Some Maasai men, for instance, would be disinterested in her 
after finding out that she was „Maasai‟. “I tell them,” she said, “okay I am Masai but have you 
ever slept with an uncircumcised one?” (prolonged laughter). By saying this, she created a 
cloud of mystery around herself arousing curiosity. She claimed that although the Maasai 
insist on marrying circumcised women, they looked for uncircumcised ones to satisfy their 
sexual desire.
196
 She told me that one of her colleagues, a Kamba woman from Makindu, lost 
a “Masai customer” at one time by posing as circumcised, thinking that by so doing, she 
would enhance his interest. The Maasai man told her he had “two circumcised women at 
home” and he was therefore looking for “something different.” Her attempts to „correct‟ the 
position fell on deaf ears. Interestingly however, Nkeni said that occasionally, she met Maasai 
men who sought only circumcised women. She explained: “For those ones, I tell them that I 
am Maasai”. Being “Maasai” was equated with having undergone the rite of circumcision. I 
asked her whether they would not find out; her answer: “Men just talk, they can‟t tell the 
difference” (Nkeni, Kiboko, 10/06/2000). 
Having lived in both „worlds‟, Nkeni saw “very few differences” between the two groups. She 
felt that apart from physical appearances (e.g. dress or marks) and fairly divergent modes of 
subsistence, both groups had similar aspirations and concerns. For the men, she drew the 
conclusion that none wanted a circumcised woman “for sex” but only as “wives”. For her, 
being „Kamba‟ or „Maasai‟ is a question of “convincing others”. Her Maasai/Kamba identities 
had become situational and negotiable. She finds it strange that identities that she had taken 
for granted all along would be subjected to such controversies.
197
 When she told me that the 
two groups are the “same”, she meant that the „incompatibilities‟ were narrowing through 
social transformation. But she acknowledges that differences are reinforced by “attitudes” and 
language. As a master of Maa and Kikamba languages, she finds it easy to oscillate between 
the two identities. However, she had been hated by the Kamba and the Maasai alike for 
making it look like there was no ethnic difference. 
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 This claim was confirmed by some Maasai men. 
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 Identities become important or are defined when in relation with others (see Eriksen, 1997). 
 141 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4   The Kamba and the Maasai as vulnerable groups 
While droughts and famine enhance forms of exchange and interdependence, it is also at such 
times that the groups attain a sense of commonality. It is a time when both are dependent on 
the state for survival. People crowd into chief‟s camps waiting for food relief which may be 
donated by the state or international relief bodies (e.g. World Food Programme) or western 
countries. It is a time when pictures of Kamba and Maasai animals dying of hunger and 
disease are familiar sights on television and in the newspapers. And true to Anderson‟s (1983) 
notion of Imagined Communities, the notion of sameness appears to be enhanced by the media 
during such difficult times. Pictures of Kamba and Maasai searching for pastures and water on 
the one hand, and queuing for relief food on the other, present a category of people united in 
grief. It is a time when the feeling that they are „sailing in the same boat‟ is enhanced. During 
such agonising moments, official statements uncharacteristically talk about affected 
“geographical areas” (districts) and not necessarily ethnic groups.  
Vulnerability suppresses differences as both groups coalesce around themes of common 
concern. As they seek external assistance to survive, talk about who is „modern‟ or 
„backward‟ becomes irrelevant. Baxter, Hultin and Triulzi note that for people “to determine 
their collective aims and objectives…a people‟s consciousness of their identity is often gorged 
through collective experience of suffering; but it assumes higher forms when they proceed to 
a rational of this identity through philosophical discernment of collective values and 
conceptual systems” (1996: 8; quoting Hagan, 1990: 10).  This analogy is useful here 
although the reference here is basically about a group that already shares or are members of 
the same ethnic category. The “collective experience of suffering” can build bridges even 
across groups that ordinarily have little in common (e.g. that may not share a common 
language). Apart from electioneering time when Kamba politicians (particularly in 1997) had 
to criss-cross Maasailand mobilising the Maasai for support of the Kamba presidential 
candidate, it is usually during droughts that political leaders from both groups join hands to 
tackle a common problem. 
Going by economic categorisation, both groups would fall under what a Kenyan scholar, 
Kinuthia Macharia, calls the “rural poor”. Due to the differences in modes of subsistence, the 
Kamba would belong to the “smallholder farmers” defined as “those growing subsistence 
crops like maize, beans and potatoes in acreage of up to two acres in the high density 
population areas and in four acres or more in low density population areas that also tend to be 
poor agriculturally”. On the other hand, the Maasai would fall under the “nomadic 
pastoralists”, a concept that ignores transhumance. In this category, pastoralists are said to be 
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“poor”, live in harsh climatic conditions, where may have livestock that sometimes die en 
masse in case of drought; they tend to have very little money to live “above the poverty line” 
(1997: 164). Though mainly practicing fairly different modes of production, the two groups 
are affected, and rendered vulnerable, by the vagaries of weather. Both groups portray 
themselves as economically and politically marginalised, albeit through fairly different 
historical processes. But this marginalisation is also a contested category as some group 
members argue that they have been “key players” in the running of the government (see 
chapter seven).  
 
4.3.5   The Kamba and the Maasai as “Christians” 
Although Christianity has been slow in winning converts among the Maasai in the past, this 
has been happening at a faster rate in recent times. Schlosser‟s comprehensive study had 
approximated that only about 20% of the Maasai had been converted to Christianity compared 
to about 90% among other groups like the Luo and Luhya (1984: 171). 
The first missionary to set foot in Ukambani was a German, Johan Ludwig Krapf who had 
been sent by the Church Missionary Society (CMS). Arriving at the East African coast in 
1844, he visited Ukambani in 1849. He later learnt Kikamba and translated the gospel of 
Mark into this tongue in 1850. Krapf‟s entry into Ukambani set the ball rolling for other 
Christian missions. These included the East African Scottish Industrial Mission which opened 
a station at Kibwezi in 1891, the Leipzig Evangelical Lutheran Society (Leipziger Mission) 
which opened stations in Ikutha (Kitui) in 1892 and the African Inland Mission which set up a 
station at Nzaui in 1895 and the Holy Ghost Fathers who built their first station at Kabaa in 
1913 (Ndolo, 1989: 76, 93). Christianity had a slow start in Ukambani all the same partly due 
to the missionaries being seen as an extension of the cruel colonial rule and two, due to their 
disapproval of Kamba cultural practices and lifestyles like polygyny, traditional dances, 
sacrifices and the administration of kithitu (oath). Ndolo notes that the reason why the Kamba 
later converted to Christianity and started going to school was that: “Under new social order 
this was the only way open for social betterment. In the 1930‟s, the Kamba saw that the 
Kikuyu, the Luo and the Luhya who had seen the light much earlier had better political 
representation than they did. Some Kamba contented that their passive resistance to the 
colonial and missionary incursions had left them behind, in comparison to the other peoples of 
Kenya” (Ndolo, 1989: 98). 
This gives a glimpse of the „catch-up‟ crusade that has characterised ethnic competition in 
Kenya. This is not necessarily based on the western model of development but a comparative 
need predicated on what the other group is believed to have. But although the Kamba gave the 
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impression that Christianity entered Maasailand through Ukambani, actually, Dr. Rebmann 
and Dr. Krapf had also made contacts with the Maasai as early as late 1840s. In Kenya today, 
Christian churches can be found nearly all over the country. 
Like any other religion, Christianity infuses a sense of community and competes with 
ethnicity as a mobilising force, by excluding others. With only about 10% of the population 
being Moslem,
198
 Kenya is predominantly a Christian society, at least going by the mere 
identification with Christian faith. Although my study was dominated by talk about cattle 
raids, enmity and hatred, what struck me was the kind of movements people make on Sundays, 
converging in churches and under trees to listen to a sermon. Then there are the open air 
charismatic groups preaching to multitudes (e.g. in Emali and Sultan Hamud), with 
interpreters translating Swahili and English sermons into Maa and Kikamba. In such 
situations, there is an air of commonality that sweeps across the ethnic divide.  
With Christianity, noted a Maasai church elder (Solinketi), “the differences are narrowing 
down…we pray together, they are our brothers.”199 In one of the open air sermons in Emali, it 
was stressed that “...we are all equal before the Lord...your neighbour is the one in need...do 
you remember the story of the good Samaritan? you see, he helped a Jew.” The “Jew” here 
was to be any Kamba or Maasai in „need‟. And it is not just the teachings about “love” for one 
another and care for the „poor‟ irrespective of ethnicity; material assistance in form of food 
and clothes are also accessed through churches. To some extent, the Christian faith seemed to 
be providing a common identity under which they would interact not necessarily as Kamba 
and Maasai but as „believers‟. Though latently, this notion of Christianity had brought in a 
new dimension where activities like cattle raids or early marriages were condemned not as 
„outdated‟ but as “unchristian”. What is more, during peace and reconciliation initiatives, 
Christian religious leaders had gradually gained recognition as mediators. 
It was difficult to gauge whether these churches had harmonised relations or enhanced closer 
interethnic relations. Some claimed that membership in common religious organisations had 
led to more ethnic convergence and the building of a community. In Maasailand, one notices 
that where Christianity has been widely embraced, these areas tend to have other facilities too 
(e.g. education and medical) while the people tended to be more receptive to „new‟ ideas. 
Most churches along the border and inside Maasailand served both groups, with Kamba and a 
few Maasai pastors. Examples included the Redeemed Gospel Church and the Catholic church 
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 Although there are mosques in Sultan Hamud and Makindu, very few local people are Moslems. But these 
mosques, among other things, assist people with foodstuffs during shortages.  
199
 In fact, it was in the local management council of the Anglican church that Mr Mutui, a Kamba and who 
introduced me to  Mr Solinketi, had both met.  
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at Simba and Emali. I witnessed „Kamba‟ Christian groups, participating in weddings or fund 
raisers organised by their Maasai counterparts and vice versa. At least, participation in 
common places of worship had provided an additional forum of interaction. Though at a 
limited scale, there were Maasai „Christian‟ families that had abandoned and abhorred female 
circumcision, and there were at least two cross-ethnic marriages involving „Christians‟ during 
the time of my study. Besides, Christianity had given people common names to identify with. 
My research assistant, for instance, preferred to be called simply as „John‟. 
The whole evangelisation process however had introduced other „differences‟. There were 
tensions between the „mainstream‟ churches (e.g. Catholic, Anglican and African Inland 
Church) and the fast growing charismatic groups. Besides, apart from these divisions along 
religious lines, it would be extremely simplistic to even imagine that “the days of enmity are 
long gone as people have turned their hearts to the Lord,” as one Maasai pastor told me. While 
churches have no doubt impacted on Kamba-Maasai relations and sense of identity, this has 
not superseded ethnic differences.  
A Kamba pastor in Maasailand told of a myriad of difficulties he had faced “spreading the 
word of God” among the Maasai. He noted: “first they look at me as a Muukamba not as a 
man of God. The other day a church elder was asking me whether I have bought land...they 
still think I am just like any other person who comes here, buys land, starts commercial 
farming and makes money. I was distributing food relief another day and the chief was asking 
me whether I took some home and I knew that he was not being genuine. It is difficult to work 
here if you are not a mzungu.
200
 If you are a mzungu, they believe you, the rest of us are 
viewed as having a hidden agenda”. (Musau, Loitokitok, 21/09/2000). Although he had faced 
resistance, he saw the church as giving both groups a medium for resolving their problems, 
for negotiation and mutual understanding. He asserted that if Christianity had a penetrated 
Maasailand like in Ukambani, there would be fewer areas of misunderstanding between the 
two groups. However, as more Kamba and Maasai become „Christians‟, there has not been a 
corresponding reduction in ethnic tensions and quest for ethnic identity. One reason was that 
the groups‟ “tribal leaders” hardly used the church as a medium when advancing ethnic 
interests or even in the resolution of conflicts. Besides, Barth warns us that that reduction of 
cultural differences between ethnic groups does not correlate in any simple way with a 
reduction in the organisational relevance of ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-
maintaining process (1969: 33). 
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 Mzungu is the Swahili word for a White. 
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4.3.6   Sameness through social transformation 
While social transformation among the Maasai has been on many fronts, apart from 
„Christianity‟, there were other fora that were seen as „emerging areas of commonality‟ with 
the Kamba. I would like to focus on Maasai women and their struggles with the Maasai 
patriarchy. With increased education and monogamy becoming the norm rather than the 
exception, women are increasingly better placed to free themselves from what they said was a 
male dominated Maasai society or “where men are in charge” (Chieni and Spencer, 1993: 
160). Take the example of Agnes Siyiankoi, who took his husband to a Kajiado court over 
accusations of wife-beating (assault). After 13 years of marriage that included many beatings 
and at least one hospital trip, Siyiankoi decided to fight for her rights through a state court. 
She took the matter for arbitration through the assistance of her brother, Keriako Tobiko, a 
lawyer. Agnes had been “married off” by her father at the age of 18 in exchange for 3 cows. 
She had however taken a step many Kamba or Kikuyu women would not envisage, perhaps 
even under worse circumstances.
201
 This was seen as a bold move and it brought the Maasai 
to the centre of national debates regarding domestic violence and women rights.  
In October 2000, the Maasai held a „cultural conference‟ to chart the way forward for the 
community‟s young generation. The meeting was attended by members of the Maasai ethnic 
group MPs, councillors and opinion leaders. It was an occasion to review Maasai culture and 
traditions and decide “which ones to discard and which ones to uphold”.202 This move was 
taken positively by other non-Maasai groups. But what has all this to do with „sameness‟? 
Well, whether it is women challenging what they perceive as oppressive patriarchal systems 
or the murran being encouraged to remain in school, these are transformations that place the 
Maasai in the „centre of things‟ or make them to be „in tune‟ with many other Kenyan groups. 
Some of the Maasai respondents associated these changes with increased proximity to 
multiethnic environments, whereby, they have to send their girls to school simply to 
„conform‟ or through imitation (since Kamba and Kikuyu parents were doing the same). 
Besides these, there has been insurmountable „pressure‟ from the state. Increasingly therefore, 
incidences where school girls have been rescued from forced marriages or walked out of them 
themselves are common features now in Kenyan newspapers.  
The chief of Kiboko cited a case where his boss, the DO,
203
 rescued a Maasai girl who had 
done very well in her end of primary school examination but had been married off by the 
father immediately after circumcision. The administrator intervened and with the support of 
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 See CNN Interactive report by Nairobi Bureau Chief, Catherine Bond about a Maasai woman who had taken 
her abusive husband to court. The report is dated October 13
th
 , 1997. 
202
 See the Kenyan daily „The People‟, Monday, October 2, 2000. 
203
 A non-Maasai. 
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some family members and the local church, he annulled the marriage and offered to take the 
girl to school at his own cost. In some cases, it is the ministry of education that takes the 
initiative. And we are not just talking about Maasailand. Just to pick recent examples; in 
Kwale district 3 girls were rescued from forced marriages and transferred into a boarding 
school.
204All the three had been „married‟ to men aged 70 and above. A man who married off 
one of the girls was jailed for 8 years. Elsewhere, the daughter of a chief, aged 15, fled their 
rural home after her father attempted to force her to undergo female circumcision. The DC 
ordered the arrest of the chief.
205
 This was a shot on the foot of the state since it is these 
administrators who were expected to eradicate the practice. In another instance in Marakwet, 
17 girls had to flee their homes and take refuge in a human rights centre after they were 
forced to undergo the „real circumcision‟ after an alternative „mock‟ rite,206 organised by 
NGOs to replace female circumcision had been successfully concluded.
207
 In Maasailand, 
there was a joint Ministry of Health/Gtz project offering this „alternative rite‟ of passage to 
girls. The campaign was gaining momentum during my study.  
Socially, female circumcision impacts on school attendance, leads to early marriages and is a 
barrier to cross-ethnic marriages. A Maasai teacher, who went through the rite and has no 
regrets, admits however that as a practice that basically prepares girls for Maasai suitors, 
educated women are disadvantaged since, after getting the chance to meet men from other 
ethnic groups while in high school or college, it dawns on them that many of these men are 
not keen on circumcised women. She notes: “Anytime a Kamba man is interested in me, they 
always ask whether I am circumcised.
208
 When I tell them that I am, most of them lose interest 
immediately.” (Vivian , Simba, 13/06/2000).  
Generally, abandonment of female circumcision and „forced marriages‟ was seen as one way 
of creating a sense of sameness between the Kamba and the Maasai; but the practice is riddled 
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 The Daily Nation, Wednesday, April 25, 2001. The girls were taken to Waa Boarding Primary School for 
„protection‟. 
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 See The Daily Nation, Friday, December 7, 2001. 
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 Women lobby groups, bilateral organisations and international NGOs (e.g. Plan International) came up with 
alternative rites of passage for girls. Among the Pokot for instance, some 153 girls aged between 10 and 18 years 
completed this rite at Cheparreiria Catholic church in West Pokot in 2001 (see The Daily Nation, Friday, 
December 21, 2001). Through lectures given by health experts and educationists, the girls are sensitised on 
contemporary reproductive health concerns (e.g. HIV/Aids) and challenges of childhood. While this alternative 
rite takes a week, the „traditional‟ practice takes about two weeks and the initiates are taken to a secluded 
dwelling deep inside a forest. The practice involves the use of „crude‟ knives and unsterilised tools, and with no 
use of anaesthesia, it is a very painful exercise. It is argued that without the pain, the exercise would lose some of 
its significance. 
207
 The Daily Nation, April 16, 2002. 
208
 The so-called female genital mutilation or clitoridectomy is called emuratare ontoyie among the Maasai 
which basically means  the circumcision of girls. The practice, even from the perception of two school teachers 
who had gone through it, did not appear to be despised or labelled with the negative connotations often 
associated with it by  among others, development organisations, researchers and the media. 
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with heaps of controversy. Vivian  says that it would be difficult to root out the practice since, 
contrary to suggestions that men perpetuate it, she blames the women: “They organise it, it is 
not men, sometimes, I feel like they are saying „we went through it, it might not be good but 
you must feel what we felt‟...”. Moreover, the monetarisation of the exercise has compounded 
the problem. The „old‟ women who carry out this exercise were being paid an average of Ksh 
1,000 (EUR 15) per girl. What used to be „tokens of appreciation‟ had been turned into means 
of income and therefore a transformation of social responsibility. Keen to protect their 
economic interests, these women, who are also influential, are opposed to the eradication of 
the practice. 
There are other inconsistencies. As many girls increasingly run away from home or seek 
refuge among sympathetic relatives to escape circumcision or forced marriage, others yearn 
for it. In West Pokot, for instance, a schoolgirl threatened to take her own life after her parents 
ruled out her participation in the circumcision.
209
 While in ordinary circumstances it is the 
parents who find themselves on the other side of the law, this time round, it was the little girl 
who was arrested by the police. In Kisii, nearly all political leaders support the practice. A 
local MP and former university lecturer, Mr Jimmy Angwenyi claimed that female 
circumcision “is good and should not be stopped.” He warned that nobody or no amount of 
intimidation would stop the Kisii from pursuing their “cultural heritage.” As to how damaging 
the practice was, he said “amongst the Abagusii (Kisii) community, the idea of female genital 
mutilation (FGM) does not exist as girls simply go for a minor cut of the clitoris.”210 In 
Marakwet, a women‟s meeting was disrupted on suspicion that it was opposed to female 
circumcision. A group of Marakwet men and women stormed the venue, Chugor Primary 
School, and pelted the participants with stones accusing them of “interfering with our 
tradition”.211  
The state has, previously in principle, and now by law, prohibited female circumcision. In 
December 2001, „forced‟ early marriages and circumcision of girls below 18 years, were both 
outlawed and criminalised. The laws, contained in the Children‟s Bill passed by parliament, 
says that anyone who commits these offences will be liable to a minimum of one year jail 
sentence or a Ksh 50,000 (EUR 650) fine or both. Shortly afterwards, President Moi banned 
the practice ahead of assenting the bill into law.
212
 In 1982, he had condemned the practice 
threatening those circumcising girls, at least in his home district of Baringo with dire 
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 The Daily Nation, Tuesday, December 4, 2001. 
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 The Daily Nation, Thursday, December 13, 2001. 
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consequences. The question is: Did the practice stop after its criminalisation? Enacting laws 
and change of practices can be two different things. Enactment of a similar law in Ghana is 
said to have failed to root out the practice.
213
 In the Kenyan case, immediately after the Bill 
became law, cases were reported in Kisii where the practice had been „medicalised‟. Under 
the guise of normal hospital visit, female nurses would be contracted for the exercise, 
charging about Ksh 400 (EUR 5) per girl.  
All this means that for many girls, the ritual is not an option, for those who somehow escape it 
have also to contend with the harassment their peers can mete out to them. While the practice 
has been condemned widely, there is no indication that there shall be adherence to the law. 
The reason why groups like the Maasai and Kisii resist even legislation banning the practice is 
that it is a deeply embedded practice, attached with a lot of symbolism and meaning. Banton 
(1983: 100) notes that when a group continues to maintain certain forms of behaviour, it is 
because the members are motivated to maintain them and that if they change, it is because 
individual motivations have changed. According to the Kenya Demographic Health Survey 
(1998) about 55% of Kenyan groups practice female circumcision. Among the Kisii, about 
97% of girls and women aged between 15 and 49 have undergone the practice while among 
the Maasai, it was 89%, while the Kenyan average prevalence was 37.6%.  
Teachers who taught in schools with Kamba and Maasai pupils, noted that girls and boys hurl 
insults at one another regarding female circumcision. This ridicule, rather than pressure from 
parents for the Maasai girls to get married, was seen as one reason why some Maasai girls 
dropped out of school after the rite. Those who avoid or „escape‟ the rite, are said to win 
praise from non-Maasai girls, and boys too. Many Maasai girls are beginning to defy their 
parents, although there are arrangements now in which the rite is combined with schooling by 
carrying it out during school holidays. And with the support of non-Maasai (and sometimes 
Maasai) teachers, education officials and local administrators, more and more Maasai girls are 
skipping this rite. With the Maasai having the first woman chief in 2002, it does not seem that 
it will take “one hundred years” before the Maasai have an elected woman parliamentarian, as 
a former MP for Kibwezi (Kamba) retorted in a gathering called to reconcile the Kamba and 
the Maasai in 1995. 
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4.4   Conclusion of chapter four  
 
Although each group is enthusiastic about showing how distinct it is from the other through 
depictions, one thing that strikes the reader is that the Maasai tend to be stereotyped more 
negatively. One explanation is that Maasai stereotypes are shared among many other Kenyan 
groups as well as outside Kenya‟s borders as I pointed out in chapter three. The fact that the 
Maasai have fewer negative depictions of the Kamba may be explained by the dilemma in 
which the Maasai find themselves as they strive to „catch-up‟ with the Kamba and other 
groups in the „modernisation‟ race.214 An examination of Maasai depictions of the Kamba 
suggest that most of them are as old as the two groups have interacted and have been passed 
over many generations. I noted in chapter three that many Kamba depictions of the Maasai are 
relatively recent. Another major departure is that the Maasai are keen to stress morality, based 
on their misgivings about modernity. What is more, the Maasai have some positive depictions 
about the Kamba; that they have “hard working women” and that they tend to be “good in 
business.” These positive notions however are a reflection of the transformation sweeping 
through the Maasai society as they take up farming and get more integrated in the monetary 
economy. It is also shows that enemies can depict each other positively, particularly if those 
depictions serve the interest of the group propagating them. Maasai women of course, are 
equally hardworking and there are Maasai engaged in very successful business ventures. But 
groups are careful not to lose those attributes that distinguish them from others, and this 
objective can be pursued by depicting others positively, simply to stress that “we are not like 
them”.  
These positive attributes can also be used conveniently depending on what the actors want to 
achieve at a given time. For instance, the “hard working” Kamba women are also said to be a 
reflection of how “oppressive” and “negligent” Kamba men are; that they have abdicated their 
responsibilities in the homestead. As for being successful in business, the Maasai often accuse 
“foreigners” doing business in their territory for “exploiting” them. The Maasai also reject one 
attribute of difference: Kamba witchcraft. But this rejection does not translate into sameness 
but as a sign of Maasai superiority. It is also a way of maintaining the balance of power by 
making sure that no group has claim to superstitious powers. 
                                                          
214
 Maasai pride rests on their cultural heritage and cattle wealth. However, as the group goes through  fast 
transformation, increasingly taking up farming, sending children to school and commoditisation of the economy, 
it becomes more difficult to sustain depictions that negate „modernity‟. Popular generalisations surrounding 
Kamba‟s apparent abandonement of their cultural practices, begin to reflect on what the Maasai themselves are 
witnessing in their own backyard. 
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At the end of the chapter, I  have indicated that coexistence is not just about difference but 
commonalities too. Irrespective of the negative ways in which the two groups depict each 
other, the Kamba on the other hand adopt Maasai identity, while Christianity, education, 
vulnerability and trading centres create common points of convergence. 
 
4.5  General conclusion (chapter three and four) 
 
As I noted in the introduction of chapter three, the two chapters had the objective of showing 
how the Kamba and the Maasai qualify as actors in a coexistence relationship. The case I am 
trying to make in the two chapters is that ethnic distinction is one of the most basic 
considerations in interethnic coexistence. I have used ethnic depictions to make sense of 
difference. Apart from the groups‟ linguistic and historical differences as shown in chapter 
one, chapter three and four show that the Kamba and the Maasai have a repertoire of 
distinctions expressed through stereotypes. They range from physical appearances (“tall”, 
“short” etc.), ecology (modes of subsistence, i.e., farming and pastoralism), monetary 
economy (e.g. “they are good in business”), social transformation (e.g. “backward”, 
“ignorant” or “modern”), cultural practices (e.g. female circumcision, dress code etc.) to 
morality (e.g. promiscuity, thievery etc.).  
Whereas stereotypes are largely “imagined differences”,215  that is, social constructions of 
identity, they are not necessarily unfounded. Most of them are based on observed practices, 
but that are often conveniently exaggerated. Besides, depictions are usually not revised to 
correspond to the processes of social transformation. They are largely negative and presented 
as incorrigible, and are therefore useful in trying to fathom the contradictions and subjectivity 
of everyday life. For a large part, ethnicity is basically about difference and maintenance of 
social boundaries (Barth, 1969). A group‟s criteria and recognition of others as „different‟ 
from themselves enables them to make sense of their own identity (Wicker, 1997: 143). 
Besides, Werbner notes that essentialism and reification of culture is essential for mobilisation 
purposes (1998: 226-30).
216
 On the other hand, Baumann notes that “ethnic divisions are 
indeed based upon a proliferation of distinctions, all of them mutually independent” (1996: 
18). We are also told that the way we act toward others is shaped by the way we imagine them 
and this becomes even more acute if those „others‟ are strangers (Scarry, 1998: 40). It is safe 
to say that most ethnic depictions are a reflection of this „imagination‟. Underscoring the ways 
in which groups depict others, Peil and Oyeneye note that “often, a people‟s name for 
                                                          
215
 For a definition of “imagined differences”, see Schlee (2002: 6-7). 
216
 The Maasai, for instance, have been seeking “indigenous group” status. For more details, see chapter six. 
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themselves means „the people‟; everyone else is somehow less human” (1998: 79). In the 
same breath, Henrietta Moore (1994) tells us in her book, A Passion for Difference, that 
“difference” exerts an uncanny fascination for all people. What I have tried to show in these 
two chapters is this “passion for difference”.  
The point I am trying to make is that ethnic difference is first and foremost what interethnic 
coexistence is all about. Without ethnic distinctions, there would be no „coexistence‟ to talk 
about. To say that two groups „coexist‟, is basically to say that they are „different‟; they are 
distinguishable, internally and externally. But equally important, is that stereotypes serve as 
indicators of coexistence, that is, they act as evidence that groups have interacted in various 
ways. To put it differently, ethnic depictions are another way of saying “we know them”. And 
yet, the “passion for difference”, to maintain ethnic identity, explains why stereotypes are 
passed from one generation to the next even when they might not reflect actual practices. In 
other words, as cultural differences become less significant, ethnicity continues to find 
relevance as part of self-identity. This is why, in spite of the emerging similarities between the 
Kamba and the Maasai, ethnic depictions continue to paint a dichotomous and „clear cut‟ 
categories (e.g. “they are backward, we are modern,” “we keep cattle, they are farmers” etc.). 
It would be important to point out that ethnic depictions do not just make a statement about 
difference, they are also about ethnic pride, supremacy, rivalry and competition. I have shown 
that since stereotypes influence human action, that is, how actors respond toward others, they 
can easily lead to ethnic tensions and conflict. And yet, on the other hand, the exoticism and 
uniqueness created by depictions also act as points of „attraction‟ between two groups. An 
example is Maasai men who seek to marry the “hardworking” Kamba women. Distinctiveness 
therefore creates an arena in which closer interactions become possible. Moreover, I have also 
shown that the two groups have commonalities, expressed through shared identities (e.g. “I 
am Kamba-Maasai”) and economic activities like cattle keeping, places of leisure (e.g. 
drinking in bars), vulnerability (through drought and famine), religious membership (where 
Christianity infuses a sense of community) and social transformation (e.g. more Maasai girls 
going to school, resisting the practice of female circumcision etc.). 
 
I have shown how groups passionately distinguish themselves. And yet, in as much as 
coexistence is about distinction and difference, it is also about cross-ethnic transactions. In 
chapter five therefore, I proceed to discuss another aspect of this multidimensional 
relationship, i.e., how and why these groups that present each other as different and as rivals 
engage in complementing and interdependent relationships. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE AS MUTUAL EXCHANGE 
(COMPLEMENTARITY)  
 
After a detailed analysis of the actors and how depictions shape ethnic difference and 
interactions, the first part of this chapter examines patterns of interdependence that sustain the 
groups‟ livelihoods. This chapter seeks to present the Kamba and the Maasai as intricately 
interacting groups. In other words, coexistence here is visualised as constituting activities 
undertaken by groups to meet their daily needs, and that transcend ethnic differences. In this 
chapter, I am saying: “In spite of difference”, there are interethnic transactions. The phrase 
brings to mind Galtung‟s Coexistence in spite of Borders (1994).  
The argument is that irrespective of ethnic differences and hatred, being juxtaposed together 
in a common territory, an environment of scarcity, disparities in the distribution of facilities 
(e.g. schools) and specialisation in different modes of subsistence make it logical for the 
Kamba and the Maasai to establish cross-ethnic networks to safeguard their livelihoods. 
Vulnerability and livelihood needs are what makes even hostile groups to be complementary 
(see Haaland, 1969). “Livelihood”, to quote Long, (1997, 2000) is not just a matter of 
“shelter” and “bread” but also ownership and circulation of information, management of skills 
and relationships and the affirmation of personal significance/self esteem (citing Wallman, 
1982). Long notes that livelihoods “represent patterns of shifting interdependencies” (2000: 
197) and could be crucial in the resolution of conflicts. In the study, “livelihood” is used to 
describe the daily consumption and economic necessities of groups and strategies which they 
device (e.g. by forging closer links with others) to make a living and cope with uncertainties 
like drought. Of particular interest in the study is what kind of exchanges take place, who is 
producing and selling what to whom, and what meanings are attached to these relations. The 
question of pride referred above is crucial as some of the exchanges, as will be shown, involve 
what one group refers to as “technology transfer”.  
While the chapter borrows some ideas from studies on social exchange and reciprocity (e.g. 
Blau, 1964; Polanyi, 1957, 1992; and Baerends, 1994), it examines exchanges at a broader 
level (interethnic), that involve not only bartering and monetarisation but also schooling 
opportunities and transfer of labour. Because of this complexity, I have developed my own 
categories based on my empirical data. While Polanyi‟s (1957) concepts of reciprocity, 
redistribution and market exchange, make sense, the kind of exchanges I examine here do not 
fit into these categories. The exchanges discussed here range from each groups‟ specialisation 
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(agricultural and animal products), labour, skills and shopping facilities (where businesses 
tend to be dominated by one group) to situations where territorial disparities in the distribution 
of schools is translated into „owners‟ of these facilities (Kamba) and „suppliers‟ of pupils and 
fees (Maasai).  
In the second part of the chapter, I examine other “conditions for coexistence” (e.g. demand 
for “respect”) and how migrant groups strategize to win acceptance from the host group. The 
chapter shows that despite the „differences‟ outlined in chapter two, three and four, there is a 
continuous process of attenuation as ecological, climatic, social, economic and political needs 
squash together the diverse interests of the two groups. In a nutshell, the chapter seeks to 
show interethnic coexistence as a complementary process that is shaped by exchanges and 
compromises.   
 
Although I am using complementarity and interdependence almost interchangeably, 
conceptually, distinctions could be drawn in terms of intensity of exchanges between groups 
and the extent to which resources are shared. In this regard, and in a strict sense, 
interdependence would be exchanges at a symbiotic level and where each group is almost 
„indispensable‟, while complementarity would be exchanges at lesser level of intensity. In fact, 
Barth (1969: 18) notes that “complementarity can give rise to interdependence or symbiosis”. 
In other words, complementary relations are not necessarily interdependent. Exchanges 
between the Kamba and the Maasai, I would argue, oscillate between these two levels and 
depend on what is exchanged and when, i.e., whether there is drought or not (the magnitude of 
vulnerability). 
 
5.1  A history of trade and exchange 
 
Kamba-Maasai conflicts and negative stereotypes are juxtaposed within a history of cross-
ethnic trade. Studies show that even for groups that claim to be „pure pastoralists‟ like some 
sections of the Maasai, they have always supplemented their diet with grains obtained from 
other groups (Spear, 1993: 8). The Maasai previously acquired these supplements (e.g. beans) 
through barter trade and today they are procured through a combination of bartering and price 
market systems. Just like in the olden days, exchanges between the Kamba and the Maasai 
tend to revolve around their core modes of subsistence, namely farming and cattle keeping 
respectively. This form of negative complementarity, where insufficiency within a group is 
met by another, appears to be the premise on which other modes of interdependence (e.g. 
political alliances) are based. To illustrate their dependence on the Kamba for agricultural 
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produce (e.g. maize and beans), the Maasai say: “One finger does not kill a flea”. The Kamba 
on the other hand have a similar proverb: “One finger does not kill a louse”. Although they 
use different insects, the message is stark, that you cannot be self-sufficient, you need others; 
that as neighbours engaged in different trades, the Kamba and the Maasai have to depend on 
each other. Throughout the generations, whenever the weather has been favourable, 
interdependence in certain aspects is lessened, for instance, many Maasai may neither need to 
move their cattle to Ukambani in search of pastures, nor would the Kamba have to migrate to 
Maasailand in search of farms (near springs) to hire. But, whenever a “flea” stung (i.e. when 
prolonged drought struck), each group would need another “finger” (the other group) to 
sustain their lives.  
The Kamba and the Maasai have engaged in cross-ethnic trade since the time they have shared 
borders, which goes way back to the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century. The Kamba are said to 
have been key providers of honey to the Maasai, which was important particularly in marriage 
ceremonies and in the making of liquor. This appears to have been at a limited scale though, 
for the chief suppliers of honey to the pastoral Maasai were the „poorer‟ Maa speaking group, 
the Okiek, who lived in the forests (Spear, 1993: 7). My research partner, Mr Kyuli, told me 
that his grandfather, who died “at the start of Mau Mau”217 (around 1952) aged about 70 years, 
used to talk about Kamba-Maasai barter trade in honey, bows and arrows
218
 and even beer in 
the exchange of livestock and its related products like milk, meat and hides. The trade in bows 
and arrows is said to have been done secretly since the Kamba were not comfortable with the 
idea of their rivals (the Maasai) owning such weapons which were considered superior to the 
Maasai spear, knife and club. This evidence of old trade links between the Kamba and the 
Maasai contradicts the findings of Ndolo who, based on an oral interview in Mutomo (Kitui 
district) concluded that: “It is seen straight away that the Kamba were prepared to trade with 
everybody and did so except with the hated “Akavi” Maasai whom they fought 
continuously...”. He notes further that “due to constant feuds, the Maasai and the Kamba did 
not have much in common with each other” (1989: 51, 57). Ndolo ignores the fact that not 
having “much in common” could actually be the prerequisite in cross-ethnic trade. In any case, 
conflicts and hatred do not necessarily act as a trade/exchange barrier. There is also the 
question of proximity. The Kamba bordering the Maasai (e.g. those in Nzaui and Kilungu) 
were better placed to trade with the Maasai compared to those in distant areas like Kitui. 
                                                          
217
 “Mau Mau” is the revolt that was mounted by African freedom fighters against the British colonial 
government. 
218
  The Maasai also obtained bows and arrows from the Torrobo (Dorobo), who, just like the Okiek, were 
hunters. 
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Besides, as the Kamba specialised in the long-distance-trade with the Arabs along the East 
African coast in the 19
th
 century, they obtained additional hides from the Maasai, a 
commodity that was in high demand in the coastal trade.  
Prior to and during colonial rule, Kikuyu country acted as the cushion for both drought-prone 
Kamba and Maasai groups. Both groups however related with the Kikuyu at different levels. 
With cattle, the Maasai enjoyed higher status among the Kikuyu compared to the Kamba 
whose members would often be armed with only labour in exchange for food. This 
“dependence” on the Kikuyu for food, noted Kariuki of Loitokitok who migrated from Gachie 
(Kiambu) in 1967, is the “main reason” why the Kikuyu “find it difficult to respect the 
Kamba.”219 Among the long list of famines that forced the Kamba to depend on the Kikuyu 
for food included: Yua ya musele, “the famine of rice” of around 1898-99 which affected both 
Ukambani and Maasailand among other areas. During this  time, there was little to eat except 
rice distributed by missionaries and the colonial government and then foodstuffs obtained 
from the Kikuyu; in 1908-09 there was yua ya maalakwe, “the famine of beans”.220 During 
this famine, the beans in question (which was the main staple food available), were obtained 
from the better watered Kikuyu country through barter trade; And just within two years, came 
yua ya ndata, “the famine of the star” which had coincided with the sighting of the Harley‟s 
Comet in 1910.
221
 During these famines and other times of food shortages, the Kamba 
obtained from the Kikuyu sweet potatoes, arrow roots and cereals in exchange for their labour 
(tilling in the farms), ivory, salt and medicine. Women would also be traded for food. This 
early links explain why many „Kikuyu‟ in Kirinyaga area trace their descent to Ukambani.  
 
5.2   Contemporary forms of exchange 
 
During the colonial and post-colonial period, the forms and commodities of exchange have 
undergone transformation in the context of a more pervasive state, diminishing agricultural 
land (high population), changes in land tenure system and adoption of a market economy. 
There has been subsequent competition for resources based on fairly different property 
relations, with new dynamics, interest groups and priorities, altering the patterns of relations 
between individuals, groups and territorial areas. 
                                                          
219
 The Kamba generally claim that the Kikuyu look down upon them. 
220
 Maalakwe is corrupted Kikamba for maharagwe, the Swahili word for beans. Otherwise, beans are mboso in 
Kikamba. 
221
 Other prominent famines include the famine of aeroplane (yua ya ndeke) of 1960-61 when food was 
distributed by aeroplanes, the famine of charcoal (yua ya makaa) of about 1969, Others include yua ya  
nzalukangye and yua ya kakuti (early 1940„s) 
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The Kamba and the Maasai usually engage in exchanges that are mutual, often due to 
vulnerability, and that result in social intercourse, acceptance and accommodation. Most of 
the exchanges tend to be routine, but there were gifts (or concessions) that were portrayed as 
“favours” and used as an indication that a group was more accommodative (i.e. demonstrating 
the willingness to live in harmony with other groups), which often went contrary to widely 
held stereotypes. A good example here would be when Kamba traders were given additional 
trading premises in Simba (Maasai territory). Let me look at the various forms of cross-ethnic 
exchange in detail.  
 
5.2.1  The „pastoral‟ Maasai and the Kamba „farmer‟: Exchange through diversity  
One notable thing about these two groups is that despite sharing a similar ecological zone, 
they have specialised in fairly distinct modes of subsistence. From ethnological studies, it has 
long been established that in certain settings, groups living side by side may occupy clearly 
distinct niches and therefore be in minimal competition for resources limiting interdependence 
despite co-residence in an area (Barth, 1969: 19). Barth also noted that groups may on the 
other hand monopolise separate territories, and compete for resources that are available in 
each territory and where groups may erect barriers to exclude others. He agrees though that in 
reality, these are fairly mixed situations and only through gross simplifications can reduce 
interactions into simple types. Although specialisation in different modes of subsistence is 
often seen as an aspect of distinction, on the other hand, it creates an opportunity for exchange 
and indispensability. 
When I talk about the Maasai as cattle keepers and the Kamba as farmers, I am simply talking 
about the dominant modes of production otherwise there are overlaps, with the Maasai 
increasingly taking up farming. But this distinction can be seen in the trading centres where 
you see Maasai women selling ghee and milk while their Kamba counterparts sell agricultural 
products like maize, beans, pigeon peas, and cowpeas, as well as tomatoes, potatoes and 
cabbages. However, some of the products the Kamba women sell are not necessarily obtained 
from Ukambani but from the so-called “Kikuyu lorries”, an aspect that highlights the external 
dimensions of this trade.
222
 
Generally speaking, trading patterns and interdependence change significantly depending on 
the season and whether there are food shortages or not. For most of the cattle keeping Maasai 
who do not practice crop farming, regardless of whether there is drought or not, they obtain 
their supplementary foodstuffs from the farmers in their midst (in cash or bartered), in the 
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 These are lorries that are mainly from Central Province (Kikuyuland) that crisscross Ukambani selling 
cabbages, tomatoes and potatoes. 
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open air markets or in food stores in the trading centres. The only thing that changes is that 
during drought, the foodstuffs appreciate in value. This makes food shortages and famine to 
be more devastating to the Kamba whose diet is entirely cereal oriented, besides the fact that 
they have fewer cattle to fall back to. When drought is prolonged, with the exception of 
Kamba traders, most Kamba farmers temporarily cease to be source of grain needed to 
supplement Maasai diet. In such occasions, both groups have to rely on the trading centres 
whose food stores rely on transporters (middlemen) obtaining their supplies from the rich 
agricultural belt of Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Kericho in the western parts of Kenya or the 
irrigated farms in Loitokitok and even Tanzania.  
 
Barter trade 
When Kamba farmers have had a bumper harvest, then the Maasai may obtain their cereals 
simply through barter trade. One of my Maasai research partners (Nkata) participates in this 
trade where, in the company of other Maasai women or alone, she visits Kamba homesteads 
in search of agricultural produce particularly maize and beans. She offers goats or sheep and 
ghee in exchange for muthokoi, maize, beans, pigeon peas and cow peas. For 0.75 litre of ghee, 
she gets in return 5 kilograms of maize or 3 kilograms of beans. The quantity of the grains is 
measured using cooking fat tins while ghee and milk is put in soft drink or juice bottles 
measuring 0.3 and 0.75 litres respectively. These are locally improvised and cross-ethnically 
acceptable measurements that ease trade transactions. In a few occasions, measurements can 
also be determined arbitrarily. The quantities exchanged are also determined by how 
“desperate” one of the parties is. If there is drought and Maasai animals drop in value, the 
Maasai are forced to exchange goats, sheep and cattle for relatively fewer quantities of grain 
as the „exchange rates‟ change. For instance, a bull, which could „ordinarily‟ fetch up to 5 
bags of maize from a Kamba household, is exchanged for 2 bags during prolonged droughts. 
During harvest, a goat is normally exchanged for one maize bag (90 kg). Equivalents of 
exchange are also determined by how “close” the parties are. This borders on the Bielefelder 
Ansatz in which, Hans-Dieter Evers in one of the studies, The Moral Economy of Trade, the 
embeddedness of a trader‟s economic behaviour by societal norms and obligations is 
discussed. In the Trader‟s Dilemma, he argues that traders have to balance between 
accumulation of capital and the moral obligation to share with kinsfolk (Evers and Schrader, 
1994: 5; cf. Hyden, 1983). In my study, the Maasai who had Kamba friends or were related in 
marriage would be offered „better terms‟. In other cases, intervention of elders and other 
leaders would make it easier and cheaper for the Maasai to access Kamba pastures and 
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agricultural produce. These compromises, to be revisited later, constitute what I am referring 
to as the „price of interethnic coexistence‟.  
 
The cattle economy 
It has been noted in the study that both groups value cattle. It is their meeting point. But this 
common fascination with animals, though at varying degrees and for fairly distinct purposes, 
allows a very strong bond to develop, which is also sustained for mutual benefit. There is even 
a semblance of patron-client relationship through which Maasai cattle keepers lend cattle to 
the Kamba. These will be Kamba whom the Maasai have known for a considerable period, 
often linked by marriage, living or working in Maasailand.  Such loaned cattle may be milked, 
one may use or sell the ghee, they have to be taken good care of and may be reclaimed if not 
well fed or watered. They are monitored by the owner who should know of new calves and 
under no circumstances can the trustee sell these animals. Rarely will such animals be used 
for drawing carts or ploughs, engagements which the Maasai consider unsuitable for their 
bulls and oxen.
223
 „Monitoring‟ of these animals and the restrictions placed on them makes the 
Kamba realise that although cattle are just as important to them, Maasai obsession with 
livestock is unmatched. The Dutch missionary (referred earlier) makes a description that 
captures this difference. He notes that when Maasai animals are coming home “every woman, 
man and child sit outside the house to watch the cows (cattle) return. There is absolute silence. 
I do not know if you can understand me but it is a very moving sight. I almost cry watching 
this. If one single cow is missing, you will know from the emotional reaction and the body 
language”.224  
Although both groups practice transhumance, it is organised differently among the Kamba. 
When there is a  prolonged drought, some of the Kamba cattle keepers  practice what is called 
kuvithya indo where one‟s animals are taken to relatives or neighbours who have bigger 
pieces of land. This may involve cash payments or expectations that your relatives reserve the 
right to access your pastures or other assistance in the future, making the arrangement appear 
reciprocal. Others take their animals to distant areas where they may have kyengo
225
 (pl. 
syengo). These are pieces of land which one bought or acquired (kukwata) for the „rainy day‟ 
and may be outside of Ukambani (e.g. in Maasailand). The whole family will normally not 
                                                          
223
 This particular requirement is a major bone of contention between Maasai cattle lenders and Kamba trustees. 
While ploughing and drawing of carts is one of the major reasons why the Kamba tend bulls, the Maasai 
normally use donkeys for these activities. To the Maasai, using bulls and oxen this way amounts to 
“mistreatment” and serves as further evidence for their claims that the Kamba are “fake” cattle keepers. 
224
 Fr. Frans Mol‟s account during an interview with Phil Ikonya of the Nation Newspapers (see Sunday Nation, 
October 28, 2001). 
225
 The „kye‟ is pronounced „che‟. 
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move but one or two family members will. The contemporary practice is to send a salaried 
herder(s) to take care of the animals, but who will be monitored closely. 
In recent years, there has been a trend where the Kamba adopt some of the „superior‟ cattle 
breeds of Sahiwal and Boran kept by the Maasai. These breeds yield more milk and fetch 
higher prices when sold or exchanged compared to the traditional Zebu. Acquisition of these 
„new‟ breeds has become a marker of social status among the Kamba while it has enhanced 
Maasai pride, since it serves as resilience of the Maasai as models and pacesetters. Such 
animals are acquired through many ways; through some form of barter where an agreed 
equivalent quantity of grain (e.g. four bags of beans) is exchanged for a cow, while others 
simply pay cash in the cattle markets or by going to Maasai homesteads. Some Kamba borrow 
male bulls from the Maasai to improve their breed sometimes „free‟ depending on how „well‟ 
they are acquainted. Others (e.g. Kyuli) got a Sahiwal bull in exchange for his grazing fields 
where his “Maasai friend” grazed his animals for two months. Apart from Sahiwal breeds of 
cattle, nearly all the Kamba I met during my study who possessed donkeys had acquired the 
same from the Maasai. 
The photos below, taken during the study, show the traditional Zebu and the preferred Sahiwal 
breed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2 : A „traditional‟ Zebu cow with a calf. 
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Plate 3: The Sahiwal breed of cattle. 
 
There are many Kamba who cross to Maasailand during droughts to burn charcoal, get 
firewood for sale, in search of herding jobs or to hire fields near springs to irrigate. In addition, 
there are Kamba families that have specialised in storing maize stalks (either after harvest or 
crop failure) and then sell these to cattle keepers in the dry season. Mr Kyuli of Kiboko, who 
has made this a form of trade, buys these stalks from his neighbours at “throw away prices” 
immediately after harvest or when rains fail and then waits for the dry spells. The maize stalks 
are not sold at „fixed‟ prices, and the Maasai pay more for them not just because they are 
outsiders, but since they are more desperate (given the economic significance and emotional 
attachment to cattle). However, the Maasai who keep large herds would generally not be 
interested for it would either be too expensive or the maize stalks would be inadequate. In 
other cases, the farms were also turned into grazing fields during droughts at a fee. These are 
normally the large ones (e.g. 20 acres and more) and well fenced off to ensure that only 
selected herds have access. The progressive Kamba farmers also travel to Kajiado and 
negotiate for cow dug which they use as manure in their farms. While some get it for free 
among their in-laws or in families where ties already exist, many obtain it in exchange for 
cash or grain. The existence of barter trade in the midst of a cash economy showed the 
contradictions that exited in the two groups in spite of the fact that one regarded itself 
“modern” and portrayed the other “traditional”. The hybridity of the trade shows that despite 
distinctions, the groups are interconnected in intricate ways. 
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One sees that to a very large extent, droughts enhance interaction between the two groups, but 
with mixed fortunes. Mr Palalelei noted that the Maasai were not necessarily placed at an 
advantage after a bumper harvest in Ukambani since the Kamba got an alternative source of 
income and therefore were less willing to rent out their pastures to the Maasai, but, “when 
they (Kamba) have a lot of food, we also get it cheaply,” he notes. The Maasai have their 
advantages; “when schools are about to open,” notes he, “the Kamba are desperate to sell their 
cattle so we take advantage of this”. It is a complex symbiotic relationship with contradictions 
and antagonisms. When there are food shortages and fewer sources of income, some Kamba 
along the border resort to crossing over the „Maasai‟ side, haul wood during the night, 
transport it to „their side‟ where its either burnt for charcoal or sold as firewood. The Maasai 
on the other hand may take their animals to Kamba grazing areas at night, including farms. 
The cattle herders often adopt a strategy where cattle are „let loose‟ and made to look like 
their whereabouts is unknown, while the herders monitor the cattle‟s movement from a 
distance as they devour crops in farms or pastures in „private‟ parcels. By the time the Kamba 
find out, the cattle have already grazed as the Maasai herders emerge with all manner of 
apologies including feigning having lost them! This is cross-border grazing among the Kamba 
and the Maasai. Such incidences have been increasingly common (particularly in the last 20 
years) that they are often ignored or are treated as „normal‟ unless they are pushed to extremes 
(e.g. a time when trees on Maasai soil were cut with impunity and “in broad daylight” or 
when cattle are led into Kamba farms “deliberately” destroying crops). As antagonistic as 
these relations might look, still, each group knows the „limits‟ beyond which  optimal 
equilibrium would be disrupted.  
 
5.2.2   “Maasai milk” and Kamba customers: Maasai women as „brokers‟ 
As noted earlier, the Kamba and Maasai modes of subsistence are not a dichotomy. Yet, due 
to a fairly long history of specialisation and adopting varying land tenure systems, one cannot 
deny the fact that the production of milk is dominated by the Maasai. Whereas most Kamba 
today have to rely on goat milk for tea and the children, the Maasai, on average, have a lot of 
cow milk that has over time been commoditised to generate income. So whereas, there are 
Kamba who are self sufficient in milk production and others who simply do without it, just 
like there are Maasai who have neither cattle nor goats, what is of interest here is the flow of 
this commodity from one group to the other and to find out how this commoditisation impacts 
on interethnic relations (e.g. whether it leads to consolidation of relations between the Kamba 
and the Maasai: See Mwende‟s story in chapter four). 
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At one time, I spent three days with a Maasai family. They live about 8 kilometres from 
Simba trading centre. I would like to present the story of one of the family‟s three wives. 
Nkata and her two co-wives and with the assistance of their four daughters were milking a 
total of 18 cows and producing about 35 litres of milk. The cows could have produced more 
milk if they were all “improved” breeds or hybrids (e.g. Sahiwal). The family was selling 
about 30 litres and the rest was for family use. The commoditisation of milk has meant that 
less and less milk is available for domestic use. The milk trade however had motivated the 
women to tend cows particularly by ensuring that they have enough pasture and are taken to 
the watering areas every day (which also translates into more workload). But by so doing, 
Maasai women in general are involving themselves not just in looking after cattle but in the 
control and appropriation of this resource. It is worth mentioning that among the pastoral 
Maasai, milk is normally a woman‟s domain. What is a bit striking is that despite the 
commoditisation of milk, Maasai men have generally shied away from seeking to control this 
resource.  
It has been shown that money changes the social-cultural interactions of society and those 
involved (Simmel, 1978). It influences not only lifestyles and living conditions but 
interpersonal relations. Going back to Nkata‟s case, her husband said: “We cannot touch milk, 
that is degrading for a man...ahaa...how much do they make anyway, little money,” implying 
that the men might not mind the money but would not want to „bend low‟ by seeking to 
„control‟ milk. Almost in agreement, a councillor noted: “To us (Maasai men), milk is not 
wealth, if the woman can earn a living and the men lose nothing, why not! after all, the men 
will even spare their money”. A careful analysis however revealed that in most cases, once a 
woman began to generate some income, then the husband either covertly or deliberately 
abdicated or ignored certain financial responsibilities in the family. Nonetheless, the 
commoditisation of milk among the Maasai has not only shaped women‟s activities and 
propelled them to attain a sense of self determination, but also to act as „brokers‟ in forging 
closer interethnic links in the process. It would also be good to point out that the Maasai men, 
whose wives were involved in the milk business, tended to be more concerned about the 
„contacts‟ and the „exposure‟ than the money generated. This „concern‟ forced one man to 
make all the business contacts himself and would also occasionally deliver the milk. 
The milk was retailing at Ksh 15 (EUR 0.2) per litre although the price was „negotiable‟. 
Kamba homesteads that were known to the Maasai could be given the milk at a „friendly‟ 
price of as low as Ksh 10. In Nkata‟s case, she was getting a bigger share of the proceeds 
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because „some‟ of the cows were hers.226 She was more literate than her co-wives and that 
perhaps explains why she had taken some leading role in the milk trade. When I asked her 
whether she would not cheat on her co-wives on the proceeds, she said that: “I wouldn‟t do 
anything like that, mzee(husband) would kill me”. „Kill‟ here basically means that she would 
be liable for some form of punishment. Mentioning of the husband to some extent suggested 
that he, and by extension other Maasai men, were not as disengaged in the milk trade as 
initially implied. About the milk trade, its commoditisation had been “a recent phenomenon.” 
And this development had not just been influenced by an increasingly market oriented 
economy or the need to raise monies to pay for school fees but other external factors as well. 
Suffice it to say that the collapse of a key state parastatal, Kenya Co-operative Creameries 
(KCC) in the 1990‟s seems to have created a vacuum which boosted sales of unpacked whole  
milk country wide.
227
 The family started offering milk for sale in 1993. It was evident that  
some other Maasai families in the village had started earlier. It started on a barter scale basis 
between families, then to occasional payments in cash to a fairly sophisticated monetary 
economy. Prior to the 1990‟s there was limited sale of „Maasai milk‟ in restaurants/tea kiosks 
in the trading centres, particularly those along the border. Nkata explained: “the Kamba who 
run these businesses used to say that our milk is dirty”. I asked her why the tea kiosk and 
restaurant proprietors changed their attitude and she said that with time, they came to “learn 
more about the Maasai,” the Maasai women also transformed themselves into “business 
women”, learnt a bit of Swahili, had to be “cleaner”, put the milk in plastic containers (rather 
than traditional gourds), and the question of demand; a vacuum had been created after scarcity 
of packaged milk and finally, that the Kamba had found out that „Maasai milk‟ “had no water 
like the one sold by  the Kamba”.228 The Maasai therefore, it seemed, had won the trust of the 
Kamba businesspersons. I did accompany Nkata in her milk marketing ventures which 
involved transporting the milk from the homestead at about 6.00 hours using donkeys to the 
Nairobi-Mombasa road where she took a matatu (commuter taxi) to Kiboko, Makindu or 
Kibwezi. Occasionally, she would also take with her milk from “other women,” particularly 
her relatives to the markets. After delivering milk to one of the Kamba „customers‟ in 
Kibwezi, I posed a number of questions:  
                                                          
226
 Maasai women accumulate property, particularly cattle, although ideally, they are supposed to be a custodian 
of the animals allocated to them by their husbands; that is, hold them but bequeath them later to their sons. 
227
Through accusations of corruption and debts, the co-operative had collapsed, owing dairy farmers (particularly 
in Central and Rift Valley provinces) millions of shillings. It was later privatised and renamed KCC 2000 but by 
then smaller packaging firms had emerged  giving it stiff competition. The firms that took centre stage include; 
Mount Kenya, Delamere Dairies, Brookside, Tuzo, Meru Dairy Co-operative Union and Kitunda Dairy Co-
operative Union.  
228
 She said that with fewer cattle, the Kamba who marketed milk added water to increase sales. This claim was 
not entirely implausible. To Nkata, Maasailand is a land of plenty while Ukambani is one of scarcity. 
 164 
 
 
 
Q : How did you get this client? 
A:  He was introduced to me by a neighbour, she could not supply anymore (meet the 
contractual obligations) after selling some of their animals and  moving the others to Nguu 
(Makueni district). 
Q: Did you sign a contract? 
A: No it is just on mutual agreement. He doesn‟t even know where I come from (but not the 
ethnicity). I assured him that I will be supplying him with milk everyday and that if there was 
a problem, I would let him know. 
Q: Did he trust you? 
A: At first he didn‟t. He said that we are very unreliable but with time he has come to trust me. 
Q: Did he give you any conditions? 
A: Yes. He said that I should be coming here very early. If I don‟t make it by 10 a. m., then I 
take the milk to any other market or hotel (tea kiosk, restaurant). He also said that the milk 
should be put in clean containers and I should not add water. 
Apart from these demands, the Maasai seemed happy that the Kamba „accepted‟ their milk. 
Of course, the „rejection‟ of Maasai milk and the notion that it was dirty, is definitely a new 
phenomenon which took root during the differential transformation witnessed during the 
colonial period. Anyhow, this change of attitude towards Maasai milk had created new arenas 
of interaction, communication, negotiation and deliberation that were not available before. As 
the Maasai proudly say that the Kamba tea kiosks and also families “depend on our milk” they 
also acknowledge that, to quote Nkata, who put in a very succinct way: “When they (Kamba) 
accept our milk, they also accept us.” (Simba, 05/01/2000). The money earned from the milk 
also enhances cross-ethnic interaction since it is used to buy grains, vegetables and fruits, and 
even to offset fees balances in schools. 
 
5.2.3   “Kamba shops” and Maasai customers 
To understand interethnic property relations, it was imperative to establish who owns what, 
where and of what significance were such property in terms of cross-ethnic interaction and 
coexistence. Although this was partly discussed in chapter four, I would like to revisit the 
subject from another dimension. 
The heading of this subchapter should not be construed to mean that the Maasai have no stake 
in local businesses. For most of them though, the „market‟ is a place where exchange between 
them and „strangers‟ takes place. Nevertheless, owning shops, food kiosks (locally called 
hoteli), cereal stores, bars and butcheries was regarded highly among the two groups. Even 
among the Maasai, the importance placed on owning cattle is gradually being eclipsed by 
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other more „sustainable‟ investments like land, commercial plots, food stores and buildings in 
trading centres. Just walking around the centres, not just along the border but also many inside 
Maasailand, the pattern was stark: most businesses were in the hands of non-Maasai groups 
(e.g. Kamba and Kikuyu). In quite a number of cases however, the buildings would be owned 
by the Maasai and few would be willing to sell them.  
Whereas Barth tells us that neighbouring groups may occupy reciprocal and therefore 
different niches and provide different goods and services for each other (1969:19), the case 
here is a little bit different. Owning shops in the Kamba-Maasai context has little to do with 
„different niches‟ but rather appropriation of market opportunities as more and more Maasai 
rely on the market for the provision of basic necessities. It was also a case where Kamba and 
Kikuyu businesses, for instance, compete for Maasai customers (market) on the one hand, and 
their own groups on the other. While the Maasai never appeared to mind where they shopped, 
the Kamba and the Kikuyu would, for the simple reason that they had „alternatives.‟ This 
preference for certain shops run by certain groups appeared to give some semblance of ethnic 
trade. All the same, this is one venture where the Kamba and the Maasai were actually not 
„competitors‟ but rather complemented each other, albeit in an unequal relationship. Anyhow, 
the Maasai on the other hand „sustain‟ most of the shop and hotel businesses in the town. A 
Kamba businessman notes that the Maasai, “for some reason shop a lot... they buy large 
quantities of maize, beans, sugar and tea.” He noted further that they had „eating out‟ habits 
adding, “if it were not for them, we would not be in business…the Kamba want to eat here too 
but they have no money.” This was also reflected in the consumption of alcohol (beer) with a 
Kamba bar proprietor in Kiboko remarking that his business is basically sustained by Maasai 
patrons. 
The question was, why didn‟t the Maasai run some of these businesses? A Kamba (chair of 
Simba trading centre) explained: “Their minds are in cattle, they have no time to sit in a shop 
when they don‟t know what is happening to their cattle.” This is fairly a simplistic explanation. 
The Maasai had their own explanations. Palalelei said, “we don‟t care, they bring to us things 
that we need, if this „hotel‟ was not here, where would we be eating now?”229 and then 
cleverly justified this „marginalisation‟ by noting that “look, we have no discrimination, we 
shop in your shops and eat in your hotels.” He ignored the fact that except for a very small 
minority, the Maasai were not running retail, wholesale or food store businesses. But non-
participation was fronted as a token of ethnic accommodation. Moreover, in Simba, a decision 
was made in the mid 1990‟s to have kiosks erected just next to the “main road” to promote 
                                                          
229
 I was having lunch with him in Kiboko trading centre. 
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“small scale businesspersons”. This particular initiative was aimed at propelling the Maasai 
into business. After no applications were received from members of the group, the Kamba 
were given a chance to apply. And again, this gesture of giving away what the Maasai rejected 
was conveniently used by Maasai leaders as a sign of goodwill and friendliness to the Kamba. 
Talking to the local Maasai councillor who personally had opted to rent out his premises to a 
Kamba, he noted: “Our people (Maasai) are very social people, I was running businesses here, 
but you see, these become chatting places…people come, take tea or eat, and then later say 
they will pay another day or just leave…you do not know what to do, some of them, you don‟t 
see them again…others say that you are rich...I made many losses…now I have peace...they 
know that when they are dealing with the Wakamba or Kikuyu they have to pay” (Tauketi, 
Simba, 23/05/2000). In this case, the „foreigner‟ becomes a scapegoat as Maasai traders avoid 
kin obligations and keep his name in good books. In any case, renting the premises to non-
Maasai ensured a steady flow of income, while the landlord enjoyed the right to change 
tenants. Besides, most landlords, and other Maasai, also demand that other groups in their 
territory should “respect” them. The notion of “respect” is revisited later in the chapter. It is 
important to note here that in spite of the reasons behind renting the premises to „foreigners‟ 
and the unpredictability of these transactions, the Maasai used these gestures as evidence of 
how accommodative they were to other groups. 
Other Maasai businessmen had other challenges. One explained how difficult and sensitive it 
was in trying to recover some Ksh 3,800 worth of goods that had been taken on credit by his 
father-in-law. On the one hand, he feared to push the old man since he had not „cleared‟ the 
bridewealth and he feared that this would come up if he “pushed too much.” He avoided the 
discussion and the old man also said nothing. The situation was saved by his brother-in-law 
(the wife‟s brother) who works in Nairobi. In one of his visits to the countryside, he explained 
to him and he cleared the debt on behalf of his father.  
From these two accounts, it appeared that even for those Maasai who were keen on business, 
the economy of affection (Hyden, 1983) where relatives and clan members would obtain 
credit or simply „eat‟ and leave, made it impossible for their kin to excel in business and 
compete with the non-Maasai. But even the Kamba and Kikuyu businesses had to reckon with 
goods taken on credit or were forced to mix cash trade with barter since, the Maasai for 
instance, would offer a goat for a bale of maize flour or an agreed quantity of beans. To run 
business among the Maasai therefore, you had to run it „in their own terms.‟ These 
„compromises‟ often led to losses as some debts would not be cleared or a goat promised to be 
handed in “immediately” never came. In some cases, the Maasai would simply refuse to pay, 
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invoking their position as „hosts‟. Losses incurred by the non-Maasai are in a way seen as 
compensation for their stay in Maasai territory. Some misunderstandings are caused by what a 
shopkeeper in Simba called “baseless trust” where the Maasai borrow goods on credit „to pay 
later‟ even when they are not known to the shopkeeper and if they don‟t get this credit, they 
mobilise other Maasai not to visit that shop. She wondered why the Maasai customers 
expected her to lend them goods without any form of security, including “at least knowing the 
person.” She noted that some borrow goods when they have brought their animals around 
only for a short period then move away not to be seen again. Because of their dressing, she 
continued, it was difficult to tell them apart making it a arduous task tracing the creditor. 
Otherwise, where the debtors were known, the “extreme cases” would be reported to the 
administration. A case in point is where a Maasai owed a Kamba businessperson goods worth 
Ksh 9,000 (EUR 113) in Sultan Hamud. Such incidences are brought before the local 
administration for arbitration. In such cases, Maasai elders also co-operate in tracing the 
creditor, whom they portray as “spoiling our good name”, and in payment of the money owed. 
In the Kamba-Maasai business transactions, there were other technicalities. Most of the hiring 
contracts of business premises in Sultan Hamud, Emali and Simba were sealed verbally. 
Kamba and Kikuyu businesspersons lamented that when the Maasai landlord wanted to raise 
the rent, he arbitrarily proposed a figure taking the tenant by surprise. However, it appeared 
that in such cases, the non-Maasai were their worst enemies, as another Kamba or Kikuyu 
would be behind the hike aiming to take over the premise.  
Rents depended on the nature of business, its location, the preference of the owner including 
„ethnic‟ considerations and rarely on the size of the premise. Whereas sale of commercial 
plots or buildings by the Maasai would give preference to other Maasai, renting of business 
outlets „excluded‟ the Maasai. The explanation given by the Maasai was that their kin would 
be less reliable in the payment of rent and two, the business they were to run would most 
likely flop. A number of factors therefore had made the Maasai appear as if they were not 
bothered by „external dominance‟.230  Rates, at least in Simba, were as follows (Ksh per 
month): Shops went for 1,000, butcheries for 700, hotelis (food business) for 400 while rooms 
in the storey buildings fetched 2,000. Apart from ethnic affiliation, the amount of rent charged 
is also determined by the mere assessment of one‟s ability to pay. Because of the lucrative 
meat business, butchery space attracts a higher charge than a hoteli even where the latter 
occupied more space.  
                                                          
230
 Trade largely fell outside what the Maasai were concerned about most, namely cattle and grazing areas. 
calling “respect”. 
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When all is said and done however, there are some businesses that are entirely „Maasai‟, 
particularly those involving their own „traditional‟ clothing. Usually handled by Maasai 
women, they travel to Loitokitok or Taveta and Namanga where they buy the clothes from 
middlemen/women who obtain them from Tanzania. These garments are then sold in the open 
air markets in Sultan Hamud and Emali. What is more, Maasai women sell small packets of 
tea, sugar and milk to an entirely Maasai clientele, as well as featuring in the famous soko ya 
ng‟ombe (cattle market)231 in Emali selling tea and mandazi (buns). 
To conclude this section, it is evident that owning shops or running businesses does not 
accord the Kamba any obvious advantages over the Maasai. It is, as shown, a complex pattern 
where „weaknesses‟ are turned into strengths, modalities are constantly revised, property 
relations are situational, unpredictable but „stable‟.  
 
5.2.4   Housing transactions: Technology transfer? 
Despite the fact that there were „clear‟ distinctions in the way the two groups construct their 
dwelling structures in the olden days, overtime, there has been imitations, overlaps and 
deployment of external labour. Historically, Kamba and Maasai houses varied in shape, size, 
construction, materials, partition, who constructed them, their permanence and organisation. 
In both cases, the construction would begin with the erection of a wooden structure. But, 
whereas the Maasai would fill in the structure with mud and cow dug, the Kamba used grass. 
At some point, the Kamba are believed to have borrowed the use of clay (mud) from the 
Maasai. This changed the „traditional‟ Kamba house to be mud-walled with a grass-thatched 
roof. Normally, Kamba houses used to be circular in design with a central pole holding up the 
roof. This pole was also used to hang things like bows and quivers. Though now associated 
more with poverty rather than an aspect of cultural heritage, these structures can be seen in 
various parts of Ukambani. The colonial period saw the adoption of „western‟ designs. Ndolo 
talks about Kamba who worked in urban centres during the British rule coming back home 
and building houses similar to those “where the Europeans lived” (1989: 121). 
It is also crucial to state that contrary to popular belief that the Maasai are keen to retain their 
traditional structures, what one sees in Maasailand is a revolution in housing. In fact, in his 
study, Holland  had found out that in a sample of 47 Maasai women, only 2 preferred to live 
in traditional Maasai houses while the rest (45) wanted to live in houses with corrugated iron 
roofs (1996: 269). A possible explanation is that traditional house construction is women‟s 
                                                          
231
 The largest in Kajiado district, the Emali cattle market (soko ya ng‟ombe), brings together cattle traders from 
as far as Kitengela, Nairobi and Mombasa. It is not only a major source of income for many  Maasai and Kamba  
cattle traders but an arena of social intercourse. Held every Thursday, it is a place where Maasai cattle breeds and 
Kamba ones change hands; those interested in trading in goats go to Sultan Hamud on Fridays.  
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responsibility, including regular maintenance. So adoption of other housing models free 
women from this enormous responsibility. 
While some Maasai have adopted “Kamba houses,” this was generally not seen as 
„technology transfer‟ but simply as a form of exchange. Over the years, the Kamba circular 
houses have been superseded by rectangular ones, and these are the ones the Maasai adopt. 
According to Palalelei, who had some of the “Kamba houses” in his homestead (see photo 
below), it was a question of pragmatism. He argued that “you (Kamba) have some good 
things, we also have some good things, that is how things are”. Actually, he did not need to be 
defensive, for part of this „technology‟ he had „imported‟ was originally Maasai. Nevertheless, 
he said that the “Kamba houses” were bigger and it was relieving to enter into the house 
“upright”.232  Although it proved difficult to ascertain exactly when this adoption process 
could have taken root, it was established that it was indeed a „recent‟ phenomenon that 
appeared to have gained currency among the Kaputiei Maasai in the 1950‟s. It appeared that 
unlike among the Kamba, having a traditional house among the Maasai was not necessarily a 
reflection of income. Having a „modern house‟ had more to do with „exposure‟, occupation 
and level of education. Palalelei noted that there were many Maasai who would neither have 
the „Kamba houses‟ nor “step inside.” During the construction process, he was despised by 
some of his age-mates and his first wife. His wife had sarcastically asked him why he had 
paid for the construction of the houses while Maasai women did the same work without any 
monetary compensation. His argument was that the wife should have been “grateful” that she 
had been “relieved” of such trouble, adding: “Our huts need to be repaired all the time...the 
cow dug keeps on peeling ...when it rains, the cow dug and mud roof is soaked very 
quickly...during El Nino
233, most Maasai had no place to hide”.234  
Contrary to „traditional‟ Kamba practices, most of these houses had been wholly constructed 
and even thatched by Kamba men. Normally, thatching of houses among the Kamba is 
women‟s work, including the harvesting of the grass. The men cut the wood logs, dig the 
holes that hold the logs firmly on the ground, fix the roof and usually apply mud to the walls. 
In this particular case, the Kamba men appear to have been motivated by the monetary gains, 
forcing them to sideline their women.
235
 They would negotiate for an average of Ksh 5,000 
                                                          
232
 One has to bend to enter a „traditional‟ Maasai dwelling. 
233
 In reference to the unprecedented heavy El Nino rains that hit parts of East Africa in the 1997/1998 season. 
234
 During the rainy season (nowadays) most Maasai homesteads use canvas and plastic materials to cover the 
roofs. 
235
 Although Kamba women may claim to be more influential in their homesteads compared to their Maasai 
counterparts, on matters of income opportunities, men often sideline them. Men will draw water, if it is for sale 
and not for the homestead. A woman complained that when they bought an oxen-drawn cart, she thought that her 
agony of carrying water gourds on her back was put to rest only for her husband to use it specifically for ferrying 
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(EUR 65) for their skill and labour. It was also surmised that the Kamba feared exposing their 
women to Maasai men who could court them. Another explanation was that being a good 
opportunity for the two groups to interact, Kamba men wanted to be in charge of this 
important gesture.  
 
 
 
Plate 4: Palalelei‟s homestead (Kiboko group ranch). Note the mix between the „traditional‟ Maasai hut in the 
foreground and the two grass-thatched “Kamba houses”. 
 
Let me turn to other housing structures. This is what one would call „modern‟ ones; 
permanent structures where bricks, concrete blocks or stones are used in the construction of 
walls by highly skilled masons, and roofed with iron sheets or tiles. The more „progressive‟ 
Maasai are increasingly erecting such structures. How do the Kamba come in? Most of the 
masons undertaking such jobs are usually non-Maasai. And because Kikuyu masons were said 
to be “expensive” and “exploitative”, the Kamba were preferred.236 Then there was „trust‟ and 
„honesty‟. A Maasai whose stone house near Sultan Hamud had been constructed by Kikuyu 
artisans complained of “theft of cement and some other construction materials...” As if that 
was not enough, he continued, “that house you are seeing there (pointing to a house about 3 
kilometres away); the owner lost a lot of things to some Kikuyu ..they even breached the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
water to the residents in Emali at a fee. She said that “the only thing they (men) are shy to do is to sell firewood”. 
Actually, some did. 
236
 The Kamba are stereotyped as not being ambitious. 
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contract and demanded more money in the course of the construction...you can‟t trust them” 
(Tuteti, Kibini, 15/08/2000). Apart from the accusations about theft, charging more money in 
the course of the construction appeared to be legitimate as the cost of materials keep on 
escalating. The Kikuyu masons being referred to here were also found to be a bit more 
„professional‟ and they would charge their labour as per the „market rates‟.  
Apart from the two sets of houses above, there were also some medium level or “improved” 
houses. These would be mud walled, then plastered with cement and have a corrugated iron 
sheets roof. As expected these ones were cheaper to construct and the Kamba „masons‟ hired 
for the job were not necessarily trained but those who „hands on‟ experience. Labour charges 
for two-roomed house would be in the region of Ksh 20,000 (EUR 260). In most of the cases, 
the Kamba masons would have a „Maasai rate‟ (usually higher) and a „Kamba rate‟. One of 
them told me that this was not aimed at  exploiting the Maasai but that “the Maasai just pay, 
they don‟t complain”. It was established that on average, a Maasai seeking to have his house 
„improved‟ will have, ordinarily, a lot more money at his disposal than a Kamba opting to do 
the same. 
 
5.2.5   Labour relations: Kamba herders among the Maasai 
In this particular subsection, I seek to illustrate how the engagement of Kamba labour in 
Maasailand shapes relations between the two groups. Although the Kamba may have claimed 
„modernity‟ status and being Maasai models, many Kamba men had been hired by the Maasai 
as cattle herders and farm labourers. This was rarely the other way round. The movement of 
unskilled labour from Ukambani to Umasai (Maasailand) is a question of relative of poverty, 
population growth and the modes of subsistence; with cattle keeping showing more resilience 
as successive crop failures, particularly in the last 20 years, destabilised the Kamba farming 
economy. This has impacted on school attendance, with parents pulling out their children 
from school because they could not afford the fees charged. Some of these drop-outs choose 
or are encouraged by their parents to move away from home in search of „better‟ opportunities. 
Depending on one‟s level of education and family networks, migration to the cities is not an 
option for some. This is how some youths (usually male) end up in Maasai territory. In some 
cases, those recruited to do menial jobs may have the option of being naturalised and 
becoming „Maasai‟. A case in point is Mbuani ole Kasimu,237 a herdsman in Murneshi sub-
location, Kenyewa location, Kajiado. Starting as a herdsboy in the mid 1980‟s, he was 
adopted by the Maasai family where he worked and treated like a child of the home. By the 
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 „Mbuani ‟, and „Kasimu‟ are Kamba names while „ole‟ is Maa for „son of‟, a prefix that precedes the father‟s 
name and used after circumcision. At least in the naming, „ole‟ was the pointer that he was „Maasai‟. 
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time of this study, his payments were even irregular and were given now as rewards rather 
than wages. He had undergone various rites of passage like circumcision (initiation into 
murranhood) and junior elder after taking up a Maasai wife. His „father‟ even paid for the 
bridewealth.  
In other cases however, like Mutua, who seek herding jobs when they are much older, tend to 
resist assimilation preferring to maintain „worker-employer‟ relations. In any case, the Maasai 
families are also less keen on adopting circumcised boys. I would like to discuss the case of 
Mutua in some detail since it is more typical. 
Mr Mutua, who comes from Masumba in Nguu division (Makueni) was born in 1975 and 
joined school in 1982. He dropped out in 1991 when, in Form 2, his father “refused” to pay 
school fees. He explained that his father had neglected his mother and her siblings after 
marrying a second wife in 1980. Although his father had a shop, traded in livestock as well as 
cereals, Mutua and his sister had to drop out of school for apparent lack of school fees. 
However, their step brothers and sisters were not affected. The mother‟s attempt to obtain 
assistance from her brother (Mutua‟s maternal uncle) whom Mutua said was “very rich” failed 
as he said that Mutua‟s father was capable of raising the fees. His mother had six children 
while the step mother had seven. He is the third born in his family and was 5 when his father 
took a second wife in 1980.  
After Mutua dropped out of school, he stayed home doing odd jobs, helping in the farm, 
hanging around in the trading centre where he did menial jobs like loading or unloading 
lorries and assisting masons in the construction activities. He resisted the idea of going to 
Nairobi or Mombasa since he felt that he was not skilled enough to make a living.  
 In 1995, he was lured by his friend to join him in Maasailand. He had never imagined that he 
could work in a Maasai homestead as a cattle herder, he asserted. His explanation was that 
they had never appeared to him as potential employers, taking them as poorer than the Kamba 
and that “because the boys don‟t go to school, I thought there would be no need of external 
(household) labour.”238  
I had met Mutua in January 2000 near Mashuru. He was on the roadside looking after a big 
herd of cattle. He said that the cattle were about 65 “excluding heifers which graze near 
home.” He started with a salary of  Ksh 2,000 and was being paid Ksh 2,500 (EUR 33)  per 
month when I met him. Out of this, he sends Ksh 500 to his mother, and spends the rest on his 
clothes, cigarettes and saves about Ksh 200 which he used to buy goats. He claimed that 
Kamba families “even those that are rich” would not have paid him that kind of money, the 
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 A common Kamba stereotype of the Maasai. 
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claim that he would not have taken up such a job “near home” notwithstanding. I asked him a 
few questions regarding these claims. 
Q: Why do you say that a Kamba could not pay you that kind of money? 
A: The Kamba are just mean and it is even worse if they knew you before...they don‟t want 
you to make any money...they even make sure that they pay you in bits so that you end up 
saving nothing (cf. chapter seven). 
Q: How about the Maasai? 
A: They are very good employers...they have no problem with money and they are proud so 
they wouldn‟t want to argue over amounts like Ksh 2,500. 
Staying with the Maasai had not led to the deconstruction Kamba-Maasai stereotypes. Mutua 
told me that the Maasai were “friendly” but “ignorant” arguing that was the reason why they 
were paying herders “a lot of money.” He also thought that they could have been trying to 
“show off” by paying a little bit more. He was even telling me that they do not send children 
to school,
239
 but he was  „positive‟ on other issues, arguing that the Maasai cattle economy 
was a better land-use practice than crop farming in the harsh climatic conditions. He was so 
pleased with the Maasai that he „assisted‟ two other young men from his village to get herding 
jobs among the Maasai. 
Mutua sees the Maasai as a cushion for the Kamba in terms of farming land, “employment 
opportunities” and milk. He did not think that the Kamba were reciprocating „enough‟. But 
the Maasai who had Kamba herders or farm labourers tended to present it like a „favour;‟ that 
all they did was to „help‟ their neighbours. The Kamba workers however said they were doing 
jobs that the Maasai „could‟ not do or did not want to do. The Kamba depiction of the Maasai 
as people of lower status makes this cross-ethnic labour engagements different from the Hutu-
Tutsi relationship where “lower status” Hutu looked after Tutsi cows (Peil and Oyeneye, 1998: 
58). And the Kamba were not just herding. Other engagements included being recruited by 
Maasai cattle traders as burunkuai (“transporters” or “escorters”), who accompany animals 
from one market to the next at an agreed fee.  
Apart from Kamba men who take up jobs in Maasai homesteads, there were also Kamba 
working in „formal‟ institutions that were run by Maasai. I would like to present a case of a 
Kamba woman employed by a Maasai chief as his clerk. Being near the border and serving 
both Maasai and Kamba populations, this was a deliberate move to symbolise what the chief 
called “good neighbourliness”. It should be seen as a concession or sacrifice to boost relations 
for the move had been resisted by Maasai elders on two grounds: That it was a woman, and 
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 As we were talking, some Maasai children were passing by in school uniform. 
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two, that she was Kamba. The older Maasai did not like the idea of going to their chief and 
having to speak Swahili “at home, as if we are in Nairobi”, as one of them put it. Instead of 
the chief justifying his position by telling the elders that he had done this to improve 
interethnic relations, he told them that Maasai men did not want to do clerical jobs and Maasai 
women did not meet the educational qualifications. Having been educated in Ukambani, the 
youthful chief of Kenyewa location had wanted to reach out to the Kamba. It was easier, he 
noted, for Maasai men to deal with a woman from another ethnic group than one from their 
group. He noted: “They know that in other places, women work in offices”. The Maasai chief 
had to „annoy‟ some of his people to do what he said was for “their own good”. He insisted 
that it was to the “benefit” of the Maasai to make the Kamba feel at home in Simba (where his 
office is based) than “treat them like aliens”. 
 
5.2.6   “Kamba schools” and “Maasai pupils”: A symbiotic relationship 
Disparities in the distribution of educational facilities had created what superficially looked 
like a dependant relationship. A closer look revealed a complex form of exchange. Owing to 
earlier missionary activity and colonial support, Ukambani has some of the oldest formal 
schools in Kenya. Entry of Christian missionaries into Maasailand had been hindered not by 
Maasai resistance but the general colonial hostility and indifference to development in 
Maasailand. A former history lecturer at the University of Nairobi, B.K. ole Kantai, notes that 
until 1952, there was only one intermediate school in the entire Maasailand including 
Samburu (Sankan, 1971: xxviii).  A 1959 map (below) showing the distribution of educational 
facilities in Kenya is a clear testimony of how Maasai districts of Kajiado and Narok had been 
marginalised by the colonial administration. Although much has been done to bridge the gap 
after independence, the discrepancies are still stark. This has translated into certain 
readjustments where some Maasai pupils have to attend school outside their home districts. In 
this regard, boarding schools in particular have been more convenient. Some of the Maasai 
parents keen on schooling are often concerned about the demotivating environment in the 
Maasai villages where still a big number of children are not send to school even where the 
facilities are available in the neighbourhood. Moreover, transhumance is another limiting 
factor. 
Along the Makueni-Kajiado border, one of the boarding primary schools where Maasai send 
their children is called Mwailu Academy. Although actual „ethnic‟ statistics were unavailable 
as this was said to be a “sensitive matter”, I was told that about 20% of the pupils in the 
school were Maasai. One of the reasons why the matter was regarded sensitive was that in 
recent times, the distribution of „crucial‟ facilities regionally has assumed enormous political 
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importance in Kenya. Promises of roads, educational facilities and hospitals have become 
major tools around which ethnic groups are mobilised. Although the unequal distribution of 
schooling facilities between Ukambani and Maasailand is often taken as  the continuation of 
the colonial lopsided policies, there are certain realities in Maasailand that would limit the 
setting up of many schools. Since the population is scattered, building schools within 
reasonable distance where pupils can commute on foot has been problematic. Besides, since 
the 1980‟s much of the responsibility of building schools has been transferred to „local 
communities,‟ with the state assisting with staffing. And the Maasai have done a lot in this 
regard too as their district development plans indicate. Much of political activity in 
Maasailand has revolved around building of schools as the groups also seeks other 
„opportunities‟ elsewhere.  
Interviews with the school headmaster revealed that schools were not only a means of 
exchange but also arenas where ethnic differences and depictions are deconstructed as both 
Maasai and Kamba pupils interact in class and share dormitories. The parents meet too during 
parents‟ days while the teaching staff occasionally has one or two Maasai teachers. But how is 
a school a form of exchange? Ethnic groups in Kenya have been socialised to claim that 
schools in their territory „belong‟ to them irrespective of whether these facilities have been 
funded by the state or non-governmental organisations. Admitting Maasai children in Mwailu 
therefore is seen as a „favour‟ or a gesture of „good will‟ and as reciprocation of past or future 
„favours.‟ Seen from this dimension, the Kamba would have a lot to „thank‟ the „Maasai‟ for, 
considering the thousands of Kamba residing in Maasailand. Nevertheless, whether in 
reference to primary schools or those Maasai attending secondary schools in schools in Ngoto, 
Enguli, Thome Andu, Kikuumini and Kasikeu in Makueni district,
240
 the Maasai claimed they 
paid their fees more promptly than the Kamba, an assertion upheld by the school authorities. 
On the basis of this claim, and on the grounds that education was not “free”, the Maasai 
argued that they “sustain” some of these schools and that the Kamba were “happy” to admit 
Maasai children since that guaranteed the flow of funds. Although this had been used to 
justify the hypothesis that the Maasai were „richer‟ than the Kamba, the explanation rather 
was that those Maasai who send their children to school tended to be of a higher social and 
economic status while for the Kamba sending children to school was a „must‟ irrespective of 
ones level of income.  
After all the ethnic talk and jostling, the Maasai recognise the fact that they have fewer 
schools in their territory, forcing them to seek opportunities elsewhere. Cross-border 
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schooling overtime has made the so-called Kamba schools equally depended on the flow of 
Maasai children which augmented school finances. The need for interdependence had made 
both groups to ignore state guidelines regarding the number of pupils within a certain district 
that may be admitted to schools in another district.  
Below is a map showing the distribution of educational facilities between Maasailand and 
Ukambani in 1959. 
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Map 3: Distribution of educational facilities between Ukambani and Maasailand in 1959 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kenya Atlas, 1959 (Kenya National Archives). The lack of educational facilities in Maasailand in 
comparison with other surrounding areas is glaring.  
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5.2.7   Kamba wood carvers and „selling of the Maasai‟ 
If this is a form of exchange, then it is an intricate one. As a tourist destination, Kenya is 
known internationally not only for its sunny tropical beaches and den of wildlife but also 
home to elegant works of wood depicting the rich variety of wildlife and cultural heritage. 
Most of these works can be credited to an old wood carving tradition of the Kamba. One of 
the striking aspects of this study was I was dealing with a group famed worldwide for its 
culture and another, six times more numerous but hardly known outside of East Africa 
although its carvings are to be found on many shelves around the globe.
241
 But in a mix of 
fortunes, the Kamba have appropriated the Maasai image. Perhaps only second to the 
Makonde of Tanzania in the East African region, at some point during the colonial period, the 
Kamba realised that foreign tourists in particular were interested in the Maasai „image‟. 
Otherwise, traditional Kamba wood carvers worked on items needed for domestic use e.g. 
mortars and pestles, wooden ladles and spoons and three-legged stools. These have long been 
eclipsed by the „dictates of the market.‟ Many of the curio shops in Kenya and abroad are full 
of carvings of Maasai peoples depicting their way of dress, use of ornaments and traditional 
weaponry like shields, knives and clubs. The Maasai-related carvings are probably only 
rivalled by the carvings of wild animals. Forster et al. note this widespread use of Maasai 
images in the promotion of tourism where, they are not only part of the scenery but one of the 
key symbols of tourism in East Africa (2000: 144).  
Carvings symbolising Maasai peoples and heritage and Kenyan wildlife make sense in 
tourism and the wood carvers have won praise for showing the world „what the country has to 
offer‟. But the whole issue of depicting the Maasai as a tourist attraction draws mixed 
reactions from various quarters. A Maasai respondent (teacher) protested: “We make these 
people come here but we don‟t gain in any way, we don‟t own the hotels where they sleep nor 
are our people even employed there”. On Kamba carvings, he noted: “Kamba wood carvers 
make money out of our rich culture...they take advantage of us...but we don‟t mind because 
through these carvings the Maasai are known all over the world. In fact, out there, people 
don‟t even know that it is not the Maasai who do the carvings”. Although he complained 
about the „exploitation‟ of the Maasai in the tourism industry, his consolation was that at least 
what the Kamba were doing promoted Maasai image globally. 
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 Because of their fame, many people I have talked to in Germany usually assume that  the Maasai must be one 
of Kenya‟s largest groups. 
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The Kamba trade in wood carvings has for many decades been done on a global scale. As 
early as the 1950‟s, the Kamba were organising trade in carvings to distant places like Britain 
and the United States. Commenting on the fame of Kamba wood carvings in East Africa, 
Adamson (1967: 237) noted that “they are also exported, and I have found them in curio 
shops in London, Stockholm, and New York.” She also took note of the group‟s skill in stone 
and iron crafts.  
One might ask, where the subtitle „selling Maasai‟ was derived.  It was midday in July 2000 
when, seated outside a filling station in Kiboko, a Kamba wood carver and a curio shop owner 
dashed from his shop just opposite the station heading towards a Pollman‟s vehicle carrying 
nine tourists en route to Mombasa. He was shouting “buy Masai, buy Masai.” He made one or 
two sales. I invited him to have a soft drink and then sought some clarifications. I asked him 
why he invoked the name “Masai” when marketing his products and he told me: “You see, I 
don‟t know why...but wazungu (Whites) like Masai. Anyway, they have maintained their 
culture. I admire them too although I feel they should change...they are being left behind by 
the rest of the country.” Well, at least Muli (his name) knew that “Masai culture” was good 
for his business.  
Muli told me how he deployed the services of a Maasai at one time to sell the products on his 
behalf. All of a sudden, he noted, the sales went up. And this is the same strategy adopted by 
some Kamba traders off University Way in Nairobi, where you find „Maasai‟ selling typically 
Kamba carvings. Let me expound why the Maasai are contracted to act as „middlemen‟?242 
There are a number of reasons; one, the Kamba, like many other Kenyan groups, know that 
the Maasai „can get away‟ with a number of things including the sale of bows, arrows and 
swords,
243
 and two, many foreign tourists are attracted to carvings or curios being sold by 
„traditional‟ groups. Muli put it this way, “the Masai and the wares match.” This „matching‟ is 
not just from the cultural aspect but also the fact that buying the products from Maasai in their 
traditional regalia makes the buyers feel they are engaging in some „fair trade‟ where the 
money goes „directly‟ to the „producer.‟ Tourists  appeared to consider wares sold by the 
Maasai as more authentic, and „coming from the right source.‟ Amid laughter, noted Muli: 
“Asungu244 keep on asking whether we are Masai, sometimes we just lie and tell them ja!” 
Although these „joint‟ partnerships still favour the „contractors,‟ most of the Maasai I talked 
to tended to focus on the „positive‟ side of the trade saying that the Kamba were “assisting” 
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 The Maasai do have their own wares too which they market directly. These include; ornaments, bangles, 
decorated belts and key holders, the Maasai sword, hide whips, clubs and walking sticks. 
243
 The law might prohibit the hawking of „weapons‟ but the practice is that the Maasai freely sell them in towns 
without any police intervention.  Others doing the same but not looking „Maasai‟ risk arrest. 
244
 Asungu in Kikamba and Wazungu in Swahili, mean “Whites”. 
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them to promote their culture in Kenya and beyond. Sitonik (the teacher) was generally 
unhappy with the whole exercise but he noted that what the Kamba had been doing is “like 
biting without hurting...they make their money but we (Maasai) also gain.” A closer 
assessment showed that through this exercise, both groups were portrayed as having sustained 
their traditions. A carving of a Maasai expresses one of the world‟s striking cultures while the 
fine piece of sculpture depicts a long cherished tradition of another group. An exercise that 
gives one group fame and the other a means of livelihood represents an intricate reciprocal 
relationship. But if the Kamba are „assisting‟ the Maasai in the promotion of their heritage, 
then this is only by default, for what the carvers are doing is simply to produce what sells. 
 
5.3   Conclusion  
 
This chapter sought to present the Kamba and the Maasai as groups that engage in mutual 
interaction and exchange. The chapter shows how interethnic coexistence is nurtured. It is an 
outline of the preconditions for coexistence. One of the most critical aspects that emerges is 
that coexistence is a complementary process. I shall expound on this by looking at the 
ecological, economic and social aspects. For ecological reasons and specialisation in different 
modes of subsistence, the Kamba and the Maasai have strong networks of exchange through 
which the Maasai provide cattle and their products while the Kamba provide agricultural 
products like maize, beans and peas. In ecological theory, it is noted that coexistence is 
enhanced when two species differ in the exploitation of resources (Pontin, 1982; see also 
Barth, 1969). Although the idea here is that this improves stability since the species in 
question reduce the frequency of “meetings”, specialising in different modes also acts as a 
basis for mutual exchange. Closely related to the ecological factor is vulnerability. Because 
both groups inhabit a semi-arid zone, drought enhances interdependence as the Maasai move 
their cattle to Ukambani in search of pastures while the Kamba go to Maasailand to hire farms 
(those near springs) or to haul wood for charcoal and firewood.  
Economically, relations of interdependence revolve around Kamba businesspersons and 
Maasai customers. This is a relationship that has developed through regional variations in the 
integration to the market economy. Ukambani having had an early start in comparison to 
Maasailand, the Kamba have over the years exploited the business opportunities among the 
Maasai. This appropriation of the Maasai has extended to the tourism industry where the 
Kamba use the Maasai image to market their wood carvings. But as I have pointed out, the 
Maasai have their stake in business too, particularly in cattle trade or constructing buildings 
which they lease to the Kamba retailers. Moreover, the commoditisation of Maasai milk has 
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shaped Kamba-Maasai relations by promoting closer ties and a rare form of exchange between 
the Maasai suppliers and the Kamba clients. 
Socially, the Kamba and the Maasai exchanges take various forms. On the one hand, the 
shortage of schools in Maasailand has created a situation where Maasai pupils seek schooling 
opportunities in Ukambani. In addition, many Kamba teachers are deployed to work in 
schools in Maasailand. Besides, the interdependence created through education, there has also  
been adoption of “Kamba houses” among the Maasai as well as the deployment of Kamba 
labour in herding cattle and in farms among Maasai who practice crop farming.  
I would like to mention something about common territory. The kinds of exchanges discussed 
in this chapter take place within a given physical space. And this is perhaps what 
differentiates „coexistence‟ from „relations‟. Coexistence seems to exemplify a relationship 
with intensity of exchanges and proximity, aspects that may not be prerequisites among 
groups that simply „relate‟. With regard to the Kamba and the Maasai, it is important to note 
that although they have independent territories, the boundaries have remained porous, making 
exchanges possible. But the most important aspect about their co-residence and 
interdependence are the distinctions and diversity they exhibit, since, common territory can 
also translate into assimilation, imitations and sameness, making exchange and coexistence 
difficult to discern. On the other hand, similarities between two ethnic groups can undermine 
coexistence as this may weaken the basis for exchange and heighten competition for similar 
resources. However, the aspect of distinctiveness should not be overemphasised, since groups 
can be very flexible. Although strangers and enemies can also engage in mutual transactions, 
there is usually some basis for understanding or commonality among groups that depend on 
each other. 
Finally, I would like to comment about the relationship between „complementarity‟ and 
„interdependence‟. From the discussion in this chapter, I would conclude that 
complementarity (a system of mutual exchange) is a milder form of „interdependence‟ (having 
to rely on others to survive). In other words, while „complementing‟ each other may be at a 
superficial level, „interdependence‟ signifies intensity of exchange and indispensability. I 
would also like to note that complementarity, interdependence and competition go hand in 
hand but the latter is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ETHNIC CONFLICT AS PART OF COEXISTENCE 
 
Having looked at complementarity and interdependence between the Kamba and the Maasai 
in chapter five, I will examine another pertinent dimension of their relationship in this chapter. 
From an empirical standpoint, the Kamba-Maasai discussion would be incomplete without 
looking at what the two groups are mainly stereotyped for: Hatred and conflict. Conflict is 
associated with struggles, strife, collision or the use of incompatible means to a certain goal 
(Horowitz, 1985: 95). There has been a discourse that looks at ethnic conflicts, particularly 
overt struggles, as falling outside of what is defined as interethnic coexistence (see Kriesberg, 
1998). Others have also seen incompatibilities as “failure of coexistence” (Korbel, 1959), 
while some argue that coexistence has “limits” (e.g. Torstrick, 2000). The kind of approach I 
adopt here looks at antagonism, ethnic tensions and conflict as integral parts of the 
coexistence process. The functionalist and structural approach to conflict become fairly 
relevant here (see Kuper, 1993).  
However, I am not suggesting that interethnic coexistence cannot “fail”, but these would be 
exceptional cases of extreme social turmoil and disorder, leading to a total breakdown of 
existing forms of exchange and sharing.
245
 My argument here is that among ethnic groups that 
share territory and resources, antagonism becomes part of everyday experience as they 
compete for the said resources, territorial boundaries and for ethnic supremacy. The 
competition for resources therefore takes the centre stage, adopting an approach that does not 
see ethnic conflict as primordial or essentialist. However, although group members can hold 
multiple and cross-cutting identities and interests, it will also be evident that cultural 
differences, particularly through politicisation, come into play as groups compete for 
resources.  
This chapter takes the reader through the issues around which the Kamba-Maasai conflict 
revolve. But, as a way of introduction, I begin by briefly examining the Kenyan scene in 
general, and then proceed to look at Kamba-Maasai ethnic tensions and conflicts. In this 
regard, I will examine territorial boundaries and coveted resources like farmland, grazing 
areas, water, cattle and trading centres. The complexity of interethnic coexistence is 
exemplified by the fact that the resources that shape the groups‟ interdependence and harmony 
(as indicated in chapter five), are more or less the same ones that the groups fight over. 
Besides discussing how ethnic conflict comes about, I will also discuss how the conflicts are 
resolved as well as legitimised.  
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 An example would be the ethnic tensions and mistrust following the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Torstrick (2000) also uses the Israeli-Palestinian case to argue that coexistence has “limits”. 
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6.1   Ethnic conflict in Kenya 
 
In the introductory chapter, I noted that Kenya has been one of the most stable states in Africa. 
In chapter seven I will seek to explain how this relative stability has been realised against a 
background of competing ethnic groups, disparities in the distribution of resources, 
ethnicisation of politics, poverty and disease. Before coming to that, the point I would like to 
make here is that behind this facade of stability, there have always been incidences of violent 
ethnic conflict. In fact, a visitor to Kenya or one who simply reads the country‟s newspapers 
would be excused if s/he were to conclude that Kenya were at the brink of an ethnic turmoil or 
bracing itself for one. For instance, very often, there are reports about armed conflicts and 
killings among pastoralist groups. The commonest involve the Pokot, the Marakwet, the 
Maasai, the Sabaot, the Turkana, the Samburu and the Somali.
246
 These conflicts usually take 
the form of cattle raids and counter raids, feuds over grazing areas and territorial boundaries. 
There are other conflicts that are presented as clashes between modes of subsistence. Under 
this category are the incessant conflicts pitting the Tana Orma and the Wardei pastoralists 
against the Pokomo farmers along the Kenyan coast.
247
 Also included here are recurring 
clashes between the Maasai and their Bantu neighbours, particularly the Kisii and the 
Kamba.
248
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 The Pokot, the Marakwet and the Sabaot are sub-groups that constitute the Kalenjin, a loose cluster of Nilotic 
speaking peoples. 
247
The Pokomo occupy most of the fertile and arable land close to River Tana while the vast arid part is inhabited 
by the pastoralists. Land distribution therefore comes to the fore as some „traditionally‟ pastoral communities 
have been trying to access the arable areas for farming. The perennial feud between Orma/Wardei pastoralists 
and the Pokomo farmers centres on land, cattle and grazing rights. The pastoralists accuse the farming group of 
restricting their movement to water points and grazing fields in the dry season, while the Pokomo accuse the 
cattle keepers of grazing on their farms and destroying crops. For this reason, the Pokomo deny the pastoralists 
access to watering points. This results in bloody clashes. In the year 2001 for instance, hardly a month passed 
without reports of fighting, killing or torching of houses. The deaths rose from about 13 in March to 52 in 
October and rose drastically to 120 by the end of November. By the time the clashes subsided at around March 
2002, there were about 250 dead and a lot of property destroyed (See, The Daily Nation, Friday, October 5, 2001 
and The Daily Nation, Saturday, February 16, 2002. These articles can be accessed on the internet: 
www.nationaudio.com). For details on the identity of the Tana Orma and Wardei pastoralists, see Schlee (1992). 
248
The Maasai relate with the Kisii in fairly distinct ways from the way they relate with the Kamba. The Maasai-
Kisii conflicts have, for instance, been rather common in the recent past. Although they inhabit one of the most 
well watered regions in East Africa, a family of ten is lucky to hold an acre of land in Kisiiland. The Kisii 
therefore hire or buy farms from their Maasai neighbours. Just like in the Kamba case, these land transactions are 
often politicised. In addition, cattle raids are common. In an article, Angima (2001), a Kisii lawyer starts by 
noting that: “Ethnic flare-ups between the Maasai and the Kisii communities sometimes seem to defy logical 
explanation”.248 This observation is based on the assumption that since the Kisii are agriculturists and the Maasai 
keep cattle as well as lease farms to the Kisii, the two groups should ideally have some basis of coexistence. 
Other clashes have been fuelled by the commonalities between the two groups, for instance, by the fact that both 
keep cattle. Angima notes that “although the Kisii are not pastoralists, they value cattle almost as much as the 
Maasai do”. During my fieldwork, Maasai-Kisii ethnic tensions reached a climax by mid 2000. The Kisii 
farming activities on Maasai leased land during the March-May 2001 rains were disrupted. Kisii farmers would 
be attacked and hacked to death while tending crops or harvesting. In fact, between 2000 and the harvesting 
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Not infrequently, ethnic conflicts in Kenya involve other groups outside of Kenya. These 
include the Karamojong of Uganda, the Ethiopian Boorana or Somali groups from Somalia 
who launch attacks in Kenya or get attacked for livestock. Most of these transnational 
conflicts usually involve more than two groups, going contrary to the supposition that most 
ethnic conflicts are dichotomous (Horowitz, 1985: 182). Moreover, the cross-border raids, 
particularly in the northern parts of Kenya, often pass as „normal‟ daily experiences, to the 
extent that even after reports that Kenyan groups have lost hundreds of livestock and several 
villagers have been killed, sometimes there is no state intervention. 
It would be important to note here that historical ethnic conflicts over cattle, territorial 
boundaries, grazing and watering areas have been significantly shaped by the market economy 
and the political elite. When the Pokot raid the Marakwet for cattle, it is not what their 
forefathers used to do; now they use modern weaponry (guns), the raiders are often organised 
gangs, the clashes are bloodier, and the cattle stolen disappear through sophisticated delivery 
systems. Besides, the police may not pursue the raiders making it plausible not to rule out a 
political hand. Access to guns became easier during the long years of chaos in Uganda, during 
and after Mariam‟s military regime in Ethiopia and particularly after the collapse of Siad 
Barre‟s government and the consequent disintegration of Somalia in the early 1990‟s. The 
flow of sophisticated guns into Kenya has undermined Kenya government‟s strategy of 
arming “home guards” who are expected to protect their groups or villagers in case of external 
attack.  
 
Conflicts that have destabilised the state 
Apart from the isolated interethnic raids and conflicts discussed above, there have been others 
that have threatened the persistence of the state. Most notable here was the so-called Shifta 
War of the mid 1960‟s, where militant groups in the northern parts of Kenya fought for 
regional autonomy and subsequent secession to join Somalia. Although the Kenyan 
government won this war, much of this region has remained quite volatile, with sporadic 
incidences of banditry. After this protracted war, the only other real test to the stability of the 
state was witnessed in the beginning of the 1990‟s. Fearing that the clamour for multiparty 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
season of 2001, the death toll had reached 80. Reminiscent of the argument that where you marry is where you 
wage war (cf. Schlee: 1997), Angima notes that “ironically, intermarriage seems to aggravate the problem. 
Maasai men now do marry Kisii women, which never happened until about two decades ago”. Actually, a closer 
analysis shows that because of the practice of female circumcision among the Kisii, Maasai men have always 
married Kisii women. Angima argues that ideally, intermarriage should bring the two groups closer by bridging 
the “cultural gap”.  But, he writes: “Sons born to the Maasai from such marriages usually go to the Kisii side to 
see their relatives. But some of them use the opportunity to spy on the Kisii and facilitate cattle theft”.  
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democracy would threaten the ruling party‟s hold on power, cabinet ministers and other 
political elite allied to President Moi organised the so-called majimbo rallies in 1991.
249
 
During these rallies, these political leaders
250
 threatened to evict migrant groups residing in 
the Rift Valley (e.g. the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya groups), and seen to be sympathetic to the 
multiparty crusade. Within no time, members of these groups were being attacked, killed and 
their homesteads burnt down. By 1993, when the orgy of violence abated, it was estimated 
that 1,500 people had been killed and 300,000 displaced (ICJ report 2000, citing Africa Watch, 
1993).
251
 Surprisingly, even after KANU won the 1992 elections that were marred with 
violence, the ethnic clashes continued in some areas. In 1993, members of the Kikuyu were 
violently evicted by armed Maasai from Enoosupukia in Narok district. Apart from 
destruction of their property, about 17 of them were killed and 30,000 displaced.
252
 Between 
1995 and 1996, the ethnic clashes subsided. However, just before the 1997 elections, they 
erupted again; this time in the Coast province where residents of upcountry origin (e.g. the 
Kamba and the Luo), assumed to be allied to opposition parties, were systematically attacked 
and evicted. After the elections, which KANU again won, clashes flared up in the multiethnic 
Laikipia district and Njoro areas of Nakuru district with the Kikuyu as the main targets. From 
1998, some semblance of calmness reigned in most parts of the country. However, as I have 
already noted, episodes of bloody clashes were witnessed between the Maasai and the 
Kipsigis along the Trans Mara-Bomet districts‟ border and again between the Maasai and the 
Kisii on the Trans Mara-Gucha border. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, the 2002 
national elections were not marred with ethnic violence, a clear departure from the two 
previous ones. 
Looking back however, the “ethnic clashes” of the 19990‟s, branded “land clashes” to mask 
the politicisation of ethnicity, almost plunged Kenya into a civil war. In fact, it must have 
been a surprise to the Moi government that these conflicts were confined to the margins. 
Groups that had lived harmoniously together were being incited to take up arms and fight 
each other over imaginary grievances. The reason why the conflicts did not spread as 
envisaged by the agitators is because in some cases
253
, the groups ignored these external 
manipulations. Nevertheless, the clashes not only destabilised the livelihoods of those directly 
                                                          
249
 Majimbo is Swahili word for “federal”. The KANU politicians touted majimboism as the solution to the 
clamour for multipartysm. They wanted Kenya to remain a one-party state or go federal, in which jimbos (federal 
states) would be exclusive ethnic enclaves. 
250
 Mainly led by Kalenjin politicians. 
251
 While some reports concur that those killed numbered about 1,500, they put the number of those forcefully 
displaced to 350,000 (see Young, 1999: 26). 
252
 ICJ report (2000: 30). 
253
 For instance, between the Kamba and the Maasai. 
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affected but also contributed to Kenya‟s economic decline. 254  Attempts made by church 
organisations, civil society, opposition parties and some Kalenjin politicians
255
 to have evicted 
groups return to their farms have hardly yielded any success, thanks to the Moi government‟s 
ambivalence in the facilitation of the process. Many of those evicted therefore are still 
displaced, residing in make-shift dwellings in church compounds and slum areas. The whole 
scenario is a showcase of how coexisting groups can be drawn into conflict and animosity 
through instrumentalisation of ethnicity. The new government ushered into office in 2002 is 
expected to revisit this problem and facilitate a reconciliation process. 
 
6.1.1   Kamba-Maasai conflicts  
“Muukamba kwata uta ulumye nundu nimakila, makwete matumo...” Translation: “You 
Kamba, hold your bow firmly because they (Maasai) have crossed the border, they are 
holding spears…” (Song by Kamba singer, Joseph Mutaiti). Composed and recorded in the 
1980‟s, it sounded more like a war song although there was no ongoing conflict. The song 
however recollects some shared consciousness about past and present fears that the Kamba 
have about the Maasai. As already pointed out, the issue of territorial boundaries is common 
talk among both groups, at least metaphorically, for Ukambani-Maasailand border, though 
arguably one of the most clearly marked, has been one of the most porous. The song 
reinforces some Maasai claims that much of the Kamba-Maasai battles were fought on Kamba 
soil.  
Apart from their astonishing history, elegance and resilience, the Maasai are widely reputed 
for their military prowess, at least before and during colonial rule. It has been noted that if it 
were not for the Rinderpest outbreak in 1880, among other cattle diseases, and a Small Pox 
attack in 1892, which dealt a severe blow to the group, they would have dominated many of 
their neighbouring groups (Adamson, 1967: 220; Lamphear, 1993: 98-9). Expounding on this 
point, a Maasai historian, Kantai, notes in Sankan‟s book that these “...natural disasters, 
disease and intra-tribal conflict decimated herds, and considerably reduced the population in 
some sections of the Maasai, thus making it possible for certain tribes to start attacking the 
Maasai with impunity. Thus the Kamba, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin tribes all made 
incursions into territory that was previously effectively controlled by the Maasai...” (1971: 
xxi).  
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 The violence at the coast, for instance, disrupted tourism. 
255
 In 1995, in a bid to lure the Kikuyu back to KANU, the so-called KAMATUSA groups led by the then 
powerful cabinet minister Nicholas Biwott started negotiations with the Kikuyu politicians led by Njenga 
Karume. These negotiations yielded little, and totally collapsed after the Kikuyu overwhelmingly voted the 
opposition in the 1997 elections. 
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6.1.1.1   Cattle raids 
Their long history of sharing borders is dotted with episodes of raids and war. Most Kamba-
Maasai conflicts have been fought over cattle. In other words, conflicts have not been 
necessarily influenced by their ethnic „difference‟ or clash in the modes of subsistence but 
rather „sameness‟, the fact that both groups keep cattle. And the keeping of cattle, which 
enhanced rivalry and competition, partly explains why the Maasai related with the Kikuyu, 
who did not keep herds worth Maasai raid, quite differently from the Kamba. Ndolo (1989: 
67-72) notes that by the 1880‟s and the 1890‟s, the “Kamba-Maasai warfare had reached a 
new level of intensity.” During the Rinderpest epidemic that ravaged both Kamba and Maasai 
herds in 1882-83 and 1890-92, both tried to restock their herds by raiding each other. The 
“southern Maasai” (e.g. Kaputiei), raided the Kamba in Nzaui (now part of Makueni district) 
in 1893 unleashing a lot of  terror and havoc in the area as they took off with large herds of 
cattle.
256
 The Maasai attacks on the Kamba at this particular time are said to have worried the 
British colonial powers who considered the Maasai as aggressors. This concern led to the 
establishment of a special militia to protect the Kamba who were major suppliers of food and 
labour to the local garrison of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAco).  
At around 1895, the Maasai were themselves engulfed in internal strife as two brothers, 
Olonana (Lenana) and Senteu (Sendeyo) fought over the ascension to the coveted position of 
Laibon
257
 or „leader‟ left vacant after the death of Mbatiany. Although the Kamba and the 
Maasai had their traditional differences, Ndolo‟s vivid account shows how the British used 
divide and rule tactics to foment hatred and rivalry. After the Kamba became hostile to 
Ainsworth after his attempts to curtail raids for cattle and women, in December 1895, a 
contingent of Maasai with the full support of the British attacked parts of Ukambani and 
collected a booty of 556 cattle and 1,300 goats which was shared among the Maasai and the 
British.
258
 Although the colonial administration was later to „abolish‟ cattle raids, their evident 
complicity in the exercise might explain why it proved difficult to stamp out. From this early 
pre-colonial period to the present, one thing that has remained is the portrayal of the Maasai as 
ultimate aggressors and the Kamba as „victims,‟ and yet, it is evident that warfare had 
significant cultural values among the Kamba. Apart from the animal wealth that was and still 
is highly valued,  military prowess was one sure way that a young man gained recognition 
among his peers and elders in the society. In comparison however, cattle raids remained more 
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 Ndolo, (1989:  67) citing Jackson F. (1936: 167). 
257
 The laibon was more of a spiritual leader but could also exercise political authority. 
258
 Ndolo (1989: 73) citing Ainsworth‟s report to Sir A. Hardinge, 3rd December 1895. 
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meaningful among the Maasai. These raids had unparalleled social, cultural and economic 
significance in the dominantly pastoral mode of production. 
I would like to cite an incident that illustrates the form some of these conflicts take. The 
narrative features Mr Maithya who took part in an armed conflict against the Maasai in 1952. 
Born in 1925, he was 27 when he faced the Maasai in battle. At the age of 13 (1938) however, 
he had witnessed another bloody battle in which his father had taken part.  
In 1952, he said that the Maasai struck at Ngoto
259
, taking everybody by surprise and taking 
off with “many cattle.” Everybody first had fled at the sight of the heavily armed Maasai 
warriors chanting war cries. Some young men came to their village and told them that “Akavi 
(Maasai) have come” and that they had not only taken cattle, but speared people at another 
place called Kavuthu. News of the attack spread quickly and within a short time, nine Kamba 
men joined him armed with bows and arrows stocked in quivers (thyaka). The Maasai had 
struck at about noon on a Thursday and from a distance, he could see smoke from Kamba huts 
that had been set on fire. His group of ten mobilised other men and they managed to 
overpower a smaller group of Maasai warriors, forcing them to the edge of a steep cliff where, 
rather than surrender, the Maasai preferred to jump down sustaining serious injuries. The 
main Maasai group had already led the larger herd of cattle away. This particular group, he 
notes, was “too confident” that when they reached the railway line (the borderline) they sat 
down on the rails.  
The Maasai warriors, displaying what Maithya called “Maasai pride and arrogance”, were 
taken by surprise. Before the Maasai could reach for their shields and spears, the Kamba 
attacked. Maithya recalls: “One of us shot one Maasai to death”, and as the Maasai became 
more desperate, “they killed an old Kamba man named Kimondiu who was passing by”. He 
said that the killing of the old man violated the “ethics” that were adhered to during such 
conflicts. “Although we did not sit anywhere to agree that, usually... old men, like me!, 
women and children were spared...but women could be taken away and married,” he 
explained.
260
 The Kamba were also not expected to lace their arrows with the poisonous 
ivai.
261
 This shows that in as much as they were sworn enemies, there were still some 
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 He explained however that many of the conflicts used to take place “farther up”, around Ngokomi (the area 
between Sultan Hamud and Yoani) and occasionally in Mbitini. 
260
 The Kamba were also aggressors. A report written by the British colonial administrator, Ainsworth, who had 
been posted to Ukambani by the Imperial British East Africa Company, shows that he secured the release of 44 
Maasai women, 20 Maasai children and 14 Kikuyu women during 1893, who had been taken by the Kamba 
during raids.  Maasai brutality during attacks is also evident, occasionally involving killing women and children 
in Ukambani (Ndolo, 1989: 73).  
261
 Ivai is made through a mixture of acocanthera and other poisonous plants. The mixture is boiled until the 
plants dissolve into a thick, black plastic paste. It is a sacred exercise which also excludes women and children 
whose presence would apparently reduce the effectiveness of the substance in killing. For details, see Ndeti 
(1972: 141-142). 
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unacceptable excesses in war. This compares to Evans-Pritchard‟s account on the Nuer where 
clubs were the only weapons permitted in feuds involving villagers while the use of spears 
was reserved for attacks on strangers (1940: 152).  
As the Kamba-Maasai conflict continued, the colonial police arrived and all were dispersed. 
They recovered all the stolen animals, he claimed, but was quick to add that this was one of 
the few occasions that the Kamba overcame the Maasai “easily”. The Maasai were very bitter 
though and later that night, they struck again, killed a Kamba fighter and fled. And although 
the Maasai did not take cattle that night, the Kamba decided to cross into Maasailand and raid 
cattle “to restore our pride”. He says that the police however intervened again after the fight 
continued into the following day.  
During the counter raid, several Maasai were killed. The Kamba suffered a serious blow too, 
with the killing of the local Kamba chief, Nguumi, who was speared by the Maasai. Maithya 
recalled that most of the time, the police would intervene before the Kamba mounted an attack 
while the Maasai used to strike “undetected”. This embarrassing aspect appeared to lend 
credence to the claim by the Maasai that they were more surreptitious than the Kamba. But as 
I observed earlier, it was expedient to develop and sustain a strong institution of secrecy 
among the Maasai. Maithya further noted that between 1952 and 1957, the Kamba could not 
organise attacks due to the restrictions imposed by the British during the state of emergency 
declared in 1952 to crack down on the African freedom fighters. 
 
6.1.1.2   Recent conflicts 
Of all conflicts between the Kamba and the Maasai in the recent past, the most memorable 
took place in 1961. Having suffered many defeats in the hands of the Maasai, the Kamba 
organised a major offensive. But perhaps to avoid being seen as aggressors, the Kamba say 
that just before they invaded Maasai country, some Maasai murran had raided some cattle 
around Emali. After a lot of planning, a big battalion of men crossed over to Maasailand and 
took what was estimated as 1,000 cattle after a fierce battle. This particular onslaught was led 
by a Kamba chief named Kivati, after whom a railway station between Emali and Simba is 
named. During the conflict, the Kamba had three groups of fighters; the front, the back and a 
reserve (support battalion).
262
  
                                                          
262
 In organised Kamba raids, the raiding army was generally divided into three sections. The front group 
normally consisted of those who could run very fast. They were charged with the responsibility of getting the 
cattle and taking them home. The second group contained the sharp shooters; they shielded the enemy as the 
runners drove animals away. Then there was a back up battalion that set on the „tired‟ Maasai warriors. This sort 
of organisation is credited to a great Kamba warrior, Mwatu wa Ngoma. But even with this cleverly organised 
group, the Maasai resistance would at times be unbearable. In any case, this sort of organisation reflects the kind 
of enemy the Kamba were up against.  Among the Maasai, the warriors similarly used to organise themselves 
into three groups and with fairly similar tasks like the Kamba, namely a group that drove the cattle, those 
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In this historical confrontation, “sharp shooters” from Kitui had been mobilised to join forces 
with the Masaku Kamba.
263
 The Kaputiei Maasai too had been joined by among other sections, 
the Matapato to face an external enemy. The actual fierce fighting took about three days and 
there were heavy casualties on both sides, including two Kamba shot by the police. But 
although the Kamba consider this as one of their successful onslaughts on the Maasai, having 
perfected the art of overcoming Maasai shields
264
 by shooting arrows upwards to hit the 
Maasai as they fell back to the ground, they were still pushed about 20 kilometres into their 
territory. The skirmishes were quelled by the paramilitary police. Through the involvement of 
the district commissioners of Machakos
265
 and Kajiado and elders from both the Maasai and 
the Kamba, a peaceful settlement was found. But this was followed by a court session in Athi 
River, near Nairobi, where it was ruled that the Kamba had to return Maasai cattle for „normal 
relations‟ to be restored. The animals were particularly recovered from Mukaa, Kasikeu, 
Mulala and Nzaui areas of Ukambani.  
In one of the worst consequences of cattle raid, the Maasai „stole‟ the late General Ndolo‟s 
hybrid cattle in 1968, just before the former head of the military forces was bundled out of his 
powerful position in 1971. It was not clear whether the Maasai raiders had mounted the raid 
with the full knowledge of whom the cattle belonged to. What followed remains one of the 
worst operations in independent Kenya ever conducted in Maasailand, as military personnel 
carried out the recovery exercise. Harmless children and women who could not have 
participated in the raid were not spared. Nevertheless, after the cattle were recovered, the then 
vice-president, Daniel Moi (later president), led leaders in both groups in a declaration of 
peace and peaceful coexistence in 1969. An effigy of „trouble‟ was set ablaze to mark the 
„end‟ of interethnic animosity.  
Although the Kamba and the Maasai have not had a major conflict since, there have been 
sporadic conflicts on a smaller scale. A case in point is an incident at Kanaani in January 
1995 in which a Kamba farmer was speared to death by the Maasai. I have also cited the 
Simba „theft‟ episode in chapter four. During the fieldwork period, minor incidents were 
reported; for instance, in May 2000, 10 goats were stolen from a Kamba homestead by a 
group of Maasai murran near Ngaakaa.
266
 Also reported were “commercial raids” where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
keeping guard on the sides and another group that used to follow the raided cattle from a safe distance. It is 
believed that the Kamba had borrowed this raiding strategy from the Maasai and made some slight adjustments. 
263
 One thing that the Kamba boast about is their superior weaponry of bows and arrows in comparison to the 
Maasai spear. They could shoot at the enemy from a safe distance, and since arrows are easily portable, one 
fighter would carry plenty of them. The Maasai dismiss this by saying that bows are for “cowards” who cannot 
face the enemy “face to face”. 
264
 Which could not be penetrated by arrows. 
265
 Makueni was then part of Machakos. 
266
 About 15 kilometres from Kiboko. 
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well organised group of Kamba men from Mulala and Matiliku area raided Maasai cattle and 
took them to slaughter houses in Mombasa where they posed as traders. A bigger raid 
however was carried out in Kibwezi where a group of Maasai murran made away with 95 
heads of cattle and 86 goats belonging to one Mr Kimatu. The incident was used by the local 
MP to ban Maasai traders from selling their livestock at Kambu, Machinery and Makindu 
markets.
267
 The move however was seen as a way of excluding Maasai cattle and buyers from 
a very competitive cattle market. The MP‟s move was unpopular among „small scale‟ Kamba 
traders and other cattle keepers who target the cheaper Maasai cattle (particularly during 
droughts), fatten them and then resale later or simply restock their herds.  
Another striking incident took place in May 2000. A group of Maasai from Namanga stole
268
 
4 bulls from a Kamba near Kiboko. The affected family mobilised a group of Kamba men 
who raided a nearby Maasai enkang (homestead) and took off with 6 head of cattle. They held 
the 6 as ransom for the recovery and handing over of the lost animals. The Maasai made some 
internal arrangements and within four days after the Kamba counter-raid, the cattle „stolen‟ 
from the Kamba were recovered. The „exchange‟ was supervised by the local police station 
(Kiboko). Apart from receiving back the animals, the Kamba demanded some monetary 
compensation from the Maasai for the “inconvenience and agony” caused and to serve as a 
deterrent act. The Maasai readily agreed to pay the fine, on the condition that the police 
dropped its demand to have those responsible for the raid identified. The Police asked the 
Kamba to accept this request and they complied.  
Although a modern institution of arbitration and justice, the police, by desisting from 
criminalising cattle raids, did not necessarily condone or perpetuate the „crime‟ but most 
importantly, this act made it possible for the Maasai to find relevance in these institutions. 
This particular police station had resolved many Kamba-Maasai disputes amicably. By 
„tolerating‟ what was presented as Maasai cultural practice, the Maasai felt recognised by the 
state authorities. As for the Kamba, they did not mind since, the state had assisted them to 
resolve a dispute and two, they felt elevated as the Maasai insisted on being treated as 
„traditionalists‟. This is part of the regulatory role of the state in interethnic coexistence, a 
theme that is examined in greater detail in chapter seven.  
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 See the East African Standard, Monday, October 16, 2000, p.8. The article is entitled „Kibwezi MP bans 
Maasai traders‟. Kambu, Machinery and Makindu shopping centres are located in Kibwezi constituency, 
Makueni district. 
268
 What used to be “traditional raids” are increasingly being defined as “mere theft” of cattle. 
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6.2   Contested territorial boundaries and resources 
 
Barth correctly points out that for social scientists interested in studying ethnicity, special 
attention should be given to social boundaries. He notes however that these boundaries may 
have a territorial counterpart (1969: 15). It is this territorial boundary that is of particular 
interest here. With conflicts increasingly being witnessed within nation-states than among 
nations, internal territorial boundaries deserve closer attention. Hannerz (1997) notes that 
boundaries have to do with discontinuity and obstacles. It is a sharp line of demarcation, he 
declares. Borrowing from Barth, he looks at boundaries as something across which contacts 
and interactions take place but do not contain isolated groups. Politically, the physical 
boundary between “Maasailand” and “Ukambani” is marked by a railway line. I have already 
pointed out that this boundary does not constitute enclosures and has not been a hindrance to 
cross-ethnic exchanges. I am particularly interested in the meanings attached to this border, 
when it matters, when it is „open‟ and when it is „closed‟ and by whom.  
Let me begin with a short history. Called Mutambo in Kikamba and Esekengei in Maa, the 
railway line in question was built by the Imperial British East Africa company (IBEAco.) at 
the onset of imperialism. Starting at the port of Mombasa in 1896, and reaching Nairobi in 
1899, the line reached Kisumu (Lake Victoria) in 1901. Named then the Uganda Railway, it 
was meant to open the vast interior for commerce by easing transportation of farm produce 
and minerals. Surprisingly, Kenya‟s railway network has not changed much since. What is 
important here however, is to note that this opening of the interior had repercussions for 
African groups. The White settlers needed land for commercial farming. In 1904, a “treaty” 
was signed between the British and the Maasai through the Maasai laibon (leader), Olonana, 
which moved the Maasai to two Reserves, one to the north of the railway and the other to the 
south of it. A further 1913 “treaty”, apparently thumb printed by a dead Olonana, moved the 
Maasai to the Southern Reserve. This confinement of the Maasai to the Southern Reserve is 
technically how the railway line became the political border between Maasailand and 
Ukambani. This Reserve is what is still “Maasailand”, stretching from Narok to Tsavo 
National Park, and bordering Ukambani to the West. I do not need to stress how colonial 
regimes artificially created physical proximity and opportunities for contact between persons 
of different ethnic groups regardless of the absence of shared understandings between them. 
Since the railway line became the „official‟ border between Ukambani and Maasailand from 
around 1912, it has meant different things to different people and governments. 
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So important has been this line that although many of Kenya‟s towns are to be found along it, 
the railway was not built to connect them. It was the other way around. Towns and trading 
centres mushroomed along the line. In the Kamba-Maasai case, trading centres and towns 
along the railway (shared border) include Athi River, Konza, Sultan Hamud, Emali, Simba 
and Kiboko. These places have been common platforms through which ethnic differences 
have been redefined and interactions enhanced through cattle and grain trade, and 
intermarriages. But at the same time, these have also been arenas of ethnic rivalry and 
competition particularly with regard to the control of business premises and rights over land. 
But as fluid and blurred as this line is, there are times when it is made to look very „real‟. In 
the first place, one has to bear in mind that in Kenya, and indeed in much of Africa, railway 
lines are not common sights. What is even more compelling, at least physically, is the fact that 
due to fairly distinct modes of production and housing, one sees demarcated farmlands dotted 
with „individual‟ homesteads (Ukambani) on one side of the railway line while on the other 
(Maasailand), one‟s attention is caught by the open grasslands, large herds of cattle and 
scattered homesteads. So when it suits either party, and depending on what is at stake, they 
say “our border is very clear”. In terms of significance, the line marks the border between 
Kajiado and Makueni/Machakos, and by extension, Maasailand and Ukambani, and between 
Eastern and Rift Valley provinces. And that is not all. Albeit metaphorically, it is said to mark 
the border between “the Kamba and the Maasai”.  
After it was imposed as a boundary between two ethnic territorial areas, it assumed new 
meanings. During cattle raids, Kamba warriors would be in hot pursuit to recover cattle from 
Maasai raiders “before they cross the Mutambo (the railway line)...we knew that if they cross, 
that is all”, explained the 75 year old Maithya. If the Maasai raiders crossed the line before the 
Kamba caught up with them, the Kamba warriors would often retreat. On the other hand, if 
they caught up with the Maasai before reaching the line, the Maasai warriors usually 
abandoned the cattle and fled. Where they exist, boundaries serve to slow down the free flow 
of transactions (Galtung, 1994: 6). The significance of the railway line should not be 
construed to mean that there were no „tribal lands‟ before it was constructed. The line 
however, with the enforcement of colonial administrators, stood out as a continuous physical 
object that eclipsed whatever ridges, streams, hills and rocks that marked Kamba and Maasai 
territories.  
Although there are Kamba and Maasai on either side of the line, attaching so much 
importance to this boundary often creates a conducive atmosphere for the reification of culture 
and differentiation. There is normally talk of “the people from the other side of the railway”. 
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That explains why I was asked whether I came “from across” (cf. chapter two). In everyday 
practice however, the railway has never been an ethnic border. In fact, there are some Maasai 
and Kamba who are unaware of its territorial significance. Besides, the number of cattle that 
are crushed by trains as they cross this line demonstrate its porosity and that it is simply a 
physical mark across a common territory. 
 
6.2.1   Meanings attached to the physical boundary  
In as much as the border between the Ukambani and Maasailand is as artificial as it can get, 
there has been only few isolated cases of ethnic antagonism in protest. Ethnic disputes here 
have largely been informed by other issues especially Kamba migrant populations in Kajiado 
and cattle raids. However, both groups have claims over land on either side of the railway. 
The Maasai claim that much of the plains covering what is now Nguu division (Makueni) was 
their territory and grazing areas about a century ago. On the other hand, the older Kamba 
generation say that the “original” boundary between Kamba and Maasai territories was in a 
place called Kwa Katule deep inside what is now Maasailand. Well, the Maasai dismiss this 
claim as unfounded. During my fieldwork, however, both groups stressed that “for the sake of 
peace”, the railway line had been “accepted” as the bona fide borderline. Nonetheless, this 
border issue remains thorny and rears its ugly head  at „critical‟ moments. For instance, during 
a meeting organised in Simba in January 1995 to reconcile the Kamba and the Maasai after 
confrontations that left a Kamba dead, this issue came up. A Kamba „local‟ leader asked the 
then minister for lands Jackson Mulinge (Kamba)
269
 to tell “those present and the nation” 
where the “border” between “the Kamba and the Maasai” lay. It was not lost to observers that 
he had not asked about the border between „Kajiado and Makueni‟ or „Maasailand and 
Ukambani‟. Cleverly, the minister deferred the answer. In the first place, it was rather strange 
that the question had not been raised by the Maasai who, unlike the Kamba, have historically 
lost large tracks of their territorial land. Besides, it appeared that the question would not have 
found relevance if the ministry of lands was not in the hands of a Kamba at the time. It 
revealed some of  the „games‟ the Kamba and Maasai play along this border and inside each 
other‟s territories. The question was to serve as a „scare‟ to the Maasai.   
Apart from the instrumentalisation of physical boundaries, there are also cartographical 
technicalities, unilateral top-bottom approach when fixing regional boundaries, and media 
reports
270
 that compound the boundary disputes. All these combine to explain, for instance, 
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 A retired general who was head of the Kenyan military forces. 
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 While reporting the incident in which the Kamba and Maasai agreed to live in peace, the The Daily Nation, 
for instance reported that the venue of the meeting, Simba, is in “Makueni District” and yet this trading centre is 
actually in Kajiado (Maasailand). See The Daily Nation, Saturday, January, 28, 1995. 
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the uncertainty over the location of Kiboko trading centre (cf. map 2 in chapter two). Unlike 
the upper part of the centre where the boundary is „clearly‟ marked by the railway line, as one 
approaches Kiboko, it is marked instead by Kiboko River.
271
 So that although the trading 
centre lies on the „left‟ side of the railway, it is, to the anger of some Maasai, not in their 
territory but in Ukambani. There is every reason for the Maasai to take advantage of this 
„confusion‟. This river hardly dries up and serves as an important source of water for Maasai 
herds. Besides, around Kiboko, there is the prestigious Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) site, with its farms and vast grasslands and a boarding primary school. I should 
mention that one other reason why the Maasai assume that Kiboko is in Kajiado is because of 
a controversial telephone code. Telephones in Kiboko trading centre, the KARI site and the 
surrounding area use the Kajiado code (0302), although these places fall under Makueni 
district. This had been done merely for convenience, but it is used by the Maasai to legitimise 
their territorial claims.  
 
6.2.2   Rivalry for land: Fighting over “Canaan” 
To Kenyans, land is what security is to Israel; it is an emotional and explosive national 
obsession.
272
 One of the reasons why productive land is such a coveted asset in Kenya is 
because unlike Uganda and Tanzania for example, only about 20% of Kenya‟s landmass 
receives adequate rainfall that can sustain agriculture. This climatical factor has resulted in 
continuous internal migration of families and groups not only within their ethnic districts but 
also to other regions. The Kamba can only be compared to the Kikuyu in terms of dispersal 
within Kenya. Apart from their native districts of Machakos, Makueni, Kitui and Mwingi, 
there are significant Kamba populations not only in Kajiado (Maasailand) but Kwale and 
Taita Taveta districts (Coast province), Embu and Kirinyaga. 
Among Kenyan farming groups, if an adult male
273
 does not own a piece of land somewhere, 
then culturally, he is incomplete. Such a piece of land is used to build a house, grow crops, 
keep cattle, or it could simply be held for status and prestige. Even those who have chosen to 
make towns and cities their permanent areas of residence, are still expected to own a piece of 
land in the rural areas. Land may be accessed through inheritance, buying, or through land 
allocation, if one is certified a “squatter”274 by state authorities. The so-called squatters are 
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 Locally called Maangi uvungu, which literally means “fake bamboo”. 
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 Sunday Nation, May 25, 1997. 
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 Under the umbrella body Widow Support Network of Kenya, widows have pushed for a constitutional 
provision enabling them to own and inherit land. In the new constitutional dispensation taking effect 2003, 
married women have sought the right to have property registered in their names without the mandatory 
endorsement from the husband. 
274
 A controversial concept, used here to refer to people who claim to be landless and living in lands whose 
ownership is claimed by others. 
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allocated such land usually after having invaded or encroached on it. Sometimes, this might 
be private property but in most cases, it is “state land” in the form of gazetted forests, 
protected water catchments, land for agricultural research or national parks. While these lands 
may be recognised as no-go areas, that does not stop people from moving into them and 
setting up settlements. Moreover, the state‟s claim to these lands remains controversial, and is 
often challenged since the same parcels were originally taken away from certain groups.  
This brings me to Mikululo ranch. Measuring some 76 square kilometres and starting as a 
grazing area, its status has changed overtime. Due to the variety of wildlife that roam freely in 
the ranch and its nearness to Tsavo national park, the state declared it a game reserve, but this 
did not restrict human encroachment.
275
  But the wildlife department went a step further and 
within ten years, this land was declared a “water catchments” area, then a “protected area” and 
finally a “national park”. Mikululo is a place where ownership of land has been redefined as 
the Kamba and the Maasai competed over its control between themselves on the one hand, 
and both against the state on the other. What made the whole struggle more complex was that 
the state officials were seen to be partisan.  
Lying at the fringes of Chyulu (Kyulu)
276
 range on the Maasailand-Ukambani border, 
Mikululo‟s moist soils and pastures attracted both the Kamba and Maasai. While the Maasai 
were interested in grazing their animals, the Kamba established farms. Inquiries indicate that 
the Kamba started migrating to Mikululo in the 1970‟s. Many migrated to the area particularly 
after the 1974-76 and the 1983 droughts and famine. However, the area had been a Maasai 
grazing ground for many years. In fact, one of my research partners, Mr Palalelei, was born 
there at around 1940, but since the Maasai were not sedentary, the Kamba made the Maasai 
cattle keepers look like late comers. Whereas the Maasai treated the area as an extension of 
their grazing zone, the Kamba accessed the ranch through a „broker‟, an influential 
businessman who would allocate an applicant about 5 acres after paying a fee of about Ksh 
1,000. There were no guarantees although he claimed that he had secured an allotment letter 
from the state paving the way for an imminent conversion of the “state land” into a settlement 
area.  
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 In game reserves, wildlife can live side by side with human populations. It is in national parks that human 
populations are excluded. 
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 Kamba name for Chyulu. Kyulu also refers to marijuana in colloquial Kikamba. The Chyulu area has not only 
been famed for its rich agricultural soils and bumper harvests but also as a source of this drug, locally smoked as 
a reefer and distributed by known „agents‟ who hardly conduct their business discreetly, although a custodial 
sentence of up to 10 years can be handed down in Kenyan courts if one is proven to have been in possession of 
kyulu (marijuana).   
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Competing for user rights  
After Mikululo proved to be extremely productive, the Kamba renamed it Kanaani, for it was 
like the biblical “Canaan”, the land “flowing with milk and honey”. With its fertile soils and 
reliable rainfall, the land offered unparalleled opportunities. It guaranteed harvest when many 
other parts of Ukambani experienced food shortages. On the other hand, the Maasai called the 
place Kinyereti which means “a place of many wells” (Mikululo has springs). For the Kamba, 
Kanaani was seen as a “gift” from the state, since, in spite of the fact that the settlement 
lacked state legitimacy, external interference was minimal. Besides, most of the Kamba who 
moved into the area retained their earlier settlements, establishing a network between the 
ranch and the original homelands. There was a flow of maize and beans as well as game meat 
during food shortages. The food crops were also sold for cash or bartered. Some 
businesspersons would also go to Mikululo during harvests to purchase grain for sale. The 
area also became a chief source of seeds during planting season, since, as Musango, a resident 
noted, “crops in new lands are not attacked by worms”.   
By creating farms and erecting settlements, the Kamba were legitimising their exclusive 
appropriation of the land. Although the Maasai pastoralists had grazed their animals there for 
generations, the Kamba settlements made it look like the Maasai were encroaching on Kamba 
property. The Maasai were also being told that these grazing areas were administratively in 
Ukambani.
277
 Competition for space intensified and in order to secure their right to the land, 
some Maasai families set up settlements. But the Kamba population was growing rather fast 
and the Maasai could not keep pace. The Kamba also set up retail kiosks and built a school. 
The school was called Kanaani. As the population continued to swell during the 1980‟s, the 
state, through the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), started putting restrictions on new 
settlements but no serious pressure was exerted before the run up to the multiparty elections 
of 1992. As the two groups competed for physical space and their modes of land-use 
(subsistence) often clashed, the KWS would set deadlines before which the groups should 
vacate the land. Pressure was therefore mounting from all sides. In 1994, there was a major 
ethnic conflict as the two groups fought for dominance.  
Minor conflicts were usually witnessed during the planting season, when the Kamba would 
clear old and new fields by cutting and burning grass and bush. This is a routine exercise 
called kuvutha. To the Maasai however, the Kamba were depleting pastures; grass for their 
cattle and leaves for the sheep and goats. As for the Kamba, they had their grievances; their 
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 At the time of study, and in practice, the area was administratively under Kasuvi sub-location, Kiboko 
location, Makindu division of Makueni district. However, following a boundary review carried out in 1994, no 
part of this land was „legally‟ in Makueni. 
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farms had to reckon not only with wild animals which would occasionally devour their crops, 
but also Maasai cattle. But since the Kamba were also keeping some cattle, and a few Maasai 
had farms, ethnic tensions were not basically due to a clash of the modes of production but 
due to instrumentalisation of ethnicity. Despite the fact that their dominant modes often put 
them on a collision course, the underlying motive however was an attempt by each group to 
enhance its control over this important resource. Since the Kamba were in their hundreds 
while the Maasai were in their tens, the latter had genuine fears about losing grip on the land. 
In January 1995, a group of Maasai murran (warriors) attacked about 10 Kamba homesteads 
and burnt houses forcing several Kamba to flee the area in fear. It was during these clashes 
that a Kamba farmer, named Katiku Maweu (a retired civil servant), referred to earlier, was 
speared to death by the Maasai. When the Kamba protested to government administrators, 
they were reminded that they should not be living there in the first place and that the land 
belonged to the KWS.
278
 But they had an immediate concern, namely why the Maasai were 
asserting themselves as the eviction pressure mounted. When the Kamba expected the state to 
pursue the attackers, the Makueni DC at the time, Mr Maurice Makhanu instead urged 
reconciliation.
279
  
All along, the KWS  appeared to tolerate grazing of cattle as opposed to farming which was 
said to create bare patches of land affecting the wildlife ecosystem. While this may have been 
logical, it translated into the state being seen as favouring the Maasai and discriminating 
against the Kamba although the KWS claimed that they were „strictly‟ talking about the 
different modes of subsistence. The period between 1995 and 1999 was marked by ethnic 
tension, conflicts, injuries, loss of lives and destruction of property. The Kamba would have 
their crops destroyed while the Maasai would lose their cattle. During the skirmishes of 1999, 
about six people were reportedly killed by KWS rangers and police while others were 
arraigned in court for “trespassing” and fined up to Ksh 6,000 each. By this time, there were 
about 1,500 families (dominantly Kamba) living in the ranch. The final blow came in 2000. 
On the 11th of May 2000, all the occupants were driven out of the land by KWS game rangers 
armed with guns. As the families were violently driven out and their school set on fire, the 
Maasai had conspicuously left by then. Unlike the Kamba, they had heeded to the eviction 
notice given by the KWS. The Kamba were adamant. Although they were pushed out, they 
mobilised political support. On the 21st of May 2000 a protest match from Makindu to 
Kanaani was led by 5 Kamba MPs to recapture the land. The aim was to force the state to 
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 Part of it belonged to the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) but it was later gazetted as part of 
Chyulu Game Reserve (under the Kenya Wildlife Service). 
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 See The Daily Nation, Saturday, January 14, 1995. 
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back out of its eviction plans. After fighting their way to Kanaani, where they addressed a 
large crowd of „squatters‟, all were forced to vacate the area by security personnel.  
 
Political influence 
In Kenya, there have been many incidences in which land, forest and wildlife departments 
have not intervened at the time when people encroached on protected land, and established 
settlements and farms, built schools, shops and religious centres. However, after they had 
done all that, they would still be forcefully evicted particularly if some influential people 
wanted the land or if the ethnic groups occupying the land were perceived to be anti-
government (ruling party).  
I shall illustrate shortly how this relates to Mikululo ranch. First and foremost, I would like to 
stress that although the Kamba and the Maasai had their own internal problems inside 
Mikululo ranch, they were also interdependent. The Maasai provided Kamba families with 
milk, while the Maasai engaged Kamba labour in the construction of houses and digging of 
wells, just to mention but a few modes of exchange. It is the external factors that compounded 
the problem. Enormous pressure was applied by the KWS in the run up to the 1992 multiparty 
elections. This was not just confined to Mikululo. In many parts of the country, the ruling 
party politicians, scared about their waning support as the elections drew closer, threatened 
opposition-allied groups with evictions in cases where these groups lived outside their 
„traditional‟ homelands. The dominantly Kamba population in Mikululo was therefore 
threatened with eviction, since Ukambani in general was perceived to be allied to the Kikuyu-
led Democratic Party (DP), while the Maasai were allied to the ruling party, the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU). Things worsened after the 1992 elections, since, true to 
prediction, the local seat where Mikululo falls (Kibwezi constituency), was won by a DP 
candidate, Mrs Agnes Ndetei. Conversely, on the adjacent side of Maasailand (Kajiado 
Central constituency), the seat was captured by the ruling party, KANU and the MP, Mr 
David Sankori was appointed an assistant minister in Moi‟s government. This tilted the 
balance of power as the Kamba were labelled “anti-government” while the Maasai appeared 
to enjoy state protection. To make matters worse, although Mrs Ndetei defected to KANU 
before completing her term, she lost the seat to the opposition in the 1997 elections.  
A „squatter‟, Mr Musango told me that things worsened following both elections, with the 
KWS taking sides, “allowing” the Maasai to graze their animals but giving the Kamba 
residents notices to leave the ranch. In fact, the Maasai MP (Sankori) was accused of having 
backed the eviction so that the Maasai would reclaim the exclusive user rights to the grazing 
fields. It was widely believed that if the Kamba had elected a KANU MP, the government 
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would have softened its stance on eviction. To make matters worse, the five MPs who led the 
evicted squatters to recapture the land were all opposition MPs except one, who by then was a 
member of a group of KANU MPs labelled “rebel MPs”. Addressing those evicted, the “rebel 
MP”, Mr Peter Maundu280 argued that the area was not a tourist attraction and even if it was, 
livelihood concerns should prevail over revenue considerations. His counterpart from Yatta 
said that better land was being reserved for animals at the expense of human life.
281
  
The local MP, Onesmus Mboko,
282
 with whom I held lengthy interviews, talked of legitimacy. 
He argued that if the government considered the settlement illegal, why did it set up a polling 
station in the ranch during the 1997 national elections?
283
 He said that it could not have been a 
protected area if people were allowed to vote from there. In addition, Mikululo had a 
recognised primary school and the ministry of education had actually posted two teachers 
there. All these, argued the MP was evidence that this was indeed a legitimate settlement.
284
 
He said that the Kamba were being “punished” for rejecting KANU during the polls.  
There were other reasons why the KANU government was seen to side with the Maasai. After 
the violent eviction in May 2000, the Kamba claimed that about 500 cows, 602 goats and 50 
sheep were taken away by the Maasai.
285
 It was claimed that a few days after the eviction, 
some of the „stolen‟ cows were found abandoned in Simba, and that after the authorities were 
informed, no follow up was made. In an interview, the area chief said that the Maasai were 
simply being branded as “thieves”. In any case, efforts by the Kamba to recover whatever they 
had lost proved futile as the police were said to be less enthusiastic to assist. A report by an 
investigative journalist, Monica Muthwii, indicates that only 28 cows had been recovered by 
September 2000 (2000: 5). Some of those who had lost their cattle threatened to raid Kajiado 
district and recover them from the Maasai herds. A local councillor, Mr Kalembe Ndile
286
 said 
that the Maasai had been served with a notice about the intended raid. This heightened 
tensions in the area, making my research work quite difficult. Some Maasai respondents asked 
me whether I was conducting a “pilot study before the attack”. Nevertheless, the “attack” 
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 Of Makueni constituency. 
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 This was the same dilemma faced by the Tanzanian government as they drove „Tanzanian‟ Maasai 
pastoralists out of Ngorongoro National Park. 
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 Representing Kibwezi constituency. 
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 The polling station‟s number was “10” based at Kanaani Primary School. 
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 Well, the state had set up a polling station there hoping that the voters will support the ruling party candidate. 
This had been witnessed in other places too. During a by-election in an opposition stronghold in the Rift Valley 
(Kipipiri) in the mid 1990‟s, the state moved in electricity posts and water pipes in the area telling residents that 
once they vote for the KANU candidate, they would have access to electricity and piped water. They voted for 
the opposition party (DP) and the state withdrew the electricity posts and pipes immediately. 
285
 See a report by The People, Wednesday, September 6, 2000. During my study, I kept getting conflicting 
figures and therefore the ones provided here should be taken as rough estimates. 
286
 Elected area MP in the 2002 polls. 
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never materialised although they did not recover their animals. Irrespective of the authenticity 
of the losses, one also has to understand that the two groups use threats to resolve disputes 
without having to resort to armed conflicts.  
The Maasai have particularly perfected the art of manoeuvre. In the KARI site, which is in 
Ukambani but is made available to Maasai cattle keepers during drought, the Maasai do what 
ecologists call “displacement”.287 Although the Kamba are officially not denied access to the 
vast grazing areas, the Maasai have in practice exclusive access. The management of the 
institute charges for each single head of cattle and the Maasai not only move their animals to 
the site “early enough”, they are also said to be “more motivated to pay” while the Kamba are 
said to be “cunning”, partly because they, unlike the Maasai, feel they have the right to graze 
their animals there. Kamba cattle keepers have other concerns however. Some fear that their 
modest stock would be “swallowed up” in the huge sea of Maasai cattle, something that 
happens whenever the two groups share grazing grounds. In the KARI scenario, the exclusion 
of Kamba cattle keepers has not led to ethnic conflicts. This is perhaps due to the fact that the 
Kamba cannot accuse the state of discrimination in the ethnic competition for the resource.   
 
Adjustment of boundaries 
In Mikululo ranch, there have been boundary adjustments in the area that seem to be in favour 
of the Maasai. In 1988, part of Mikululo was chopped off and made part of Chyulu game 
reserve. The reason looked genuine; to safeguard wildlife and water catchments. It was a time 
when soil conservation and environmental issues were given special attention by the head of 
state.
288
 The adjustment did not arouse any ethnic tensions since the boundary, from the top of 
the hill, was adjusted fairly equally on the Makueni (Ukambani) and Kajiado (Maasailand) 
districts‟ boundary. 
After the 1988 elections, there was further adjustment of boundaries. This time round (1989) 
many Kamba migrant families were evicted as the game reserve and water catchments was 
expanded and the area was given an exclusive boundary (from the districts). On July 12th, 
1994, there was a new boundary adjustment which appeared to target Makueni area but left 
out Kajiado district. This adjustment heightened ethnic tensions leading to clashes in 
September 1994 as the Kamba, whose agricultural space had been reduced, started clearing 
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 Where a species dislocates another taking its place. 
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 In the 1980‟s, former President Moi spent a lot of time in soil conservation efforts. He would feature in the 
national television casually dressed leading various communities in filling gullies,  building gabions and in 
afforestation activities. It was a time when one Mr Zephania Anyieni, appointed to head a presidential 
commission on soil conservation was a better known personality than many cabinet ministers. A Maasai 
respondent intimated: “That was the only time this man (president) was doing something for this country” (in 
Imaroro-Mashuru, 12/09/2000). 
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bushes (Maasai grazing fields). Houses were burnt, people were injured and both groups 
registered losses in cattle. The government‟s position was that all the groups were threatening 
the environment, destroying wildlife habitats and breaking the law. Through a legal notice of 
1995, the area was gazetted and transformed from a game reserve and catchments area to a 
national park under the KWS. The boundary plan no. 204/71 of 12th July 1994 shows 
Mikululo as part of Chyulu national park and a small part in Kajiado. By the time I was 
carrying out fieldwork therefore, there was „legally‟ no part of Chyulu/Mikululo that was in 
Makueni/Ukambani. After the KWS decisive eviction in May 2000, “the Kamba”, argued the 
local MP, had lost land that for generations had been an alternative source of livelihood. He 
reiterated that compared to the Maasai, the Kamba had gotten “a raw deal”. He said that the 
whole struggle had taught him that “belonging to a certain „tribe‟ is the most important issue 
in this government”. The MP argued that the KANU government had fuelled enmity between 
the two ethnic groups through “selective treatment”. But he forgot that if the Kamba were not 
in the opposition, they would most likely not have been „punished‟. He argued that “left 
alone” the Kamba and the Maasai, “despite our many differences...have a way of sorting out 
our problems”. (Onesmus Mboko, Makindu and Nairobi, 22/08/2000; 01/09/2000).289 While 
he stresses that the two groups have ways of reverting to an equilibrium following conflict, he 
sees the state as a spoiler by taking sides. 
 
Why the land was lost 
Evicted Kamba and Maasai said that Kamba leaders, including the „broker‟ used a 
confrontational approach instead of doing it the “Kenyan way”. Musango, who has been a 
„squatter‟ a number of times in different places, argued that the Kamba leaders “forgot” that 
the lands the Kamba accessed throughout the 1950‟s, 60‟s and 70‟s290 were acquired through 
a combination of “invasion”, negotiation, lobbying and organising delegations; in short, doing 
what Musango called “playing some games with the government”. He noted: “You don‟t get 
anything from this government, even before, by fighting...you visit the minister or somebody 
close to the head of state, like Mulu
291
...then he takes some of you there (to the 
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 It was difficult to get the MP for an interview. I had planned to ask him for an interview on 21/05/2000 when 
he led a group of other MPs to Mikululo but I could not get an opportunity. I met him later in Makindu (in his 
Kibwezi constituency). After this interview, he agreed to meet me later in Nairobi on appointment. He also 
brought with him maps (to back his position) and other documents. Efforts to interview Kajiado Central MP did 
not materialise despite enormous effort. 
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 Many parts of „lower Makueni‟ were accessed during this period.  The area, now settled, was a state protected 
area under wildlife. 
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 Mulu Mutisya, hardly literate, has been an influential Kamba politician and very close to former President 
Moi. 
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President)...you dance for the President (laughs), tell him that yes...we have an opposition MP 
but that was a „mistake‟, you still support him...he will be happy and he just says that you stay 
and that is all,
292
 these people do not know that”. Actually, the opposition MPs knew that a 
delegation to President Moi would have resolved the problem, but on the other hand, such a 
move would have undermined their credibility. Unfortunately, after losing the land, most of 
the Kamba squatters were sceptical about opposition parties, questioning their relevance if 
they could not “solve our problems”.  
The ranch chairperson („broker‟) ensured the area remained volatile for his own gain. He 
maintained enmity between Kamba and Maasai families in Mikululo, arguably to sideline the 
Maasai at some point, settle more Kamba migrants and therefore gain financially. The 
„broker‟ would raise funds from the residents to file cases in court against the state. Musango 
said that over the years, the residents had given out “thousands of shillings”. But taking the 
state to court proved counterproductive. It became difficult to sustain a case against the state 
in which land had been acquired through encroachment. A local chief noted that at some point, 
the state was ready to lift the “protection” status on the land and carve a residential area out of 
it.
293
 He believed that by going to court and by using “confrontational tactics”, the Kamba 
themselves jeopardised a chance of having the land “given” to them. The „broker‟ had thought 
that in the course of time, grossly outnumbered and hopefully frustrated, the Maasai would 
give up and leave the ranch. He could not have been more wrong. True to what the Maasai are 
depicted to be, namely proud, courageous and fearless, they hung on. In a desperate move to 
keep the land, Kamba migrants had been „advised‟ to keep bows and arrows in case the need 
arose to fight for „their‟ land. The weapons were to be used against agents of the state (KWS), 
a possible Maasai attack and to some extent, wild animals. This particular requirement seemed 
to discourage women residence in the ranch.
294
 Anyhow, bows and arrows may have sufficed 
against the Maasai and wild animals, but were no match for KWS rangers armed with guns. 
Keeping the ranch required a different strategy. A Maasai councillor told me that both groups 
would have retained the land “if they (Kamba) had lobbied with us”. He said that the Maasai 
“support the government (KANU) but we fight too, we don‟t keep quiet”. 295  I shall be 
revisiting the strategies both groups adopt in the ethnic competition for political power in 
chapter seven.  
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 Presidential decrees, which may contradict the law, have been common practice in Kenya. 
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 It was apparently to be made a sub-location (usually headed by a sub-chief).  
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 In the Kamba custom, women did not handle bows and arrows which were hunting tools and for defence of 
territorial boundaries in the event of external aggression or intrusion. 
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 During the study, some Maasai portrayed themselves as being defenceless or having “nobody” to champion 
their rights while on the other hand, the Kamba considered them as enjoying government protection and favour. 
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I would like to note that the state authorities did not want to be seen as being partisan or as 
destroying people‟s livelihoods. For continuity and partly to enhance peaceful coexistence 
between the Kamba and the Maasai, about 200 „families‟296 of those evicted were resettled by 
the state in an area called Kiboko B, not far away from Mikululo. This land was part of the 
KARI based in Kiboko. The 200 „families‟ were said to have been the only “genuine” landless 
peasants with no alternative pieces of land. The criteria used were not clear as some more 
deserving cases were left out, resorting to setting up temporary camps in the nearby trading 
centres. Ironically, bigger chunks of the land went to influential personalities. There was 
pressure mounted on the 200 to reject the offer and hang on to Mikululo which had more 
agricultural potential. Many ignored this „collective‟ action for fear of victimisation and 
possible loss of this „offer‟ too. Musango was one of those who hung on to the last minute and 
felt extremely let down by „his own people‟ the Kamba whom he dismissed in a familiar 
depiction: “Cowards!” and sadly asserted: “If these were the Maasai, they would not betray 
their people” (Musango, Makindu, 26/06/2000).  
 
In this section, I have shown how peaceful coexistence between the Kamba and the Maasai 
was strained as they competed for farmland and grazing grounds. As a strategy to exclude one 
group from the land, their modes of subsistence are portrayed as incompatible. But if there is 
something to deduce from this text, it is the role the state plays in the coexistence of groups. 
As the state intervenes to regulate the appropriation of this prime land, new loyalties emerge. 
Party politics in particular introduces a new attribute of difference between the Kamba and the 
Maasai. This is worsened by those affiliated to the ruling party being portrayed as “pro-
government” while those allied to the opposition are branded “anti-government”. The Maasai 
“pro-government” stance is used to lure the Kamba, who would have got this land as a reward. 
However, the Kamba neither supported the ruling party nor did they organise a delegation to 
President Moi. Since the land was not buying loyalty to the government, both groups were 
driven out. The Maasai could not keep the land since it was administratively in Ukambani, 
and the authorities feared such a move would provoke a backlash among the Kamba. Besides, 
politics being a game of numbers, it would have made political sense to give the land to the 
Kamba residents whose population outnumbered the Maasai by far. Below, I look at how the 
groups‟ rivalry for control of a water project was also shaped by the state. 
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 Preference is given to families during resettlements. Since singles hardly stand a chance, people „create‟ 
families by corrupting administrators or fooling them. 
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6.2.3   Competing for “state water”  
The case I would like to discuss here is quite similar to the one above, where the involvement 
of the state sows seeds of antagonism between the Kamba and the Maasai. In this particular 
case, a water project implemented in the name of the two groups ended up serving the 
interests of influential personalities. Since the groups could not establish where the water had 
gone, they turned against each other.  
Popularly called the Kilimanjaro water project, and started with a lot of fanfare in the 1980‟s 
and completed by 1990, this mammoth project was meant to transform the livelihoods of 
cattle keepers in Kajiado and the farming populations of Makueni and Machakos district. To 
put it differently, the project was meant to serve parts of Maasailand and Ukambani. Getting 
its water from the Nolturesh spring in Loitokitok at the shores of Mt. Kilimanjaro, this 
inexhaustible water supply was expected to improve agriculture and animal husbandry in 
those arid districts, as well as provide clean drinking water. To make sure that the water 
serves both groups, the pipeline followed the administrative boundary between Kajiado and 
Makueni/Machakos. The Kamba, as well as the Maasai, were encouraged to form self-help 
groups, or use existing ones to buy pipes which would be connected to the main line. The 
Maasai were to have cattle troughs at reasonable distance, while the Kamba were to have 
individual as well as communal water points. The Kamba were particularly interested in small 
scale irrigation.  
Although those to be served made monetary contributions, the government was to supplement 
these contributions. But this expected support was hardly forthcoming, with accusations of 
massive corruption in the project. Places earmarked for extensions or water points were 
phased out altogether. All the same, some homesteads and public institutions (e.g. schools and 
medical centres) in Emali, Sultan Hamud and Yoani areas received water. The Kamba quickly 
started growing oranges, paw paws, bananas and tomatoes through irrigation. The Maasai also 
got water, but just like the Kamba, only a few could access this resource. Many stared at the 
massive pipeline with their herds, as they would not find any cattle trough in the vicinity. 
Within no time, even where there were watering points, the water flow became erratic. People 
were generally disillusioned and yet, government officials offered no satisfactory explanations. 
Among the Maasai, inadequacy of cattle troughs and the erratic flow of water were 
erroneously, but conveniently explained as resulting from the diversion of water to Ukambani. 
Left with no alternative, the pastoralists in some areas vandalised the massive concrete 
pipeline, creating ponds from which they watered their animals. The cost of repairing these 
damages, which have continued, has been colossal. But even for those who water their 
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animals, the project has not contained transhumance as the search for pastures remains a 
perpetual problem. 
For the Kamba, long cherished dreams of food security through irrigation were shattered. 
While the water did not reach Makueni district‟s headquarters, residents of Machakos town 
were equally disappointed. State officials and politicians had promised that the water would 
put to rest the town‟s chronic shortages, but only the district hospital was connected. With 
rumours that water had been diverted to Kajiado through the influence of the then vice-
president, George Saitoti, some Kamba leaders protested to the Moi government. It was 
argued that Saitoti had used the water project to enhance his influence and shaky position in 
Maasai politics.
297
 In a very rare move, the then powerful Kamba politician and close Moi ally, 
Mulu Mutisya took many by surprise when, while addressing a public rally attended by the 
President, he turned to the head of state and said: “Tell your makamu (vice-president) to leave 
Kamba water alone”. Although both groups were President Moi‟s supporters then, the water 
debate had created the impression that in the event that the Maasai and the Kamba were to 
compete for a national resource, the interests of the Maasai would prevail.  
At around 1995, local residents (both Kamba and Maasai) were beginning to realise that they 
had been dragged into a conflict, but the blame lay elsewhere. What emerged was that after 
the project was implemented, powerful personalities set up large scale flower farms in Athi 
River and Kitengela, near Nairobi, and diverted much of the water into those multimillion 
projects. The result was that the pipes started running dry, jeopardising the small scale 
irrigation farms, domestic water supply, cattle watering areas, business premises (e.g. 
restaurants) and health facilities.  
An investigative report by Monica Muthwii noted that among those for whom the project was 
intended, “taps have become monuments of desperation” (1999: 15). The problem had been 
compounded by the fact that many could not afford to put up storage tanks to harvest and 
store water during those occasional moments when something trickled from the taps. But, she 
blamed the Maasai for vandalising the pipeline asking: “Why do they adopt careless tactics of 
vandalising the project? Can‟t something be done about it?” She ignores the failure on the part 
of the state to meet its obligations by providing watering points, and the fact that influential 
personalities had diverted the water. And contrary to her claims, the Maasai were ready to pay 
for the water. The vandalism of the pipeline however, which is quite conspicuous, has given 
some Kamba the impression that the Moi government was soft on the Maasai.  
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It is worth noting that ten years after the implementation of the project, and with some 
knowledge about the complicity of the government and its operatives, many Kamba still have 
the notion that „their‟ water was given to the Maasai. But the „Maasai‟ they talk about did not 
get this water either, although they have been more daring, breaking the pipeline to access 
water. On their part, some Maasai are a bit ambivalent, saying that the water was meant for 
them and not the Kamba. Asking a Maasai pastoralist, Nkari, about the water, he posed: 
“Which water? okay, we see the big pipe, is that water?”  
The Nolturesh water story remains a scar in Kamba-Maasai relations and yet, both groups 
have been losers. It is a case of „negative impartiality‟ where, while the authorities did not 
side with any of the groups, both were also denied what was due to them. Nevertheless, since 
the flower farms were associated with some Maasai personalities, to some Kamba, “the 
Maasai” are still seen as beneficiaries. Although the Kamba and the Maasai have not taken up 
arms against each other over this water, it remains a potential area of conflict. 
 
 
6.3   Ethnic tensions in Maasai territory 
 
I have repeatedly underscored the fact that there are thousands of Kamba living in Maasailand. 
This has been occasioned by intermarriages, migration in search of farmlands, to work as 
household labourers and to establish retail businesses. I would like to highlight two trading 
centres, both in Maasai territory, and to discuss how the Kamba in these centres and the 
surrounding areas live alongside the Maasai. Key concepts here are „dominance‟ and „co-
dominance‟. 
 
6.3.1   Co-dominance in a „Maasai‟ trading centre?  
„Dominance‟ is quite a relative term, but it is generally associated with power relations, 
competition for resources and rivalry (see Banton, 1983). I start by discussing a case of “co-
dominance”,298 where both the Maasai and the Kamba strategise to „control‟ a trading centre, 
but in different ways. “The Kamba should know that Simba is in Kajiado”, are the words of a 
Maasai businessman. Such words are not uttered by a contented person. And as a matter of 
fact, Sainkoi, is not. A fairly propertied man, with many cattle and in the management 
committee of a group ranch, he represents a cohort of Maasai that accuse the “older” 
generation of “betraying” the group. Sainkoi looks genuinely bitter. He complains about non-
Maasai groups that “are doing better than the Maasai” in Maasailand and a government that 
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has apparently marginalised the group. Concerning Simba,
299
 he is unhappy about the Kamba 
whom he says have “taken over” the trading centre. He laments that the group controls “the 
most important businesses”, that “they are the ones treating you” if you go to the local health 
centre, and that even the chair of the trading centre is Kamba. His list of grievances is long.  
Simba is one of the most volatile of all the trading centres shared by the two groups. For 
instance, to the anger of the Maasai, it is taken for granted that the centre, just like the rest 
along the railway boundary, is in Ukambani. Sainkoi bitterly notes: “Few care to take note 
that the railway line lies on the right hand side”, that is, Simba is in Maasailand (in Simba, 
10/08/2000). The analogy fits the basic theory regarding boundaries, that they are stronger or 
stressed at the point of intersection (interface) and weaker as you move away from this point. 
Since Simba‟s actual location is a matter of conjecture, it is here that the issue of the border is 
most sensitive and significant, than, say, Loitokitok, which lies in the heart of Maasailand.  
 Sainkoi is equally displeased with the Maasai whom he says should be more assertive and 
competitive, arguing that it is them “who gave the Kamba an opportunity”. He also notes 
correctly that among all the trading centres, it is “only Simba” that has no electricity and 
telephone facilities. He blurts out: “At least that is what makes it (Simba) a Maasai soko 
(Maasai trading centre)!” On the question of Simba‟s location, I provocatively asked him 
whether he meant that the Kamba did not know that Simba was indeed in Maasai territory. He 
quipped: “No, they don‟t.” But he is not talking about mere knowledge where the boundary is 
located but rather „evidence‟ that this is indeed the case. He does not buy the idea that 
whatever the Kamba are doing in Simba complements the Maasai, arguing that it is “only the 
Maasai” who can chart their own destiny. He wants the Kamba to “earn” their accommodation 
by being “useful” to the Maasai.  
Controversially, he told me that he had “no regrets” about the Kamba who had been speared 
in Mikululo in January 1995. He argued: “The Maasai have to resist, they have to fight, 
people are stepping on us”. He complains that the population of the Kamba in the trading 
centre continued to swell while the Maasai was “constant”. He argues that the trading centre 
“belongs” to the Maasai. In what sense would a trading centre „belong‟ to a certain ethnic 
group? His justification is based on ethnic territorial boundaries. Such claims are not 
uncommon in Kenya, and indeed elsewhere. It is similar to a CNN report I watched in 
October 2000 following days of chaos in Lagos, Nigeria in which more than 100 people 
(mainly Hausa) were killed. The leader of the militant Odua People‟s Congress (OPC), Mr 
Fredrick Fasheun, said: “We welcome people to Yorubaland, but it is Yorubaland and they 
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should know that”. Appadurai correctly points out that deterritorialisation, where people have 
to move outside their native lands in search of new opportunities, is a cause to new forms of 
conflict. He cites the Los Angelenos getting worried about the Japanese buying up their city, 
and Indians in Bombay (Mumbai) getting worried about Arab investors from the Gulf states 
(1996: 49). Wimmer strongly feels that in analysing ethnic conflicts, the aspect of emotions 
involved tend to be underrated (1997b: 632; Horowitz, 1985: 134). Horowitz argues that the 
extent of emotion often invested in ethnic conflicts and groups‟ quest for autonomy or 
domination and symbols of prestige, may take precedence over economic interest.  
In Kenya, exclusive control of trading centres and towns gained currency during the clamour 
for multiparty democracy in the early 1990‟s where “host” groups demanded that “foreigners” 
(groups from other areas) should either leave or tow the ruling party line. The Maasai 
happened to have been one of the groups whose leaders were against the introduction of 
mutipartysm. As I have noted earlier, this was an attempt by the KAMATUSA to cow 
multiparty activists, fearing that political pluralism would be a threat to their grip on power.  
Looking at the issue of Simba closely, the Maasai appeared not to be striving to exclude the 
Kamba but were rather deeply concerned about recognition. Departing from Sainkoi‟s 
position, a Maasai who owned a commercial building in the trading centre (rented out to a 
Kamba) said that the Kamba should “do whatever they want, but they should know who owns 
this place”. But it remained unclear how the Kamba were to express this gratitude. The 
Kamba businesswoman referred to in chapter five argued that the Maasai “cannot be respected 
just like that, what have they done to be respected?” Well, to the Maasai, being in „their‟ 
territory is enough. 
There were other aspects of disagreement. The Nairobi-Mombasa road, that runs through the 
trading centre, has been a problematic one. Local residents attach various meanings to this 
road. One side of the trading centre is branded the “Kamba side”, while the other is the 
“Maasai side”. To lay some claim on the trading centre, the Kamba insist that the road marks 
the border between Ukambani and Maasailand. They conveniently ignore the railway line, the 
statutory recognised border, for recognising the line would weaken their stake in the trading 
centre whose business they control and which lies “just a few metres from Ukambani”, to 
quote the chairperson of the centre. Whenever there is ethnic conflict in the centre, each group 
consolidates their numbers on one side. During the “theft” incident referred in chapter four, 
Kamba men, armed with bows and arrows took positions on the “Kamba side” while the 
Maasai with spears, shields, knives and clubs paraded on the opposite side. But the 
chairperson argued that regardless of ethnic affiliation, one could run or put up a business 
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structure anywhere in Simba. That does not wholly reflect the actual situation. To start with, 
the Kamba are not allocated commercial plots in Simba. Those who own plots have bought 
them from the Maasai, and these have preferably done so on the “Kamba side”. Ethnic 
identity seemed to determine who puts up what where; spaces are ethnically allocated. Much 
of „Maasai activity‟ is confined to „their side‟ and vice versa. Some Maasai, claimed a bar 
attendant, cross to the “Kamba side…just to be seen there and to prove that the whole of 
Simba is theirs.” All the same, there are other reasons that have shaped this ethnic pattern. By 
virtue of their home districts, the Maasai approach the trading centre from the left, while the 
Kamba do so from the right, and therefore each group has a side „closer home‟. Secondly, the 
road at the middle is a busy one and criss-crossing it is usually risky. However, the Maasai 
have to cross to the other side where most of the shopping facilities are located. 
 
Control of social facilities 
There seems to be a distinction between control over business premises and social facilities. 
Simba primary school and Simba health centre for instance, are regarded by all groups as 
“Maasai” although they are located on the “Kamba side”, and irrespective of the fact that 
these amenities were run by non-Maasai. Another critical location is the chief‟s office. Its 
location on the “Maasai side”, may have been a coincidence, notes the chair of the centre,  but 
it “makes them (Maasai) feel that they have the authority, if a Kamba or Kikuyu wants help, 
you go to them, and they like seeing people going to them for help” (Mavuthi, Simba, 
20/06/2000).  
A water project funded by AMREF
300
 in Simba and completed in 1999 was subjected to 
ethnic antagonism. The borehole, that cost Ksh 2 million (EUR 26.000), was particularly 
meant to provide water for the health centre (also supported by the aid organisation) but the 
facility also served Simba primary school and some residents in the trading centre. Problems 
started during the siting of the borehole. As the engineering team was searching for a suitable 
site to drill, they kept on drifting to the railway line and that did not go down well with 
Maasai elders. The team was summoned and cautioned that should the borehole be located on 
the “other side of the railway” (Ukambani), the project would be unacceptable to the Maasai. 
Lucky enough, water was struck very close to the line but at least on Maasai soil. The elders 
were „ready‟ to reject any „anti-Maasai‟ scientific findings.  
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What was interesting was that the Kamba had actually not expressed interest in the borehole. 
But a Maasai elder, a member of the health centre‟s management committee, said that the 
Maasai simply did not want to take chances. Actually, AMREF, as well as the health centre 
administrator were deeply concerned about the Maasai dominated management committee. 
The committee of 13 members consisted of 11 Maasai, and only 2 Kamba although the 
patients were fifty-fifty in terms of ethnic composition. In fact, most of those who reside in 
the trading centre are Kamba. However, the Maasai said they had to have more members “to 
avoid control from outside” and to avoid “dominance from all sides”. They needed to 
convince others and themselves that they were in control. The concern expressed by AMREF 
and the administrator of the health centre was not ethnicity per se, but rather the attributes
301
 
of the committee members, where age and gender appeared to be the overriding factors. The 
administrator, a Kalenjin then, noted: “Most Kamba feel they are intimidated by the Maasai 
committee and they expect me, as a neutral person to intervene.” (Simba, 27/04/2000). He 
had a difficult task as the Maasai expected him to be on their side. In fact, a committee 
member boasted that they had an administrator “from our side” (invoking both territorial and 
Nilotic links). Occasionally, the Maasai were accused of not necessarily ethnic, but “province 
politics”302 in the running of the health centre.  
In a nutshell, what one sees here is an attempt by the Kamba to be „co-dominant‟ in 
Maasailand and a Maasai strategy to enhance their authority within their territory. It is a 
negotiation of coexistence. 
 
6.3.2   Dominance with equilibrium?: The story of Loitokitok 
Whether one is within the town or in the countryside, Loitokitok is a place of striking 
contrasts, at least on the surface. It is important to point out that the Maasai living here are 
usually not the Kaputiei section found near the Ukambani border (e.g. around Simba). This 
area is dominated by Matapato and Loitokitok sections, who also speak slightly different 
dialects of Maa.
303
 The town itself, being on the Tanzanian border, is a booming commercial 
centre, with a heavy police presence and a busy customs office. There are many people here 
involved in the black market, „smuggling‟ goods across the border, often with the full 
knowledge or involvement of the custom officials and the police.  Anyhow, overlooking Mt. 
Kilimanjaro, the town is multiethnic, with many Tanzanian and Kenyan groups, and is a 
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 By claiming that since the health centre is in Kajiado (Rift Valley province) where Maasailand falls and the 
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tourist destination too, as well as a stop-over for those proceeding to the famed Amboseli 
national park.  
Though deep in Maasai territory, the heavy Kikuyu and Kamba presence, among other ethnic 
groups, is, at least to an outsider, astounding. The main businesses in the town are in the 
hands of these non-Maasai groups. A prominent businessperson in the town, Mr Shah 
(Kenyan Asian), who portrayed himself as “neutral”, shook his head as he spoke about the 
ethnic composition in the town. Speaking in English, he noted: “This is a Kikuyu area, my 
friend, even you man you can see, just get out of this place and go knocking the doors...it will 
be Njuguna, Kamau and Kariuki (Kikuyu names)...you will also find Munyao…Mutisya 
(Kamba names) that is the situation here man (laughs)...if you find two Maasai living in this 
town and doing business come and tell me because I would also like to witness...it is a pity 
because this is their place...and you know what? 8 or 10 kilometres from here, you will find 
Lasset but the place is actually called Kiambu ndogo (“small Kiambu”)304 people hardly speak 
any other language there (apart from Kikuyu)” (Shah, Loitokitok, 12/09/2000). As a matter of 
fact, only one „real‟ Maasai was confirmed to be doing „serious‟ business in a town with 
dozens of retail shops, restaurants, hardware stores, boarding facilities, wholesale outlets and 
kiosks. During the day, you see many Maasai in the town but in the evening, they withdraw to 
the villages. While „formal‟ business (e.g. shops and restaurants) appeared to be mainly in the 
hands of the Kikuyu, Kamba women appeared to be overrepresented in the selling of fresh 
farm produce in the open air market.  
In the countryside, agriculture is entirely in the hands of non-Maasai groups. At the shores of 
Mt. Kilimanjaro and dotted with springs, the area surrounding Loitokitok offers some of most 
conducive farming areas in Kenya. When you visit places like Rombo and Kimana where 
migrant Kikuyu and Kamba took advantage of vast lands and spring water to irrigate farms 
that produce onions, cabbages, kale, potatoes and tomatoes, then you might sympathise with 
the pastoral Maasai when they tell you that they have been “marginalised in our own land.” In 
fact, only a small proportion of these agricultural products are sold in the local trading centres, 
for the bulk is grown for the Nairobi and Mombasa markets. Other products like okra, karella 
and chillies are exported to Europe.  
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With about 20,000 inhabitants,
305
 Loitokitok has the second largest urban population in 
Kajiado district (after Kajiado town). In and outside the urban centre, you find „pockets‟ of 
various ethnic groups. Those tracing their origins to Tanzania include Chagga, Warusha (Maa 
speakers) and Pare. The Kikuyu migrated to this area as early as the 1920‟s but thousands of 
them were expelled from the area following the declaration of emergency by the British 
colonial government in 1952 (Campbell, 1993: 262). But it appears that as some Kikuyu were 
being driven out of the area, others moved in at the same time as the colonial power was 
engaged in armed conflict with African freedom fighters. The Kamba migrants started moving 
into this area mainly after 1940. The Kamba family of Reverend Mumo that migrated to this 
area and opened the first Africa Inland Mission (Africa Inland Church) is particularly said to 
have opened the area for other Kamba migrants. The church presence is quite evident in the 
town, running a school and a health centre. The Kamba population is not confined to the town, 
and most of them are to be found between Njoro and Ndonet.
306
  
Going by their names, one would think that many „Maasai‟ were doing farming. But many of 
these people posing as Maasai, at times clad in full traditional regalia, are non-Maasai or are 
not recognised as Maasai. Most of these „impostors‟ are Kikuyu. I met one ole Nkanka who 
was said to have been originally Ng‟ang‟a from Kiambu in central province.307 He insisted he 
is Maasai though and posed a very controversial question in his defence: “What part of me 
does not look Maasai...(laughs)”. I did not tell him that his accent as he spoke Swahili clearly 
showed that his first language was likely to be Kikuyu. That was before I met a stream of 
others who had also strategised to legitimise their residential rights. Individual migrants 
tended to prefer some form of assimilation while those who had migrated in large groups or as 
families maintained distinct identities and lived in certain geographical areas.  
Although Shah argued that the Maasai hawana neno (“they are peaceful”), and that they were 
not “bothered” by the presence of other groups, there was evidence to the contrary. The 
Maasai  have gradually become vociferous particularly in the wake of increased politicisation 
of ethnicity from the late 1980‟s. Complaints that “people from outside” had relegated them to 
the periphery “on our own soil” were common. But Margaret, a Kamba teacher living in the 
area since 1980 noted: “I have not witnessed anything like ethnic clashes here and there can‟t 
be” (Loitokitok, 20/09/2000). She argued that because there are many ethnic groups in the 
area, the Maasai have a problem identifying a particular group at which to direct their 
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anger.
308
 But there are cases where pieces of land bought by non-Maasai are repossessed and 
„foreigners‟ property destroyed. The general elections of 1992 and 1997 were marred by 
harassment of non-Maasai groups and eviction threats. With glaring disparities in the control 
and ownership of property, Loitokitok looks potentially explosive. The Maasai are not just 
concerned about ethnic competition for resources, but also feel incapacitated and vulnerable. 
Some said they were not “equipped” to compete effectively in the lucrative commercial 
farming and business ventures. Distinct from the cattle keeping Maasai, predominantly non-
Maasai actors operate sophisticated irrigated farms producing French beans that are exported 
to Europe. Besides, non-Maasai also run modern restaurants, wholesale shops and control 
long distance grain trade using heavy commercial lorries.  
Generally, young Maasai men are dissatisfied with this state of affairs. The bitterness 
emanates from what they see as an alienation by “newcomers” in „their‟ own backyard. 
Except for just a few Maasai, most seem to be bystanders, but excluded by „default‟. What is 
perhaps more disturbing is that much of this dissatisfaction is suppressed and only in very 
exceptional cases, overtly expressed. In one occasion, two young men (in their early 20‟s) 
almost shed tears as they narrated how Loitokitok sub-district had been “taken over” by 
“outsiders”. The bitterness of the two had been heightened by what they interpreted as an 
unwillingness on the part of the non-Maasai commercial farmers and traders to engage 
“Maasai” labour, taking this as a deliberate move to exclude the Maasai from optimal 
participation in the „local‟ economy. Their inadequate technical skills notwithstanding, they 
argued that “outsiders” had a moral responsibility to “involve” the Maasai in their “lucrative” 
activities as quid pro quo. It is one of these young men who said that “outsiders make money 
as we watch.” Forster et al. wrote: “It is possible that the Maasai will use their identity in an 
instrumental way to secure what they see as their just rights...the Maasai...are not yet involved 
in many commercial ventures with a high degree of valued added” (2000: 145, italics mine). 
The question of agency here is important. While Forster et al. talks about involvement as 
something that the Maasai can choose to do, the young men saw this as a responsibility that 
rested squarely with „others‟. This also raises the question of comparative need; that is, it is 
the non-Maasai who had made the Maasai look bad! (not to be progressive).  
Some of the Kamba residents I spent time with (e.g. Mualuko) said that at times, their 
property is targeted in robberies or for ridicule. In public meetings, said Mualuko, Maasai 
chiefs and politicians stress that “people from outside who came here and made money, do not 
look down on the Maasai, they are your bosses, they are your bosses…and we can drive you 
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out” (Makutano, Loitokitok, 19/09/2000). Generally speaking though, Loitokitok has been 
fairly calm, with the Maasai appearing to be “suffering without bitterness”(cf. Schlee, 2002). 
However, below I discuss some of the strategies that the Maasai deploy to enhance their status 
and authority. 
 
6.3.3   “If you respect us, then you can stay” 
Maasai history is marked by conquests and cultural superiority enhanced by the possession of 
large herds of cattle and control over vast lands. These attributes have instilled in them an 
unmatched sense of pride. Although much has changed over the years, the Maasai still remain 
a proud people. The Maasai recognise that much has changed since the 19
th
 century, with 
mixed fortunes; loss of land, declining herds, disease and their being dragged into a new 
social, political and economic dispensation. But despite these setbacks, the pride of being 
Maasai has not been lost and many resist any form of intimidation.  
Although the Maasai may, in view of the dominant role played by migrant groups in business 
and commercial farming, appear a subordinated group, they cleverly set certain conditions for 
accommodating “foreigners”. During interviews, I was repeatedly told by Maasai respondents 
that non-Maasai living in their territory should accord them anganyet, that is, “respect”, and 
recognition. I found out that migrant Kamba, who acted “disrespectfully”, were usually 
chased away or “warned”. The bottom line is: The Maasai attach special importance to being 
honoured and dignified. Anganyet featured prominently during conversations with Maasai 
respondents. It is safe to conclude that as in the days of old, the Maasai expect to be accorded 
honour, not just because of their historical military might and large herds, but as hosts to 
migrant non-Maasai groups. During interviews, the Maasai stressed that they are “friendly” 
but since it is the non-Maasai who are in „their‟ land, and not the other way round, then „they‟ 
should show gratitude and “respect”.  
It was not uncommon to hear the Maasai say, kiyeu neishori iyok anganyet (“we have to be 
respected”). So what do the Maasai mean by “respect”? Before answering this question, it 
would be important to note that the concept had been instrumentalised during the multiparty 
campaigns of the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, during which the KAMATUSA politicians 
threatened to evict “foreigners” unless they “respected the wishes of the hosts”, which 
basically meant supporting the ruling party. Unexpectedly, demands for ethnic territorial areas 
ended up pitting some of the KAMATUSA groups against one another.
309
At the time of my 
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 Presenting his views to the Land Commission, a Minister of State Mr Julius Sunkuli claimed that the Kipsigis 
have no right to live in Trans Mara district which should only be for the Maasai. This was however challenged 
by the Kipsigis Trans Mara civic leaders who argued that the two groups have lived together peacefully since 
1949 (see The Daily Nation, Monday, July 2, 2001)  
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study, the Maasai were using the concept slightly differently although this instrumentalisation 
process had shaped their ethnic consciousness.  
I shall use a “Kamba village” in Maasai territory to illustrate this notion of “respect”. The 
village is located in a place called Nkaatu
310
 which has maintained some semblance of Kamba 
identity, many years after the first Kamba migrants settled there during the colonial period. 
Although some of the Kamba (over a thousand) are associated with mbaa Nganga (the lineage 
of Nganga) said to have migrated here in the 1930‟s, there were many other Kamba not from 
this lineage. Like the first migrants, most of the Kamba here trace their origins to Kilungu and 
Mukaa areas, now in Makueni district. Survival here is said to have been easier in the past 
when the Maasai were less sedentary.  
As more and more Maasai set up more permanent homesteads, the Kamba were under 
pressure to adopt and practice certain Maasai rites of passage including female circumcision. 
This made it possible to give and take wives from each group. In fact, the people in the village, 
which include the Kikuyu, speak Maa, Kikamba and Kikuyu. Talking to one of the residents, 
Mr Mwangangi Mule,
311
 a third generation Kamba, I realised that I was neither talking to a 
Kamba nor a Maasai. Apart from mixing Kamba with Maa, he used “we” interchangeably, 
often exclusively for the Kamba and occasionally inclusive of both Kamba and Maasai. But in 
spite of cross-ethnic marriages, the village is conspicuous because of farms and „Kamba huts‟ 
in the midst of Maasai pasturelands and homesteads. However, one sees some „Maasainess‟ in 
the Kamba dwellings. While the houses have mud walls, wooden doors and grass-thatched 
roofs, they are grouped together like a typical Maasai enkang. This arrangement was adopted 
to keep the amount of bare ground freed from bushes and grass to a minimum, otherwise that 
would have brought them on a collision course with the Maasai pastoralists. On the other hand, 
these enlarged homesteads were potentially useful for security in the event of a Maasai attack. 
While the Kamba were under enormous pressure to conform to Maasai lifestyles, the hosts 
made some concessions. The Kamba were „allowed‟ to have farms where they grew crops like 
maize and beans. In any case, the agricultural produce supplemented Maasai diet. In the 
course of time, the Kamba and the Kikuyu established a church and a school which now serve 
all the ethnic groups.  
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 In Imaroro, Mashuru division of Kajiado district. 
311
 The pastor of the local Anglican church. 
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In recent times, Kamba survival has been pegged on other „conditions‟. 312  During the 
multiparty campaigns of 1992 and 1997, for instance, many Kamba could not fully identify 
themselves with opposition politics. Mwangangi said that the Kamba strategies to get 
accommodated by the Maasai often leads them to “extremes...we end up being more Maasai 
than the Maasai themselves” (Mwangangi, Nkaatu, 12/09/2000). In fact, on that material day, 
the Kamba presidential candidate in the 1997 polls, Mrs Charity Ngilu, toured Imaroro (just a 
few kilometres from Nkaatu) to meet the local people. But very few Kamba attended the rally 
fearing that they would be branded „opposition‟, thereby jeopardising their „peaceful‟ 
coexistence with the Maasai. Ironically, the Maasai attended the meeting in large numbers.  
Besides these sacrifices, the Kamba have had to make other concessions. Much of the local 
leadership is in the hands of the Maasai irrespective of the availability of what Mwangangi 
called “more qualified Kamba”. What is more, although Nkaatu Sub-location was older and 
more prominent than Imaroro (which is dominantly Maasai), Nkaatu was denied the status of 
a “location” in favour of Imaroro. Mwangangi says: “They never want us to be prominent in 
their land...but we could not fight for it...they can drive us out”. In other words, for the Kamba 
to win acceptance, they have had to make sure that they comply with Maasai demands. 
Kriesberg (1998: 183) avers that groups may coexist peacefully without overt signs of conflict 
but one could be dominated by the other. He notes that the domination might be so severe that 
the subordinated party does not consider it feasible to raise any challenges and may accept the 
domination as if it were legitimate. However, the kind of dominance demonstrated by the 
Maasai here is slightly different. If the Kamba are „dominated,‟ then it is perhaps what 
Bourdieu calls “disguised dominance” (1990: 128), where dominance is contested.  
 
 
“Respect” for the elders 
I would like to look at “respect” from another dimension. Empirically, this excludes demands 
for assimilation or integration. The Kamba do not have to adopt Maasai practices or seek 
naturalisation in order to secure their residential rights in Maasailand. Sitonik says: “We are 
not asking anybody to be Maasai, no, but if you live here, know that we are different, we have 
a tradition, elders have to be respected...it is not just the Kamba, even our other brothers 
(sections) when they mock us, we fight”. As noted previously, respect and honour are 
cherished virtues among the Maasai. In fact, although many conflicts between the Kamba and 
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 In ecology, Pontin (1982) notes that one of the “conditions of coexistence” is that different species stabilise 
ecosystems by possessing different abilities. Among human groups, the “conditions” are negotiated depending 
on the social, economic and political context.  
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the Maasai have been occasioned by cattle raids, the driving force is arguably an attempt to 
restore Maasai pride, honour and dignity.  
To illustrate what “respect” in practice meant in certain contexts, I would like to discuss the 
experience of a non-Maasai medical nurse who worked in an AMREF supported dispensary in  
a place called Ematoroki. Her duties included diagnosis and treatment of common diseases 
among the local Maasai. In October 1999, something very unusual happened. A group of 
Maasai murran came to the dispensary and beat her up for “embarrassing elders”, that is, for 
injecting them in the buttocks. She was accused of “undressing old men and humiliating 
them”. Narrating the incident, one of the old men said in broken Swahili: “Wazee 
walilalamika na watoto wetu wakaona watie yeye tabia kidogo”, which means, “the old men 
complained (about her) and our sons saw it wise to discipline her”.313 She was forced to 
abandon her work. Although I had been told that she was Kamba, I established that she was 
not. It is rather mysterious how they had arrived at the conclusion that she was Kamba. The 
point however is that whatever she did amounted to “humiliating” old men who “deserve 
respect”. The punishment meted out to her was meant to be “a lesson for those people who do 
not respect the Maasai”. I was told that if she had been “Maasai”, she would not have done 
“something like that”.  
The corrective action taken by the Maasai underscored their intolerance of demeaning 
practices particularly from those defined as strangers.
314
 It shows the extent to which they 
detest real and imagined subordination on their soil. But there is a gender dimension too, 
which compounds the ethnic aspect. The Maasai elders, who are men, were particularly 
alarmed because the person “humiliating” them was a woman. Although the dispensary was 
closed after the nurse left, the Maasai said that honour took precedence over medical care. 
Their reaction goes beyond the reification of culture, where people say “in our culture we do” 
and “in our culture we don‟t” (Baumann, 1996: 4), to setting certain don‟ts and dos arbitrarily 
as preconditions for accommodation.  
 
6.3.4   The Maasai as “indigenous people” and the politics of recognition 
The Maasai are not just famed for the resilience of their cultural practices but also for the vast 
lands they lost during and after colonial rule. As they reorganise themselves to fight for the 
protection of their cultural heritage and to reclaim lost lands, they have made a case to join the 
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 In Ematoroki, Kajiado district; 29/01/2000. The respondent did not want to be identified fearing that what 
they did to the woman nurse may have some repercussions.  
314
 During the ethnic clashes of the early 1990‟s, „foreigners‟ working as teachers, medical personnel and others 
running  businesses were chased away from Mt. Elgon and West Pokot areas, creating a vacuum in the provision 
of essential services.  
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ranks of world‟s indigenous peoples. Who are indigenous people? It is a concept that brings to 
mind, among others, the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, the Red Indians 
of America and the Innu of New Foundland in Canada. These are groups whose identities are 
normally tied to their lands, usually lost either to accommodate migrant settlers or as an 
attempt by governments to create space for wildlife conservation or mineral exploration. 
Eriksen defines indigenous peoples as “aboriginal inhabitants of a territory, who are 
politically relatively powerless and who are only partly integrated to the dominant nation 
state” (1997: 40). While in some cases only a single ethnic group is involved, in others, it is 
an amalgamation of peoples. In nearly all the cases, there have been attempts to transform 
these societies into western oriented lifestyles. Indigenous groups have been closely 
associated with colonialism and marginalisation. “Indigenous people” therefore, are normally 
found in places particularly where descendants of European immigrants remain a dominant 
political and economic force in a formerly colonised, or where previous occupants have been 
reduced to a minority (see Morris-Hale, 1996: 12). To what extent therefore, would the 
Maasai qualify as an „indigenous‟ group?  
 
In search of legitimacy 
While the Maasai are aggressively pursuing education and market economy, they have also 
used their heritage and their history of land losses to have an edge over other groups. In his 
politics of recognition, Charles Taylor (1994) goes against conformity and modelling, arguing 
that recognition is a basic human need. However, he stresses the need for the external 
authenticity of the “oppressed” group. And that is basically what the Maasai have done by 
seeking to reclaim lost lands at regional, national and also at international fora. Looking at 
Levy‟s (1997) classification of cultural rights, what eludes the Maasai is the legal enforcement 
of their claims, partly because of the controversy surrounding their claims. Apart from seeking 
to be recognised as a marginalised group, the Maasai leadership has made frantic efforts to 
transform the ethnic identity of their group to bargain for „higher‟ stakes. At least 
metaphorically, being an „indigenous‟ group has gradually become the Maasai basis for 
representation and organisation. Whether the Maasai have succeeded to acquire this status is 
still debatable. However, appropriating this title has not only made the Maasai „unique‟ but 
has also elevated them to another level in the highly competitive multiethnic Kenyan society. 
At least, it has been used to negotiate for more political influence. After the Durban 
conference in South Africa in 2001, in which the Maasai sent delegates, the campaign for the 
recognition of ancestral property rights has intensified. It is in such global arenas where 
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Maasai elite, ordinarily clad in designer „western‟ clothing, are seen in the traditional Maasai 
shawls, loin-clothes and ornaments.  
However, besides the gimmicks, the objective has been to recapture lands the Maasai lost in 
history, secure certain guarantees for the same, and to protect their rich cultural heritage and 
artefacts. It has been a move to convert „Maasailand‟ into „Maasai land‟. The crusade, has, in 
the process, reinvented new collective identities and a fight for self determination, drawing 
similarities to Pfaff-Czarnecka et al. (1999: 13) observations. But instead of the Kenyan 
government containing what the authors call a “minority complex”, in the wake of such 
minority movements, it encouraged the Maasai cause in what appeared to be a way of keeping 
the “big tribes” on their toes.315 Actually, the Maasai are not the only Kenyan group seeking 
to be recognised as „indigenous‟. In fact, the Okiek, the Dorobo, the Cherangany and the 
Elmolo could be more persuasive cases.
316
 However, the Maasai have stolen the show and 
attracted more public attention. And there is little doubt that the Maasai have almost 
convinced the world that they are a disadvantaged minority group. And there is empirical 
evidence that this has not necessarily been an elitist campaign staged in Nairobi and other 
world cities. A respondent, Mr Sitonik, told me that it was one way to ensure that the Maasai 
are “taken seriously”. The comment was reminiscent of how a Kamba research partner, Ms 
Mwende, justified Kamba‟s quest for the presidency in the 1997 elections, saying that the 
group was seeking “recognition” in Kenyan politics. In other words, these two neighbours 
have been doing different things to achieve similar goals. Nevertheless, while the Maasai 
could still field a presidential candidate, the Kamba are locked out of the indigenisation 
discourse. The Kamba and the Maasai contrast in some other ways. While the Maasai have a 
semblance of a „Maasai cause‟, the Kamba lack a „tribal agenda‟, something around which the 
group could coalesce or get mobilised. They can only dream of the deep sense of 
„Maasainess‟. This difference is underscored by Amponsem, who, writing on ethnic groups in 
Ghana, highlights that groups differ in internal solidarity, some being unable to create a 
common identity for purposes of achieving common goals (1996: 160). 
The Maasai agenda has been pushed by influential personalities. In October 2000, a Maasai 
cabinet minister Mr William ole Ntimama called for the return of “all Maasai land annexed by 
the colonialist or grabbed by post-independence settlers”.317 He called for compensation for 
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 Coming from a “small tribe”, Moi  tried to broaden his political constituency by bringing together many 
Nilotic groups. This was aimed at enhancing his position vis-à-vis  the “big tribes”. There are more details in 
chapter seven.  
316
 These groups have equally been seeking recovery of their lost lands and protection of their dwindling forest 
based economies. Unlike the Maasai, they have not had an influential leadership to press for their case. However, 
it is important to note that the Dorobo and the Okiek, just like the Maasai, are Maa speaking groups.  
317
 See The People, Monday, October 2, 2000. 
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lands that cannot be reverted back to the group. The minister also criticised the principle of 
“equitable distribution”, claiming that it had not been applied to the Maasai, particularly in 
education. He noted: “We have been victims of discrimination in the past, we have also been 
victims of geographical exclusion and victims of underdevelopment”. He did not stop there. 
The self styled “Maasai spokesman” read a detailed memorandum to the Njonjo Land 
Commission
318
 in which he noted that the Maasai had lost “too much” land through “dubious 
transactions”. He said that land dealers “took advantage” of illiterate Maasai to undervalue 
and sell large tracks of land in Maasailand, and that land speculators worked in cahoots with 
the land control boards to dispossess the Maasai. He retraced the problem historically, noting 
that the Maasai presented their grievances to the famous Carter Commission of 1933
319
 where 
the group‟s representatives showed that their land had been carved out, but were apparently 
ignored.
320
  
Earlier in the year, January 2000, the Maasai quest for indigenous status had got a major boost. 
A group of Australian Aborigines visited Maasailand to „brainstorm‟ on how to reclaim their 
land. The four Australians had also toured the Arusha region of Tanzania to consult with the 
Maasai across the Kenyan border. This group was led by Fred Tanner, a land rights lawyer. 
They visited several areas of Maasai territory, ate in Maasai homesteads and held lengthy 
discussions. The trip was organised by a British NGO, Pilotlight. In fact, in 1998, 10 East 
African Maasai delegates
321
 visited Australia. Regarding the Aborigine visit to East Africa, a 
writer who covered the story noted: “Both communities (the Australian Aborigines and the 
Maasai) complain that their land is encroached upon and that their way of life is threatened by 
this encroachment...they feel that modern civilisation poses a major threat to their existence”. 
The similarities between the two were said to be that both groups “cling stubbornly to their 
past ways of life while at the same time being forced to change in order to fit into a modern 
way of life” (see Benson Kimathi, 2000). 322 
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 Mr Charles Njonjo, a Kikuyu and a Moi ally, was appointed chairman of the land commission set up in 1999 
which handed in its report in October 2002. He was an immensely powerful attorney general in the Kenyatta and 
Moi regimes. 
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 A Commission that had been set up by the British colonial government. 
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 The Daily Nation, Wednesday, August 30, 2000. Ethnic claims to lands lost in the colonial time is not 
uncommon in Kenya. The Pokot have for instance staked claim to about 48,000 acres of Agricultural 
Development Corporation land in Trans Nzoia. Presenting their views to the Land commission in 2002, they also 
demanded compensation from government for land occupied by “other tribes” in Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, 
Marakwet and Bungoma districts (see The Daily Nation, Friday, April 19, 2002). 
321
 The delegates included a Kenyan High Court judge, Ole Keiwua (later Court of Appeal), Keriako Tobiko, a 
lawyer, Dr. Naomi Kipury, an anthropologist and Ben Lobulu, chairman of the Tanzanian Human Rights 
Monitoring Group. 
322
 In an article entitled “a tale of two tribes”, The Daily Nation, Saturday, February 26, 2000, pp 5-7. 
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Plate 5: Maasai murran (warriors) admiring the hairy hand of Fred Tanner who led the Aborigine group during 
the Maasailand tour. The physical differences are rather obvious, but the two groups are united in their quest to 
restore land rights.
323
  
 
Other points of commonality may include;  the fact that they lost land to „foreign powers‟ and 
that their respective governments have not done enough to restore these lost treasures, at least 
to their satisfaction. Just like the Maasai, the Aborigines were for long portrayed as a 
primitive group, not least by researchers. There are accounts of how whites in Australia, as 
they alienated land, would poison waterholes in Aboriginal areas while others engaged in 
human-hunting activities shooting native people as a form of sport (Banton, 1983: 121). These 
are some historical facts that legitimise the Aboriginal cause and weaken the Maasai one. I 
shall revisit this below.  
 
Are the claims legitimate?  
The Maasai have the advantage of winning sympathy and international recognition as the 
most well known ethnic group outside Kenya‟s borders. While there is no denying that the 
Maasai meet some of the “indigenous” criteria, their claims beg some fundamental questions. 
Eriksen‟s definition of indigenous groups (above) appears to disqualify the Maasai. Whereas 
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 Photo copied from the The Daily Nation (ibid.). 
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they lost land under a colonial power, and the post-independence state has not corrected these 
anomalies, and while there is need to preserve their endangered cultural heritage, one may still 
ask: Are they a minority group? are they marginalised? If they are „indigenous‟, which 
Kenyan groups are not? One may also ask, which part of Kenya are the Maasai indigenous to? 
Let me address these questions systematically. Let me start with the controversial land 
question. Any attempt to recover real or imagined traditional territory would be difficult to 
justify, for different territories were under the control of different groups throughout history. 
Some of the lands the Maasai lost through questionable treaties with the British, had been 
brought under Maasai control through military conquest of other groups before the Maasai 
might started to decline in the late 1880‟s. In any case, in contemporary Kenya, landlessness 
is almost synonymous with being Kikuyu, who also lost land during the colonial period. 
Besides, save for the land the Maasai have lost to wildlife conservation efforts, most of the 
non-Maasai who have migrated to Maasailand or continue to do so, are in many ways just as 
disadvantaged as the Maasai themselves. These are peasant populations practicing small scale 
farming or keeping some animals.  
Actually, those who own hundreds of acres, fenced off and inaccessible to the Maasai 
pastoralists during drought, are fellow Maasai chiefs, politicians, senior civil servants and the 
educated elite. Looked at from this angle, the Maasai crusaders would appear to be taking 
advantage of their well documented loss of land to the British to exclude other groups from 
their midst. Whereas the links with the Australian Aborigines are quite noble, the only 
problem is that those non-Maasai who have „encroached‟ on Maasai territory are not the same 
„powerful and mighty‟ group that took over Australia‟s Aboriginal lands following Captain 
James Cook‟s exploration of Australia in 1770. If the British were still a colonial power in 
Kenya, or those left behind were still holding large chunks of Maasai lands, then the claims to 
indigenous status would, in my view, be more legitimate. 
Are the Maasai a „minority‟? When you talk to them, the Maasai do not consider themselves 
as a „minority‟ group. After all, as the eighth most populous group in a country with 42 ethnic 
groups, the Maasai would not be an obvious „minority‟ group, at least in the demographic 
sense. Moreover, the numbers exclude other Maa-speaking groups like the Samburu and the 
Njemps.
324
 What is more, they have three vast administrative districts in their name. One 
would also have problems presenting the Maasai as marginalised or as a minority in the 
political sense. We are not talking about a group of people that are down trodden, ignored, 
insignificant and who, as Kituyi (1990) argued, are merely being dragged into mainstream 
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socio-economic structure and politics. On the contrary, at least in the Moi regime, the Maasai 
were part and parcel of the decision making process itself, with some of the most powerful 
and influential cabinet ministers in government. Moi‟s long time friend and co-founder of 
KADU during the freedom struggle, Justus ole Tipis, was one of the most revered and 
powerful ministers in his cabinet in the 1980‟s. In the cabinet drawn after the 1997 elections, 
the Maasai had three cabinet positions including the vice-presidency. One could argue that it 
is actually because the Maasai are not „marginalised‟ that they have managed to bring the 
indigenisation question into the international fora. The „closeness‟ between the Maasai and the 
Kalenjin is one shaped not only by loose ethnic links, similarities in cultural practices, 
„marginality‟ (during Kenyatta‟s regime) and geographical proximity but more importantly, 
their common hatred for and mistrust of the Kikuyu.  
In Kenya, there is a diversity of opinion as to what constitutes ancestral land rights or where 
such rights should apply. Apart from the Maasai and the Okiek; the Indian, Somali, Arab and 
Nubian groups lament that they are treated as second class citizens. It is a complex debate that 
revolves around ancestry, history and political power. In the clamour for multipartysm that 
preceded the 1992 elections, a group of six
325
 politicians came together to found Forum for 
Restoration of Democracy (FORD). An exasperated President Moi quipped that one of the 
leaders of this popular front, a Kenyan-Arab named Salim Bamahriz, was not a Kenyan and 
should go back to his native Yemen. Little did Moi know that he was getting himself into a 
quagmire, for pegging citizenry strictly on ancestry. Mr Bamahriz eloquently told Moi that he 
would be more than willing to go back to Yemen provided that the President also joins him by 
going back to the ancestral home of the Kalenjin, namely southern Sudan. The President 
tactfully withdrew from the debate. 
It is important to point out that the state has no policy on indigenous groups. In any case, the 
clamour for such status is also quite a recent development. An interview with a senior 
government official revealed that the state hesitates to “create” what he called “special 
groups” or “special Kenyans” stressing that “all Kenyans should be treated equally” by the 
state.
326
 Even after suggesting to him that the lack of action on the part of the state amounted 
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 Masinde Muliro and Martin Shikuku (Luhya); Oginga Odinga (Luo), Philip Gachoka (Matiba), George 
Nthenge (Kamba) and Salim Bamahriz (Arab). 
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 Writing on ethnic land rights in Kenya, John Kamau notes that the Trust Land Act Cap 288, Forest Act Cap 
385 and Government Lands Act Cap 280 do not recognise a subsection of the Maasai, the Okiek as a forest 
dwelling community. The Okiek, though organised under the Okiek People‟s National Assembly (OPNA) have 
not achieved much. And they are not an exception. A high court sitting in Nakuru (Rift Valley) failed to accord 
another small group (the Eldorois) land rights and rejected a plea to award them any benefits from Lake Bogoria 
National Reserve where they have subsisted for many generations (for details, see The Daily Nation,  Thursday, 
May 30, 2002). Kamau suggested that Kenya should borrow a leaf from Fiji which is one of the pioneer 
countries to recognise the rights of its indigenous people. Picking on Fiji however weakens his thesis for Kenya‟s 
groups cannot be clearly categorised into indigenous and non-indigenous groups. The issue of indigenous rights 
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to „inequality‟ since small minority groups were being pushed into the periphery, he was 
rather adamant. But in the same breath, the state has at least, tolerated the Maasai clamour for 
indigenous status. This is interesting because if the Maasai were to get legal backing to 
reclaim their lands, the state would be a loser, in view of Maasai lands it took and converted 
into national parks and game reserves. The question is: If the state does not back the Maasai 
cause in principle, why does it condone it? One explanation is that the campaign elevates a 
pastoral group (with whom the Kalenjin closely associate), to the political limelight. 
Underlying the Maasai quest for protection of their cultural heritage is a move that can 
adversely affect the livelihoods of groups living among them. Ntimama for instance, has on 
many occasions singled out the Kikuyu as unwanted migrants in Maasailand and in 1993, he 
was the force behind their eviction from parts of Narok district on excuses of environmental 
concerns. The Kikuyu sought legal redress. Mr Ngengi Muigai, a former legislator and 
nephew of the former president Kenyatta took Ntimama to court over forced ethnic evictions. 
The first mention of the case in the high court of Nairobi became an ethnic showdown as 
buses full of Maasai headed for the city. Inside the courtroom, the magistrate presiding over 
the case could hardly find her way to her bench as Maasai supporters occupied all available 
space in the courtroom. In a daring manner, she started by condemning what she called ethnic 
and political manipulation of the due process of law. Nonetheless, Ngengi did not win the 
case. 
Looking at the whole Maasai crusade, there has been an attempt to present them as victims of 
circumstances, creating the impression that the group qualifies to be treated as what Werbner, 
(1997) calls “communities of suffering”. The Maasai are portrayed as having suffered and 
experienced incessant exploitation and as passive victims who were unable to appropriate 
these unequal property relations. Hiding behind the collective notion that they have been 
cheated out of their land, the Maasai have in some cases repossessed lands that had mutually 
changed hands to non-Maasai, on the grounds that the sellers were “taken advantage of”. 
„Genuine‟ migrants (those who have accessed land „legitimately‟) resent being branded 
“grabbers”. Mualuko, the Kamba-Maasai, noted that some Maasai lay claim to lands they sold 
before when they get broke later or an opportunity presents itself (e.g. when there are ethnic 
tensions), they lay claim to lands they had sold before. There is no doubt that some land 
transactions beg for a review, but making it a collective problem, in which the Maasai en 
masse are presented as having been cheated out of their land, is too simplistic. Non-Maasai 
groups fear that if the Maasai indigenous claims were given legal enforcement, many would 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for minority groups has been raised elsewhere in Africa. In Botswana for instance, the Khoisan are fighting for 
the land they stand to lose in the Kalahari Desert to pave way for the mining of diamonds. 
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lose their property. It is not clear whether the state is wary of the backlash such a move would 
produce. 
Whereas Maasai claim for ancestral land rights and indigenous status is a battleground of 
conflicting opinions and interests, the groups living in their territory are fairly receptive to 
Maasai “indigenous” status provided this is not going to shape property relations. Although 
guaranteeing “indigenous groups” their lands has been seen as a key factor in the coexistence 
of “diverse populations” (cf. Pfaff-Czarnecka et al. 1999), such guarantees could threaten 
interethnic harmony, depending on how the guarantees are enforced and the meanings 
accorded such entitlements by the actors.  
  
6.4   Yielding to win acceptance 
 
Apart from the strategies and demands that the Maasai adopt to enhance their pride and self-
esteem in their territories, migrant groups also have their own strategies of winning 
accommodation and acceptance. I have already highlighted how the Kamba in Nkaatu 
suppress their political ambitions in order to win acceptance from the Maasai. 
Villarreal (1994) talks about how “subordinated” or disadvantaged people can strategise, by 
“yielding”, in order to wield power. The Kamba living in Maasai territory seem to have 
adopted a similar strategy to avoid conflicts. By „lying low‟, and posing as harmless, they win 
trust and acceptance from the Maasai, and in the process, access land and secure their 
livelihoods. In addition, through ethnic networks, the Kamba living in Ukambani appease the 
Maasai by allowing them to graze their animals “for free” during drought. Other concessions 
include lowering the price of cereals for the Maasai customers. By so doing, they secure the 
residence of their kin in Maasailand. Although most of these parcels of land have been 
acquired commercially, the Kamba know that their entitlement to land is anchored on other 
unspecified and arbitrary conditions, and not title deeds.  
As a student of Norman Long, Villarreal uses the actor-oriented approach to show how the 
„poor‟ or groups trapped in poverty adopt strategies like compliance and subordination to 
improve their livelihoods. She demonstrates that such disadvantaged groups access power “by 
acceding to the wishes of the other, thus relinquishing a possible social capacity or status to 
acknowledge a stronger, better or more appropriate bearer”(1994: 224).   
 
 
 
 
 
 227 
 
 
 
„Excelling‟ without being a threat 
In some extreme cases, some migrant Kamba adopt a strategy of building modest houses even 
when they would have preferred better structures. This is to avoid creating the impression they 
are doing well. But this impression management has its own complications. Some of those 
forced to be modest in order to avoid looking conspicuous are angry, since they are not 
necessarily better off. A migrant Kamba teacher, for instance, would be a source of envy due 
to the salaried job, way of dress and housing, and yet his/her income would be a small fraction 
of a Maasai keeping a large herd of cattle but clad in the traditional shawls and living in a mud 
house. To avoid ethnic tensions, however, such teachers choose to build a simple house (avoid 
brick- or stone-walled structures) in order to look quite „ordinary‟. Others borrow cattle from 
the Maasai, even when they can afford to buy them. The Kamba have to look worse off to win 
acceptance. The whole scenario reminds one of Goffman‟s (1969) dramaturgy.  
One cannot generalise that all Maasai are bystanders in the transformation process of the 
Kenyan society and economy. Whereas progressive non-Maasai may arouse ethnic hatred and 
tensions, this results mainly from the actual participation of the Maasai in the new modes of 
production. But one must underscore that the choice between transforming grazing areas into 
farms and retaining pastoralism represents one of the greatest challenges to the Maasai society 
today. While some have combined both with lots of success, many are sceptical. In any case, 
the Maasai do not keep cattle just for economic reasons. Cattle largely define their identity, 
being, history, heritage and social status. This special attachment to cattle explains why some 
Maasai pastoralists resist destocking even when the animals are dying of hunger or in the face 
of an imminent drought. In extreme cases, some would rather their children dropped out of 
school than sell cattle and pay school fees. To some of these, external dominance can be 
overcome not by participating in new modes of production but by keeping off and avoiding 
„comparison‟. And this remains a big challenge to the migrant non-Maasai groups who at 
times have to conform and comply in order to avoid envy and hatred. 
However, as I shall indicate below, the actors have a way of legitimising conflict if it occurs. 
 
 
6.5   Justifying conflict: “Axes in one basket will make noise” 
 
Looking at the examples above, it is clear that there are conflicts fuelled by competition and 
the drive to control scarce resources like land, cattle or water. These „known‟ differences 
however may be hijacked or instrumentalised by „tribal leaders‟ or politicians. In a fragile 
multiparty state, where party loyalties follow ethnic lines, the party in power may also take 
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advantage of potentially volatile interethnic relations to marshal support by pushing 
oppositionist groups back to the fold. The conflicting groups however, may have their own 
logic or explanation for their disputes. Mr Mavuthi, chairperson of Simba trading centre, 
where confrontations between the Kamba and the Maasai recur, looked at interethnic conflicts 
as “inevitable”. He cited a popular Kamba saying that mathoka me kyondoni kimwe maiema 
ukayany‟a (“axes in one basket will make noise”).327 I tried to develop a story out of this 
statement and the conversation lasted an entire afternoon. “In one basket” referred to the 
shared borders and territory: The Kamba and the Maasai share physical space, a demarcated 
geographical area, an ecological setting and the resources therein. This dimension of 
„common territory‟ lies at the centre of interethnic coexistence. It is the sharing of territory 
that puts groups on a collision course. This point is expounded more in the conclusion of this 
chapter and revisited in the last chapter.  
Having come to Simba in 1973 when the centre had only 8 residents
328
 and becoming its 
chairperson in 1975, Mavuthi said that experience had taught him that groups living side by 
side and conflict were inextricable. He posed: “If people from the same womb can fight, how 
about two tribes?” Schlee tells us that it is not unusual to find neighbouring groups with 
varying value systems committing aggression and killings against their rivals (1989: 40). 
Mavuthi was saying that what should be surprising and indeed striking is that the Kamba and 
the Maasai coexist peacefully at all. He said that “looking at other places,” the Maasai-Kamba 
relations were cordial. This aspect of relativity is crucial; what he had in mind was the 
recurring bloody conflicts among other Kenyan groups. The point is that interethnic conflicts 
have to be seen in relative terms. Following his analogy of axes and the basket, he confirmed 
that the „axes‟ rattle depending on their number,  the size of the basket and how hard the 
basket is shaken. On „the number of axes‟ he argued that one reason why conflicts were 
relatively fewer and “short-lived” was because of the population imbalance; the fact that the 
Kamba outnumber the Maasai. He reasoned that although the Maasai could easily lodge an 
onslaught against the Kamba migrants, the latter „fear‟ that such an act could provoke a 
backlash in Ukambani. Still on numbers, he noted: “Lucky enough, these people (Maasai) are 
not very many...can you imagine if they were several millions or something?...eem…by the 
way, how many are they?” After sharing with him the Maasai population as per the 1999 
census,
329
 he conceded that he had thought that they were “a little bit more”. He was glad to 
                                                          
327
 There is a similar saying among the Kikuyu: Mathanwa me kiondo kimwe matiagaga gukomongana. 
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 Seven of these were women. The centre had about 500 residents in 2000 but it is crowded during the day; in 
the evening, many people return to the villages. 
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 The Maasai population in Kenya was indicated as 584,488. 
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hear that they were fewer than he thought, for a bigger Maasai population, he reasoned, would 
destabilise migrant groups living in Maasailand. On the „size‟ of the basket, he surmised that 
whereas the Kamba had land shortage, the Maasai had “plenty of land.” 
Pursuing the “axes” metaphor further, I told him that axes would not rattle unless somebody 
shook the basket. He noted that those responsible for “shaking the basket” are the group 
members themselves, “leaders” (political) and the state/government. But being an actor keen 
to paint a rosy picture regarding Kamba-Maasai relations, he was quick to add that rattling 
does not necessarily suggest “trouble” and that groups may be vociferous about their 
“common interests” rather than infighting. And he was right on this, considering the rich body 
of ethnic stereotypes and war rhetoric which hardly materialises into actual confrontation but 
actually pre-empts it. But we did not stop there. Even in situations where the „noise‟ could 
mean conflict, he clarified that to make sure that the „axes‟ remain silent even when shaken,  
one could put in a piece of “cloth”, “cotton” or a “lubricant”. He identified such soft materials 
and lubricants as intermarriages, formal education, “deeper understanding” of each group‟s 
cultural practices and values and joint business ventures. 
It is important to point out here that although the Kamba and the Maasai often portray 
themselves as enemies and are also portrayed as such, during the “ethnic clashes” of the early 
1990‟s, attempts to drag the two groups into armed conflicts failed.330 Although both the 
Kamba and the Maasai were President Moi supporters, Kamba loyalty was divided.
331
 
Through the instrumentalisation of ethnicity, some Kamba migrants living in Maasailand were 
evicted between 1991-92 while others left out of fear. In addition, people posing as Maasai 
murran would cross into Ukambani, burn homesteads and raid cattle. The Kamba would 
occasionally retaliate by invading Maasailand and avenge for their losses. Ethnic tensions 
heightened but Maasai elders insisted that those attacking Kamba homesteads were “unknown 
people”. But even before leaders opposed to the ethnic conflict held meetings and resolved 
that the two groups should ignore the isolated attacks, it was clear that an outright conflict 
would not pick up. After a short while, normalcy was restored. This did not auger well for the 
instigators, for the idea was not just to punish the Kamba, who were still loyal to the ruling 
party. The inciters also wanted to ensure that conflicts started in the Rift Valley spread to 
other areas, which would have given the President an excuse to declare a state of emergency, 
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 As I noted earlier, these ethnic clashes, which were particularly intense in the Rift Valley, were politically 
instigated. Fearing a possible loss of their grip on power in the 1992 elections, the political elite among the 
KAMATUSA (see glossary) incited their groups to violently reclaim lands occupied by other groups in „their‟ 
territories. The conflicts were largely aimed at derailing the clamour for multipartysm and to punish ethnic 
groups that were sympathetic to opposition politics.   
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 Details regarding ethnic alliances are provided in chapter seven. 
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and as a consequence postpone the dreaded elections indefinitely. The inciters had assumed 
that since the Kamba and the Maasai are portrayed as enemies, inciting both groups to conflict 
would be easy. What they ignored is that groups sharing a territory can engage in 
“competitive coexistence”, whereby, as I indicated in chapter two, diverse interests are 
pursued without necessarily any recourse to armed conflict. 
Asking Mavuthi to explain why the instigators failed, he noted that the Kamba and the Maasai 
“fight their own wars”. Besides, as I have pointed out in chapter five, the two groups have 
strong bonds of interdependence which the instigators seemed oblivious to. These bonds, as I 
have noted above, act as the “lubricants” that inhibit the rattling of the “axes”. 
 
6.6   Explanations for ethnic conflict  
 
Before concluding this section, I wish to review some of the explanations offered by scholars 
with regard to ethnic conflict and see how their arguments compare with my findings. 
Disharmony in multiethnic societies is quite a complex phenomenon that is not easy to 
unravel. Morris-Hale (1996: 8) argues that in cases where conflict obtains, one should 
examine underlying social inequalities (see also Wood, 1993). Where resources are seen to be 
unequally distributed, this is likely to be a basis for hatred and disharmony. While this is also 
true in my case, I have also pointed out in chapter five that unequal distribution of facilities 
(e.g. schools) may not necessarily lead to conflict but rather be the basis for interethnic 
complementary exchange system.  
In his book, Racial and Ethnic Competition, Banton (1983) argues that in competitive 
situations, human beings act in order to maximise their net advantage and to optimise. He says 
that competition begins “when two individuals or groups want the same thing and strive for it 
within a market”(1983: 103). Just like Banton, Wood noted that conflicts are common where 
resources are limited and demand is high (1993: 84). Similarly, Blau noted that “competition 
occurs only among like units that have the same objective and not among unlike units with 
different objectives” (1964: 331). While there seems to be a consensus that groups will 
compete if they are interested in the same thing (e.g. land), they will not necessarily 
appropriate it the same way. This is illustrated by the clashes between Kamba farmers and 
Maasai pastoralists, in which different modes of land-use introduce additional fronts/areas of 
conflict.
332
 Besides, ethnic conflicts have been premised not just on competition for scarce 
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 Where tensions are not just out of the competition for land but about how it is used (e.g. the example given in 
the chapter where the clearing of bushes to create more farmland is seen by the pastoralists as depletion of 
pastures). 
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resources, but also on the “material dimension” of the “cultural” and on “symbolic” elements 
among groups (Zitelmann, 1997: 105, quoting Markakis, 1994: 217-37). This is the kind of 
ethnic antagonism that has greeted Maasai quest for indigenous status, with fears that such 
entitlement would jeopardise the livelihoods of other groups living in Maasai territory. 
Citing ecological theory, Banton notes that there are some ideas that could be borrowed from 
plants and animal ecology in terms of how they colonise new environments. He notes: 
“People of superior status are unwilling to compete on equal terms with those of inferior 
status; they represent the latter as belonging to naturally distinct categories and as therefore 
suited to a different place in the division of labour” (Banton, 1983: 79). The lower group, he 
notes further, “might struggle to acquire a niche in which they would enjoy relative security 
from competition with members of the more powerful group”. In my case, it would be 
difficult to say which group, between the Kamba and the Maasai, is more “powerful”. Power 
shifts depending on which group is vulnerable when (e.g. the vulnerability of the Maasai 
pastoralists during drought) and where (e.g. migrant Kamba populations being „subordinate‟ 
to the Maasai).  
Banton notes that where groups enjoy different privileges and power, it is difficult to make 
compromises. Citing the case of Australia, he notes that the whites were unwilling to enter 
into any treaties with the Aborigines since that would have meant recognition of the native 
groups as land owners. And yet such negotiations would have pre-empted tensions and 
conflict.
333
 Banton notes that “when men are subject to little social restraint they will pursue 
what they consider their interest without scruple, and will later seek to justify it in whatever 
way they can, including arguments like the others attacked them first, or that their action was 
necessary to ensure their own survival” (1983: 121). Banton however is talking about a group 
that is seeking separateness from another for fear that close association would compromise its 
control and appropriation of resources. This presents a different scenario from the Kamba and 
the Maasai, whose survival is intricately vested in sharing of territory and resources.  
The modernity-tradition theory has also been advanced to explain ethnic conflict. In Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, Horowitz (1985) critically examines the view that conflict is informed by 
tradition and that modernization would overcome it (see also, Morris-Hale, 1996: 1). 
Horowitz points out that conflict is largely a product of modernity itself. He says that groups 
may engage in conflict basically because they are the same or have similar interests or where 
the benefits of modernity are not spread equitably (1985: 97-101). The fact that sameness can 
lead to conflict as groups compete for similar resources attests to my findings. In chapter five, 
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 Compromises and concessions are considered as key dimensions of interethnic coexistence.  The discussion is 
revisited in the final chapter. 
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I noted that as the Maasai „modernise,‟ similarities in aspirations with the Kamba heighten 
competition in other fronts (e.g. schools and jobs). I have also pointed out that as the Maasai, 
hiding behind „modernity‟, revisit past interethnic transactions (e.g. where migrants got land) 
and nullify them, they raise ethnic tensions and incidences of violence.  Horowitz (1985: 166) 
argues that the best recipe for competition and conflict is where a “backward” group and an 
“advanced” one are juxtaposed together. While the disparities in education and integration 
into the monetary economy between the Kamba and the Maasai are discernible, this has 
created the basis for interdependence rather than conflict.  
Ethnic conflicts have also been associated with business rivalries where traders may compete 
among themselves, over customers or the so-called ethnic division of labour. Peil and 
Oyeneye note that societies where social differentiation is mainly based on race and where 
class, status and power positions correspond to racial identity, are more sharply divided than 
other societies (1998: 83). This is also what Andreas Wimmer calls “ethnically segregated 
labour markets” (1997b: 640). While these observations are plausible, I have pointed out that 
a group‟s monopoly of businesses ventures may not entrench ethnic divisions, hatred and 
conflict. Specialising in certain economic niches like business can serve the interests of a 
„host‟ group which predominantly pursues other interests (e.g. the Kamba running shops 
among pastoral Maasai). Banton‟s argument therefore that as groups stand in different 
relations to the market, divisions between them deepen, can be challenged. He admits though 
that class theory may not be an appropriate analytical tool among African societies which tend 
to be divided on ethnic rather than class lines (1983: 87-93).
334
 Banton takes this debate 
further by noting that in an attempt to maintain group dominance, members of a category may 
come together and create a cartel aimed at maintaining a monopoly. My study however shows  
the group that is „dominant‟ not trying to entrench itself but rather making attempts to conceal 
its „success‟ or legitimise their dominance as a consequence of the other group‟s failure to 
compete effectively. 
Ethnic conflict has also been explained in terms of culture. Furnivall (1948) and Smith‟s 
(1965) wrote about the concept of “cultural pluralism” in which ethnic differences in culture, 
history, preferences and imputed attitudes are said to lead groups into conflict (see also 
Banton, 1983: 91-94; Horowitz, 1985). Limitations in cross-cultural contact in non-plural 
societies (separate society) and lack of shared values are seen as fertile grounds for fomenting 
disharmony and conflict. Conflict is conceived as a clash of incompatible values. Smith has 
argued that where there is ethnic pluralism (i.e. where groups are hierarchically organised), 
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there is a strong tendency toward cultural domination by one of the groups.
335
 Horowitz says 
that the plural society theory ignores the role of elite in ethnic conflict, citing the case of the 
Philippines where ethnic prejudice is said to be most marked among professional and salaried 
middle class.
336
 What is more, in practice, it is possible to have a dominant culture in a non-
plural society. Jenkins argues that the concept has been used loosely for labelling all 
multiethnic societies. It is rather inconceivable to imagine groups “living side by side, but 
separately, within the same political unit” (Furnivall, 1948: 304). Such notions, which suggest 
a homogeneous nation-state consisting of isolated groups has been heavily criticised for not 
only contradicting the notion of fluidity and permeability of social boundaries but also for 
ignoring economic disparities and inequalities (Jenkins, 1997: 27-28). The study has shown 
that linguistic and cultural distinctions, transformational disparities and ethnic territories do 
not contribute to separateness but are actually the basis for interethnic exchange. 
Politicisation of ethnic differences is also seen as responsible for the creation of artificial 
boundaries and discontent of unprecedented scale in post-imperial societies (Wimmer, 1997b). 
Wimmer indicates that in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been a direct relationship between 
state-formation and ethnic conflict. He notes that this results from ethnicised state 
bureaucracies and where private competition becomes a matter of public politics as educated 
middle class from various groups feel disadvantaged over access to power.
337
 This is what 
Horowitz basically calls unevenly distributed legitimacy.
338
 Morris-Hale argues that most 
cases of ethnic disharmony in former British colonies have been erroneously blamed on the 
colonial policy of “divide and rule”. He holds the view that most cases of disharmony could 
be explained by the fact that there is movement away from national solidarity and political 
integration (“centrifugal ethnicity”) as individual ethnic groups seek instead their own 
autonomy (“centripetal nationalism”), where local attachments and loyalty take precedence 
over wider socio-political networks.
339
 Although none of the groups discussed here seeks 
sovereignty, the Maasai have been seeking protection rights for their lands and cultural 
heritage by pushing for an “indigenous group” status. These campaigns however have not 
been conducted violently and are contradictory since, on the other hand, the Maasai are 
increasingly “becoming Kenyans”.340 As the Maasai seek these rights, they are equally active 
in the „wider game‟, pursuing education and playing an active role in competitive politics. 
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Even during the ethnic clashes of the 1990‟s, apart from politicisation, the eviction of non-
Maasai from Maasailand was not aimed at autonomy but recognition, “respect”, and to stem 
or limit the continuous flow of migrant groups into Maasailand. I therefore disagree with 
Horowitz‟s generalisation that “when ethnic violence occurs, unranked groups usually aim not 
only at social transformation, but at something sovereign, autonomy, the exclusion of parallel 
ethnic groups from a share of power...” (1985: 31). While that may be the case in those 
conflicts that attract world attention, attention has to be drawn to other ethnic conflicts fuelled 
by livelihood concerns: Territorial boundaries, grazing areas, watering points and control of 
trading centres/markets.  
There are some scholars who trace some of the ethnic conflicts in Africa to the way the groups 
„traditionally‟ relate. While some argue that groups are inherently unstable and conflictual 
(e.g. Gluckman, 1965; Turner, 1972), Mazrui (1975: 67) controversially notes that in many 
traditional African societies, one was either a kinsman or a potential enemy since there was no 
intermediate category like “fellow citizen”. Such a clear dichotomous relationship is highly 
doubtful since groups did/do not relate with all other groups the same way. While some are 
considered enemies, others are allies. In fact, the Kamba-Maasai relationship shows that even 
enemies can maintain interdependence. Nevertheless, in most African societies, primary 
attachment is largely to the clan, sub-group or ethnic group, with many people relating to the 
state only at the tertiary level. This is also partly the reason why much of social and political 
insurgencies in Africa have been associated with problems of an „ethnic‟ nature. Quoting 
Magmata Diouf, Asowa-Okwe (1999: 96) notes that “ethnic issue is at the very heart of the 
bloodiest crises not only in Africa, but also in the former Yugoslavia”. However, Asowa-
Okwe goes further and talks about the excessive centralisation of power and the 
marginalisation of particular ethnic groups in accessing economic resources and political 
power as critical explanations for ethnic strive and conflict in Africa.  
Other factors attributed to ethnic conflict include the “very nature” of the post-colonial state 
as an authoritarian structure serving primarily the interests of those who control it and their 
external allies (Asowa-Okwe, quoting Mamdani, 1987). These ideas are taken up in chapter 
seven where, among other things, I show that ethnicisation of politics may not necessarily 
lead to ethnic conflict or threaten the political stability of the state. But there is no denial that 
the ruling elite can easily sow seeds of antagonism. A case in point is the unequal distribution 
of crucial facilities in various regions (e.g. educational facilities or water facilities), a factor 
that could trigger ethnic discontent, group tensions and conflict (Wimmer, 1997b: 638; 
Horowitz, 1985: 101; Morris-Hale, 1996: 20). Schooling facilities, for instance, are useful 
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tools in positioning individuals and groups in the competitive job markets while water is 
crucial for the sustenance of pastoral and farming groups. But again, claims of marginalisation 
in a multiethnic society have to be treated with caution. The Maasai, for instance, claim to be 
a marginalised group while holding key positions in government.
341
 Of course, participation in 
government cannot be construed to mean that equitable distribution of resources has been 
achieved or seen  as such. Most Kamba and Kikuyu I talked to felt that the Maasai were 
getting more government attention than them. While it is undeniable that Maasai leaders were 
highly influential during the Moi regime, some of these leaders cleverly pursued a popular 
post-colonial doctrine that portrayed the Maasai as marginalised. Wimmer cautions that in the 
job market, ethnic tensions are not necessarily heightened by real competition for those 
limited opportunities but rather the perception of equality and difference (Wimmer, 1997a: 21; 
original emphasis). 
It would be important to note that ethnic conflicts also spring from the demands of ethnic 
minorities for equal access to the rights of citizenship. Members of minority groups often lack 
access to government positions as well as being relegated to inferior positions in the political 
structure (Pfaff-Czarnecka et al. 1999: 17; Yinger 1994: 346). In Malaysia, Morris-Hale 
argues that while the Malay are politically dominant, the Chinese minority dominate the 
economic sphere, therefore having fairly clear lines of rivalry and conflict (1996: 181). Others 
see such disparities as unavoidable. Rothschild for example, notes that in multiethnic societies, 
there will inevitably be differential power among the groups (1981: 102). The Kamba-Maasai 
study shows that differential power among groups is not necessarily destabilising.  
 
 
 
6.7   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have made an attempt to show the intricate linkages between ethnic conflict 
and coexistence. The general conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that coexistence is a 
complex antagonistic process where interdependent groups oscillate between harmony and 
conflict. Conflict here is not viewed as a consequence of cultural differences but rather the 
rivalry for resources and the politicisation of ethnicity. To illustrate antagonism, I used 
various concepts like competition, dominance, destabilisation, marginalisation and co-
dominance. I started by looking at the aspect of ethnic territory, noting that although the 
imposed political boundary has assumed permanence, it is constantly being negotiated and 
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often triggers conflict, depending on the interests at stake (e.g. siting of amenities) or simply 
when the boundary is instrumentalised as a way of seeking concessions from one group. The 
second aspect I looked at is the competition for land, water and animal resources. Common 
disputes revolve around land and cattle as the two groups compete for grazing and farming 
space.  
It is also clear that disputes are closely tied to seasons: It matters whether there is drought 
which leads to transhumance and food shortages or whether there are adequate rains to 
support agriculture and regeneration of pastures. Variations in the weather conditions 
influence the magnitude of vulnerability and therefore the propensity to „invade‟ farms or raid 
cattle, consequently heightening ethnic tensions and conflict.  
The state, which controls large tracks of land through its wildlife, forest and agricultural 
research departments, brings itself on a collision course with groups that encroach on these 
lands on the one hand, and on the other, destabilises livelihoods and interethnic coexistence in 
its intervention to reclaim the land. Although such lands act as common territory in which 
different groups build strong bonds of interdependence, these are also arenas of ethnic conflict 
as groups compete to appropriate land whose ownership remains fluid. The so-called squatters 
know that the state authorities can take the land „back‟, but they also have a stake since such 
lands were originally taken away from them. In the Kamba-Maasai case, pursuing distinct 
modes of subsistence/land-use on land where each group claims user rights, makes it difficult 
for the groups to coexist peacefully. Although pastoralism and farming ordinarily complement 
each other, this proved difficult where there were no mutually agreed ethnic territorial 
boundaries. Besides, it turned out to be an arena in which politicisation of ethnicity took place, 
with the Maasai, taken as government supporters, would raid Kamba homesteads with 
impunity. Although the state authorities and politicians can be blamed for being an 
accomplice in ethnic conflicts, they play a crucial role in arbitration and normalisation of 
Kamba-Maasai relations. Besides, groups that have „invaded‟ state land may legitimise these 
acquisitions by going the “Kenyan way” where they do not confront the state authorities but 
rather combine these „invasions‟ with negotiation, lobbying and organising delegations to the 
head of state.
342
 But it is a complex situation, where groups adopt different strategies. On their 
part, the Maasai are trying to reclaim some of their lost lands and heritage by seeking to be 
recognised as an “indigenous group” with special property rights, a crusade that has met 
resistance, not least from non-Maasai groups whose livelihoods and entitlement to land in 
Maasailand is threatened. Since the state also stands to lose should the Maasai be granted 
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these rights, it has at best been ambivalent. All these scenarios demonstrate the regulatory 
function of the state on interethnic coexistence, a theme that is pursued in greater detail in the 
next chapter.  
A third important aspect that emerges from the chapter, just like in the previous chapter, is 
„common territory‟. While ethnic conflicts will often be associated with hatred, suspicion, 
mistrust, enmity and agitation for revenge, groups will most likely „coexist‟ (depend on each 
other) for as long as they share a common territory
343
 and resources. The bonds of coexistence 
will be particularly difficult to break if the groups occupy different ecological/economic 
niches in their shared territory. In the Kamba-Maasai case, the logic of justifying conflicts 
with the metaphor that “axes in one basket will make noise”, stresses the idea of common 
territory. In this metaphor, the “basket” represents territory. The actors see the inevitability of 
some form of conflict for as long as distinct groups share territorial space. 
The fourth aspect I would like to highlight is rivalry for business in trading centres. As the 
market economy entrenches itself particularly among the Maasai, trading centres in their 
territory are acquiring new meanings and unprecedented significance. This has meant that 
non-Maasai groups that have controlled business enterprises are confronted with new 
challenges as the Maasai seek to assert themselves. And yet, as I have noted, the Maasai are 
not necessarily competing by venturing into business themselves, but by seeking to be 
involved, to be recognised as the hosts, and to be “respected”. By making this ambiguous 
demand, the Maasai are hanging onto something that cannot be taken away from them. 
Besides, whereas they are marginalised in business enterprises, they have held political 
power
344
 and demand loyalty from those running businesses in their territory. This is what I 
have called „co-dominance‟, where each group wields certain powers in a given niche. 
Although this is not devoid of tensions and struggles, making concessions and recognising 
each group‟s contribution allows some semblance of equilibrium. Often, ethnic conflicts 
occur when a group oversteps the „limits‟ of tolerance/difference. Accommodation or 
acceptance is predicated on stiff conditions and sacrifices. For instance, the Kamba have to 
restrain themselves from challenging Maasai political authority.
345
 
I have also discussed other situations (e.g. Loitokitok) where coexistence takes the form of 
„bad peace‟346 and „dominance‟. But again, dominance is a very relative concept. Although 
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 „Common territory‟ here does not imply the absence of ethnic territorial boundaries. But such boundaries, like 
the railway line in the Kamba-Maasai case, do not inhibit the movement and exchange among groups.  
344
 Political power is held through Maasai chiefs, councillors and members of parliament.  
345
 Other conditions include Maasai demand that migrant groups living in their territory should not join certain 
political parties. 
346
 Living „peacefully‟ despite inequalities. 
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many Maasai in Loitokitok say that they are “dominated at home”, that is, non-Maasai groups 
are more privileged (particularly in economic terms), other Maasai would deny that they have 
been relegated to a subordinate status. Nevertheless, the marginalisation of the Maasai in the 
field of business ventures and commercial farming is evident. Loitokitok remains a potentially 
explosive case although the indigenous Maasai appear to have little chance of breaking the 
bonds of domination. But just like in the case of Simba, the Maasai wield political power 
which they use as a leverage. Moreover, if the non-Maasai groups were as dominant as they 
were made to appear, they would not be keen to conceal their „successes‟. This concealment 
meant that the Maasai are not entirely viewed as a subordinate group. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES (THE STATE/OTHER GROUPS) 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to show that ethnic groups do not coexist in a vacuum. In 
other words, interethnic coexistence has an external dimension. In the previous chapters, I 
have inevitably touched on various state departments and political elite, showing how they 
shape ethnic difference, modes of exchange and conflict. However, I have largely restricted 
myself to how these agencies influence group activities at the regional or „local‟ level. This 
chapter shifts the arena to the centre, to examine how Kenya‟s stability/instability is produced. 
I discuss this by looking at the Kamba and the Maasai as an integral part of the state, and as 
major players in Kenya‟s ethnic politics. This also involves looking at the broader context, 
that is, other ethnic groups, and how the Kamba and the Maasai interact with them in the 
competition for state power, state jobs and national resources (e.g. infrastructure). Equally 
important are ethnic alliances and how they shift to counter other alliances.  
As sovereign polities, states are products of historical and political processes, and may be 
differentiated by the way they distribute political power within the population (Eller, 1999: 
17). Kenya would fall under those states that are called Nation-building states, i.e., those that 
are in the process of becoming “nations” since they are yet to achieve national solidarity and 
political integration witnessed in older and more stable democratic states (see Morris-Hale, 
1996: 256). As a democratising and fragile multiethnic state, Kenya can be seen not just as an 
embodiment and symbol of ethnic integration and peaceful interethnic coexistence, but also as 
antagonistic. I am presenting an ambivalent state, whose power bearers are torn between 
sustaining a united cohesive multiethnic state and reinforcing ethnic divisions for their 
political survival. Pierson argues that one of the main functions of a “modern state” is to act as 
a “regulator” of its citizens activities (1996: 106). While that may not be disputable, it is also 
plausible to argue that ethnic groups, particularly in “Nation-building states”, equally regulate 
the state. Therefore, it is basically for analytical purposes that I look at the state and other 
ethnic groups as “external influences” to the Kamba and the Maasai, for all these players are 
intricately interconnected. 
I have noted in chapter six that despite being one of Africa‟s most stable states, Kenya has 
also experienced ethnic conflicts, but most of these have not threatened the stability of the 
state. In this chapter, I look at some of the policies initiated or adopted by the political elite to 
perpetuate itself in power and how they have impacted on ethnic politics. There has been a 
debate as to whether  Kenya‟s relative stability should be credited to the political leadership 
(which has occasionally promoted ethnic hatred and conflict as indicated in chapter six), or to 
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the restraint and resilience demonstrated by the Kenyan groups themselves. I have already 
noted that the ethnic clashes of the 1990‟s were perpetrated by political leaders and 
administrators, whose aim was to see conflicts that had started in the margins replicated in 
other places.
347
 I have, for instance, singled out the Kamba and the Maasai as some of the 
groups that ignored incitement to conflict. A political scientist, Mutahi Ngunyi (2002) avers: 
“Kenya has remained peaceful because its people have chosen peace. They were provoked 
into civil strife during the ethnic clashes of the 1990‟s but they did not cave in. The biggest 
lesson we learnt from these provocations was that there are no war-like Kenyans. What we 
have are just war-like leaders”. 348  This observation corresponds to Armstrong‟s (1998) 
statement that states have a lot to learn from ethnic groups with regard to tolerance and mutual 
acceptance. Horowitz (1985) argues that ethnic groups often operate as if they were sovereign 
states, forging alliances when necessary and signing peace treaties to avoid confrontation.
349
 
Peacemaking rituals among groups are said to be vigorously enforced with those who violate 
them being subjected to severe punishment to deter recurrence (see Oba, 1996: 120). In his 
discussion of the interethnic clan relationships among the Rendille, Sakuye, Gabbra and 
Somali of northern Kenya, Schlee highlights the “tribe-wide rituals” as an “integrative force” 
(1989: 50).  
While these examples clearly show that groups can regulate their coexistence, there is no 
doubt that the state remains a major influential force. Irrespective of the capacity of ethnic 
groups to live in peace, the overt and covert hand of the state authorities in interethnic 
transactions cannot be ignored. Schlee, for instance, draws our attention to the “one sided and 
unrestrained intervention of government forces” in the resolving of ethnic disputes in the 
northern parts of Kenya (2002: 22). This further underscores the significance of the state in 
interethnic coexistence. Although Rajah (1990) argues that the role of the state should not be 
over emphasised, ignoring this key player in a study of this nature would render it incomplete. 
I shall begin by showing how the politics of divide-and-rule, initiated by the colonial powers 
and retained by the post-independent state, have contributed both to Kenya‟s instability as 
well as stability. 
 
                                                          
347
 Distinctions are drawn between “conflicts at the centre” and “conflicts at the margins” (see Zitelmann, 1997: 
108-9; Fukui and Markakis, 1994: 3). 
348
 Sunday Nation, May 19, 2002. 
349
 He cites the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in Sri Lanka to illustrate this point. 
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7.1   State „stability‟ through divide-and-rule tactics 
7.1.1   The creation of „ethnic‟ districts 
One of the major challenges of the newly independent African states was to enhance 
integration against centrifugal forces (Ake, 1967: 17). An independent Kenyan state was born 
in 1963, but largely, it inherited the power structure, laws and bylaws established by the 
colonial British administrators. In fact, it was as late as 1968 that the Kenyatta government 
changed the laws that confined ethnic groups to their own districts.
350
 Nevertheless, his 
regime retained the ethnic based districts. In 1978, Moi stepped into Kenyatta‟s shoes after the 
latter‟s death. In spite of the fact that the Moi government repeatedly accused the former 
colonial powers of having sown the seeds of ukabila (“tribalism”) and hatred in Kenya, he 
created about 30 additional „ethnic‟ districts during his 24 year rule. Throughout Kenyatta‟s 
regime (1963-78), Kenya maintained 46 districts, which was also the number approved in the 
country‟s constitution. In fact, two Kikuyu MPs sued the state over the creation of the 30 
districts arguing that this had contravened the constitution and that such a move should have 
been backed by an Act of parliament.
351
 The question is, why did Moi create so many „ethnic‟ 
districts? But this even begs a more fundamental question, namely why did the newly 
independent African state retain districts that had been drawn along ethnic lines? This 
question is particularly important because the party that took over government after 
independence, KANU, stood for a centralised national system as opposed to KADU, which 
was for a federal system.
352
 The KANU government had even promised to abolish the 
provincial administration, and yet, the government not only retained it, but entrenched the 
same by creating more districts. A quick answer would be that the new African leaders 
realised that the same divide-and-rule method of the British would be useful for their survival 
and retention of power.  
What is a district? Just like the demarcation of African boundaries during the Scramble for 
Africa ignored ethnic territorial boundaries and therefore ended up creating artificial nation 
states, the creation of administrative districts within the Kenyan protectorate by the British 
was no exception. They were meant to be for certain “tribes” but since neither pure tribes nor 
pure tribal territories existed, they were created in the name of majority groups and sub-
groups in a given area. Where ethnic groups were assumed to be confined in one district, these 
territorial units were given the group‟s name (e.g. Embu, Meru and Kisii). Over the years, the 
significance attached to the district, as a channel for distributing national resources and as 
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 Irrespective of all the positive merits of this change, it was later seen as Kenyatta‟s ploy to enable the Kikuyu 
to move freely and settle in other parts of Kenya. 
351
 East African Standard, Wednesday, September 5, 2001; The Daily Nation (same dates). 
352
 KADU, the Kenya African  Democratic Union, dissolved itself in 1964 and its members joined the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU). 
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bases of ethnic leadership, meant that minority groups living among dominant ones in a given 
district were rendered insecure, since having a district translated into ethnic recognition from 
the state. President Moi exploited this aspect to create more districts. 
If some African scholars and government officials are justified in arguing that „tribalism‟ was 
unknown to African groups before the arrival of the Europeans (e.g. see Eller, 1999: 195), 
why have post-independence African states tended to uphold those divisive colonial policies. 
Ideally, there would be nothing wrong if Kenya were federal, with districts constituting 
„federal states‟, complete with autonomous local governments. On the contrary, Kenya is a 
centralised republic, the districts are headed by civil servants, and they are created for political 
convenience, literally on a whim by the head of state. The civil servants however wield much 
power within their areas of jurisdiction, making the country to have a semblance of a federal 
state, albeit through the back door. And just like in the colonial period,  these ethnic enclaves 
are usually not headed by officers from the local ethnic groups. Detached from the local scene, 
these officers‟ only loyalty and source of power is the central government. Having no 
adequate knowledge of the regional dynamics, the power relations, social structure, cultural 
practices and local interests, these officers are alienated from the local people. This alienation 
however is „good‟ for the state, since, just like in the colonial times, the officer is not 
accountable to the local people, who in turn are expected to „fear‟ the authority of the state. 
Besides, the officers are transferred arbitrarily, before they have established any power bases. 
They normally serve the interests of state‟s functionaries or local power brokers who could 
work for their transfer or their sack if the officers exercise a considerable degree of 
independence. Working in unfamiliar environments forces them to address gatherings either 
in Swahili or English, irrespective of whether their audience understands them or not. In a 
nutshell, although the state grants ethnic groups an emblem of identity by creating districts for 
them, it weakens the base for a strong regional authority and self-determination. This is what 
can be called the “institutionalisation of strangeness”, where „aliens‟ run the affairs in 
territorial areas away from home theoretically not bound to the local ethnic group, sub-tribe or 
clans by loyalty (see Simmel, 1958; Schutz, 1964).  
 
Creation of districts during the Moi era 
As I have noted above, President Moi created about 30 new districts during his rule. Creation 
of a district means additional costs, in terms of administration and construction of buildings. 
Moi created these units under very prohibitive economic conditions. The Kenyan economy 
was basically in a pathetic state partly due to fluctuations in tea and coffee prices, a 
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deteriorating tourism sector and corruption. Tourism was particularly affected by the “ethnic 
clashes” of 1991-93 and 1997. Secondly, the IMF and World Bank were pushing for a leaner 
civil service. Apart from these economic limitations, the new districts created, just like the 
older ones, were multiethnic, contrary to the political elite‟s rhetoric of “rewarding” certain 
groups.
353
 What is more, as the state created new districts, ethnic groups, sub-groups and clans 
fought over territorial boundaries, the areas that were to be included or excluded from the new 
district(s) as well as the location of the new district headquarters.  
In Ukambani for instance, there were disagreements regarding boundaries when Makueni was 
carved out of Machakos, and in Maasailand, when Narok district was split into „Narok‟ and 
Trans Mara. There were even deeper crises among the Kisii, the Meru and the Luhya.
354
 The 
initiatives generally created deeper ethnic divisions, rivalry and hatred. The selective 
subdivision of existing districts creates new frontiers for conflict. Some of the Kamba 
respondents said that they felt cheated in relation to the Maasai who, constituting less than a 
fifth of the Kamba population, had three districts in their name against Kamba‟s four. 
However, although numbers should be a key criterion in the creation of districts, ethnicity has 
always been the overriding factor. In fact, irrespective of the glaring gap in population, the 
Kamba and the Maasai had two districts each up to as recent as the late 1980‟s. Before 
independence, Kamba and Maasai districts were actually in one province called Southern.
355
 It 
is not clear why the Maasai and Kamba districts were put in different provinces later on (i.e., 
Eastern and Rift Valley respectively). A respondent argued that it was an attempt to create 
uniformity by putting the Maasai together with other “Nilotic” groups. This move however 
did not inhibit cross-ethnic interactions and the sharing of a „common territory‟.356 
During Moi‟s rule, districts attained unprecedented significance. A new district translated into 
more government jobs and invariably, improvements in infrastructural development, making 
it a coveted entity. Besides, Moi‟s cabinet appointments were awarded to leading party 
parliamentarians within a certain district. After the 1997 elections, for instance, at a time when 
Maasai districts had been increased to three and Kamba districts to four, each of these districts 
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 For instance, Mbeere district, created in the late 1990‟s to „reward‟ the Mbeere, is a multiethnic district with a 
significant Kamba and Kikuyu population. 
354
 People fight over the location of the headquarters since that basically means the elevation of the market centre 
or town to a bigger urban centre through building of new office blocks, residential areas, , installation of services 
like electricity, post office and  construction of all weather roads, tapped water, sewerage systems etc. 
Consequently, what used to be a small centre grows rapidly through the attraction of investments, creation of 
jobs and markets for the local agricultural produce or livestock. 
355
 See Kenya Atlas, 1959. 
356
 „Common territory‟ may not be affected by imposing political boundaries. Although the effect would ideally 
be relatively minimal within the state‟s boundaries, there are many cases where international boundaries hardly 
introduce any inhibitions on transnational linkages between groups (e.g. the Maasai territory that stretches from 
Kenya into Tanzania, the Teso of Kenya and Uganda or along the Kenya-Somali-Ethiopian border). 
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was allocated a ministerial position.
357
 In such cases where an ethnic group had several 
districts, key politicians from each district became major political rivals as they fought to be 
the overall „tribal‟ leader or the so-called ethnic group‟s “spokesman”.358 These internal fights 
deflected attention from the centre as political leaders were kept busy in the margins. 
Moi knew that all Kenyan groups, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation and political 
inclination, would be excited about the idea of having a district of “our own” or an additional 
one. Moi perfected the idea of making districts ethnic enclaves and platforms for regional and 
national politics. Groups or sub-groups therefore lobbied for these territorial entities and not 
for lower level units like divisions (which constitute districts) or larger units like provinces 
(constituted by districts). The demarcation of a district remained „strictly ethnic‟, so that when 
Makueni was created out of Machakos in the late 1980‟s, the new district could not take up 
some parts of the neighbouring and vast Kajiado district simply because Kajiado is a „Maasai 
district‟. Creation of districts was mainly for political reasons, although the President and his 
allies claimed that they were created to hasten rural development.
359
 In practice, most were 
created to reward certain ethnic groups that had supported the KANU government. This 
reward would then serve as a punishment to others perceived to be “anti-government”. In 
other cases, those opposed to the Moi regime would also be given districts, as a way of luring 
them back into the fold.
360
 Those districts created as rewards for supporting the Moi 
government include Trans Mara in Maasailand and Mwingi in Ukambani.  
The divide-and-rule method was taken to the extreme in cases where very small minority 
groups or sub-groups were awarded districts. This was aimed at breaking ethnic blocs 
opposed to Moi‟s rule. That is how the Suba,361 a group that only exists by name since it has 
been assimilated by the Luo, were given a separate district called Suba. Although human 
groups continue to find reasons to differentiate themselves from others by creating new 
groups, what was different here was the fact that the Moi government eagerly legitimised this 
„difference‟, making the Suba to be in political competition with the Luo. Moi did not stop 
there. In 1995, he created one of the smallest districts in Kenya. This is Teso district, for the 
Teso people, who were hitherto in Bungoma district. The idea here was twofold: To reward 
the Teso for supporting the ruling party, and woo or punish the more populous Bukusu who 
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 The Maasai ministers were: Prof. George Saitoti (Kajiado), William ole Ntimama (Narok) and Julius Sunkuli 
(Trans Mara). On the other hand, Kamba ministers were: Joseph Ngutu (Machakos), Gideon Ndambuki 
(Makueni), Joseph Nyenze (Kitui) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Mwingi). 
358
 While cabinet ministers, Julius Sunkuli of Trans Mara rivaled William ole Ntimama of Narok for Maasai 
“spokesmanship”, Kalonzo Musyoka of Mwingi competed with his cabinet colleague Gideon Ndambuki from 
Makueni for “Kamba leadership”. 
359
 The state insists that districts “bring development closer to the people.” 
360
 Districts created in Luoland and Kikuyuland were aimed at that goal. 
361
 Or the Basuba. 
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fully backed Ford-Kenya, a leading opposition party.
362
 Besides, the boundaries were drawn 
in an extremely antagonising manner. Some Bukusu localities like Chepkui and Tamulega 
were moved from Bungoma to the new Teso district. It was argued that the Bukusu and other 
Luhya groups like the Bakhayo would not have minded the shift if the district had been given 
a non-tribal name (e.g. the name of a town).
363
 While the Teso may have been entitled to some 
regional autonomy, the exercise was full of intrigue, literally creating chaos where diverse 
groups had coexisted peacefully for generations. But again, these are the „regional fights‟ that 
deflect attention from the centre.  
As various ethnic groups were embroiled in conflicts over these awards, and as the state 
exploited the appetite for ethnic autonomy, using the carrot and the stick on others, the state 
could not afford these money guzzling projects. This is party because of the reasons outlined 
earlier. But Moi knew that people would still want a district at any cost, so he transferred the 
responsibility of putting up offices and residential houses to the local people. To some extent, 
this move irretrievably diminished the original significance attached to districts. But the 
trappings remained in place and the state could not cope with the demand.  
One of Kenya‟s smallest sub-groups, the Maa-speaking Njemps (Ilchamus), numbering only 
around 40,000, sought for a separate regional autonomy.
364
 Living mainly in Baringo central, 
which was represented in parliament by the President, the Njemps argued that since they are 
ethnically closer to the Maasai than the Pokot and the Tugen (Kalenjin) among whom they 
live, their unique cultural and social background had isolated them from the Kalenjin groups. 
Their request was rejected. Nonetheless, even those sub-groups that are numerically so few to 
be administered under a separate territorial jurisdiction (e.g. the Okiek and the Dorobo) have 
been pushing for a district.
365
 The reason why the Njemps, the Okiek and the Dorobo were not 
given districts or electoral constituencies by the Moi government was partly because they 
were considered numerically too few to warrant such coveted rewards. On the other hand, the 
Njemps crusade for autonomy was treated as rebellion against the President. 
 
Districts and everyday practices: Going against the state 
While districts are basically aimed at serving the interests of certain groups, everyday 
practices are different. State administrators, treating their areas of jurisdiction as separate 
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 FORD stands for Forum for Restoration of Democracy. 
363
 See The Daily Nation, Friday, January 4, 2002. Possible „non-tribal‟ names suggested for the new district 
were Amagoro and Malaba. The Teso factor is complicated by the fact that most of the group members are on 
the Ugandan side. 
364
 The Daily Nation, Friday 5, 2002. The Njemps have also been seeking a minority group status. 
365
 See The Daily Nation, Saturday, June 1, 2002. The report, by Lucas Barasa says that the Okiek “also want to 
be recognised as the country‟s 43rd tribe”. The Okiek number about 10,000. 
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entities, have to exercise flexibility as they realise that local groups have cross-cutting ties and 
livelihood networks that cannot be confined within administrative boundaries. This flexibility 
deviates from the usual practice and in some areas, government officials refuse to be 
expedient. Contrary to my expectations, this was not the case among the Kamba and the 
Maasai. Let me illustrate. Emali Location is administratively in the Makueni district of 
Eastern province. The Kamba chief, however, serves the Maasai “from across” Kenyewa 
location of Kajiado district in the Rift Valley province. If the chief was to follow the 
provincial administration protocol, the Maasai would have to walk for many hours or board a 
matatu (communal taxi) to Simba where „their chief‟ is. And yet, all this travel would be done 
to obtain a formality signature, an „official‟ stamp, to sort out a domestic dispute or to get 
food relief. I found out that the Maasai chief of Kenyewa likewise, serves the Kamba from 
Makueni. Asking the Maasai chief about this arrangement, he said “we are all Kenyans”, an 
obvious remark but which questions the logic behind the creation of districts along ethnic 
lines. In both cases, it was evident that the chiefs simply complied with the common needs of 
the people.  
Another departure from the norm was the mobility of these offices. In July 2000, I met the 
Maasai chief in Ukambani where hundreds of Maasai cattle, including his, had been relocated 
for grazing. He told me that since “my people moved, I had to move”. He also clarified that: 
“I move with my office, I am serving my people from here, those who come to the office are 
told that I am here” (Kamoni, Kiboko, 27/07/2000). Apart from this flexibility, he was also 
saying that serving „other groups‟ had its limits. He explained that there were still issues that 
remained “exclusively Maasai” (e.g. safety of Maasai cattle) and therefore could only be 
handled by the “Maasai chief”. While this could be the case, when I talked to the local chief 
(Kiboko location), he insisted that when the Maasai bring their cattle to the KARI grazing 
grounds, “they are under my care, they are Maasai but they are not in Maasailand, if 
something happens to them, who is responsible? It is me. They lose their cattle at times, and 
they come here” (his office). However, the reason why the Maasai pastoralists come to him 
when they lose their cattle in Ukambani is because they suspect the Kamba to be the villains. 
The point I wanted to make here is that despite provincial administration‟s restrictions and 
boundary maintenance, the state officials are compelled to conform to actors‟ practices. This 
is one way that ethnic groups influence the operations of the state. The „mobility‟ of the 
chief‟s office shows how state institutions can be adjusted to meet local conditions. This also 
suggests that creation of districts along ethnic lines may make sense as unique and peculiar 
 247 
 
 
 
needs, for example, among pastoralists, may prove difficult to address if they were lumped 
together with farming groups.  
It is safe to surmise that state stability is a multifaceted process, produced through a 
combination of ethnic autonomy and the symbolism of ethnic recognition on the one hand, 
and the flexibility of the state to allow wider cross-ethnic networks on the other.  
 
 
7.1.2   The federal scare 
At the eve of independence, there were serious debates as to what system of government 
Kenya should adopt. During the Mau Mau revolt between 1952 and 1960, the British colonial 
administration prohibited the formation of broad based national parties. Political parties were 
limited only to the district level. Some of the political parties that were formed on district or 
regional basis included Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Maasai United Front, the Coast 
African Political Union, the Kamba Peoples Party and the Kenya Indian Congress. The 
colonial government had created an antagonistic atmosphere between different ethnic groups, 
fearing for a unified opposition (Macharia, 1997: 83). When this ban that limited political 
association to ethnic groups was lifted in 1960, two political parties, KANU and KADU 
emerged. 
Whereas KANU stood for a centralised system, stressing the need for integration (a unitary 
state) and equitable distribution of resources, the opposition party then, KADU, which 
enjoyed the support of White settlers and the colonial government, sought to adopt a majimbo 
(federal) government (Ake, 1967:22), where power would be devolved from the centre to the 
regions. These differences however were not informed by ideology but ethnicity. While 
KANU had the backing of the so-called “big tribes,” led by the Kikuyu and the Luo, KADU 
brought together “small tribes”, which included the Kalenjin sub-groups, the Luhya sub-
groups, the Maasai and the coastal Mijikenda. The Kamba were in KANU but their leader 
then, Paul Ngei, differed with KANU leadership and founded African People‟s Party (APP). 
After the 1963 elections, he joined KADU as the deputy leader of the opposition in parliament. 
On the first anniversary of independence in 1964, Kenya became a republic under a KANU 
government that was centralised but recognised the existence of ethnic groups and „tribal‟ 
homelands. The opposition parties, KADU and APP dissolved themselves and their members 
crossed the floor and joined KANU. 
So why am I talking about a “federal scare” (majimbo scare) long after KADU‟s demise? As I 
have noted in chapter six, in post-independent Kenya, the majimbo debate has kept on rearing 
its ugly head in political discourse. Though often touted as a measure to accommodate 
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difference and diversity, in the Moi era, the debate was usually activated to intimidate or woo 
certain ethnic groups. In other words, just like the districts, it was used as a bait and as a 
scare/punishment. As I noted earlier, majimbo rallies were organised in the early 1990‟s in 
which cabinet ministers and other politicians allied to President Moi called for the adoption of 
majimbo if Kenya was to adopt a multiparty system. Interestingly, political leaders who 
backed majimbo were from the same groups that at independence supported KADU, namely 
the Kalenjin, the Maasai, the Turkana, the Somali and coastal groups. In other words, the old 
members of the defunct KADU, who were now running a KANU government, used this to 
intimidate the “big tribes” which, although the original KANU founders and members, had 
joined opposition ranks to push for a multiparty system of government.  
After “ethnic clashes” were started in the Rift Valley and Western provinces to drive out 
“oppositionists”, (particularly the Luo, the Kikuyu and the Luhya), and KANU won the 1992 
elections, the push for a federal government subsided. It was to emerge in the run up to the 
1997 elections, and during the review of the country‟s constitution in preparation for the 2002 
elections. During the Moi era, the objective of the campaign was stark: “For as long as we 
(Kalenjin and allied groups) rule, we can have a centralised government. Should other groups 
threaten our grip on power, then let us have majimbo or a civil war”. Although a referendum 
has never been carried out to find out which regions or groups support this system of 
government and why, coastal leaders have been quite consistent. But even there, it is the 
leaders who say “my people want majimbo”. For instance, before the constitution review 
commission visited the Coast province to collect views, a local MP was drilling his people. 
He told them: “You must tell the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission that this is what 
you want...I want a federal government that would allow us to rule this region ourselves and 
control revenues collected from this area to boost our economy”.366 As the 2002 elections 
drew closer, a small party that calls itself Chama cha Majimbo na Mwangaza (“federal and 
light party”), proposed the creation of 11 jimbos (counties) combining various ethnic districts 
together. The party also proposed that in the public sector, jobs should be shared “Majimbo-
style”.367 Proposals from other areas were quite radical. Representatives from the Somali 
dominated North Eastern province told the review commission that the  Islamic Sharia law 
should be introduced in province.
368
 Based on the fact that they are transhumant or nomadic, 
often taking their animals to neighbouring countries, they also proposed that a future 
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 Sentiments expressed by Mr Suleiman Kamole, the MP for Matuga in Kwale district (Coast province). 
Featured in the The Daily Nation, Wednesday, July 18, 2001.  
367
 The Daily Nation, Thursday, March 28, 2002. 
368
 The Daily Nation, Tuesday, June 11, 2000. 
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constitution should allow them to acquire Ethiopian and Somali nationality while retaining 
their Kenyan citizenship. The existing Kenyan law does not allow double citizenship.  
In general, few disagree that a federal system may be better suited to tackle Kenya‟s ethnic 
diversity, varying modes of subsistence and the regional imbalances in social transformation. 
Conceding power to the regions could be a better guarantee for a stable multiethnic state. 
With all the potential benefits that could accrue from a federal system, what makes some 
groups sceptical is the kind of system the leading crusaders usually have in mind. It is one 
where a certain jimbo (county) would be exclusive for a certain ethnic group or groups, 
making nonsense of the ideals of decentralisation, devolution of power, safeguarding minority 
rights and being more responsive to local needs. This intention, whether real or used as a scare 
to tribalise regions, explains why the Kamba, though solid Moi supporters almost throughout 
his rule, steered clear of the clamour for a federal system.  
 
Kamba and Maasai response to Majimboism 
Although sharing an ecological zone with the Maasai and both firmly represented in Moi‟s 
cabinet, the Kamba did not join the Maasai in supporting this controversial system. As I noted 
earlier, the Maasai have been seeking indigenous status and protection of their land. To some 
of their vociferous leaders (e.g. Ole Ntimama), a federal system would serve Maasai interests. 
On the other hand, the Kamba have been concerned about their drought prone area, which 
could be relegated to poverty in the kind of federalism sought by the crusaders. The majimbo 
proponents have evaded discussing the logical mandatory redistribution system, in which 
richer jimbos would finance poorer ones. But when the campaign intensified, with some 
politicians even saying that a majimbo constitution was ready (see ICJ, 2000), groups that 
were opposed to the system began drawing some strategies. Groups started laying claims to 
whatever valuable resource that was in „their‟ region. Ethnic claims have been made on cities, 
towns, ports, industrial establishments, universities and land. With the Maasai keen to „own‟ 
the highly valuable Magadi Soda in Lake Magadi and the Maasai Mara game reserve, the 
Kamba were saying that should a federal system be thrust down their throats, then their jimbo 
would control the industrial Athi River town, Tsavo National Park, Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport and Nairobi-Mombasa road! So exclusionist and ethnic has been the 
majimbo debate.  
The debate has been full of blackmail and arm twisting. As the Kamba were beginning to talk 
about the strategic Nairobi-Mombasa road, which cuts through their territory, a rumour was 
going round that the road would be re-routed to pass through Kajiado (Maasailand) and 
 250 
 
 
 
therefore „deny‟ the Kamba any possible benefits. It remains unclear whether this was just a 
scare or it was intended to heighten ethnic tensions between the Kamba and the Maasai. 
Besides the aridity in Ukambani, the Kamba have been generally against majimbo due to their 
migrant kin. Actually, this concern is what brought the Kamba and the Kikuyu together in 
opposing majimbo. The two groups are some of the most dispersed peoples in Kenya. 
Theoretically, in fact constitutionally, Kenyans are free to settle anywhere in the republic 
irrespective of their ethnic identity. While this has been possible, the ethnic clashes discussed 
earlier, where KANU leadership talked of “host” groups and “foreigners”, was a pointer to 
what kind of a federal government the crusaders had in mind. As I noted, the “foreigners” 
(migrant groups) were being asked to “respect” the “hosts” (the dominant local groups) or go 
back to their original homelands. This brings a discrepancy between theory and practice. The 
1991-93 and 1997 experiences, in which the Kikuyu were forcefully driven out of the Rift 
Valley while the Kamba were evicted from the coastal region, are enough reasons for them to 
reject majimbo. During the majimbo rallies, the Kamba ministers, who were notoriously 
ardent Moi supporters, feared the backlash their support would provoke among the Kamba. 
As for the Kikuyu, „their‟ jimbo would, in an ideal situation, perhaps be the most progressive, 
but the notion of creating pure ethnic zones would threaten the livelihoods of many others. 
This is why the Kikuyu-led Democratic Party (DP) dismissed majimbo as “tribal apartheid”, 
favouring instead a unitary system but where power is devolved to local authorities (local 
councils).
369
 
So what has the debate done? On the one hand, it has made groups to think inwardly 
(regionally) rather than nationally. The Luhya and the coastal groups for instance, have been 
pushing for the establishment of a university in their areas. During Moi‟s rule, Kenyans did 
not only see two state universities and some of Kenya‟s best schools and highways built in his 
home area, but also an international airport.
370
 While it is widely believed that this was in 
anticipation of a majimbo government, it left many groups pondering: “What do we have?” 
The move reinforced the catch-up syndrome where each ethnic group evaluated its national 
standing in terms of schools,  state of roads, medical facilities, and key jobs in government.  
But the whole debate had an impact on state stability. The rhetoric helped to deflect attention 
from the centre (that Moi had served parochial  interests), as it cracked ethnic alliances that 
would be a threat to his grip on power. It slowed down the momentum of multipartysm as 
those who backed plural democracy had to counter the majimbo wave. Members of ethnic 
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 Kenya has a total of only six state universities and three international airports. 
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groups that had disproportionately benefited from Moi‟s rule felt vulnerable and therefore 
chose to support majimbo and protect „what they had‟ while others supported the system in 
anticipation that they would be rewarded or that they would get a chance for self 
determination (e.g., North Eastern and coastal groups). The majimbo debate enhanced ethnic 
antagonism between “small” and “big” tribes. The so-called “small tribes”, which President 
Moi was purported to represent, were being told that they would be marginalised by a 
government led by the “big tribes”.  
The whole debate undermined peaceful coexistence between the Kamba and the Maasai. This 
was particularly because, with regard to “small” and “big” tribes, the Kamba position, unlike 
the Maasai‟s, has remained ambiguous. Whereas the Maasai have always been categorised as 
a “small tribe”, the Kamba, as I shall expound below, are regarded as “small” although they 
are numerically “big”. The politics of ethnic numbers introduce a discourse in which the 
Kamba and the Maasai cannot share a common platform. In a nutshell, the majimbo scare 
remains active in Kenya‟s politics. Even after the 2002 elections in which KANU lost the 
presidency, a group of KANU MPs from the Rift Valley threatened to agitate for Majimbo “if 
the NARC Government continues to persecute the Kalenjin community”.371 The complaint 
was that the new government had started replacing Kalenjin personalities appointed to senior 
positions by former President Moi. They threatened that they could even declare Rift Valley a 
state on its own. This time round, other MPs from the province, notably Maasai MPs, did not 
endorse those sentiments. Following a countrywide condemnation of the threats, some of the 
Kalenjin MPs who had made the threats softened their stance. However, for as long as 
ethnicity, rather than ideology, remains the mode in which Kenya‟s polity is organised, 
majimboism will always be a useful way of building ethnic alliances in the competition for 
political power.
372
 
 
7.1.3   The politics of ethnic numbers 
There are several countries in Africa, prominent among them Nigeria, where census figures on 
the various ethnic groups have been potentially explosive (see Morris-Hale, 1996: 194). Until 
very recently, this was not the case in Kenya. From the censuses conducted from the period of 
British rule in 1948, up to at least 1979, Kenyans knew that the Kikuyu were the most 
populous group, followed by the Luo, the Luhya, the Kamba etc., in that order. It never 
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occurred to them that this positioning could drastically change, since, during the intercensal 
periods, population growth rate among all groups tended to be fairly similar.  
While the Kenyan government takes pride in being one of the few countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa that conduct population censuses every ten years, as per United Nations 
recommendations, recent censuses have been clearly delusive. The table below clearly shows 
that in 1969, the Kalenjin category did not exist, and therefore the individual groups (e.g. the 
Nandi, the Kipsigis, the Pokot, the Tugen etc.) were counted separately. However, with Moi‟s 
ascendancy to power in 1978, things changed. In the 1979 census, all these groups were 
transformed into sub-groups belonging to the Kalenjin
373
. Coming from the small Tugen 
group, Moi needed a bigger political constituency to counter the Kikuyu and Luo groups in 
particular. Although the Kalenjin cluster makes political sense, two of its most populous 
groups, the Nandi and the Kipsigis, have often distanced themselves from it, arguing that they 
have been used in the ethnic politics of numbers while the Elgeyo and the Tugen were the 
ones wielding real power and influence.  
Throwing a glance again at the 1979 census, shows that for the first time too, the Suba 
(Basuba)
374
, an assimilated group, were counted separately from the Luo, who, having been in 
opposition politics since Kenyatta‟s time, were still considered a political threat. Reviving the 
Suba identity as a distinct category took away several tens of thousands from the Luo tally, 
besides its impact on Luo-Suba social relations. This partly paved the way for the Luo to be 
„overtaken‟ by the Luhya as Kenya‟s second largest group, contrary to Ochieng‟s (2000) 
observation that this took place in 1989.
375
  It is most unlikely that the Kikuyu elite, still 
entrenched in power then, would have minded weakening numerically their political rivals, 
the Luo.  
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 The term Kalenjin is basically a way of greeting meant to draw somebody‟s attention. It is like saying I say! 
and is one of the words the various groups have in common. It was  coined in the 1940‟s by the broadcasting 
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374
 The Suba inhabit the highlands of Rusinga and Mfang‟ano and the south east part of Lake Victoria. They are 
closely related to the Basoga of Uganda, the Haya of Tanzania, the Kuria of Tanzania and Kenya, the Samia of 
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even speak the Basuba language. And besides, they identify themselves as Luo, carry Luo names, fish is a staple 
food (just like the Luo) and practice Luo traditions. 
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Table 3:  Kenya‟s population census (selected ethnic groups) 
 
                                     1969                   1979                     1989                1999 
Kikuyu                       2,201,623          3,202,821              4,455,865           5,302,479 
Luo                             1,521,595          1,955,845              2,653,932           3,105,100 
Suba                          (as “Luo”)               59,668                107,819              155,629376  
Luhya                        1,453,302           2,119,708              3,083,273           4,069,920    
Kamba                       1,197,712           1,725,569              2,448,302          2,962,445 
Nandi, Kipsigis,        1,190,203           1,652,243              2,458,123          3,455,953  
Elgeyo, Marakwet,                        (as “Kalenjin”)     (as “Kalenjin”)   (as “Kalenjin”) 
Pokot, Sabaot, Tugen/ 
Cherangani   
Maasai                          154,906              241,395                377,089              584,488 
Samburu                         54,796               73,625                 106,897             141,104 
Njemps/Ilchamus             6,526                7,546                   15,872                40,000
377
 
 
Total population: 28,595,323 (1999). 
Source: Kenya‟s population census reports and the The Daily Nation. 
 
In the 1989 census, a number of things happened. The Kamba were overtaken by the Kalenjin 
as the fourth largest ethnic group, prompting a politician
378
 to ask whether there was an 
“epidemic” in Ukambani. The mysterious Kalenjin population growth rate continued to soar. 
In just ten years, that is, 1999, the group had not only maintained their unexplainable lead 
over the Kamba, but they overtook the Luo too and „became‟ the third largest group in Kenya. 
After the results were released, the The Daily Nation, which published an exclusive report, 
wrote: “Another significant fact, if the figures are correct, is that the Luo have lost their place 
as Kenya‟s third largest community behind the Kikuyu and the Luhya. They have slipped into 
fourth place with 3.1 million members, overtaken by the Kalenjin who are now in third place 
with 3.5 million”.379  
During the intercensal period (1989-99), the Kalenjin population growth rate, at 40.9%, looks 
rather intriguingly astronomical compared to the Kamba‟s 20.9%. Another remarkable 
observation is that all through, the “Luhya” cluster has been left intact. If we define ethnicity 
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in terms of common language, cultural practices, shared history and ethnic consciousness, the 
Luhya category is simply untenable. As a name, “Luhya” is said to have been coined during 
the colonial period. It means “clansman” or “relative” in some of the dialects or languages 
spoken among the various groups or sub-groups that constitute the cluster. Otherwise, what 
are called the Luhya (or Baluhya), are three distinct groups: The Maragoli, the Bukusu and the 
Baluhya “proper”. To illustrate how distinct these groups are, Ochieng (2000) notes that when 
a Bukusu marries a Kisa (a sub-group of the Luhya “proper”), they can only communicate in 
Swahili or, if they can, in English: “They cannot understand each other in either Kisa or 
Lubukusu”. That partly explains why it has remained merely speculative to talk about a 
“Luhya vote” or a “Luhya presidential candidate”. In fact, the Bukusu, one of the most 
populous and influential sub-groups among the Luhya cluster, maintained an anti-Moi stance 
throughout the 1990‟s. But closer Moi allies in the cluster would still tell him that “all the 
Luhya speak with one voice” or they are “solidly behind you”. 
The Luhya and the Kalenjin categories deviate significantly from the level of homogeneity 
observed, for instance, among the Luo, the Kikuyu and the Kamba. Despite the glaring fallacy 
of Luhya and Kalenjin „ethnic groups‟, in the political game of numbers, these two categories 
were used by the Moi government as a counter weapon against the numerous Kikuyu, Luo 
and Kamba groups. One notices that after the „Luhya‟ overtook the Luo for the first time after 
Moi‟s ascendancy to power in the 1979 census, they maintained a commanding lead in the 
subsequent censuses. 
 
Making sense of the census manipulations 
There are social, political and economic explanations why the Moi government seemingly 
falsified census results. Socially, it appears to have been a way of seeking some social justice. 
Since the Kalenjin were presented as a group that had been marginalised by the previous 
Kikuyu-led regime, inflating their numbers became a way of „correcting‟ real or imaginary 
wrongs committed against the group. What is interesting however is that other „marginalised‟ 
groups (e.g. the Maasai and the Somali), whose interests Moi was portrayed as representing, 
appear to have been excluded from this consideration. For instance, while the Kalenjin and the 
Luhya were presented as ethnic categories, the Somali, just like in previous censuses before 
Moi came to power, were counted as clans (e.g. Ajuran, Ogaden, Degodia etc.). Counting the 
Somali as clans appeared to contradict Moi regime‟s attempt to consolidate and boost the 
numbers of pastoral and “small tribes” during censuses. However, the post-independence 
Kenyan government has never been entirely comfortable with the Somali, partly due to the 
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fluidity of the border between Kenya and Somalia and the war fought in the mid 1960‟s over 
secession threat. It is therefore possible that in spite of Moi‟s appointment of Somali 
personalities to influential positions in his administration, the need to present the group as 
splintered, „small‟ and inconsequential may have been overwhelming. The same goes for the 
Maasai. Although the Maasai were an influential group in the Moi government, it is not clear 
why the Samburu and the Njemps, who are Maa-speakers, were not lumped together with the 
„Maasai‟. One explanation would be that, though ardent Moi supporters, the Maasai remained 
a thorn in the flesh. Their leaders made incessant demands for restoration of lost lands or 
compensation, and claimed that the group was still marginalised.  
Politically, I have already underscored what appears to have been Moi‟s need to present 
himself as representing a broader political constituency against the “big tribes”. To this end, 
he did two things. One, the Kalenjin became a category in the national census, and two, 
during his rule, the consolidated group moved from the fifth place in 1979 to the third place in 
1999. The inflated and deflated figures (e.g. Luo‟s and Kamba‟s) appear to have been used to 
legitimise other things. The 1992 and 1997 elections, characterised by both local and 
international observers as irregular (rigged in the ruling party‟s favour), comes to mind. 
Although the Kamba were generally considered a KANU stronghold, about half of the Kamba 
vote went to opposition parties in the 1992 and 1997 elections. This might explain why it was 
necessary to deflate their numbers in the 1999 census. From an economic point of view, 
inflated population figures led to lopsided budgetary allocations, as districts with „more 
people‟ received bigger allocations.  
 
One might ask, of what relevance is this discussion to the coexistence of the Kamba and the 
Maasai and Kenya‟s stability? The 1999 census indicated Kamba‟s intercensal growth rate as 
20.9%, while the Maasai stood at 35%. This glaring discrepancy has not been explained. In 
fact, since Kenya‟s demographic health surveys 380  usually indicate higher fertility among 
farming sedentary groups (e.g. the Kamba and the Kisii), as opposed to pastoral and 
transhumant groups (e.g. the Maasai and the Pokot), it would be more logical to swap the 
Kamba-Maasai growth rates. Some Kamba respondents argued that the manipulation of 
Maasai figures must have been used to justify the creation of Trans Mara district. But again, 
why would the Kamba complain about a 20.9% growth rate while that of the Kikuyu was 
indicated to be as low as 15%? What I am talking about here is state stability that is produced 
not by what ethnic groups did, but rather what they did not do. Although the Kikuyu, the Luo 
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and the Kamba may have had genuine reasons to question the authenticity of the 1989 and the 
1999 censuses in particular, actions that would have raised ethnic tensions, caused anarchy 
and destabilised the state, they did not. Neither political leaders from these groups nor civil 
society lodged any co-ordinated protest to the government. Incidentally, the 1999 census 
results were released by a Kamba, Mr Gideon Ndambuki, the planning minister then. 
Although the Kamba were an aggrieved party, when he was releasing the results, he praised 
the census team for doing “a good job”. However, there is no evidence that any Kamba 
expected the minister to reject the outcome of the census. But if he failed to react out of 
Kamba “cowardice” (see chapter four) or in observance of the so-called collective 
responsibility of ministers, how about the “courageous” and “fearless” Luo and the Kikuyu 
who were even known critics of the Moi regime? It is difficult to come up with an answer.  
Taking the Nigerian example, where the mere talk of a population census threatens the 
survival of the state, one might ponder: Are Kenyan groups docile? A German who has 
worked in Kenya and other African countries told me that in matters of governance, most 
Kenyan groups are aloof and that things that would take South Africans, Zambians and 
Nigerians to the streets would not “bother” a Kenyan. What would explain this apparent 
apathy and docility? The situation might change in due course, but it appears that just like in 
the colonial times, most Kenyans do not regard themselves as an integral part of the state. 
Although they vote, they hardly expect the state to be accountable to them. Many may know 
that they finance the state as tax payers, but few expect the state to be responsible. Whereas 
Kenya enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, it seems that this is not matched by a 
high level of political consciousness. Apart from a weak civil society, the state has over the 
years blocked any attempts to create awareness on governance, electoral laws, ethnic politics 
and citizen entitlements. Not many Kenyans discern the intricate links between population 
census and the allocation of state resources or how manipulated census figures can be used to 
influence the outcome of national elections. 
It would be logical to argue that Kenya‟s relative stability has resulted from ethnic apathy and 
indifference. The long uninterrupted reigns of Kenyatta and Moi taught Kenyans that the 
„ruling tribe‟ discriminates against other groups. The consolation among the „discriminated‟ 
groups, it will be argued later, has been that they will have their chance at some point in time.  
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7.2    Ethnic politics and Kenya‟s stability: The inconsistencies 
7.2.1   The ever shifting ethnic alliances 
To say that Kenya‟s polity is organised around ethnic groups is truism. One positive thing, 
though, is that ethnic alliances have always been possible. And sometimes, they come from 
the most unexpected quarters. During the freedom struggle, the alliance between the Luo and 
the Kikuyu embodied the real threat to colonial rule. The fact that Oginga Odinga, a Luo, 
refused to form a government and demanded instead the release of Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, in 
1960, epitomised not only the height of nationalism, but showed also that a peaceful post 
colonial state would be possible. It was not a surprise therefore that after Kenyatta became the 
first president of the republic in 1964, Odinga became his vice-president. But in 1966, 
differences, particularly on land policy and redistribution, led to a falling out between 
Kenyatta and Odinga, forcing the latter to resign from government. It could have been a 
complete Luo-Kikuyu split, but, a youthful, flamboyant and equally influential Luo, Tom 
Mboya, remained in government. In fact, this political stratagem was the architect behind the 
downfall of his fellow Luo, Odinga. Therefore, Kenyatta somehow escaped blame.  
Together with a cabinet colleague, Bildad Kaggia, a Kikuyu, and former freedom fighter, 
Odinga found an opposition party, the Kenya People‟s Union (KPU) and bounced back into 
parliament in 1969. But shortly afterwards, the party was proscribed and its leaders were 
thrown into detention. Moreover, Tom Mboya was assassinated in the same year, and the Luo 
blamed the Kikuyu ruling clique for the murder. But it was also a time when Odinga was 
bitter with the Kenyatta government and the timing of Mboya‟s assassination might have been 
expected to leave some speculating that it could have been a Luo internal affair. The country 
experienced the first threat of a civil war at this time. And although these incidences instilled 
anti-Kikuyu sentiments among many Luo, one could still see personalities like Omolo Okero 
in Kenyatta‟s cabinet. Kenyatta therefore tactfully left an opening, a „cord‟ through which he 
could still reach out to the Luo. Odinga‟s exit led to the elevation of Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, 
as vice-president, after Joseph Murumbi‟s appointment lasted only a year with his resignation 
in 1967. The appointment of Moi took many by surprise, not least the Kikuyu elite who were 
increasingly getting concerned about the Kenyatta succession. Anxious about Kenyatta‟s 
health and longevity, this Kikuyu clique, led by personalities like Njenga Karume, at the time 
a powerful head of the moribund Gikuyu, Meru and Embu Association (GEMA), championed 
a “change the constitution” bid to block any automatic ascendancy of the vice-president to 
power in case the president died or was incapacitated. The bid failed, paving the way for 
Moi‟s presidency in 1978.  
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What is interesting is that the move to block Moi from succeeding Kenyatta was foiled by a 
Kikuyu, the then powerful attorney general, Charles Njonjo. When Moi took over as President, 
he could not do without the Kikuyu. For his own immediate survival, he had to keep them 
around and perhaps, eventually socialise them out of power. He therefore had a Kikuyu vice-
president, Mwai Kibaki,
381
 and Njonjo retained his job as attorney general. There were other 
Kikuyu personalities in the cabinet and the civil service. But keen to form his own power base, 
he started dismantling the „king makers‟, beginning with Njonjo. Although Kibaki was 
retained as vice-president after the 1983 elections, the Kikuyu presence in the cabinet and 
civil service had been reduced drastically. Moi had started reaching out to his Kalenjin group, 
the Maasai, the Luhya, the Kamba, coastal groups and the Somali as new centres of power. 
After the 1988 elections, Kibaki was dropped as vice-president, but was appointed to the 
cabinet as health minister. Moi appointed a newcomer in politics, Dr. Josephat Karanja, a 
Kikuyu, to replace Kibaki. But it appeared that the new appointee was basically warming the 
seat for another person.  
After just one year, Karanja was unceremoniously bundled out of the post and replaced with 
Prof. George Saitoti, an academic possessing a contested and ambiguous ethnic identity. 
Brought up as a Kikuyu, he „became‟ a Maasai at some point.382 Having been nominated to 
parliament in 1983, he left his teaching job at the University of Nairobi. After the nomination, 
he was appointed minister for finance and then literally „marketed‟ to the Maasai as a „true 
son‟ by among others, the then combative minister William ole Ntimama. Saitoti easily won 
the Kajiado North seat in the 1988 elections.
383
 He retained his vice-presidential position after 
the 1992 elections, although Moi had used the position to woo the Kisii, the Kamba and the 
Luhya voters during the campaigns. Although Saitoti was re-elected to parliament in the 1997 
polls, the President did not name a vice-president for 14 months.   
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 Elected Kenya‟s third President in the December 2002 polls. 
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 One of my Maasai research partners who lives near Sultan Hamud, told me that his late wife knew Saitoti 
from the time when he was a young boy in Ngong. The vice-president was one of the dignitaries who attended 
her funeral. Regarding Saitoti‟s ethnic identity, he said: “Of course he is not Maasai but that is not important, he 
has done a lot for the Maasai”. A prominent Kajiado politician, Oliver Seki, challenged the ethnic identity of all 
those fighting for  Maasai leadership noting “Mr Sunkuli has his roots in Luhyaland, Mr Ole Muyaa (a Saitoti 
opponent) is from Ukambani while Prof. Saitoti is a Kikuyu and they should therefore stop dragging the 
community into the selfish war of riding to state house. Let them address the plight of the Maasai who are 
languishing in poverty” (The Daily Nation, Friday, September 7, 2001). With Ntimama said to have Meru origins 
while John Keen‟s father is actually German, it appears that political power among the Maasai rests on 
personalities with contested identities. 
383
 Saitoti‟s likely opponents in the Kajiado North seat were prevailed upon not to run. The past MP, Phillip 
Odupouy was appointed managing director of a collapsing Pan African Vegetable Processors in Naivasha while  
a former MP, John Keen was nominated to parliament. Otherwise, according to the Kenyan constitution one has 
to be an elected member of parliament to be appointed as vice-president. 
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The 1997 polls and after 
Prior to, and after the 1992 elections, there were the “ethnic clashes”, in which the Kikuyu, 
among other groups, were evicted from their farms in the Rift Valley and others were killed. 
Because of this, among other reasons, the Kikuyu voted for their two presidential 
candidates,
384
 and all MPs from their areas were elected on opposition tickets. But Moi 
nominated Joseph Kamotho, a Kikuyu, to parliament and appointed him to the cabinet. He 
was also KANU‟s secretary general. Just before the 1997 elections, Moi was back to woo the 
Kikuyu back to KANU. The party‟s overall victory in the 1992 election notwithstanding, it 
was extremely weak in Central Province (Kikuyuland). Kamotho and Saitoti were 
instrumental in setting up what was called Central Province Development Group which 
organised fund raisers and sought to reconcile the Kikuyu with the Kalenjin or to put it 
differently, the KAMATUSA and the GEMA. There were even deliberations regarding 
compensation and resettlement for those forcefully evicted from the Rift Valley. In the 1997 
polls, KANU launched a high profile and moneyed campaign in Kikuyuland, but the Kikuyu 
overwhelmingly voted for their candidate, Mr Mwai Kibaki. Even people like Kamotho could 
not win a seat on KANU tickets. 
This is partly seen as the reason why Moi hesitated in re-appointing Saitoti. But he finally did, 
taking many by surprise, since, once more, leading politicians from various ethnic groups 
were lobbying for the seat. Among other considerations, it appears that Saitoti‟s contested 
ethnic identity worked to his advantage during Moi‟s rule, for in him, Moi had a Maasai and a 
Kikuyu vice-president. The 1999 re-appointment however marked a very problematic tenure 
for Saitoti. Apart from opposition in his home district that seemed to enjoy presidential 
support or tolerance, his ethnic identity came to the fore when Kikuyu MPs joined the ruling 
party to vote against a motion of “no confidence” against him as vice-president. This bloc 
vote to save Saitoti was perhaps the first public endorsement of his ethnicity. Ochieng‟ (2001) 
put it thus: “If these MPs can openly vote to save KANU‟s second most important potentate, 
one whose name is deeply mired in Goldengate,
385
 the symbol of all KANU inequities, what 
exactly do they, then oppose in KANU? There can only be one answer. Their opposition to 
KANU has no ideo-moral content whatsoever. It is purely tribal. As long as Saitoti is our 
tribesman, it does not matter to us that he is in KANU. As long as he is one of us, if he can 
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 Mr Kenneth Matiba and Mr Mwai Kibaki. 
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 In reference to the so-called Goldenberg scandal in which the state lost more than Ksh 13 billion (EUR 
162,500,000) in fake claims paid out by the central bank as compensation for non-existent gold exports. 
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use his position to climb to the presidency, we can‟t care less that his name is so 
besmirched”.386  
The defeat of the motion, tabled in the parliament by Otieno Kajwang of the Luo-led National 
Development Party (NDP), did not go down well among the Luo. To them, it was yet another 
betrayal of the Luo at the hands of the Kikuyu.
387
 In an unprecedented move, the NDP started 
working closely with KANU, and in March 18
th
 2002, the parties merged. Following this 
merger, two Luo ministers were appointed to Moi‟s cabinet. In addition, one of the cabinet 
ministers and the leader of the NDP, Raila Odinga, became KANU‟s secretary general. But as 
the Luo began to nurse presidential ambitions in the Moi succession, the President went back 
to the Kikuyu and identified the son of the late President Kenyatta, Uhuru as his preferred 
successor in the KANU presidential nominations.  
The youthful Uhuru, born at independence in 1962, had only been nominated by the President 
to parliament in May 2001, and in October the same year, Moi made him a minister in his 
cabinet. Many state-funded campaigns were organised to popularise Uhuru, with the President 
taking the lead. He took the Kalenjin also by surprise, for it was assumed that a Kikuyu would 
not safeguard what the Kalenjin called the “community‟s interests”.  But after it appeared that 
Moi was determined, most Kalenjin leaders decided to support the President. All of a sudden, 
praises were being heaped on the Kenyatta regime. In one such rally, Mr Henry Kosgey, a 
cabinet minister, and four assistant ministers from the Rift Valley, praised the founding 
President, saying he had  “enabled the Kalenjin to settle in the former White Highlands” and 
pledged their support for Uhuru as a show of gratitude to his father.
388
 This was a departure 
from the dominant discourse, in which Kenyatta‟s rule was associated with marginalisation of 
the Kalenjin and with having paved the way for many Kikuyu migrants to settle in the Rift 
Valley to the disadvantage of native groups (Kalenjin). It appeared that ethnic alliances could 
shift that quickly, at least in the Kenyan case.  
Unfortunately, the October 2002 nomination of Uhuru to run for president on a KANU ticket 
led to a major split in the party. Saitoti, who had been sacked as vice-president, Kamotho, also 
sacked from the cabinet after opposing Uhuru‟s bid, joined forces with Raila Odinga, Kalonzo 
Musyoka (Kamba minister and KANU vice-chairman), Moody Awori (a Luhya and assistant 
minister) and William ole Ntimama (a Maasai cabinet minister), to found the so-called 
Rainbow Coalition. Just a day before the KANU presidential nominations, the „Rainbow‟ 
ministers whom Moi had not sacked started resigning and relinquishing their KANU‟s 
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 The first betrayal being the fall out between Kenyatta and Odinga in the 1960‟s. 
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 Sunday Nation, June 16, 2002. 
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positions. They joined forces with the opposition to found the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC), a united front which faced KANU in the December 2002 elections. Since NARC 
brought together many ethnic groups together,
389
 KANU was defeated in the elections. 
Decamping of the Luo from KANU was particularly significant. 
What one sees here is a chronology of ethnic alliances that shift and shift again. Crawford 
(1998: 5) notes that in multiethnic societies, breaking of old social contracts leads to shifts in 
political power. He says that if these shifts are experienced as ethnic discrimination and 
privilege, the resulting resentment and opportunity provide fertile ground for politicians to 
mobilize support around ethnic and sectarian identities. While this is true for Kenya, 
Crawford does not capture the contradictions and inconsistencies and their frequency, where 
foes are potential allies and foes again. I am arguing that this dynamic scenario, where 
hostility assumes impermanence, and where spaces are often created to accommodate „tribal‟ 
leaders, not only explains perpetuation of Kenyatta and Moi regimes, but also explains the 
relative stability and ethnic coexistence in Kenya. Kenya has not had governments dominated 
exclusively by „westerners‟, „southerners‟ or „northerners‟ as has been the case in Nigeria, 
Sudan and Ivory Coast.  This has ruled out the possibility of an ethnonationalist conflict (see 
Wimmer (1997b: 632). Alongside the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin political elite, there has always 
been appendages, that is, other groups, co-opted to share power. For those groups „left out‟ at 
a given time (e.g. the Luo), there has been a sustained signal that „soon‟ they will be on board, 
or if „if they want‟, they can join.  
 
7.2.1.1   Voting along ethnic lines  
There have been many contradictions and inconsistencies in Kenya‟s ethnic politics. In the 
multiparty era of the 1990‟s, the Kamba and the Luhya in particular tilted the balance in the 
run for the presidency. The Kalenjin-led KANU, the Luo-led, and the Kikuyu-led opposition 
parties all scrambled for support from these groups. Since they are among the five most 
populous groups, backing from the Kamba and the Luhya was decisive. Besides, these groups 
either fielded no presidential candidates, or those who ran for president did not receive full 
backing from their group. Of course, the Luo and Kikuyu candidates sought support from 
other groups, be they the Kisii, the Somali, the Boorana or the Mijikenda. It was taken for 
granted that the Meru and the Embu vote would go to the Kikuyu-led parties while the Maasai, 
the Samburu and the Turkana allied themselves with the Kalenjin.  
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In 1992, the Kamba vote was literally up for grabs, since the Kamba who ran for president did 
not enjoy the group‟s support.390 There were assumptions that the Kikuyu-led DP would 
receive strong backing from the group since prominent Kamba politicians like Paul Ngei, 
Joseph Munyao, Mrs Agnes Ndetei and Mrs Charity Ngilu had allied themselves with the 
party. However, President Moi and the ruling party still claimed over 50% of the Kamba vote. 
In fact, in terms of the seats, KANU won convincingly, capturing 12 out of 15.  Piqued by the 
Kamba support for KANU, enraged Kikuyu men beat up a number of Kamba at the main bus 
terminus in Nairobi accusing them of “betraying the opposition cause”. What was ironical was 
that about half of the Kamba vote had actually gone to the Kikuyu-led Democratic Party (DP) 
presidential candidate and secondly, those who had voted for KANU had not betrayed the 
opposition but frustrated the Kikuyu quest for power. In any case, a GEMA group had also 
voted KANU: Among the Meru, 4 out of 8 seats went to KANU and the Luo-led Ford-Kenya 
took one seat, with the DP taking only three.  
In the 1992 elections, the GEMA groups proved not to be a formidable cohesive entity, a 
reality that infuriated the Kikuyu. And whereas the Kikuyu accused the Kamba of betrayal in 
1992, in the 1997 elections, theirs was an outright deception. Mrs Charity Ngilu, a Kamba, 
had been touted as a possible compromise candidate by the opposition parties but the plan 
shattered. Nevertheless, some Kikuyu parliamentary candidates ran on Ngilu‟s SDP ticket and 
it was expected that they would also campaign for her. The outcome however could not have 
been more different. In Gatundu South (Kikuyuland), for instance, while the MP was elected 
on an SDP ticket, garnering 22,637 votes, Ngilu received only 1,006 for president compared 
to Kibaki‟s 30,738. In fact, Moi did much better than Ngilu with 2,608.391 This was the same 
trend in Gatundu North, Gatanga, Juja, Githunguri and Dagoretti. In all these constituencies, 
Kikuyu parliamentary candidates were elected on SDP tickets but the presidential vote went to 
the Kikuyu DP candidate. These voting trends, where ethnic groups were mobilised to vote 
for their ethnic presidential candidates, split the opposition vote and consequently handed Moi 
another term. The opposition lost the presidency, although it had a combined vote of 
3,688,819 against Moi‟s 2,500,865. It was not surprising therefore that in the 2002 elections, a 
combined opposition of 14 parties, that brought together many ethnic groups, saw Mwai 
Kibaki capture the presidency easily. 
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 Mr Harun Mwau, who ran for president on the Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK), did not run 
as a „Kamba candidate‟. He did not launch a credible campaign and failed even to capture the Westlands 
(Nairobi) parliamentary seat. 
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Strictly speaking, Kenya does not have a majority ethnic group, a fact which creates an 
environment where, to win a presidential election, groups have to forge alliances as a matter 
of necessity. Constituting only 18.5% of the population,
392
 the Kikuyu are merely the most 
numerous ethnic group, and their candidates have had to court other groups to broaden their 
constituency in seeking the presidency. Without an outright dominant group (like in Ethiopia 
where the Oromo constitute about 40% of the population), it is difficult to envisage a situation 
where a single ethnic group in Kenya could capture the presidency. In a mix of fortunes, it has 
not been possible to rally all Bantu groups, comprising 65% of the population, on a common 
platform. In the early 1990‟s a leading Luhya trade unionist393 called for a “Bantu alliance” to 
counter the KAMATUSA groups, but the call was treated with indifference. True, if that was 
workable, such an alliance would dominate power, but that would be the turning point in 
Kenya‟s history of ethnic coexistence, for this would clearly polarise other groups. 
Information gathered during my fieldwork shows that only the highly literate Kamba knew 
that the group is linguistically related to the Kisii and the Luhya of western Kenya. Most 
respondents considered these groups to be as distant to them as the Luo or the Kalenjin 
(Nilotes). And this is basically because they do not share territory and are in different 
ecological zones. 
If the “Bantu alliance” would have destabilised Kenya, how about if the Kamba were 
members of GEMA? It is fairly strange that despite the linguistic and territorial linkages, the 
Kamba did not get recruited into this loose cluster of Bantu groups. The reasons are both 
historical and ecological. The GEMA groups were brought together particularly by the 
freedom struggle, with most intensive anti-colonial revolts and armed conflict taking place in 
the Mount Kenya region. Secondly, as an organisation that also had interests in the tea and 
coffee sectors, the semi-arid Ukambani did not fit well in this scheme of things. However, the 
fact that the Kamba are not members of GEMA was seen as denying the association critical 
backing during the multiparty elections of the 1990‟s. The Kikuyu-led GEMA was so 
desperate for the Kamba vote in 1992 that, in one of the campaign rallies in Machakos town, 
it was claimed that the Kamba are indeed members of GEMA: That the last letter „A‟ in the 
acronym was said to stand for „Akamba‟ rather than „Association‟! Although the Kamba 
crowd was not convinced, viewed from linguistic, cultural and territorial terms, the claim was 
not far fetched.  
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 Wafula wa Musamia; he made the call in 1993. 
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As I noted earlier, GEMA was a very influential entity, at least during the Kenyatta era. When 
Moi came to power, in the name of fighting ukabila (“tribalism”), he proscribed all tribal 
organisations. Apart from GEMA, there were other „tribal‟ organisations such as New 
Akamba Union (NAU)
394
, Luo Union and Abaluhya Union, among others. It is widely 
believed that this ban was not necessarily directed at these other groups but GEMA, which 
was financially, politically and numerically a big threat to Moi‟s efforts to consolidate his 
power. Coming from a “small tribe”, Moi was uncomfortable with alternative power bases.395 
But he had dug a hole to fill another one. The proscription of these bodies left a vacuum and 
perhaps to some extent polarised groups more to the centre. The ban, on the pretext of 
creating a more cohesive nation, blocked alternative avenues for expressing ethnic and 
regional concerns. These concerns were to emerge later through the agitation for multiparty 
democracy and the formation of political parties along ethnic lines.  
 
The table below shows the voting patterns in selected provinces in the 1997 elections. This 
particular poll is selected because unlike the 1992 and 2002 elections, the 1997 elections 
witnessed fielding of many candidates that commanded broad support from their ethnic 
constituencies. The five candidates presented below also represented the five biggest ethnic 
groups. The four opposition politicians who faced Moi in the polls had failed to agree on 
fielding one presidential candidate. 
 
Table 4: The 1997 presidential election results by province („ethnicity‟) 
 
                      Moi              Kibaki        Ngilu        Wamalwa      Odinga 
Rift Valley    1,140,109      343,529        11,345        102,178           36,022 
Central               56,367      891,484        30,535            3,058             6,869    
Eastern             370,954      296,335      349,754            7,017             7,787      
Western            314,669          9,755          3,429        338,120          13,458    
Nyanza             215,923      138,202         15,301         14,623         519,180     
 
Source: Human Rights Report, no. 2, 1998.  
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 Founded as “Kamba Union” by Nairobi based Kamba in 1938, the union worked closely with the Gikuyu 
Central Association, particularly on the issue regarding land alienation. 
395
 Leaders of these associations enjoyed considerable influence among their ethnic groups. 
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It is obvious from this table that each candidate had the highest number of votes in their native 
provinces (i.e., among their ethnic constituencies). To some extent, this confirms Horowitz‟s 
assertion that “where parties break along ethnic lines, elections are divisive” (1985: 12). 
Kibaki‟s impressive performance in Eastern is basically because of the other GEMA groups, 
the Embu and the Meru. In Ukambani, he received a mere 8,474 votes.   
One sees that apart from the Rift Valley, Moi had a very strong showing in Eastern, Nyanza 
and Western. Two cases of „rejecting your own‟ emerge. In Ukambani, which is in the Eastern 
province, Moi claimed 161,950 votes among the Kamba while Ngilu got 344,920. Moi 
therefore took a considerable chunk of the Kamba vote. After accusations that those who 
voted for Moi were “sell outs”, a Kamba KANU politician asked, “where did the Kamba sit to 
agree to vote for Ngilu?” He argued that the Kamba who voted for the ruling party were 
“nationalists”396 while those who voted for Ngilu were “tribalists”. But there are other Kamba, 
and indeed other Kenyan groups, who doubted Ngilu‟s sincerity in opposition politics. Her 
husband, Mwendwa Ngilu, who owns a consulting engineering firm, Ngilu Associates, 
continued to receive lucrative tenders from the KANU government while his wife was in 
opposition politics. Being a vindictive government, that crippled opponents economically, 
these tender awards, running into several million euros, left many people wondering whether 
Mrs Ngilu was genuinely against the KANU regime.  
From the table, one can see that another contradiction emerged in Western province. Although 
dominantly inhabited by the Luhya, Moi got almost the same number of votes as Wamalwa, 
the “Luhya candidate”. One reason why Wamalwa did not command a decisive chunk of his 
native Luhya vote is because of the loose and fairly antagonistic ethnic links among the Luhya 
sub-groups as noted earlier. Actually, much of the votes Wamalwa got in Western province 
were from his Bukusu sub-group, with other sub-groups like the Maragoli fully backing Moi. 
In Nyanza, support for Moi came from the Kisii and Kuria groups, otherwise Raila Odinga 
decisively claimed the Luo vote. Mrs Ngilu‟s performance in general had a gender dimension. 
Although the Kamba have elected women to parliament from as early as 1974, sending one to 
the State House was a totally new experience. Her candidacy was met with scepticism, and 
because some voters simply thought she could not win, they decided to vote for other 
candidates. Nationally, she turned out to be an ethnic candidate, more or less just like the rest, 
although she had been portrayed and presented as the “women‟s candidate”. It is worth 
mentioning that women constituted only 3.4% of the 1997 parliament. A distinguished editor 
and gender activist, Lucy Oriang‟ explains that in as much as Ngilu had become one of the 
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most spectacular women leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, she had not succeeded in becoming “a 
women‟s woman”.397  
In Maasailand, where a woman respondent told me that Ngilu “ni president wa akina mama” 
(“she‟s the women‟s president”) and that “she‟s the only woman we have”, Ngilu had faired 
very poorly in the 1997 polls. She received only 3,210 votes against Kibaki‟s 47,374 and 
Moi‟s 127,796. As noted in chapter six, many Kamba living in Maasailand had chosen to 
comply with the “hosts‟” choice, fearing that voting for the Kamba presidential candidate 
would jeopardise their residential rights. In any case, in absolute numbers, Moi still got more 
votes in Ukambani than in Maasailand (161,950 against 127,796). As for Maasai women who 
did not vote for Ngilu, they simply fell within the national trend. In fact, despite being in a 
male dominated society, the Maasai women I talked with believed that women can provide 
effective leadership. Asking the Maasai woman respondent whether she voted for Ngilu 
during the polls, she said: “I did not, we only used to hear about her, she did not come...(here 
to campaign) and we were told that she cannot win so we should not waste our votes. Some 
other people also said that she is for the Kamba and that our candidate is Moi”. I asked her, 
“why was your candidate Moi?” She replied, “we are told that Moi‟s people (Kalenjin) and 
the Maasai are the same” (Woman‟s group leader, Imaroro, Kajiado, 12/09/2000). She 
appeared sceptical about the apparent ethnic links between the Maasai and the Kalenjin. 
Cleverly, she said that both the Kamba and the Maasai were “used by the Kalenjin as stepping 
stones” without real gains from the government.  
 
Besides ethnicity 
Although the 1992, 1997 and even 2002 elections have followed an ethnic pattern in terms of 
party support, there have been other issues too. These range from the mismanagement of the 
sugar industry in Luhyaland to the mysterious murder of former foreign affairs minister, Dr 
Robert Ouko, which did not go down well among the Luo.
398
 In Ukambani, the opposition 
criticised the Moi government for its failure to address the recurrent food shortages and water 
scarcity. The opposition argued that sustainable food security and water supply would have 
worked against KANU‟s practice of providing food donations prior to, and during general 
elections. The same case applies in Maasailand, where the stop-gap measures adopted by the 
state during prolonged droughts (e.g. food relief) pacifies dissatisfaction with the ruling party. 
These livelihood concerns cannot be taken for granted. The people inhabiting the rich 
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agricultural zones like the Kikuyu, Meru, Embu and the Luhya have had many grievances. 
Their economic base has been deteriorating with little or erratic returns from their tea, coffee, 
milk, maize and pyrethrum. And this has not been simply because prices have been 
fluctuating in the world markets, but due to mismanagement of the state marketing institutions.  
These quasi-government firms, otherwise called parastatals, have not only been ridden with 
corruption but are also seen as siphoning wealth off these groups to the benefit of the 
KAMATUSA elite (see Tostensen et al., 1998). But while the authors see these economic 
concerns as unconnected to ethnicity, there are overlaps and inconsistencies. In spite of the 
fact that some Kalenjin groups like the Nandi and the Kipsigis have not been spared the losses 
in maize, milk and tea, the backbone of their economy, they have still been supporting KANU. 
Although the GEMA groups have had logical economic grievances against the Moi regime, 
ethnicity would still be a major consideration in the presidential race. The meagre support the 
Kamba candidate, Mrs Ngilu, got among the Kikuyu in the 1997 elections, as noted earlier, is 
a case in point. Back in 1991, the Kikuyu had appeared to back Odinga Oginga (Luo) for the 
presidency but as time went by, they broke away and fielded their own presidential candidates. 
Even the backing the Kikuyu enjoy from the Embu and the Meru cannot be divorced from 
ethnic considerations, despite the fact that matters of livelihood are brought to the fore during 
campaigns. These are situations in which leaders of ethnic groups combine policy and the 
instrumentalisation of identifications for the organisation of support (Schlee, 2001:11).  
 
Explaining the Kamba and the Kalenjin alliance 
At least during the Moi regime, one of the most unusual alliances in the Kenyan political 
scene was between the Kamba and the Kalenjin.  It was puzzling because, at least on the 
surface, a number of factors rule it out. Apart from the linguistic and cultural differences, in 
terms of physical proximity, Ukambani and Kalenjinland are two worlds apart. Besides, as 
noted earlier, the Kamba are closer, linguistically, culturally and geographically to the GEMA 
groups. And yet, the Kamba have backed Kalenjin-led KANU even when there have been 
Kamba or Kikuyu presidential candidates.  
There are a number of explanations for the Kamba-Kalenjin alliance. As the most populous 
group inhabiting a semi-arid region, rendering them vulnerable and often dependant on the 
state for food relief, the Kamba became convenient Moi allies. However, one of the missing 
links is the African Inland Church (AIC). Historically, as the African Inland Mission (AIM) of 
Canada established itself in Nzaui (in Ukambani) in 1895 through Peter Cameron Scott, it also 
set camp in the Rift Valley, among the Kalenjin groups. In 1943 AIM became the self 
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governing Africa Inland Church (AIC) and took over the Mission‟s work in 1971. Up to this 
day, this church draws most of its followers from the Kamba and the Kalenjin. What is more, 
former President Moi is a staunch AIC, and because of his intensive involvement in the 
church‟s activities, it acquired the distinction of “state church”. During his rule, Kenyans got 
used to the fact that on Sundays, the first item on the state television, the Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation (KBC), was the coverage of the President attending a church service.  
During Moi‟s reign, two Kamba pastors, Dr. Jones Kaleli and Nthiw‟a rose to unprecedented 
prominence. While one was the chaplain of Kabarak, the other one was in Sacho, two ultra-
modern schools founded and funded by the President and located very near his home. Dr. 
Kaleli in particular became a prominent power broker and a national figure. Through his 
influence, his home area of Kalamba became a beehive of activity attracting all manner of rare 
infrastructure like a tarmacked road, telephone and electricity. Many Kamba leaders seeking 
favours from the head of state would either go through these pastors or find out where the 
President would be attending his next church service. It is an open secret that most of the 
Kamba whom Moi appointed to key positions during his rule (e.g. Prof. Philip Mbithi whom 
he plucked from the university to head the civil service in 1991), were either AIC faithful or 
posed as such. Mbithi proved instrumental in assisting KANU weather the multiparty storm 
that threatened the ruling party‟s grip on power. He was on Moi‟s side, whether the President 
was attending a political rally or listening to church sermons.  
The religious link between the Kamba and the Kalenjin shaped ethnic politics. During the Moi 
era, the most solid KANU support in Ukambani was usually found in areas where the AIC 
had a considerable following. The church remained a crucial anchorage for the ruling party. It 
was the ignored „religious factor‟ in Kamba politics during the multiparty era. Even during the 
single party period, AIC affiliation would give a parliamentary aspirant an edge where the 
church had a strong following. Kilome and Kaiti, for instance, were impenetrable even when 
Mrs Ngilu (Kamba) was running for president in 1997. While the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), on which Ngilu ran enjoyed formidable support in many parts of Ukambani, and won 
9 out of 16 seats
399
, one of the biggest margins was in Kilome where the SDP candidate polled 
a mere 4,526 compared to KANU‟s 10,368. Even in places where the SDP was extremely 
popular, like in Makueni, the KANU parliamentary candidate, Peter Maundu received solid 
support from AIC strongholds of Kalamba, Nzaui, Kilumba and Kilili. He received a total of 
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14,896 votes against SDP‟s 21,420. In fact, he won the seat in a by-election occasioned by the 
death of the MP, Prof. Paul Sumbi in 1998.  
The fact that Kamba AIC members voted for Moi instead of Mrs Ngilu may suggest that 
religious affiliation overrode ethnic considerations. The AIC members displayed unwavering 
loyalty to the President and popularising him during church sermons was the norm rather than 
the exception. The AIC gatherings became platforms for praising the head of state, praying for 
his “good health”, “long life” so that he can “continue to lead Kenya into greater heights of 
development”. While the other mainstream churches like the Catholic, the Anglican and the 
Pentecostal churches were key critics of Moi and his government, at no time did the AIC top 
clergy, normally Kamba and Kalenjin, lodge any protest to the head of state and his 
government even during some of the worst state scandals (e.g. revelations of massive 
corruption or the “ethnic clashes” of the 1990‟s). 
 
7.2.1.2    Using the Maasai to woo the Kamba: “The Kitengela Declaration” 
It has been shown that the Kamba occupy an ambiguous position in Kenya‟s ethnic politics 
and alliances. They are neither allied to GEMA nor could they be recruited to the 
KAMATUSA cluster. The latter, a Kalenjin-led outfit, had brought together Rift Valley 
Nilotic groups, many of them pastoral, with the aim of derailing the clamour for 
democratisation and multipartysm. In order to achieve their objectives, they violently 
reclaimed lands allegedly occupied by “outsiders” and threatened to go federal should the  
country adopt a multiparty democracy. Even after KANU won the 1992 elections, the threat 
of losing power through the ballot box loomed. In any case, the elections results had been 
manipulated in many areas, with incredible results showing that registered voters had voted 
100%, and in some cases, votes cast superseded the number of the registered voters. The 
Kalenjin knew that they needed broader ethnic alliances. Holding four cabinet positions after 
the 1992 elections, populous and vulnerable, the Kamba fitted well into their scheme of things. 
It is against this background that the “Kitengela Declaration” of 1993 should be seen. To 
imagine that the Kamba could also qualify as KAMATUSA simply shows how a wide range 
of criteria can be selectively applied to determine who is recruited to what membership, 
depending on the stakes (cf. Schlee, 1997: 577). 
Immediately after the elections, the Kalenjin-led KAMATUSA leaders were criss-crossing the 
country once more, antagonising some groups and seeking the support of others. One such 
meeting was held in April 1993 at a place called Kitengela, in Kajiado North constituency 
whose MP, Prof. George Saitoti,  was the vice-president. During this meeting, the Kamba and 
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Maasai groups were urged to co-operate “for the common good”400 This had come hot on the 
heels of another meeting in the Rift Valley hosted by the combative and then powerful 
Kalenjin minister, Nicholas Biwott and where the Maasai self styled “spokesman”, William 
ole Ntimama warned the “true inhabitants” of the province to be on their guard against 
“outsiders”. As noted earlier, similar statements had been made during the majimbo rallies of 
1991, which preceded the bloody ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley. The Kitengela meeting was 
attended by among others, Saitoti and Ntimama, representing the Maasai, while cabinet 
ministers, Johnstone Makau and Jackson Mulinge represented the Kamba.   
The aim of the meeting was not to make a pact between the Kamba and the Maasai, but rather 
to draw the Kamba into the inflammatory KAMATUSA, held together by their common fear 
of the perceived hegemonic tendencies of the big ethnic groups, especially the Kikuyu. It was 
seen as an attempt to whip up ethnic animosity between the Kamba and the Kikuyu or at least 
foil a possible Kamba backing of GEMA groups.  The KAMATUSA link became clear when 
Biwott, who was not in the meeting, later endorsed the “declaration”, which had said that the 
Kamba and the Maasai had buried their unspecified differences and will in future “work 
together”. The Kamba and the Maasai were not told why they should unite, if they were 
disunited at all. The move reminds one of the famous American dictum: “If it ain‟t broke, why 
fix it?” As the most powerful man besides Moi, the fact that Biwott‟s hand was invariably 
lurking in the background of all these anti-Kikuyu crusades was telling. However, the bid to 
recruit the Kamba into the bandwagon did not succeed, as the Kamba leaders realised that the 
people they purported to represent were opposed to the move. Incidentally, this was a crop of 
ministers that served Moi with so much dedication that at one time during their tenure, they 
denied that Ukambani had massive food shortages. It took the President himself to contradict 
them! No wonder that out of the four Kamba ministers in the 1992-97 cabinet, only one was 
re-elected in 1997.  
The meeting at Kitengela was challenged not only by the opposition parties but KANU 
personalities like Cyrus Jirongo
401
 and a Kalenjin MP, Kipruto arap Kirwa. There was 
concern that the ethnic alliances being mooted could plunge the country into turmoil. The fear 
was that the Kamba would join the KAMATUSA, a scenario that perhaps would have seen 
other alliances emerge, polarising the country. The outcome of the Kitengela meeting showed 
that although the Kamba and the Maasai were Moi supporters, the Kamba were still keen to 
maintain some neutrality, by not allowing themselves to be dragged into a hate campaign 
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 Who was then chairman of a lobby group called Youth for KANU ‟92 which had  campaigned for KANU in 
the 1992 elections.  
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against the Kikuyu. In retrospection, the Kamba and the KAMATUSA groups had related 
fairly differently with the former Kenyatta (Kikuyu) regime. While the KAMATUSA claim 
that they were marginalised may appear plausible, the same cannot be said about the Kamba. 
It appears that in both Kenyatta and Moi governments, the Kamba were neither 
marginalised
402
 nor „too close‟. But again, the Maasai have a unique historical and strong 
ethnic links with the Kikuyu. It was rather ironical that the anti-Kikuyu crusade in Kitengela 
was led by Saitoti, whose Kikuyu ethnicity is an open secret. But that is perhaps the reason 
why he had to be ultra hawkish to convince others and himself that he was indeed Maasai.  
 
„Fearing‟ the Kikuyu 
Writing on the politics of ethnicity in Kenya, Ochieng (2001) notes that “only a united tribe 
can contribute meaningfully to a united nation. That is why, as I have often said in this 
column, if leaders of a tribe or a group of tribes make a conscious effort to unite their people, 
we should encourage them. But there is a proviso. Although ethnic unity is a necessary 
condition for national unity, it is not a sufficient one. It depends on the ideo-ethical teaching 
which informs the ethnic unity”.403 He asked why it was tribalism to revive GEMA whereas it 
was not tribalism to flaunt KAMATUSA or to resuscitate unity among the Luo or among the 
Kamba. So why is GEMA dismissed as “tribalist”? He reasons that the Kikuyu, given their 
numerical strength and “overriding economic and intellectual fund”, play the vanguard role in 
GEMA, making the union a convenient Kikuyu front. 
Ochieng argues that most ethnic groups in Kenya have a phobia about the Kikuyu, which, he 
says, goes back to the Mau Mau period when colonial propaganda ceaselessly depicted the 
Kikuyu as “born terrorists”. He notes that the other source is the “Mau Mau homeguards” who 
after independence, surrounded Kenyatta, and “with extraordinary chauvinism and ferocity” 
grabbed land, looted banks and subjected Kenyans, “including their own Kikuyu masses, to 
extreme tyranny”. While this may not be indisputable, the Moi regime was any different. 
Besides, Kikuyu presidential candidates have received support outside of their ethnic 
constituency since 1992. Moreover, through a coalition of opposition parties, Mwai Kibaki, a 
Kikuyu, became Kenya‟s third president in the 2002 elections. If there has been any phobia 
about a Kikuyu president, it was based on the ethnicisation of the resourcefulness with which 
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Kenyans have come to associate the presidency, and therefore a genuine feeling that the 
presidency should rotate so that groups can “eat” in turns.  
 
Are the Kamba less ethnocentric? 
Although power relations in multiethnic societies are largely antagonistic and dominantly 
ethnic (Foucault, 2000: 12), group members may also discriminate against their own members. 
In the Kenyan society, like others in Africa, ethnicity transcends many aspects of people‟s 
lives. Whether you are thinking about a school for your son or daughter, a job in both the 
public or the private sector, training institutions etc., the inevitable question that crosses the 
applicant‟s mind or their kin is “who is in charge there”. Whereas many rejoice at the idea that 
one of „their own‟ is in charge, others may see it as a disadvantage. It is not uncommon in 
Kenya to hear group members say that their own kin despises “their people”.404 The Kamba 
say “Muukamba ndatethasya ungi” (“a Kamba does not help another one”). If you get rich, 
neighbours and relatives often remark “ethua tuilea” (“s/he is getting rich against our wish”). 
This common talk among the Kamba is not just symbolic and metaphorical but also matched 
by lived experiences. For instance, when Prof. Mbithi was head of the civil service in the 
1990‟s (the most powerful position after the presidency), the Kamba claimed that he did not 
“help” them. Kamba cabinet ministers have also been accused of being Moi puppets and 
“doing nothing” for the group. It is argued that Kamba personalities occupying powerful 
positions have been gullible, easily used for the benefit of other groups. The former head of 
the military, Jackson Mulinge, was accused of having been used by Moi to remove senior 
Kamba military officers before his retirement. However, during public gatherings in 
Ukambani, President Moi used to parade Kamba personalities he had appointed to positions of 
influence, naming them one by one and mentioning their positions. He would occasionally tell 
the Kamba that he had a soft spot for them! Besides, he would create the impression that if 
those appointees were not „helping‟ the Kamba, then he‟s not to blame. This gesture 
reinforced the stereotype that the Kamba do not “help” their own. When Mrs Ngilu found 
NPK, the sharpest criticism came from her backyard, the Kamba KANU leaders. After Kamba 
supporters crowned her a Kamba heroine, giving her the symbolic bow and arrows, a huge 
gathering was organised by Kamba KANU leaders to discredit the move. Keen to please 
President Moi, the leaders even argued that the crowning ceremony had flouted Kamba 
customs. They said that she should have been given a lesso
405
 and a basket full of cassava or 
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 A decorated piece of cloth popularly tied around the waist by women. 
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sweet potatoes which “befits a woman” and not bow and arrows.406 They vowed to fine her 
several bulls and goats to “cleanse the Kamba community for breaking traditions”. This was 
simply a threat though, for the main purpose was to show the head of state that his “co-eaters” 
were still loyal. Earlier, a Kamba cabinet minister, Kalonzo Musyoka, had challenged her to 
seek fresh mandate from the electorate.
407
 But this particular call notwithstanding, she 
surprised many opposition adherents a few months later when she asked Kalonzo to seek the 
nomination for KANU‟s presidential candidate to succeed president Moi. She said that 
Musyoka‟s position as KANU vice-chairman had “boosted” Kamba chances of ascending to 
the presidency. The minister welcomed the challenge but asked her to cross over to KANU.
408
  
There are also other incidences that challenge the notion that the Kamba are less ethnocentric. 
During Mbithi‟s tenure as head of the civil service, a Kikuyu MP accused him of “tribalism” 
in the appointment of civil servants. During the Kenyatta era, it is claimed that the Makueni 
district hospital in Ukambani was meant for Kikuyuland but a Kamba, who was the 
permanent secretary in the ministry of health, transferred the multimillion project to Makueni. 
What is more, it is an open secret in Kenya that the Kamba are over-represented in the police 
force. It is alleged that many got recruited particularly when a Kamba was the commissioner 
of police. Whereas it is conventional knowledge and practice that senior public appointees 
have been avenues through which the state redistributes resources in the Kenyan multiethnic 
society, the „outsiders‟ do not lose an opportunity to accuse those appointees of “tribalism”.  
It is a complex debate. Even as the Kamba depict their leaders as incorrigibly disinterested in 
assisting them, and as being used as door mats by other groups, one has to bear in mind that 
few of Moi‟s appointees had „real‟ power to influence the allocation of state resources without 
his due approval or influence. Nevertheless, a study done among various ethnic groups in 
Nairobi appeared to lend credence to the notion that the Kamba were less ethnocentric. In his 
study of the „informal‟ sector, Macharia notes that in the food selling business, among the 
Kamba, unlike other ethnic groups (e.g. Kikuyu and Luo), ethnicity was for them not a basis 
for “trust” and therefore consideration to give their members credit. Writing about one of his 
Kamba key respondents, he notes: “She would rather give credit to people from other ethnic 
groups than to her co-ethics. Her explanation was that the Kamba are jealous and envious of 
each other‟s success and may never pay back a credit, all aimed at running down the business 
of their co-ethnic. She also added that, in fact, they did not patronise her food, especially 
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when they had money. They only came to her when they were without money and were 
looking for food service on credit”. Macharia continues “...my observations confirmed her 
story as I found that very few Kambas patronised her food especially during the beginning 
and the end of the month, when they were loaded with cash from their salary payments”. He 
concludes, “this case of one ethnic group is unique as the opposite is true of other ethnic 
groups. They build more trust with their co-ethics who also patronised their businesses and 
were therefore likely to be given small credits on services they could not afford to pay 
promptly” (1997: 137).  
If what Macharia is telling us is anything to go by, this question of ethnicity and trust building 
among the Kamba is analytically challenging. In fact, in contrast, he gives an account of a 
Luhya woman
409
 who regrets having given credit to a man who was non-Luhya and who had 
disappeared. He notes, “her main concern was that he was from a different ethnic group and 
she swore not to repeat the mistake ever again”. 410  What makes the whole discourse 
problematic is that one cannot say that the Kamba are organised on other levels like class or 
have shed ethnic affiliations and kinship ties. In any case, Macharia ignores the fact that the 
patrons did come to her when they had no money. Although they took their money elsewhere, 
where they could not be given credit, they turned to wamusyi (“one from home”) at the hour 
of need. Macharia also does not tell us what kind of food she was selling. Let me clarify why 
this is important. In most cases, when the Kamba join the labour market or migrate to the city 
and get jobs, they tend to avoid some of their „traditional‟ dishes like isyo (a mixture of maize 
and legumes) which, being the food most people ate on a daily basis during their childhood 
and part of adult life, is associated with poverty. Some are in a hurry to remove it from their 
menu as soon as they „make it‟ in life. 
Nevertheless, assuming that Macharia‟s conclusions on the one hand, and what the Kamba 
say about themselves on the other, have some basis, what would be the explanation? Being 
very complex issues, there are no easy answers. Although many Kamba grow up in 
environments of scarcity, and therefore competition, I do not think that jealousy and envy can 
be attributed to any one group. As for the Kamba leaders accused of not helping their kin, it is 
basically the discrepancy between expectation and performance. In most cases, those seeking 
such favours simply exceed the capacity to assist. In other cases, those expected to assist their 
kin have to reckon with the risk of losing their jobs as a result. But it is not always a question 
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of material gains. Regarding Mrs Ngilu‟s bid for the State House, a Kamba research partner 
told me that: “We knew that she will not win but we wanted to make it known that we can 
also produce a president”. The actor, Ann Mwende, brings out the complexity of ethnic 
politics where ethnic support may not be predicated on expected material rewards but 
recognition. Breaking away from KANU in 1992 to the Kikuyu-led DP and then jumping 
camp in the run up to 1997 to seek the presidency on an SDP ticket, Ngilu may have been 
pursuing her personal ambitions. In supporting her, the Kamba were not just thinking about 
recognition but better schools, electricity and state jobs. After emerging a poor fifth, she 
joined forces with other losers, Mwai Kibaki and Wamalwa Kijana to launch a united bid in 
2002. But in a surprise move, her party introduced a controversial clause that ruled out 
fielding presidential candidates who were not university graduates. She dumped the party and 
founded the National Party of Kenya (NPK). A colleague of mine who was directly involved 
in the drafting of the NPK‟s constitution wrote me an e-mail, saying: “You know very well 
that SDP had become problematic. The president (of NPK) is the lady
411
 and we seek to 
galvanise the support of the Kamba. Some tribal chauvinism somebody may say, but with 
humility, that is about the only way to the power negotiating table”. While expecting material 
benefits from a political leader may be a fallacy, it is difficult to convince Kenyan groups 
otherwise, including the elite who would be expected to champion ideology based political 
parties.  
Although the Moi regime continuously cautioned Kenyans to be wary of “tribal parties”, to 
the contrary, it created an environment where they mushroomed, partly by isolating some 
groups. Besides, the registrar of societies often hastened the registration of parties seen to be 
“tribal” while blocking those that appeared to be potentially multiethnic and therefore broad 
based. A case in point is a party backed by the so-called “KANU rebels”, named United 
Democratic Movement (UDM), which was denied registration.  
 
7.2.2   “They ate, it is our time to eat”: Justifying ethnic politics 
From the 1990‟s, and up to the 2002 elections, Kenya was a country in deep economic and 
political crisis. Looking at Abdullahi‟s (1998) criteria for a “failed state”, Kenya had all the 
characteristics. Certainly, the situation was not as bad as in Somalia, which Abdullahi is 
discussing, but all the practices that finally saw the collapse of Somalia were in place: 
Nepotism, sowing of hatred, corruption, looting of the nations assets, anarchy etc. In both 
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Kenyatta and Moi governments, patronage and clientelism
412
 became major pillars of the 
Kenyan political and social organisation. However, with an increasingly more enlightened 
citizenry, the Moi regime was under closer scrutiny. Beginning in the 1990‟s, accusations of 
ineptitude, corruption, tribalism, and nepotism became so common that they were no longer 
news. Often, instead of Moi and his allies denying these accusations, they would legitimise 
them by saying that Kenyatta was no different.  
The whole idea of an ethnic group being in government, and appropriating state resources at 
the exclusion of others, is what Kenyans call “eating”. “Eating” includes being in cabinet 
positions, in other senior public jobs, winning government tenders, as well as having roads, 
electricity, schools and medical facilities. During Kenyatta‟s time, the Kikuyu were said to be 
“eating” while in the Moi era, it was the Kalenjin. Just like in the Kenyatta regime, Moi‟s also 
had “co-eaters”. Alongside the Kalenjin therefore, were the Maasai, the Turkana, the Somali, 
the Luhya and also the Kamba. The list of ethnic groups that “ate” is quite long though, since, 
the mere appointment of a few personalities to senior positions in government was interpreted 
as being beneficial to their ethnic groups. When the Luo-led NDP merged with KANU
413
 and 
Moi appointed two Luo MPs to cabinet positions, “the Luo” were said to be “eating”, 
although these appointments did not even last a year. It is the politicians who claim that their 
groups are “eating” or they are not. 
“Eating” implies that some other groups have been excluded. The Kikuyu were said to have 
“eaten” during Kenyatta‟s time, and the KAMATUSA groups would say during Moi‟s rule 
that “it is our time to eat”. This simple statement is pregnant with meaning. It is the kind of 
politics where the concern of a group is not just the management of state economy but what 
flows to the members of the group. This kind of attitude also abetted corruption as people 
thought that they should make hay while the sun shines. The state remained an entity that 
people hardly identified with and one was never sure about its permanence. You loot and go, 
for that might be the only chance you have. The fallacy in this thinking is that the Kikuyu did 
not benefit en masse during Kenyatta‟s rule.  
In this “eating” game, the groups in government do not “eat” the same way, there are those  
who “eat” at the high table, i.e., the inner circle; those at other tables and those picking the 
crumbs. But these categories are disputable and highly contested. While a Maasai cabinet 
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minister, Julius Sunkuli, claimed that the Moi government had not marginalised the Maasai 
but “rehabilitated” them, his cabinet colleague and fellow Maasai, Ntimama, took a contrary 
view. Some Nandi and Kipsigis leaders lamented that it was the Keiyo and the Tugen sub-
groups of the Kalenjin that were “eating” during Moi‟s rule. But looking at it closely, the 
Nandi and the Kipsigis were equally well represented in the Moi administration, but like the 
Maasai, they felt that they deserved more. If there was an ethnic group that was at the centre 
of things in the Moi regime but remained vociferous and controversial, it is the Maasai. As for 
the Kamba, their cabinet ministers would never lose an opportunity to thank Moi for the 
„crumbs‟ falling from the table.414 But it is also important to point out here that “eating”, is 
not just seen in material benefits. There are matters of social capital and symbolism. In fact, it 
is not uncommon to see an unemployed destitute person saying that their group is “eating”. 
There are the non-material benefits like group pride, self-worth and recognition that group 
members enjoy just by the mere fact that one of their own is in a position of influence. There 
are many Kenyans who win respect and reverence in their places of work, not because they 
are related to a minister or the President, but by the mere fact that they come from the same 
ethnic group. Some have even appropriated these ethnic links in seeking jobs or to hasten their 
upward mobility in their places of work. 
 
“Co-eating” and ruling in turns 
In Kenyan politics, it is almost impossible to conduct a successful election campaign based on 
issues that cut across ethnicities: The poor state of the economy, illiteracy, land reform, 
gender equity, HIV/Aids, the rule of law and good governance. If you do not tell your group 
how they will “eat” in the future or will continue to do so, then you have no election agenda. 
The educated elite, who may want to focus on issues and ideology, can be easily defeated at 
the polls by a novice if they don‟t comply.  
In the run up to the 1992 elections, Luhya and Luo leaders claimed that it was now their turn 
to rule. As the Luo pursued this goal through the opposition, the Luhya supported Moi whom 
they lobbied to appoint a Luhya as vice-president who would eventually succeed Moi. In both 
cases, the respective ethnic constituencies were being told “our turn is coming”. Among other 
things, the metaphor was intended to socialise the Kikuyu into accepting that the presidency 
should rotate along ethnic lines, and to let them know that they were excluded from “eating” 
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since they had had their turn before Moi. Waiting to rule, it is argued here, has contributed to 
Kenya‟s stability. On the other hand, no group has “eaten” alone, there has always been some 
“co-eaters”, a situation which has helped in minimising the chances of polarisation. Moi 
would play weak and vulnerable, and thereby creating the impression that he was co-ruling 
with some of his ministers or senior civil servants. For instance, when Simeon Nyachae, a 
Kisii, was head of the civil service in the 1980‟s, Moi once remarked: Nyachae akisema, 
nimesema (“when Nyachae talks, I have talked”). Besides, in the early days of his regime, 
Moi used to carry some of the most powerful Kikuyu personalities in his official limousine, 
making it look unnecessary for them to topple him from power.  
In this “eating”, “co-eating” and waiting to “eat”, months turned into years. Although few 
would dispute that the Kenyatta and Moi governments were dominated by the Kikuyu and the 
Kalenjin respectively, other ethnic groups were not excluded. In fact, although the Moi regime 
was seen to be anti-Kikuyu in the 1990‟s it is estimated that his government still spent more 
resources in Kikuyuland, than the so-called “KANU zones” like Ukambani and Maasailand. 
During the Kenyatta regime, the Kamba were trusted with one of the most sensitive 
departments. At a time when military governments were being established all over Africa and 
Latin America, and therefore the possibility of coup detat was real, Kenyatta left the armed 
forces entirely in the hands of the Kamba. In fact, even after some Kamba were implicated in 
the abortive coup in 1971, the head of the military then, Joseph Ndolo, was retired and 
replaced with another Kamba, Jackson Mulinge. When Moi took over, the face of the military 
changed. Although some Kamba generals were retained, others were retired, with the Kalenjin 
taking up senior positions.
415
   
This story about “eating” finds some relevance in studies on ecology. Pontin (1982), for 
instance, talks about “diversity in dominance”, that is, where different species dominate 
certain niches in turns. As the species form what he calls a “dominance ring”416, coexistence 
of the species is enhanced.   
 
7.3   Kenya and the question of a nation-state  
Introduction 
Before concluding this chapter, the idea of ethnic cohesiveness and nation state, introduced at 
the beginning of the chapter, will be revisited here. Whereas most African states are anything 
but “nation states”, Tanzania and Somalia can be regarded as exceptions. At least at a 
theoretical level, Somalia had what it takes to qualify as a nation state, but clannism 
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overshadowed shared language, cultural practices, religion and territory. In the case of 
Tanzania, the semblance of a nation state was achieved through the concerted efforts of the 
founding president, who pursued a common language (Swahili) policy and suppressed 
ethnicity. To a great extent, Nyerere succeeded in creating among Tanzanians a consciousness 
of nationhood. In Kenya and many other African states, such a goal remains elusive, as much 
of economic, social and political life revolves around lower levels of identification.  
But the concept of nation is, unlike state, quite diffuse. If we adopt Smith‟s definition, that a 
nation is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members” (1991: 40, quoted in Eller 1999: 17), then it would be difficult to 
classify Kenya as a nation. Borrowing heavily from Connor (1994), Eller identifies “nations 
proper”, “prenational” or “potential nations“, “offshoot nations” and “immigrant societies”. 
“Nations proper”, are said to be the largest human grouping characterised by a myth of 
common ancestry. Following his description, Kenya and most African states would fall under 
the categories “prenational” or “potential nations”. These are said to be groups that will or 
may become nations in the future but which currently lack a “national consciousness” and 
where meaningful identity is still limited to locale or “tribe”. This category is what Cottam 
and Cottam (2001) refer to as “non-nation states” or states that are in the process of being or 
becoming as opposed to “nation-states”. This distinction has its own inherent controversies. 
Other scholars, like Morris-Hale (1996) use “multiethnic societies” as a blanket concept to 
capture the diversity obtaining across the board from Nigeria, South Africa, Switzerland 
through Canada. Morris-Hale‟s “multi-ethnic society”, appears to correspond to Barth‟s and 
Furnivall‟s “polyethnic society”. Cottam and Cottam‟s definition of “multi-ethnic states”, 
raises questions on Morris-Hale‟s use of the concept. They argue that in such states/societies, 
primary identity and loyalty goes to the various ethnic groups and that attachment to the state 
is either secondary or at a lower level (2001: 195). Besides, they say that multiethnic states 
differ from “core-community states” in that “they do not have a single community that 
considers itself the rightful national community for the territorial state”.417  
On his part, Jenkins poses the question: “When does ethnic identity become national identity, 
and what is the relationship between them?” (1997: 42). And drawing from Eriksen‟s (1993) 
concept of non-ethnic nationalism, he asks, “when does nationalism cease to be ethnic?”, 
thereby raising some of the core issues in the nationalism debate in Africa. With regard to 
African states, Eller avers that: “Certainly, the peoples of Africa, or even the peoples in most 
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single African states, do not conceive of themselves as one nation but as many; they 
may…someday come to see themselves as a common nation...but not yet” (1999: 18). He also 
stresses the idea that nationhood is not just achieved but subjective, a “state of mind”, echoing 
the idea of “imagination” (Anderson, 1983), where a group embraces a common myth and 
memory. Calhoun (1991) however argues that national identities are not simply products of 
such “indirect social relationships”. Challenges to nationalism have been encountered in many 
contexts. Writing about multiethnic Malaysia, Morris-Hale notes, “developing something 
called a Malaysian national identity is a Herculean task indeed, as so little is common to each 
group to use as a basis for a national identity” (1996: 180). 
 
Kenya and ethnic cohesiveness 
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, Kenyan ethnic groups live in „ethnic districts‟, 
some bearing ethnic names, and where this does not apply (e.g. where ethnic groups occupy 
more than one district), then people talk about “Luhyaland”, “Luoland”, “Ukambani” or 
“Kambaland”, “Maasailand” etc. It appears that Kenya had the potential for faster 
cohesiveness and nationhood under Kenyatta, during whose tenure many „ethnic districts‟ 
became increasingly multiethnic, with people settling and owning property outside their own 
districts. It was also a time when pupils accessed education anywhere in the republic 
undeterred. President Moi made a series of changes which reversed this trend. He introduced 
District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), which, though theoretically aimed at 
devolving power from the centre, proved to be a way of enhancing disparities in regional 
development and ethnic divisions. Besides, limits were set as to how many pupils seeking 
secondary education could do so outside their home district. Moreover, the majimbo debates, 
as already indicated, were revived. It has also been stressed that the agitation for majimbo was 
not aimed at creating a federal state but ethnic enclaves. When multiparty democracy was re-
introduced in 1991, the Moi administration was not comfortable with the multiethnic outfit 
(FORD), which was to challenge KANU in the polls.  As this party split into smaller parties 
that followed ethnic lines, the government was blamed for it. I have also noted that the 
multiparty elections were accompanied by ethnic clashes in the Rift valley, Western and Coast 
provinces, targeting groups that were perceived as anti-KANU. In view of these developments, 
one would argue that if Kenya was in the process of becoming a nation, the Moi era reversed 
this process.  
With regard to common language, Kenyans increasingly saw political leaders, even ministers 
addressing gatherings of mixed ethnicities in a dominant local tongue, instead of using 
 281 
 
 
 
Swahili, the National Language. The head of state himself was no exception. Of course, there 
is nothing wrong with local languages, if anything, their use should be encouraged. But, in a 
country with 42 ethnic groups, Swahili provides a sense of common identity among the 
diverse groups. While Tanzania emphasised Swahili as both official and national language, 
Kenya gave it lip service, with the situation worsening in the Moi era.
418
 There are many 
Kenyans today, even in urban areas, who cannot communicate in the “national language,” 
something that puts Kenyans to shame when they meet Tanzanians. Nevertheless, Swahili is 
occasionally used as a criteria to gauge citizenship. For instance, during crackdowns on 
“illegal immigrants”, the police „test‟ whether a Somali is a Kenyan, and not a Somalian 
national, by speaking to them is Swahili. Lack of proficiency is construed to mean that one is 
not a Kenyan.  
In daily life, rarely do people express themselves as “Kenyans”, unless they are filling forms 
at the airport or when the police confronts them at night, asking them to produce the national 
identity card or a passport. Even as late as the 1990‟s, Kenyan identity cards used to indicate 
one‟s “tribe”. In an editorial, the leading Kenyan daily notes: “The basic question which faces 
Kenya as it approaches the Moi transition and a new constitutional dispensation is whether it 
will ever become a nation, or continue to be a mere collection of tribes...” The editor 
continued, “...we assumed that interethnic marriages, urbanisation, interaction of students in 
ethnically integrated schools and employment outside local territories would eliminate 
tribalism. Regrettably, this has not happened. Politicians have turned tribalism into a medium 
for mobilising their tribesmen in their struggle for power”.419 Kenya disproves the notion that 
tribalism diminishes in significance with increased literacy, urbanisation, cross-ethnic 
interaction and democratisation processes. People are increasingly considering themselves as 
Maasai, Kamba or Kikuyu first, then perhaps, Kenyan.  
Following Moi government‟s crackdown on broad based student unions in public universities 
during the 1980‟s and 90‟s, ethnic based organisations (e.g. Akamba University Students 
Association-AUSU), were encouraged and took centre stage. What is interesting is that the 
same “tribal consciousness,” writes Onyango-Obbo (1998), has intensified in Uganda in spite 
of the fact that Museveni banned political party activities after coming to power in 1986, 
accusing them of causing division through religion and ethnicity.
420
  This was done through a 
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 Partly due to increased schooling costs leading to high drop out and the policy of confining pupils in their 
home districts. 
419
 See The Daily Nation, Saturday, August 25, 2001. 
420
 The Editor of the leading Ugandan daily, The Monitor. His article featured in The East African, July 6-12, 
1998. Another Ugandan journalist, Joachim Buwembo, also wrote a similar article with the title “tribalism 
resurfaces in Ugandan life and politics,” The East African, August 3-9, 1998. 
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1987 amendment to the penal code (the “anti-sectarian act”) which outlawed tribalism. He 
says that in the once prestigious Makerere University, “there is no tree on the campus which is 
not papered over with announcements of meetings and cultural events of tribal associations”. 
In the article entitled “for Ugandans, tribe always comes first”, Onyango-Obbo notes that 
every “tribe” has an association in Makerere and that even Ugandans living abroad organise 
themselves around “tribes”, with the Acholi and the Baganda taking the lead.421 Looking at 
the proliferation of ethnic based student organisations, it seems that whereas Kenya‟s were 
created, financed and strengthened as a way of weakening the unifying and once powerful 
student body,
422
 in the Ugandan case, outlawing and criminalising association along ethnic 
lines created anxiety, arousing a spontaneous ethnic consciousness as the imposed „Ugandan‟ 
identity was too amorphous and „distant‟. 
A Kenyan political scientist and politician, Prof. Anyang‟ Nyong‟o, argued that during the 
long authoritarian spell of one-party rule, “Kenyans lost even the art of political organisation. 
Having been huddled into tribes that KANU can rule by organising elite competition for jobs, 
contracts, bribes, business, etc. on the basis of tribes, Kenyans seem to believe that political 
parties should be owned by tribes for the sake of such elite bargains”.423 He argues that before, 
and at independence, political parties in Kenya were organised on issues and were guided by 
ideology and therefore having „district-bound‟ parties is retrogressive and a step backwards. 
He advocates the incorporation of “issue-based politics” into the civic education campaigns. 
Nyong‟o asserts that many Kenyans have fallen into the trap of ethnic politics of distribution 
and that the nationalistic outlook proves elusive and its not even desirable. His argument 
raises the question of the medium through which allegiance to the „tribe‟ can be minimised in 
favour of the nation. In Kenya, it has been possible to combine allegiance to the „tribe‟ and to 
the nation. Actually, I do not think that Kenyans should be asked to reject the chauvinism that 
drives them to support parties merely because they are led by their tribesmen/women. 
Nyong‟o argues that at independence, the „tribe‟ was not at the centre of elections in which 
the “more nationalistic” KANU won. That argument is not convincing, considering the fact 
that it was a Luo-Kikuyu alliance that won the elections. In any case, Kenyatta „rewarded‟ the 
Luo by making Odinga his first vice-president. What is nationalistic about two ethnic groups 
forming an alliance in a state with 42 ethnic groups? Besides, the fact that “small tribes” were 
united under KADU adds credence to the fact that „tribalism‟ has been at the centre of 
                                                          
421
 With internet chat forums Acholinet and Bugandanet respectively. 
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 Students Organisation of Nairobi University (SONU). 
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Kenya‟s political and social life. Moreover, the fact the two ethnic groups came together did 
not mean that each had shed its sense of identity and interest.  
Turning to more recent developments, three opposition politicians from different ethnic 
groups formed a united front in 2002 to dislodge KANU from power. Then there were 
demands that the three, who had run for president in 1997, should step aside for other new 
leaders. Regarding this debate, Mutahi Ngunyi, a political scientist, wrote: “The three are 
tribal chiefs and their ethnic constituencies cannot be passed over...without legitimacy in the 
tribe. In other words, ethnicity is the bottom line. Or has this changed?”424 A plausible answer 
would be that it has not, as Kenyans continue to oscillate between an elusive national identity 
while cushioned in the cultural/ethnic identity. The ambivalent role of the state has slackened 
the process through which a „nation‟ could emerge. On Moi‟s ethnic manipulation, Ochieng‟ 
says, “nobody knows our tribal stupidity like the President. He is thus able with the greatest 
ease to exploit it to the greatest advantage”.425 Actually, there is no „stupidity‟ here, for the 
state has not emerged as a symbol of collective identity.  
Whether it is the context (e.g. divisive colonial and post colonial policies), the actors 
(particularly those assuming „tribal‟ leadership positions) or what is at stake (e.g. competition 
for political power), what has been certain are the contradictions and inconsistencies. The 
question, perhaps, should be why there are populations available for ethnic mobilisation and 
why they respond to a call to act as “ethnic subjects” (Mare, 1992: 27). But as the chapter 
illustrates, a stable state is still possible in spite of the politicisation of ethnicity. The coalition 
that deposed KANU from power in 2002 is trying to restore harmony among groups by 
engaging in campaigns for cohesion and political integration.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The chapter aimed at presenting the Kamba and the Maasai in wider social spheres; as part of 
the larger Kenyan multiethnic society. In other words, the objective was to examine the 
external dimension of interethnic coexistence. The chapter has showed how interactions 
between both groups are shaped by other groups and those running government, in the 
production of a stable state. By examining state stability, the chapter sought to highlight the 
political dimension of Kamba-Maasai coexistence. While it has been argued that the primary 
task of establishing states is to subordinate primordial attachments since ethnic allegiances 
may compete with the state for allegiance and loyalty (Geertz, 1973; Morris-Hale, 1996), the 
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chapter has shown that the state could also enhance these “primordial attachments” and 
reinforce ethnic difference with the aim of foiling any potential broad based ethnic alliances. 
Kenya‟s state stability is discussed by looking at the creation of ethnic districts, the politics of 
“small” and “big tribes”, “tribalism”, ethnic alliances, ethnic dominance and political 
consciousness. On districts, I have argued that although they were designed to serve as divide-
and-rule mechanisms, and to undermine the basis for a cohesive society, they have also 
provided groups with their own spaces in which they can exercise their autonomy and address 
regional issues. Besides, district boundaries, though politically significant, do not inhibit 
interethnic interactions and exchanges. With regard to ethnic dominance, it is noted that 
Kenya does not have a numerically dominant ethnic group.
426
 Moreover, it has not been 
possible to unite groups under wider linguistic categories, e.g. as Bantu. This creates a 
situation where ethnic groups have to form loose alliances to capture and maintain political 
power. This interdependence, it is argued, has contributed immensely to the country‟s relative 
stability. Closely tied to this, is the fact that in pre- and post-independent Kenya, it has always 
been possible to form ethnic alliances across Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic groups. The 
dynamism of these alliances is illustrated by the frequency at which they shift. Besides, there 
has also been an all-inclusive practice, where ruling groups “eat” with others. These “rings of 
dominance”,427 where “eaters” also recruit “co-eaters”, as others wait for their turn, precludes 
a situation where groups are polarised or isolated.  The 1992, 1997 and 2002 elections also 
demonstrate that although ethnic groups may vote along ethnic lines, it is the 
instrumentalisation of ethnicity by the political elite or “political entrepreneurs”,428 that shapes 
this process. When these „tribal leaders‟ formed a common front in the 2002 elections, the 
voting patterns similarly changed. 
Another aspect I would like to highlight is political consciousness. When discussing the 
politics of ethnic numbers, it was noted that although the manipulation of ethnic numerical 
strength during censuses, are evident, the affected groups did not confront the state authorities. 
This illustrates not only the apathy and indifference of the people to the state but also lower 
levels of political consciousness. In this case, political stability is a consequence of groups‟ 
inaction rather than action.  
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 Although the Kikuyu are the most populous ethnic group, they constitute only about 20% of the Kenyan 
population. This is particularly why Kikuyu presidential candidates, running without broader ethnic alliances, 
could not win the presidency in the 1992 and 1997 elections.  Mr Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, won the 2002 
presidential elections after leading a coalition that brought together the Kikuyu, the Luo, the Luhya, the Kamba 
and the Maasai among other groups. 
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 Quoting Pontin (1982). 
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 See Elwert (2002). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TOWARDS A REDEFINITION OF INTERETHNIC 
COEXISTENCE 
 
This section serves two purposes. First, it is a summary of the main ideas carried in the 
previous chapters and second, it is an analytical chapter where the researcher makes a case for 
a redefinition of interethnic coexistence. By pulling together the main theoretical outcomes in 
the study, this chapter therefore attempts to answer the core research question: What is 
interethnic coexistence? 
 
8.1  Revisiting the concept of coexistence 
 
I have argued that „coexistence‟ is a concept that begs for concretisation in its application on 
how ethnic groups relate. As I have noted in chapters one and two, the concept has enjoyed 
wide application in the natural sciences, particularly in ecology (see Pontin, 1982), political 
economy (Aubey, 1961), history (Davies, 1987), peace studies (e.g. Kriesberg, 1998; Galtung, 
1994) and social anthropology (Torstrick, 2000). While Pontin talks about the “conditions of 
coexistence”, and “rings of dominance”, Aubey talks about “competitive coexistence”, as 
Davies looks at coexistence as an antagonistic process. Kriesberg regards coexistence as a 
harmonious relationship while Galtung says that coexistence is possible “in spite of borders”. 
Torstrick examines the “limits” of coexistence. As evident in the previous chapters, these 
insights have been utilised in the analysis of the empirical data. The political economy debates 
during the cold war period which expounded on the contradictions that characterised the 
juxtaposition of the market economy and communism or the “coexistence” between the West 
and the Communist Bloc, have been particularly inspiring. But, I have underscored the 
tendency in ethnological studies to use „coexistence‟ rather casually. Quite often, its use is not 
even clarified, forcing the reader to deduce the meaning from the context.  
For some scholars who have defined the concept (e.g. Kriesberg), „coexistence‟ is limited to 
situations where groups are purported to live together in peace, excluding relationships 
“characterised by overt struggle” (1998: 182). The approach I have adopted here however, 
presents „coexistence‟ as constituting interactions that are not only peaceful and 
complementary but also antagonistic, where conflict is an integral part of the interactive 
process. Early anthropological studies conducted by Gluckman, Evans-Pritchard, Turner and 
Leach among others showed that social life is permeated by antagonism and conflict (see 
Kuper, 1993). But instead of looking at a single group‟s social structure and organisation, as 
commonly is the case in ethnological studies, this study examined groups in interaction in 
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order to make a contribution on the complexity and the multidimensionality of interethnic 
coexistence.  
I have also argued that while „relations‟ and „coexistence‟ appear to be used interchangeably, 
there are empirical and theoretical differences. My position is that „relations‟ is a more general 
description of human interactions that may not be limited by physical space (i.e. groups that 
„relate‟ may not necessarily share common territory).429 In addition, „relations‟ is devoid of 
the intensity of exchanges that define „coexistence‟. To put it differently, „relations‟ can be 
considered a broader concept under which „coexistence‟ falls. Groups or entities that „relate‟ 
may not necessarily be interdependent. In other words, ethnic groups „relate‟ with many other 
groups but „coexist‟ with a few. I will expound on this aspect shortly. 
In a nutshell, I have, on the basis of my findings and readings developed what I would call the 
main dimensions of interethnic coexistence. These dimensions are linked and are basically put 
in different categories for analytical purposes. I visualise interethnic coexistence as 
interactions characterised by: One, the actors (ethnic groups) whose distinctions (difference) 
and how they make sense of each other have to be concretised; two, as a complementary 
process that involves systems of exchange between the actors; three, as an antagonistic 
relationship where groups compete and fight for resources, ethnic supremacy and power; four, 
as a game of compromises, negotiations and concessions; five, where groups shared common 
territory; and finally, as a relationship that is externally shaped by other groups and the state 
authorities. 
 
8.1.1   Coexistence as a question of ethnic difference   
The discernment and constitution of actors in a study that looks at interactions between groups 
is a minimum requirement. Ethnic difference therefore becomes the first step in analysing a 
coexistence relationship. In chapters two, three and four, I attempted to deepen the 
understanding of how the actors (the Kamba and the Maasai) define themselves and their 
neighbours, as they struggle to appropriate and compete for shared resources. If there is 
anything primordialist, instrumentalist and pragmatist approaches of ethnicity have in 
common, it is that ethnic boundaries are important in the study of identity and ethnic 
difference. Seeking to understand how the Kamba and the Maasai make sense of each other 
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 However, there are exceptions. Ethnic groups can get into a „coexistence‟ relationship even if their territories 
are far apart.  In Africa for example, this „coexistence‟ can be witnessed in the large urban centres where people 
from different parts of the country have migrated to in search of jobs and better amenities. As centres of power 
and commerce, it is also in these urban areas where ethnic competition for political power and business 
opportunities will be more intense.  In the world of global trade, distant countries can easily be interdependent 
(e.g. Japan and the United States). Besides, important natural resources (e.g. oil) are also vital links which bring 
together distant countries and peoples of different political and religious orientations. 
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led to the exploration of their rich body of ethnic stereotypes. I tried to see how these 
depictions influenced everyday cross-ethnic transactions. It emerged that common stereotypes 
(e.g. that the Kamba farmers are “poor” or the Maasai are “backward”) was a way of drawing 
ethnic boundaries and distinction. Stereotypes are used as identity markers. Whereas it is 
evident that through social transformation and increased interaction, cultural differences 
between the Kamba and the Maasai are losing significance, ethnicity continues to find 
relevance as a way of maintaining identity. In fact, both groups claim to display distinct 
physical traits, apart from „traditional‟ dress codes. Indeed Barth (1969) noted that 
interactions between groups do not inhibit maintenance of ethnic boundaries. In fact, even for 
the Kamba who live in Maasai territory, subverting physical boundaries does not mean that 
cultural borders lose significance. 
In general, depictions present actors as static, predictable and with incorrigible attributes. As I 
noted in chapter four, stereotypes “refuse to take individual variations into account” (Eriksen 
1995: 252). In actual practice, the actors contradict these generalisations. Those portrayed as 
possessing certain fixed cultural traits prove to be differentiated, flexible and are calculating. I 
gave the example of how the Kamba depiction of the Maasai as ignorant is falsified in 
everyday practice (see chapter three). The question is: If the actors know that ethnic 
depictions are simplistic descriptions or have been overtaken by processes of social 
transformation, why do they retain depictions and pass them on to the next generation? In a 
situation where groups live side by side, there seems to be a deep “passion for difference”. 
Ethnic depictions play a crucial role in this endeavour. Keen to maintain ethnic identity, 
ethnic depictions become useful tools in the enhancement of a group‟s self-esteem and self-
worth and in making sense of its own existence. That is particularly important where groups 
are rivals but share territory and resources. Like any interface relationship (Long, 1989), 
identity attains significance at the threshold of interaction (see Eriksen, 1997).  
Stereotypes make sense in a coexistence relationship; they enhance group solidarity and serve 
to distinguish between different actors. The quest for difference is one of the most basic 
„requirements‟ in a coexistence relationship. To put it differently, interethnic coexistence is 
about distinctions and identity. It involves ethnic distinctiveness, drawing and maintenance of 
ethnic and territorial boundaries. And yet on the other hand, it is also the porosity of these 
boundaries that tell whether groups „coexist‟ or not. This contrast is demonstrated by 
Rajasingham-Senanayake (see chapter two), who notes that for a long time, the peaceful 
coexistence of “diverse and hybrid cultures” in Sri Lanka astounded ethnologists (1999: 99). 
Chapters three and four have among other things, shown that the Kamba and the Maasai 
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qualify as ideal actors in a „coexistence‟ relationship. The two groups display distinct 
linguistic, cultural and economic attributes, and disparities in social transformation processes. 
As I have shown in chapter five, a system of exchange (complementarity) is embedded in 
these differences (particularly the distinct modes of subsistence). Ethnic depictions enabled 
the researcher to know “who is who” and to discern more clearly the cross-ethnic flow of 
exchanges. The exchanges, as I shall indicate below, are very important in a study on 
coexistence since not all ethnic groups that live side by side „coexist‟. The terminology of 
„coexistence‟ should apply in those cases where the said groups are externally regarded, and 
recognise themselves, as distinct on the one hand, and yet are engaged in social intercourse on 
the other. Moreover, there has to be evidence that these distinctions (ethnic, modes of 
subsistence, religious, social transformation etc.), shape the day-to-day cross-ethnic 
interactions.  
Coexistence may also take the form of commonalities or sameness. Whether acquired through 
interaction with the neighbouring group or through other agents, shared practices ease and 
enhance interethnic transactions. In terms of economic activities, cattle, for instance, serve as 
one of the most important areas of convergence between the Kamba and the Maasai. Apart 
from being a commodity of trade, cattle symbolise wealth in both groups, determine the flow 
of labour, enhance interdependence as drought compels cattle keepers to cross into other 
territories in search of pastures, seal not only marriage contracts but also determine where 
brides may be given for marriage. What is more, they form an important commodity of 
exchange (including milk) as well as create a forum where other issues like political alliances, 
resolution of conflict, cross-ethnic land sales etc. are negotiated. Sameness is also realised 
through farming, the quest for literacy, bilingualism and loan words, shared cultural practices 
(e.g. female circumcision) adoption of a religious identity (e.g. “we are Christians”), shared 
geographical locality, harsh climatic conditions (vulnerability), membership in similar 
political parties and being members of “small tribes”. Christianity in particular provides a 
common identity that has eased intermarriages between the two groups (cf. chapter four). 
Commonalities in general may be imagined or situational. 
 
 
8.1.2   Coexistence as a complementary process 
I have used complementarity and interdependence to make sense of the wide range of social 
and economic exchanges undertaken by groups to sustain their livelihoods (cf. chapter five). 
Although I have used both concepts interchangeably, I have noted that in a strict sense, 
distinctions could be drawn with regard to the intensity of exchanges, i.e., by looking at 
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interdependence as an extreme form of complementarity (see also Barth, 1969: 18). Chapter 
five showed how complementarity underlies coexistence. Interethnic exchanges, to put it 
simply, is what keeps groups together.  
I shall briefly look at the exchanges between the Kamba and the Maasai under various 
categories: The ecological, economic and social aspects. On the ecological perspective, the 
Kamba and the Maasai occupy fairly distinct niches, specialising in different modes of 
subsistence. The Maasai pastoralists provide cattle, milk and ghee while the Kamba farmers 
supplement Maasai diet with agricultural produce (e.g. maize and legumes). These exchanges 
are carried out through barter trade, price market system or mutual aid. In addition, there are 
also loaning systems in which the Maasai loan cattle to the Kamba, while other Kamba also 
adopt certain Maasai cattle breeds.
430
 This is particularly significant in enhancing Maasai 
pride and self-esteem since they reclaim their past glory as models for the Kamba. Apart from 
these exchanges of animals, transhumance establishes strong ethnic interdependencies. During 
drought, some Maasai pastoralists move their cattle to Ukambani in search of pastures. These 
pastures are accessed through individual or collective agreements in which the Maasai can pay 
in cash or in kind (e.g. cattle). Moreover, there are also unconventional but tolerated methods 
of interdependence. For instance, the Maasai graze their animals in Ukambani at night, while 
the Kamba cut and haul wood from Maasailand for sale when the pastoralists have taken their 
animals to other areas or when it is dark. It is only when these practices are taken into 
“extremes” that they are regulated or penalised.  
Closely related to the first are the economic linkages. The exchanges here take the form of 
trade relations in which the Kamba run shops while the Maasai act as customers. This has 
more to do with the slower pace at which the Maasai have adopted the market economy. In 
addition, there are also labour exchanges through which Kamba men are engaged as cattle 
herders and farm labourers in Maasai homesteads. There are other exchanges based on 
disparities in social and economic transformation. These include housing transactions 
whereby Kamba „traditional‟ houses are adopted by the Maasai as “improved housing” and 
Kamba masons are engaged by the Maasai in the construction of brick and stone houses. I 
have also noted that facilities like schools and youth polytechnics are unevenly distributed 
between the two ethnic territorial areas. The Maasai, whose territory has fewer schools, send 
some of their children to “Kamba schools”. Moreover, there are many Kamba teachers in 
“Maasai schools”, while others work as medical personnel and veterinary officers in 
Maasailand.  
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 The Sahiwal and Boran breeds (for details, see chapter five). 
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All these forms of exchange and interdependence are embedded in the diversity of the modes 
of subsistence and in the disparity in the adoption of „modernity‟. The patterns of exchange 
also underscore how vulnerability shapes interdependence. It is an intricate system of 
complementarity, where exchanges are unequal and erratic, and where, due to uncertainties 
and common vulnerability, both groups somehow assume indispensability.  
The other forms of exchange I would like to highlight are the social ones. In coexistence 
studies, intermarriage has been singled out as a common way of forming alliances across 
ethnic or kinship groups. Weber (1922/1978) observed that in all groups, the absence of 
intermarriage would be a consequence of „racial‟ segregation. He noted that except in the rare 
situations where only endogamous children are accepted as full members of a group, most 
ethnic groups intermarry and form alliances (see also Schlee, 1997; Kurtz, 2001). The practice 
of exogamy
431
 among the Kamba and the Maasai has led to intermarriages which have been 
an effective way of building bridges across these groups. Although these intermarriages are 
erratic and unbalanced,
432
 they have been crucial in the shaping of property relations. Writing 
on the Maasai, Campbell shows how they lost some of their valuable grazing lands to 
immigrant Kikuyu and Kamba farmers whom the Maasai could not chase away since they 
were “relatives of Maasai by marriage and were thus permitted to settle in the area by custom” 
(1993: 262).
433
 In fact, Kurtz talks about “strategic marriages” that may be arranged to create 
“friends” out of “enemies” and therefore reduce the potential for conflict (see also Triulzi, 
1996). As noted in the study, it is important to highlight here that although taking wives or 
giving daughters in marriage across ethnicities might not be deliberate actions aimed at 
forging harmony, once intermarriage has taken place, the alliances created can be 
appropriated
434
 conveniently if the need arose (e.g. during food shortages). Besides, I noted in 
chapter six that exchanges act as “lubricants” which ease the rattling of the “axes”. In other 
words, exchanges serve to minimise conflict. 
 
 
8.1.3   Coexistence as an antagonistic process 
As evident in chapters three, four and six, interethnic coexistence is not just about harmony, 
interethnic exchange and interdependence, but also about competition, rivalry, hatred and 
opposing interests. In fact, I have noted in chapter two that coexistence is a process of 
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 Kamba women marry Maasai men but it is a rarity to find a Kamba man married to a Maasai woman. For 
explanations, see chapter four (4.4). 
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 When ethnic differences are instrumentalised/politicised, migrants are stripped of these rights. 
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 A church wedding in Simba (Maasailand) where a Kamba man married a Maasai woman in 1999 was cited by 
many respondents as an illustration that  “we are not enemies”. 
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blending two “antagonistic ways of life” (Korbel, 1959: vii). Indeed social life among groups 
is seen as ambiguous and conflicting (Turner, 1972; Kuper, 1993). Ethnic stereotypes 
themselves are not just markers of identity but also signify hatred and rivalry among groups. 
Interethnic coexistence is therefore not just about harmony as is sometimes argued (cf. 
Kriesberg, 1998). Coexistence is a complex process where interdependent groups oscillate 
between harmony and conflict. Despite interdependence, groups will have competing interests, 
sometimes threatening the survival of the other. In localities where environments are more 
fragile and resources scarce, such rivalries occur with heightened frequency. It has been 
shown that even groups that intermarry may still sustain conflict since they “share the 
common feature of otherness” (Schlee, 1997: 577). In fact, even in cases where different 
groups assume common identity (e.g. through Christianity), this may not mean a resolution of 
conflict. Kamba and Maasai „Christians‟, for instance, are divided along denominations which 
tend to compete with one another.  
I examined antagonism and conflict by looking at the economic, social, ethnic and political 
aspects of competition. Economically, I looked at the competition for land, water and animal 
resources. Common disputes revolve around these groups‟ most valuable resources, namely 
land and cattle. As one group expands farming space, the other laments over shrinking grazing 
grounds. I have also indicated that disputes increase depending on the level of vulnerability 
and interdependence (particularly during drought). Variations in the weather conditions 
influence the magnitude of vulnerability and therefore the propensity to „invade‟ farms or raid 
cattle, consequently heightening ethnic tensions and conflict.  
The other aspect I looked at is the unequal trading relations. Although Kamba‟s running of 
businesses in Maasailand serves as a form of mutual exchange, it is also a source of ethnic 
tensions. Some Maasai see this as external dominance and exploitation. As the market 
economy entrenches itself particularly among the Maasai, trading centres in their territory are 
acquiring new meanings and unprecedented significance. This has meant that non-Maasai 
groups that have hitherto controlled business enterprises are confronted with new challenges 
as the Maasai seek to assert themselves. And yet, as I have noted, the Maasai are not 
necessarily competing by venturing into business themselves, but by seeking to be involved 
(e.g. by employment) and arguing that “foreigners” have been taking advantage of them. 
Often, ethnic conflicts occur when a group oversteps the „limits‟ of tolerance/difference. 
Accommodation or acceptance can be predicated on stiff conditions and sacrifices. For 
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instance, the Kamba have to restrain themselves from challenging Maasai political 
authority.
435
 
Politically, I have shown how the Kamba have to yield to Maasai authority in Maasailand in 
order to win acceptance.
436
 This was partly achieved through coercion whereby Maasai 
political elite, as allies in Moi regime‟s attempt to suppress “big tribes”, demanded that 
farming groups in their territory should “respect” the “hosts”. So as the Kamba dominated 
businesses, the Maasai retained political power (as chiefs, councillors etc.) This is what I have 
called „co-dominance‟, where each group dominates a given niche. Although this is not 
devoid of tensions and struggles, making concessions and recognising each group‟s 
contribution allows some semblance of equilibrium. Apart from this, the state authorities 
antagonise groups in other ways. As a controller and distributor of resources, the state 
enhances ethnic tensions as it allocates these resources disproportionately across ethnic 
territorial areas. The state‟s control of large tracks of land through its wildlife, forest and 
agricultural research departments brings itself on a collision course with groups that encroach 
on these lands. “State land”, as I indicated in chapter six, became an arena of conflict. 
Although pastoralism and farming ordinarily complement each other, this proved difficult 
where there were no mutually agreed ethnic territorial boundaries. Worse still, shifts in 
political patronage saw the state evict both groups. More details on how the state destabilises 
ethnic groups are provided in the last section on “external” influences. Still on the political 
aspects, I examined ethnic territories, and noted that although the imposed political boundary 
has assumed permanence, it is constantly being negotiated and often triggers conflict, 
depending on the interests at stake (e.g. location of amenities) or simply when the boundary is 
instrumentalised as a way of seeking concessions from one group.  
In the race for social transformation and catching-up, ethnic tensions are aroused as groups 
compete for allocation of national resources. Besides, the Maasai have sought special cultural 
and property rights. The Maasai have not just sought for ethnic recognition, but also to be 
recognised as an “indigenous group”. This campaign has been met with resistance, not least 
from non-Maasai groups whose livelihoods and land user rights in Maasailand are threatened.  
The complementarity between the Kamba and the Maasai on the one hand and the 
antagonistic relations on the other hand, shows the complexity of coexistence where mutual 
exchanges take place between „enemies‟. The Kamba-Maasai relationship does not 
necessarily follow the time and space pattern where “good neighbours” of today become 
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 Other conditions that were set by Maasai ethnic mobilisers included asking migrant groups living in their 
territory to support only the ruling party. 
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 And as result, secure their livelihood. 
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“strangers” tomorrow (Hahn, 2000: 11). While this conception is empirically and theoretically 
plausible, the Kamba and the Maasai display a complex mix where the “good neighbours” are 
also “strangers”; where your Maasai in-laws may not necessarily be your friends and where, 
in some cases, (e.g. Mwende‟s case in chapter four), cross-ethnic transactions are denied or 
trivialised. So that if there is anything that has assumed permanence in Kamba-Maasai 
relationship, it is the frequency with which harmony alternates with disharmony and ethnic 
rivalry. The labelling of strangers is a complex process (see Simmel, 1958, Schutz, 1964 and 
Hahn, 2000). Simmel, for instance, argued that those who are close to us may be strangers 
while those who are far are not perceived as such (1958: 509). 
 
8.1.4   Coexistence as a game of compromise 
In as much as interethnic coexistence is antagonistic and conflictual, I have also argued that it 
involves compromises. This is where differences between contending parties are settled by 
mutual concession. Compromises constitute what can be called „the price of interethnic 
coexistence‟. These comprise a wide range of actions which take the form of concessions or 
sacrifices made to avert conflict between groups. It is a negotiation process through which 
diverse and clashing interests coalesce in a give-and-take relationship. Made after an 
explosive conflict or when one is imminent, compromises are usually reached after actors 
have evaluated what they stand to lose or gain. Where a group lives in „foreign‟ territory, 
where its presence fuels ethnic tensions, it may make concessions as it seeks acceptance and 
accommodation, or as demanded by those providing it. Such concessions may be collectively 
undertaken (where representatives from both parties enter into negotiations) or may take the 
form of individual initiatives (e.g. between a landowner and a tenant). As I have shown in 
chapter six, disputes may revolve around issues that are external to both groups. A case in 
point is the contested boundary between Ukambani and Maasailand, in which, “for the sake of 
peace”, the groups mutually agreed to recognise the validity of the imposed (artificial) 
boundary.
437
 This particular case showed that it might be easier to make compromises if the 
affected parties mutually regard the cause of the dispute as external to them, i.e., if none of the 
contending parties can be apportioned blame.  
However, while compromises ease ethnic tensions and enhance interethnic harmony, they are 
complex negotiation processes. And because they involve sacrifices and partial surrender of a 
group‟s position, compromises are difficult to reach. They may involve transfer of land 
resources, accommodating migrant groups, granting access rights to watering and grazing 
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areas and sharing trading space. The group making these concessions therefore, may have to 
swallow its pride. But on the other hand, granting another group concessions can be used by 
the actors to enhance their pride. For instance, I have indicated that the Maasai view the 
concessions they make as evidence of how considerate, friendly and accommodative they are. 
Compromises therefore may take the form of “favours”, where, a concession given is not 
regarded as a right by the group making the sacrifice. An example would be the “theft” case in 
Simba trading centre (chapter four), where the Kamba agreed to compensate the Maasai to 
quell tensions, although the Kamba regarded the “theft” allegation as fabricated. I also 
mentioned the gesture of allowing Maasai herders to graze in Ukambani “for free” during 
drought, as well as lowering for them the price of cereals, which they need to supplement their 
diet. This also means that the level of vulnerability influences groups‟ readiness to make 
concessions and enhance interethnic understanding and harmony.  
Most importantly, concession making processes are shaped by power differentials among 
groups. I have made a distinction between scenarios where subordinated groups negotiate 
with those that control the instruments of state power, and other situations where none of the 
groups has an outright monopoly on state power (e.g. the Kamba and the Maasai). Examples 
cited where one group dominates state power include the whites-Aborigines case in Australia 
(Banton, 1983) and the Israelis-Palestinians case in Israel (Torstrick, 2000). Similar examples 
in Africa include Somalia (Abdullahi, 1998), the Sudan and Ivory Coast.
438
  
The Kamba-Maasai experience shows that concessions between groups may emerge not 
merely as gestures aimed at better harmony but out of a group‟s inability or weakness to 
compete effectively. The concessions therefore may actually turn out to be disadvantageous to 
the “foreigners”. This is illustrated by the case in Simba and Sultan Hamud trading centres 
where the Maasai rented out their business premises to the Kamba not because they were 
accommodative or sought to improve harmony, but rather because the Maasai themselves 
failed to make profits. Besides, by allowing the Kamba to run these businesses, the Maasai 
escaped the burden of their kin who borrowed goods on credit and often failed to pay for them. 
But as this incident showed, a compromise can also be a burden to the beneficiaries. The 
Kamba who rented these premises had to make additional sacrifices to win acceptance and to 
run their businesses smoothly. I noted that some had to sell goods to Maasai customers on 
credit without any guarantees, and sometimes to people they could not trace later.
439
 But as I 
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 Where, in February 2003, a power sharing deal brokered by France between government and rebel groups 
collapsed. In the agreement, the President was to cede some of his powers to be transferred to a new post of 
prime minister. Those backing the President rejected the deal. 
439
 These costs are treated by the Maasai as a “compensation” for their generosity in allowing “foreigners” to live 
and do business among them. 
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noted (chapter five), these concessions have limits, i.e. there are “extremes” that both groups 
regard as intolerable. One of the reasons why compromises constitute an important aspect of 
coexistence is because coexistence has limits and can fail. 
I have also used Villarreal‟s (1994) ideas regarding how “subordinated” groups yield to wield 
power and secure their livelihoods. Closely related to this is the need for ethnic recognition 
and ethnic pride. For instance, I have indicated in chapter six that the Kamba living in Maasai 
territory choose not to challenge Maasai authority in the villages and trading centres so as not 
to be perceived as a threat. In addition, the Maasai occasionally demand that they must be 
accorded anganyet (“respect”) as “hosts” of migrant groups. Moreover, the Kamba who 
“excel” in Maasailand are often forced to conceal their success to avoid being conspicuous. 
Strategies adopted include resisting the temptation to build stone or brick houses in the midst 
of Maasai huts and making sure that they do not dress “too well”.440 However, I have also 
argued that groups may avoid conflict by engaging in “competitive coexistence”, where 
diverse interests are pursued without recourse to ethnic tensions or armed conflict.  
It is also important to note that the state has a role to play in the making of concessions. I have 
cited cases where local state officials (e.g. police and chiefs) act as arbitrators in settling of 
differences between groups. I have argued that state intervention is usually more successful if 
its officials adopt the local ways of resolving disputes. I made reference to an incident where 
Kamba-Maasai conflicts were resolved not by enforcing the state law, but by ignoring it. This 
is where the Maasai were allowed to get away with the “theft” of cattle by treating it as a 
“traditional raid” and therefore safeguarding their honour. Instead of taking the raiders to 
court, the Maasai were asked to compensate the Kamba. Although the police and chiefs are 
expected to enforce the law of the land, they have learnt that enhancement of interethnic 
harmony is more important. This particular case corresponds to Weber‟s argument that groups, 
even when “mutually repulsive” may coexist in harmony if they allow each other to consider 
their own honour and prestige as the highest.
441
 The groups do not need to be “equals” but 
rather exercise mutual respect and recognise each other‟s ways of life. 
 
8.1.5   Coexistence and „common territory‟ 
The theme of „common territory‟ runs through the thesis. This is partly because it is the 
sharing of territory that enables groups to interact, stereotype each other, engage in social and 
economic exchanges and also become rivals. Although physical locality has been challenged 
as an attribute of ethnicity (Jenkins, 1997), there is little doubt that sharing of territorial space 
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 This is besides the urge to conceal possessions and success out of  fear of being bewitched (see chapter five). 
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 Horowitz (1985: 24), quoting Weber (1958: 189). 
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provides the arena in which interethnic coexistence becomes possible. As I indicated in 
chapter two, geographical contiguity is seen to be particularly significant in shaping the way 
ethnic groups are constituted and how they interact with others (Du Toit, 1978; Roosens, 1989; 
Cottam and Cottam, 2000). While discussing “ecologic interdependence”, Barth (1969: 19), 
shows that groups may monopolise separate territories but their proximity to one another 
creates a basis for complementarity and interdependence.  
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, „common territory‟ can also clarify what appears 
to be both an empirical as well as a conceptual question, namely the distinction between 
„relations‟ and „coexistence‟. My argument is that the distinction lies in the intensity of 
exchanges between groups, which in turn has implications on territorial proximity. Whereas 
groups that „relate‟ may not necessarily share territory, „coexistence‟, which implies that 
groups are either complementary or interdependent, suggests co-residence. For some groups 
like the Kamba and the Maasai, distance assumes special importance since some of their 
commodities of exchange like milk, meat, green maize and vegetables are perishable, and yet 
they have no storage facilities. This is compounded not only by the hot tropical climate but 
also the limited means of modern transport (e.g. buses or lorries). These limitations confine 
trade and exchange to a given geographical area. As I noted earlier, advances in technology 
like air transport and the internet make it possible for groups (or countries) to „coexist‟ 
irrespective of the physical distance between them. 
I have noted that in spite of the fact that the Kamba and the Maasai have separate ethnic 
territories, the boundary between them has remained porous, making it possible for both 
groups to pursue collective as well as individual goals. As I noted in chapter seven, both 
groups used to be in one “province” before and shortly after Kenya‟s independence. Putting 
the groups in different provinces later hardly altered the interdependence between them. 
Besides, I have also noted that despite restrictions in terms of movement within administrative 
units, the groups ignore political borders, often forcing state administrators to conform to the 
local practices. Common territory therefore has to be determined by the everyday practices of 
actors and not by the political boundaries imposed by the state. As I noted in chapter six, the 
concept of common territory challenges Furnivall‟s notion of groups that live “side by side, 
but separately, within the same political unit” (1948: 304). Furnivall‟s position depicts 
common territory as an inadequate criterion for coexistence. 
I have stressed, particularly in chapter six, that common territory is also used to explain the 
inevitability of conflict. While explaining how the Kamba and the Maasai legitimise conflicts, 
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I cited an emic metaphor: “Axes in one basket will make noise”.442 As I clarified, the “axes” 
are the Kamba and the Maasai while “one basket” represents “common territory”. The point is 
that although groups will often be associated with hatred, suspicion, mistrust, enmity and 
wrangles, they still „coexist‟ (depend on each other) mainly because they share a common 
territory and resources. The bonds of coexistence will be particularly difficult to break if the 
groups occupy different ecological/economic niches in their shared territory.  
 
8.1.6    Coexistence as an externally shaped process 
Interethnic coexistence does not occur in a vacuum. It is a relationship that is not only shaped 
by the state but other groups as well. The state, as the organisation bestowed with authority, is 
indeed a “regulator” of ethnic groups (Pierson, 1996). The idea therefore was to show that in 
none nation-states, where nationhood is still on course, the stability of the state itself and 
within ethnic groups is a reflexive process. This is why it is a matter of conjecture as to 
whether the state should be considered as „external‟ to the groups that constitute it.  
Using Kenya as an example, chapters six and seven in particular demonstrated how a system 
of government within a state can destabilise ethnic groups on the one hand, and enhance 
interethnic coexistence on the other. In general, state-formation in Africa has been directly 
linked to ethnic conflict (Wimmer, 1997b). One of the complications in the continent has to 
do with the fact that due to limited private capital, the state is considered a key resource that 
provides jobs, medical facilities, electricity and builds roads and schools. The ethnicisation of 
the resource distribution process, and the resultant tilting of the balance of power, is what 
often destabilises interethnic coexistence, and consequently the state. In chapter six, for 
instance, I discussed how the involvement of Kenya‟s state officials and parliamentary 
representatives in the accessibility and use of land and water resources enhanced rivalry and 
enmity between the Kamba and the Maasai. Besides, the inequitable distribution of national 
resources has produced glaring disparities between the two groups. These disparities in social 
transformation have partly contributed to a situation where one group regards itself as 
“modern” while the other is seen as “backward”.  
Another important aspect I considered is party politics. In a multiethnic society, where loyalty 
to the ethnic group or clan takes precedence over the state, the multiparty politics of the 
1990‟s introduced an additional element of difference among ethnic groups. However, the 
problem was not the mere adoption of a multiparty constitution but the politicisation of 
ethnicity. As I have indicated, the ruling party then, KANU, had been running a one-party 
                                                          
442
 See chapter six (6.5). 
 298 
 
 
 
government since 1964. Scared to lose power, the KANU regime saw the instrumentalisation 
of ethnicity as a convenient strategy to break up ethnic alliances opposed to it. The events of 
the 1990‟s tested the viability of the Kenyan state, as this remains one of the most 
destabilising phases in Kenya‟s history. The clamour for multipartysm was portrayed as 
rivalry between “small tribes” and “big tribes”, with the ruling clique claiming that the 
crusade was merely aimed at wresting power from the Kalenjin and other “small tribes”.443 To 
derail the process, ethnic clashes were instigated, in which migrant groups residing in the Rift 
Valley were violently evicted and others killed. Besides, the ruling elite proposed to introduce 
a majimbo (federal) government, in which, residence in a jimbo (district/county) would be on 
the basis of ethnicity.  
I showed that although the Kamba and the Maasai were appendages in the Moi government, 
debates regarding “small tribes” and “big tribes” as well as regarding majimbo, among others, 
saw both groups taking different positions. I noted that even after the party won the flawed 
1992 elections, it pursued an exclusionist policy, where groups backing opposition parties 
were treated as anti-government and discriminated against in the allocation of national 
resources. The KANU government, which was bundled out of power by a broad ethnic 
alliance in 2002, demonstrated what “tribal spokesmen”444, “ethnic entrepreneurs” (Crawford, 
1998) or “political entrepreneurs” (Elwert, 2002), can do in the pretext of protecting ethnic 
interests. Through their manipulations, ethnic groups that had coexisted peacefully were 
turned into rivals. But as I have argued, those who instigated groups to take up arms against 
each other or to evict their neighbours were often resisted by the groups through their local 
leadership (e.g. chiefs). It is such cross-ethnic capacity to resist and repel external pressure 
that largely saved the Kenyan state. Indeed, irrespective of the state‟s influence, Davies (1987) 
emphasises that groups‟ have a potential and interest to coexist. 
As I have argued, the Kenyan state occupies rather an ambivalent role, combining divide-and-
rule tactics with national integration. The divisive colonial policies, where districts were 
drawn along ethnic lines and cross-district migration restricted, and some groups demonised, 
led to a situation where, by the time of independence in 1963, ethnic groups were less 
cohesive compared to the precolonial era. The post-independence state reinforced these 
differences and disparities for its own survival. But I have also argued that Kenya has been 
one of the most stable states in Africa. Regarding the ethnic districts, for instance, I have 
argued that although they were designed to serve as divide-and-rule mechanisms, and to 
undermine the basis for a cohesive society, they have also provided groups with their own 
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spaces in which they can exercise their autonomy and address regional issues. I have also 
noted that although district boundaries are politically significant, they do not inhibit 
interethnic interactions and exchanges. 
Many state instabilities in Africa have resulted from exclusion and marginalisation of some 
ethnic groups from power (see Eller, 1999; Wimmer, 1997b; Abdullahi, 1998 etc.). I have 
argued that one of the reasons Kenya remained politically stable is because both Kenyatta and 
Moi regimes formed fairly inclusive governments. Although there were always “kitchen 
cabinets” (the inner circle), including what Kenyans call “eaters” (usually members from the 
President‟s ethnic group), there were also “co-eaters” (members co-opted from other 
groups).
445
 These strategies minimised the possibility of marginalisation and rebellion. This 
practice, partly served to avert competition for state power and secessionist tendencies 
witnessed elsewhere in the African continent. Besides, not only would the “co-eaters” be 
changed depending on shifts in ethnic alliances, the governments, particularly Moi‟s, created 
the impression that the presidency would rotate along ethnic lines. As groups waited for their 
“turn”, this pre-empted ethnic power struggles.446 It was in this sense that I borrowed Pontin‟s 
(1982) concepts: “Diversity in dominance” and “dominance ring”, i.e., where groups 
dominate certain niches in turns, a practice, which, he notes, enhances the peaceful 
coexistence of species.  
Apart from the notion of “eating in turns”, I have also discussed the issue of ethnic numbers 
and dominance. I have noted that Kenya does not have a numerically dominant ethnic 
group.
447
 Moreover, it has not been possible to unite groups under wider linguistic categories, 
e.g., as Bantu. This creates a situation where ethnic groups have to form loose alliances to 
capture and maintain political power. This is why in pre- and post-independent Kenya, it has 
always been possible to form ethnic alliances across Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic groups. 
Although the alliances shift, this interdependence, as I indicated, has contributed immensely 
to Kenya‟s relative stability.   
Another aspect discussed was political consciousness. When discussing the politics of ethnic 
numbers, I noted that although the manipulation of ethnic numerical strengths during censuses 
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 I cited, for example, the 1992 and 1997 elections where President Moi used the vice-presidency to woo ethnic 
support. During the campaigns, Moi promised to appoint members of various ethnic groups, particularly the 
Luhya, the Kamba and the Kisii as his successor. After the elections however, those who had been groomed for 
the position were appointed ministers instead. 
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 Although the Kikuyu are the most populous ethnic group, they constitute only about 20% of the Kenyan 
population. This is particularly why Kikuyu presidential candidates, running without broader ethnic alliances, 
could not win the presidency in the 1992 and 1997 elections.  Mr Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, won the 2002 
presidential elections after leading a coalition that brought together the Kikuyu, the Luo, the Luhya, the Kamba 
and the Maasai among other groups. 
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was evident, the affected groups did not confront the state authorities. This illustrates, in my 
view, not only the apathy and indifference of the people to the state, but also a low level of 
political consciousness. In this case, political stability results not from what ethnic groups do 
but what they fail to do. I have indicated that this seemingly limited level of political 
consciousness is closely linked to the state‟s policies and directives which nipped in the bud 
initiatives to strengthen civil society and to sensitise communities on their civic rights 
(through civic education). 
 
8.2   Conclusion 
This study was intended to make a contribution in the understanding of interethnic 
coexistence. It has shown that this is a multifaceted concept. By using the Kamba and the 
Maasai as examples, it has been demonstrated that despite hostility and antagonism, ethnic 
groups can be complementary and interdependent. It has been shown that groups with 
linguistic, historical and cultural differences can live together in harmony. Due to proximity, 
vulnerability and scarcity of resources, ethnic differences will not inhibit interaction and 
forms of exchange which sustain the groups‟ livelihoods. However, the study has also stressed 
that interacting ethnic groups have a “passion for difference”, and will strive to maintain 
ethnic boundaries. It has been shown that even in intensive interactions, cultural/ethnic 
differences do not lose significance. However, I have argued that distinctiveness is the basis 
for coexistence.  
The study has also demonstrated that complementarity and interdependence relationships are 
possible especially where groups share a common territory. This territory may have ethnic 
territorial boundaries which may be enforced by state authorities, but actors‟ everyday 
practices show that such boundaries remain porous and blurred. The study has also shown that 
complementarity will particularly be enhanced if groups occupy different ecological niches or 
specialise in different modes of subsistence. But, it is also the sharing of territory that brings 
groups into a collision course. Although coexistence is often seen as synonymous with 
harmony, I have adopted an approach that treats conflict as an integral part of this relationship. 
It has been noted that in spite of complementarity and interdependence, ethnic groups will 
also be antagonistic and conflictual as they compete for the same resources and ethnic 
supremacy. Nevertheless, the study has also shown that through compromises and 
concessions, groups have their own ways of resolving and averting conflicts. It can be argued 
that while differences, conflict and antagonisms are inevitable in interethnic relationships, it is 
shared territory, compromises and complementarity that keep groups together. 
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I have also argued that groups do not coexist in a vacuum; they are shaped by the state and 
other groups as well. The political leadership within the state can enhance ethnic difference, 
disparities in social transformation and conflict through politics of patronage and clientelism 
and in its attempt to foil broader ethnic alliances that might challenge its grip on power. The 
state, through its departments, officials and political elite, permeates the whole process of 
interethnic interaction. Political leaders influence how ethnic differences are defined as well 
as whether they are instrumentalised; they are often responsible for sowing seeds of ethnic 
hatred and conflict. On the other hand, the groups can also resist the machinations of the 
political elite.  
On the question of state stability, I have argued that it is a multifaceted process, produced 
through a combination of ethnic autonomy and ethnic recognition on the one hand, and the 
flexibility of the state authorities to allow wider cross-ethnic networks on the other. State 
stability can also be produced by the lack of a dominant ethnic group or a cohesive alliance 
that could monopolise power. In the Kenyan case, this has forced the political elite to seek 
broader but loose ethnic alliances. Besides, having “co-eaters” among “eaters”, and a situation 
where group members not included in government wait for their “turn”, creates a situation 
which pre-empts rebellion.  
In a nutshell, I have argued that „interethnic coexistence‟ should be seen as a complex mix of 
ethnic distinction, complementarity, common territory, antagonism, compromises and as an 
externally shaped process.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AMREF……………African Medical Research Foundation 
CMC……………….Central Management Committee 
DC............................District Commissioner 
DO............................District Officer 
DP……………….....Democratic Party of Kenya 
FORD……………....Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
GEMA……………..Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association 
IMF………………...International Monetary Fund 
KANU……………...Kenya African National Union 
KADU………………Kenya African Democratic Union 
KAMATUSA……….Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu 
KARI………………..Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
Ksh………………….Kenya shilling 
KWS………………..Kenya Wildlife Service 
OCPD.......................Officer Commanding Police Division 
NARC………….......National Rainbow Coalition 
NDP………………..National Development Party 
SDP………………..Social Democratic Party 
 
 
 
Glossary 
 
Akavi:  Kamba name for “the Maasai”. They also call the Maasai Muumasai (singular).  
Anganyet: “Respect” in the Maa language. 
“Eaters”: A metaphor in the Kenyan political sphere used in reference to those seen as 
disproportionately benefiting from the government (usually members of an ethnic group).   
Enkang:  Maasai homestead/kraal. 
Iloong‟u: Written as long‟u. It is the Maa word for something that stinks. The metaphor is 
used by the Maasai to refer to the Kamba. 
Ilmeek: Maasai name for those who till the soil/cultivators like the Kamba. 
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Imanyat/Manyata: The camps where the Maasai murran stay. 
Majimbo: A federal system of government where a jimbo (county) is an ethnic enclave.   
Mau Mau: The African revolt against the British colonial rule in Kenya. 
Muthokoi: A Kamba dish prepared by mixing white maize whose husks has been removed 
(using a mortar and pestel) with legumes. The maize prepared for this dish, which is a 
common commodity of trade, is also referred as such. 
Murran: Initiated Maasai young men after the rite of circumcision. It is one of the most 
important age-sets among the Maasai. As warriors, they are „traditionally‟ charged with the 
responsibility of protecting the group.  
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